

NATIONS INTELLECTUAL HISTORY PROJECT
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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF

THOMAS G. WEISS

BY

LOUIS EMMERIJ

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LOUIS EMMERIJ: This is Louis Emmerij interviewing Thomas G. Weiss at The Graduate Center on the fifth floor. We have come to the end of the road of the oral history component, but what a road it has been! This is the seventy-sixth and last—one can never be sure—interview in the project. Now Tom, you have done the bulk of the interviews. We have a well-established structure and a well-established sequence of questions, and I will obey that structure and that sequence. So the first question, of course, is, “Can you tell us something about your early years, where you came from, your parents, your uncles and aunts, your city of birth, the primary and secondary schools, et cetera?”

THOMAS G. WEISS: I guess it actually is fun to be at the end of the line. It is hard to believe that we started seven years ago and here we are. I was born in the first year of the baby boom, February 1946, on the 26th, shortly after my dad came back from being in the army, although he didn’t see any combat because his eyes were too bad. I was born into a very Catholic family in Detroit, the Motor City. We’ll come to that later. My mother is a simple woman—warm, baked goods for my sweet tooth, took very good care of me. My father was a fair but stern, serious, and strict man who finished high school when he was fifteen—very early, a very bright guy, but he never was able to go beyond that. He managed to do a little college on the sly while he was working but basically should have gone on and been a teacher. But he had to support his three younger brothers because his father was working for something called the St. Vincent de Paul Society, a charitable organization that didn’t pay very much.

So I was the oldest child of three, although I had an older brother who died before me when he was only a few months old. I spent my first years in a house in the inner city of Detroit with my grandmother. Then we moved to our own, very small house in what would have been not quite the northern suburbs, but the “northern frontier” of the City of Detroit, at Seven Mile

Road and Southfield, which at that time was a white Catholic ghetto. It is now a black Baptist ghetto. But at the time it was filled with mainly hard-working people with either blue collars or a few middle-class ones with white-collars. My dad initially was a kind of a clerk in a business. He eventually worked his way up and became what I suppose would have been called a “middle manager.” That was the area I grew up in.

I went to a Catholic school and was inculcated with all of those values by the good Dominican sisters. The most important of these nuns was Sister Joseph Cecile. I could never figure out why all of these nuns had men’s names, but I suppose there is an explanation in some postmodern textbook. But anyway, she really liked me. She thought that I was wasting my time in this small parish school, and she insisted that I leave. She contacted my parents and said that I should take the exam for what was the Jesuit prep school about ten miles away, which at the time was probably the most competitive Catholic boys’ school in the city. We only had boys’ schools and girls’ schools in those days.

So I went to the University of Detroit Jesuit High School, where I did the usual Latin-Scientific program. But that was a very, very critical period because the Jesuits taught me to work hard and respect education—if not intellectual life. We were a very disciplined lot, and I always did well in school, and always played a lot of athletics—I was the usual captain of the football team and part of the American success story, I suppose. My parents sacrificed to send me to this place. And I got a very good training. So should I stop there?

LE: That Jesuit school was a school for gifted youngsters?

TGW: No. My daughters can hardly believe this, because when they went to school the Quakers tried to hide who was really good and who was not. The Jesuits had admissions standards and were not bashful about making clear distinctions. When you had your photo

taken, you were in front of a cardboard placard with Class 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, and so on. Most of the athletes were in class 1H. I happened to be in 1B—there was always a dispute whether 1A or 1B was better: 1A took Greek, 1B took science. But these were the top, I suppose, fifty of the 300 boys who were in this class. We were pushed hard.

LE: Was this a private school? You had to pay tuition?

TGW: It was a private school. We had tuition, right.

LE: That's why your parents—

TGW: Had to sacrifice, exactly.

LE: Now Sister Joseph Cecile, she discovered you in a sense.

TGW: Yes.

LE: She insisted with your parents that they should send you to that auspicious school. Why?

TGW: Why? I don't know. I guess she just looked out and saw that I could do whatever she was assigning very quickly. She asked me to sort of run the school. So I sold sweet rolls instead of going to class because I had nothing to do in class. She also felt that I had some kind of leadership qualities. It is a little hard to remember back that far, but she basically picked me out. In addition to getting me statues of saints to put into my shorts for basketball championships—to make sure that the good Lord was on our side—she also took an interest in my future.

LE: Well, you were lucky that there was a Sister Joseph Cecile.

TGW: Yes. In fact, this year I went back to a reunion of the local school. There was a high school where most kids I went to grade school with continued on. It was called Benedictine High School. They had a reunion in late 2004, and I suggested that they invite along the grade

schoolers, because I was about the only person who didn't go from St. Scholastica School to Benedictine. So they said yes. It really would have been quite a different fork in the road had I stayed there. Virtually every single other person who went on to that school—with a couple of exceptions—are still basically anchored in Detroit, basically went on to one of the state colleges, became a lawyer or businessman in Detroit. Very few managed to get beyond that very cloistered context.

LE: Thanks to Sister Joseph Cecile you escaped to the wider world. Now you said your father was in the war, although not at the front lines. Where was he?

TGW: He was actually in Michigan at first, then posted to Wisconsin, Illinois, Wisconsin, and finally to St. Louis, Missouri. His eyes were very bad, so he was assigned to typing duties. My parents got married right in the midst of the war, in September 1943. I actually found out recently that the statistical definition of the baby boom is 1946 to 1964. So I was born in 1946 and I graduated from high school in 1964, so my first eighteen years were part of that unusual period.

LE: So there were no real war stories when you were kids.

TGW: No, there really were none. My father's youngest brother saw combat in Korea. So the first time I really became aware of the consequences of war was then. My grandmother was always speaking about him and showing his picture and saying, "I hope he gets back soon. You have to pray for him." But I had no direct experience with stories from the Second World War.

LE: And no stories about the Great Depression?

TGW: The stories—the best story—was of my mother and her sister. Because my grandfather, whom I actually never met because he left the family—he was an alcoholic—but

my mother and aunt often tell stories of going over to Canada during Prohibition and sitting in the back seat of the car and shoving alcohol into their dresses to smuggle across the border from Ontario back into Detroit. So that was one way the family managed. The other big story was that, in fact, the house in which I grew up for the first three years belonged to my grandmother. Fortunately, the federal government picked up a lot of mortgages in 1929 and they didn't lose the house. So it was that kind of story. Be thankful for what you have.

While they never told many stories, we never wasted a scrap of food. Everyone was very, very frugal. My parents insisted on my earning my keep—I actually started working on a paper route when I was ten. I never had an allowance, and if I wanted to spend any money I had to earn it. In fact, there was once an article in a local newspaper about me when I was twelve, because I took out a loan from a bank to buy a pool table. I had to make payments every month on my pool table from this. So I was the youngest borrower from the credit union.

LE: Look, that's the influence of the Great Depression. Also in my country, you eat everything that's on the table. You don't eat too much, but you finish everything. You hand in the money you make when you start working. You hand it in to your parents, or in my case my mother.

Now tell me, high school—was that eventful? Was anything happening there during these six years?

TGW: Four years. It was the University of Detroit High School. I mainly remember working very hard. I played three sports. I played football, basketball, and baseball. I always had a job, and I always had several hours of homework. So I think the most eventful part of that was I became very well-organized. I really had to parcel my day up into sections because otherwise I would have never been able to keep my head above water at school.

The other thing that was really quite important was my relationship with several Jesuits—I remember one scholastic in particular, Bill Dodd, who eventually left the order and married. The best relationships happened to be with the scholastics, the ones who hadn't quite made it through thirteen years of training, but who spent literally hours with us—in athletics, in counseling, in taking us on trips. These people were dedicated idealists in one way or another. Actually, a couple of them went on to become missionaries, but even the ones who stayed around were clearly devoted to the values that we were learning in this school.

I also learned to type! In my interview with Margaret [Joan Anstee], she said, “Never learn to type.” But the Jesuits insisted that I go to a class. We started school at 7:45, and I had to go to a typing class at 7:00 until I could actually type sixty words a minute on a manual typewriter, which I can tell you is very fast. So that is one skill that I learned that has stayed with me thereafter. I may be the best typist on the fifth floor.

I learned to become a kind of a leader, because I was head of student government and of the athletic teams and was seen as somebody you could count on. So I think early on I was pushed in that direction.

LE: So you had a pretty exclusive kind of education there.

TGW: Very.

LE: All this thanks to Sister Joseph Cecile. Now, did somebody push you to go to Harvard for your undergrad work?

TGW: No. My parents made quite clear that they had sacrificed to put me through high school, and so there was no question I had to do better than everybody else or they would have pulled me off the athletic teams. But they also made it clear that there was very little disposable

income around and therefore, what I really should do was make sure I got a scholarship or a fellowship or something.

I was not directionless. I just knew very little other than that I wanted to go to college. I also knew I wanted to escape Detroit. For some reason, I had an intuition. I left St. Scholastica's for the University of Detroit High, and then I thought that there must also be something beyond that. So I applied for the military academies, which at the time were the easiest way to get a free education. You had to be very physically fit. You had to pass physical and mental exams, and you had to persuade either a congressman or a senator to give you a nomination. So I early on contacted them, and because I could knock people over playing football and I clearly wasn't stupid, they were quite keen on me. So it turned out that I could have gone to West Point, Annapolis, or the Air Force Academy. Since nobody in my family really knew anything about other colleges, I sort of simply followed that route initially.

I was a reasonably good football player—not Big 10 material, but not bad. As the colleges in the United States that had reasonable athletic teams but wanted somebody who could actually be admitted and not flunk out, basically the Ivy League schools began to contact me. The first one was the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. They flew me out and it was my first airplane ride. I went to Philadelphia and proceeded to get very drunk with the fraternity parties and thought this was terrific.

Pretty soon, a whole series of the other Ivy League schools—Cornell, Princeton, Columbia, and Brown—all contacted me. As I said, I only applied to the places that contacted me. Then, after the applications were closed—in fact, it was only one week before the acceptance announcements came out, because the applications closed on the 1st of January. On the 15th of April, all of the schools sent out their papers at the same time.

During the first week of April, as I recall—I used to hitchhike to school to save money by not taking buses—a friend at the time, Bill Major, was being interviewed by Harvard, because there is an alumni interview as part of the application process. So after the interview, I was waiting to go home with him. The interviewer came out and said, “Who are you?” I said, “Tom Weiss.” He said, “Where are you going to school?” I said, “I don’t know, but I think I’m going to Princeton or maybe Brown.” By that time, I really wanted a non-military option.” He said, “Why didn’t you think of Harvard?”

Quite straightforwardly, it wasn’t arrogance, I just said, “Harvard didn’t contact me, why would I go there?” He took one look at me and said, “Listen kid, I want to talk with you.” So he then sat me down and said, “Hmm, why don’t you apply?” I said, “Well, OK.” So he broke all the rules, gave me the application, and pulled strings. He was the head person for the State of Michigan.

One week later, there was a spring vacation, and he had invited some students over to his house who were home for the week. He invited me and I met three or four people who were absolutely scintillating, really interesting. I sometimes do things very reflectively, and I sometimes do things impulsively. This was totally impulse. It obviously turned out to be a good impulse. The Ivy League has this system in which they all give you the same amount of money. So I basically got into all of these places. People who had asked me and paid a lot of attention to me at the other colleges of course were irritated, but I just decided at the last minute to go to Harvard. And that was that.

LE: You must have been a kind of wonder boy. You only applied yourself, out of your own initiative, to the military academies. Were you accepted, by the way, by these military academies?

TGW: Yes.

LE: By all three?

TGW: By all three.

LE: Then you tell them to go somewhere. Was that normal that the Ivy League universities would contact you, or was it because you were a special, gifted person in high school?

TGW: They wanted to compete, and so the coaches—not the academic people but the athletic coaches—were interested in getting people to apply, because otherwise they would have been shortchanged and at a disadvantage in the athletic competition. So it was the football coach at all of these various places who came to see me. It had little to do with academics, although I was not stupid, except they knew that I could get in and that I could also play football. So it was the football coaches who came out. They couldn't actually promise you anything, but since they thought there was a good chance I would get in, they spent time with me and wanted me to come.

I think about my own daughters, going through books and talking to all kinds of people, saying, "I want to go here, there, and elsewhere." Mine was really quite a fortuitous set of circumstances. I feel genuinely lucky.

LE: It was amazing. It's absolutely amazing, but marvelous. So you dropped everybody else and went to Harvard.

TGW: That's right.

LE: Did they give you a scholarship?

TGW: Yes.

LE: So why did you have to work in the smelting factory in Detroit again? You wanted to leave Detroit, and you went back and worked in the smelting factory.

TGW: That's right. At that time, an equation was worked out. Your parents submitted their tax forms and a committee decided how much money you would get. It was the same at all of these places. But there was also a requirement to contribute some money from your own pocket. The way to do that was either to work during the school year or during the summer. So the easiest thing to do in Detroit was to get a job in a factory, because workers went on vacation and they needed to replace them. It also paid extremely well. In those days, I was making \$7 an hour—in 1964.

LE: That's amazing. That's \$70 today.

TGW: Exactly. So I made enough money in the summer to last the year, and my parents then had to pay nothing. I worked seven days a week. I worked from midnight until eight in the morning because it paid double time. I made a pile of money, which then allowed me to not quite keep up with my classmates who had a lot more money, but at least be able to buy some clothes and some books and some beers on occasion.

LE: And take a girl out—

TGW: From time to time, that's right.

LE: Now tell me. I was told by my informants that you also spent a summer in a Jesuit seminary. There was a time when you apparently wanted to—you were so impressed by the Jesuits that you wanted to become one yourself. Now you didn't, did you?

TGW: No, no. As I mentioned, I was incredibly Catholic and in a fairly unquestioning fashion. Everybody I knew was Catholic and went to Catholic schools. But several of the people I really respected—including Sister Joseph Cecile, and then a whole series of

Jesuits—really were impressive, genuine, unselfish, and dedicated individuals. My freshman year at Harvard was a kind of smorgasbord of distractions that I had never had before, including all kinds of roommates with lots of money, cars, and women, drink. While I had a very good time and did reasonably well, I somehow felt that something was missing. I was troubled because I was unfocused, really.

So the most sensible thing to me—or what I temporarily thought was the most sensible thing—was to become a Jesuit, which was basically the Marine Corps of the Catholic Church. I thought about it and I thought about it, and I couldn't get the idea out of my head. So the only thing I thought I could do was try. So I tried.

My dear wife would point out that I lost the faith there in the novitiate, which I think is the case. I finally began thinking through all kinds of issues. As a follower of Ignatius, you start out with a thirty-day retreat. You don't talk to anybody for thirty days. You read, write, think. And at the end of this period, I thought, one, I miss women; two, I miss beer; three, I really don't want to spend my life doing this. But at that point, in good conscience, I thought, "There are other ways to save my soul and save the planet, than being in the Jesuits. This just ain't for me."

This was a very important period because I got that notion out of my head. I actually calmed down a lot, in the sense that I began thinking about what's really important. It's not that I disliked partying with my friends, but I became much more reasonable and moderate in what I was doing and when I went back to Harvard, I was able to take a little more advantage of what Harvard had to offer.

LE: Now apparently, you met Priscilla during the Harvard period. Was it before you went to the seminary or after?

TGW: After I returned to Harvard in 1966, January or February, or whenever the semester started, for my sophomore year. Actually, I was going out with someone that spring, a woman I was very fond of. But that summer, when I ended up in Detroit working my usual seven days a week, there was a Harvard-organized party. I had to go to work at midnight. I arrived and I didn't have a date because I was going to the factory a couple of hours after the party started. I wanted to say hello to some friends.

Priscilla actually was the date of someone who got rip-roaring drunk and passed out. With this, I was able to chat with her. She seemed totally charming. That's literally how I met her. So, a few days later, I called her up and we had our first date.

LE: You were in your working clothes to go to the smelting factory, and she was all dressed up to go to a party. It's an interesting way to meet. That was in Detroit?

TGW: It was in Detroit. I must not have been too memorable, however, as she had forgotten my name, but her mother rescued her by coming to the door and introducing herself and then telling Priscilla the name of the person she would be going out with. It turns out that later she ended up being the girl next door, because my parents then moved literally across the street from her parents, but the following year, a year after we'd met.

LE: It was practically love at first sight.

TGW: Yes, I think so. There was, as in all relations, friction afterwards, but we both were somewhat smitten.

LE: It was the first and only one. You did not divorce and remarry?

TGW: No.

LE: Now tell me, you were at Harvard during an interesting and turbulent period—1964 to 1968. There was Vietnam. Did anything of that affect you and the campus?

TGW: Well, it certainly affected the campus and it certainly had a huge impact on me. I still remember Robert McNamara coming to give a speech. He describes this in his book, *In Retrospect*. It was a turning point in his life because he said, “I couldn’t believe that I looked out and there were all of these clearly bright young people who were so hostile and thought everything I was involved in was wrong.” I myself began thinking seriously about the war, and I decided that I actually couldn’t, in good conscience, participate in it. There were three solutions at that point. You could either leave the country, or you could get a deferment, or you could become a conscientious objector (CO).

The only thing I was sure of was that I didn’t want to go into the armed forces, certainly not in Vietnam. I didn’t really want to leave the country. So I thought, “What I really need to do is get a deferment.” At that time, there was—it may have been the second or third year—a [John F.] Kennedy program called Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), which was a domestic Peace Corps. I hadn’t ever been overseas, so this seemed more like the kind of service I should do. So I applied to VISTA during my senior year. I had not heard from them, so it was a little tenuous because I graduated in June of 1968. I had put in this application and was waiting to hear from them. My draft status was 1A, which meant that I would be the first to be called up.

I went home to Detroit, waiting to get into VISTA. At this point, after four years at the factory, they decided to make me a management trainee at Lincoln-Mercury. They offered me a very good job. I took it because I figured I might as well earn some money. What the hell, I wasn’t doing anything. I ended up being a kind of special assistant to the vice president in charge of—I don’t even remember now, but anyway, something or other, probably marketing.

My poor father had spent his entire life and would have done anything to have the job I was just sort of handed. I worked for the man who was a stereotypical, or maybe not

stereotypical, but in my mind stereotypical, executive: crass. Anyway, I was going out with Priscilla, and she was actually at NYU studying Arabic that summer. Every two or three weekends, I would leave on a Friday and try to fly out to New York—there were cheap flights on a stand-by basis—for two days or three days. She was taking intensive Arabic ten hours a day, so she couldn't really move. One Friday, the vice-president of Lincoln-Mercury calls up and says he wants to see me. I have all of these flunkies around me, a lot of people about my father's age who were in their forties or mid-fifties, and there is a call from the top. They could all hear me when I said, "That is very nice indeed, but I have to catch an airplane at 3:00."

Again, this really wasn't arrogance. It was just the way I felt. I knew I wasn't going to stay, and it was more important for me to get to see my girlfriend than to BS with a pompous executive. Moreover, he made the worst possible sales pitch for me. He brings out pictures of his house on Corfu. He tried to say that if I stayed with Lincoln-Mercury, I could have such a house. The crowning part of his sales pitch was that he showed me his cufflinks, which had some sort of gold Lincoln-Mercury. I said, "Sir, I am very grateful for your doing this, but this really doesn't interest me in the least."

LE: So you went into VISTA.

TGW: I went into VISTA. My father at this point was about ready to shoot me. Looking back, I was quite clear about what I wanted to do. I probably didn't articulate it to him very well. We didn't communicate that well. We communicate better now, but at the time I was the son who had gone off and done all of these things. I had this big opportunity—or what my dad would have thought as a super opportunity—but wanted no part of it. Instead of going into the army or going to the University of Michigan-Law School, I went to work at the youth reformatory at Riker's Island in New York City. For him, this made absolutely no sense.

LE: I think that is quite normal. You had come already so far beyond what he or your mother had ever obtained. That created miscomprehensions and problems. VISTA was the equivalent of the Peace Corps within the United States of America and you spent a year there?

TGW: That's right.

LE: It was because you wanted a deferment from military service?

TGW: And I wanted to think about what I was going to do next, yes.

LE: Now, I have a couple of short questions that jump the chronological order. As you know, I am interested in breaks in education and recurrent education. I have noted that you had two breaks in your educational career. One was after the Harvard B.A., when you went into VISTA. The second one, longer—two years—was from 1971 to 1973, after your Master's at Princeton.

The question was, and you started answering that already when we were talking about VISTA, were these deliberate breaks? You wanted to reflect on what you wanted to do further, or was it coincidence, military service, deferment? What was it?

TGW: Actually the first, going into VISTA, was forced upon me. Had it not been for the Vietnam War, I quite probably would have just gone to graduate school. It seems existentially absurd, but had it not been for the war, I probably would have gone to business school or law school. In fact, I had applied at some point and had a place at the University of Michigan Law School. The war forced me to say, "Wait a minute. I don't think I want to go to law school. Why am I going to law school? I certainly don't want to go into the military, and I've got to figure out what is more or less important." So that particular break was imposed on me, but after it was imposed on me, it became a blessing. During that period, first of all, I met some different kinds of other people who were involved in social change. I was able to work with governments.

The idea that you could do anything at Riker's Island was very unrealistic. My task was to take a kid released from Riker's and plop him into the South Bronx and get him a job as a painter's apprentice. To think that this was going to solve all the world's problems—you suddenly realized that things were a little more complex than that.

Second of all, if I was going to get anything done, I had to figure out how to operate within the Department of Corrections bureaucracy, which was part of the City of New York bureaucracy, which was part of the State of New York bureaucracy, which was linked to the federal government bureaucracy. So in some ways, learning to maneuver, learning how on occasion to handle the press—because we had to learn how to do a proposal to get some money to get something done—all of those things happened during that year.

I also decided that, rather than going to law school or business school, what I really wanted to do was go into public service. So that was a very important year in my decision-making. During that year, I decided, "Listen, I am either going to leave the country, or I am going to go to a school of public policy, and we will see what happens."

The policy for deferments switched during the course of the year. They were no longer automatic. I had already applied to graduate school, and I said, "To hell with this. They will either come and get me or not." I applied to both Harvard and Princeton schools of public policy, because I thought what I really wanted to do was basically look at U.S. domestic problems. I gained admittance.

I had also been thinking through what I really felt in terms of kind of spiritual thoughts about the war. At that time, I decided to apply to be a conscientious objector. I actually then ended up getting the status of conscientious objector, somewhat disingenuously, because the law said that you had to be a conscientious objector to all wars at all times, which I wasn't. I was a

selective conscientious objector. But the woman on my draft board who handled the paperwork said not to worry about that—or my earlier appointments to military academies or playing football or taking free courses in Naval Science to finish college on time. She was against the war. So this woman gave me advice. I said, “Listen, I am either leaving the country or I am going to get this. I am happy to do alternative service, but I am not going into the army.” So she basically put my case forward and I was classified as a “CO.” In the midst of this, the president instituted the lottery system.

LE: This is [Richard] Nixon by now.

TGW: Yes. He instituted a lottery system to get all of these kids off his back, I guess, and to make conscription fairer. So I received my conscientious objector status. I was going to finish the two years at Princeton, and then I was going to do my two years of alternative service. But then the president, in all of his wisdom, institutes a lottery system, which means what you are, you are called up to be a conscientious objector or a soldier, but the numbers go from one to 366. I still remember—this will be forever ingrained in my memory—the night of the drawing. I went off with my friend, Charles Beitz, to go drink. We had several beers, as was our custom. We came back around 10:30 or 11:00 to watch the end of the lottery, somebody pulling numbers out of a jar on national TV. I walked into this room which was just a kind of a morgue, because everybody had a brother or a husband or a boyfriend who was subject to the draft.

I walked in and said, “Does anybody know what February 26th was?” Of course, no one had anything in mind except the birth dates of friends or their own. “We don’t know. We never heard that.” Just at that moment, the TV announcer said, “Number 366,” because they had to do leap years. It was my birthday! Everybody looked at me as if it was just absurd, because I

already had a way out—something I wanted to do—and in addition, I got number 366. So I went out and had another beer at that point.

The next time through, when I did leave graduate school, I thought I really had to do some work and get some practical experience. I wasn't sure I wanted to do a dissertation. So I decided to work, and that experience was actually an important part of the eventual decision to go back and write my dissertation. I consciously decided I didn't want to continue just studying, I wanted to work. First, I went to work for a peace organization and then I went overseas.

LE: Now hold on a minute. You say that during those two years between your M.P.A. and your Ph.D. work, between 1971 and 1973, you had to work? You did not work. You did a training period in the ILO (International Labour Organization) for a month. Then you went home and then you pursued some various studies at the *Institut de Hautes Études Internationales* in Geneva, with Priscilla, who was then I suppose your wife or your fiancé. Where did the money come from?

TGW: I was always working. I got a fellowship to go to Geneva. I worked for the World Law Fund, which became the Institute for World Order, in, what was it, 1972/1973? I had saved some money from the Lincoln-Mercury days. I had had a full fellowship at Princeton, worked during the summers there, made money at UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research) and the ILO. So I had money in the bank.

LE: I want to press you a little bit. From 1972 to 1973, you worked briefly with the Institute for World Order, which has changed its name 25,000 times. In 1972, the ILO paid you a little bit, I suppose. Moscow is a mystery. You will explain that. Then in 1971/1972, both you and Priscilla took graduate courses. Who paid for this? You only raised so much money and—

TGW: Well, I had saved money in Detroit. I had saved money at Lincoln-Mercury. Since Princeton was giving me a full fellowship, we had put some money aside. Geneva gave us money as well, and that seemed like a nice way to learn another language—I had studied German and Latin, but I really wanted to learn French. That helped us do that, too. But we came back broke. Then I went to work for a year.

LE: Tell me now, the second brief question which jumps a little bit up and down, you spent a month in the ILO five months before I came on the scene. You were there August 1970. I came on the 2nd of January 1971. If I remember correctly, you were at the International Institute of Labor Studies. Was that still [Bob] Cox? He was on his way out by then?

TGW: He may have been on his way out, but I worked for him.

LE: When I came there, I saw him walking out practically. So that's how you knew him?

TGW: That's how I knew Bob Cox, yes. It was a very wonderful summer. We have to go back. That was between my first and second year of the Master's program. During my first semester of the first year of my Master's program, I became exposed to things international. I had gone to Princeton thinking I was going to work on U.S. domestic issues. I was exposed the first semester. I just decided to take a course on international relations issues and a course on international economics. I thought, "Gosh, this is interesting stuff." Again another change. That spring—that is, the second semester—I thought, "Maybe I should do international things."

I got a work study at what was called the World Law Fund, helping to organize a conference on U.S.-Soviet relations. I thought, "This is fascinating." Because Princeton was Princeton, with plenty of money coming in, they provided money during the summer for me to do whatever I wanted to do. There was a two-months—or something like that—research

assistantship at the ILO at the Institute for Labor Studies. Princeton provided an airline ticket and expenses. So I said, “Gee, I am going to find out.” So that was my first exposure to international institutions, and it was at that point I had decided I am now going to do international relations, as opposed to what was called U.S. public policy.

LE: Now in spite of Cox, why was that experience somewhat frustrating for you, as you later say in your dissertation?

TGW: My only international experience had been in this small NGO (non-governmental organization) in New York, which subsequently became the Institute for World Order. But there were two or three people who had good ideas, a small staff who put together a grant, got a major conference under way. Here I was with no experience, and they gave me plenty of responsibility that allowed me to do things. Then I get dropped in Geneva. Here I am, ready and quite able to do something. But I find myself in a mausoleum-like building along the lake. Nobody seemed to know where I was or what I did. No one cared. I kept trying to say, “Can I do something?” Nobody was around. Everybody was asleep. Cox was living in his own world. So he said, “Why don’t you do this?”

I went off and did my own research project, but it seemed to me that, as a bureaucracy, it really was very, very wasteful. I thought to myself, “Why are international taxpayers financing this?” The people I had met—Cox was full of ideas, but he didn’t spend much time with me. So I mainly ended up having a wonderful summer. I did a lot of research which ended up in my dissertation. But as a professional experience, I thought, “My God, I don’t want to ever do this.”

LE: Do you remember anybody else in the ILO during this short period you were there, or it’s all shadows now?

TGW: It really is all shadows. The one thing I do remember was that, to fast-forward, when my first daughter was born, the Institute for Labor Studies, the villa, was turned into a crèche. My daughter's crib was in Cox's office. So I had come full circle. Ten years later, I show up, and she's in Cox's office in her crib.

LE: I suppose you had time to wander through this wonderful park along the lake, and that's how you discovered the *Institut* and that's how you found a place to study?

TGW: Many of the things that I do—maybe we all do—we kind of stumble into them. I decided that I really thought I was now going to do international relations. I realized that I knew very little about languages and other cultures. So I thought, some day I am going to come back and do further studies. That was a place that seemed to me possible, because in fact they worked in English and French. You could speak whatever language, and you had to understand the other one. So I thought it was doable for me with a little effort. I could go back there.

LE: The director there was still Jacques Freymond?

TGW: Yes, it was Freymond.

LE: So the second break in your educational career—the internship and then between the M.P.A. and the start of your Ph.D. program—was basically because you wanted to get out and you wanted to work. At the same time, it shifted—which again is a kind of blessing in disguise—it shifted your attention from national problems to international problems. That's about it. We'll come back to all this, of course. But the third question I had is whether the tripartite structure of the ILO struck you as something interesting?

TGW: Yes, the tripartite structure struck me as interesting, but I didn't know enough about other international institutions at that point to see how unusual it was. Subsequently, the idea that there were non-state voices in intergovernmental institutions struck me as something

quite fascinating. But I learned that after the fact, when I wasn't any longer living in that bureaucracy.

LE: You were quite critical about international organizations. This was reflected in what you had to say in your Ph.D. thesis. But as soon as you had finished your Ph.D. thesis, then you go off to Geneva? What are you, a masochist? You spent ten years at UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development). How do you explain that?

TGW: One should never say "never." Also, making recommendations to governments and institutions is a lot easier than making recommendations to oneself. Actually, the move to Geneva was, I think, basically opportunistic. When I finished my Ph.D., the brakes had already been put on recruitment in U.S. universities. Therefore, people were no longer retiring. There was a freeze on all kinds of recruitment. There was the 1973 energy crisis and on and on and on. When I came on the job market, the first problem was that I finished my dissertation in the spring of 1974 after that year's crop had been finished. So I took a job at UNITAR for a year. My intention was then to apply for university jobs while I had this research position at UNITAR. I applied, but there were only a handful of jobs in the entire United States in international relations. I think I applied for four or five. Anyway, I ended up getting two of them, but both of them were at places where I really did not want to be—one was at Buffalo, New York and one was at Tempe, Arizona. Both were state universities. Both were tenure track jobs, but I wasn't sure I wanted to go to upstate New York or to Tempe, Arizona.

I would have done it, because that's what I thought I wanted to do. But while I was doing my research at UNITAR—I was always interested in the behavior or misbehavior of institutions—I was working on what turned out to be the first wave of conferences in the 1970s. I became quite interested in the UN World Food Conference, which was tied into the oil-price

hikes. So I was given a grant to go ahead and do a joint book with the director of research, who actually did not do much of the research. In fact, he did none of it. But he gave me a year to do what I wanted. I went off to Rome to spend three months in the fall of 1973. The conference was in 1974, and that's when I was writing the book. But during that time, I was meeting all kinds of people. I thought, "Hmm, I can go to Buffalo, or I can go to Tempe, Arizona, or maybe I should take a year and do something else."

It turned out that, through coffees, or dinners, or sitting next to people, I ended up applying for a job at OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), one at the WFP (World Food Programme) and one at UNCTAD. In those days, there was not the sort of need to publicize jobs and jump through hoops. If you were the right person at the right time—or the wrong person at the right time—with the correct sponsorship from the right people, you got a job. So to make a long story short, I was offered three jobs—one in Paris, one in Geneva, and one in Douala. I thought, "Well, I don't think we—because Priscilla was part of the decision—want to go to Doualla," although I suppose that would have been interesting. But I looked at the Paris job and the Geneva job. I was quite comfortable with Geneva because I had been there a couple of times. I met many people including Jack Stone, who is sort of in a category of one. They offered me a job to do some things that I had never done for a year. So I said, "Well, one more time, what the hell?" I will go on leave from the university. I had never been to the university, but they said, "OK, you can go on leave for one year." Actually, it was eleven months, because the UN couldn't provide a contract for a year. If they had done that, they would have had to go through the official procedures. So they hired me for eleven months.

I actually had such a good time. I was paid more money than I was worth and travelled a lot to parts of the world I had never been. So for me, it was quite easy to give up a tenure track

job in Buffalo, New York. No, I think it was the one in Tempe. I actually can't remember. Anyhow, I went to work at UNCTAD, and that was actually for ten years.

LE: Now tell me, this is an in-between question. At Harvard, on the insistence apparently of your father, you had an economics major.

TGW: Yes, I thought that would persuade him that I was modestly practical.

LE: But then in your graduate work, both the M.P.A. and your thesis, you switched to political science/international relations. Were the OECD and UNCTAD so impressed with the universities—Harvard and Princeton—that they didn't really look to see if you were an economist or something else? Because at the UNCTAD, you were a senior economic affairs officer, no?

TGW: As I recall, and maybe I'm wrong, there were probably a couple of lawyers, and there may also have been people hired without any degrees, I don't really know. But I believe I was really the only Ph.D. in political science amongst anybody I knew at UNCTAD in those days. On one of my first missions, the team leader [Igor Karmiloff] was furious. He said, "What the hell are you coming along for? You know nothing," which was pretty much the case. But I learned fairly quickly. I also could write better and more quickly than any of these people.

For the kind of stuff we were doing, frankly, it was back-of-the-envelope economics. It was not very sophisticated in least-developed countries (LDCs). But my guess is the proposition that I was hired because I was somewhat articulate, and they needed a "bonne à tout faire."

LE: I agree. I think anybody can learn economics in less than two years. You don't have to go through six years. The final little quick question that jumps over the chronology is that I have been looking somewhat carefully at your publications record, which is formidable. My God! But two things struck me. One was that there was a slow start until about 1989/1990,

and then there is literally an explosion both in terms of books and in terms of articles. That was one. The second thing is that when I looked at all these books—thirty or so I counted, but I may have lost count—many were with co-authors or co-editors, Can you explain that explosion and why you apparently preferred to work in a family?

TGW: I always enjoyed writing, although I had no particular training. In fact, when I went to Princeton, I felt quite uneasy. I took a writing course the first few weeks that I was at Princeton, an extra course. I think it may have been one of the best things I ever did, because the person who taught this course really tore apart two or three pages of an assignment. I learned more in that six weeks course than I had in probably the rest of my education in terms of how to make an argument, how to construct a paper.

So I then wrote my dissertation. I wrote a book at UNITAR, supposedly co-authored with the director of research, who actually did not write anything. So maybe you could call that a single authored work along with five or six other of my books. Once I got to UNCTAD, I really felt that I needed to continue writing and doing some research, otherwise I would not be able to go back to a university. I always thought I would go back to a university.

Fortunately, during those UNCTAD days, Jan Pronk was the deputy. You were supposed to get permission to write. When I asked him, he said, “That’s a crock of shit. You write whatever you want.” He thus gave me blank permission to publish what I wrote before I wrote anything. He said, “Whatever you write is fine with me.” So he signed off in advance.

I was involved in an area then that was new—least-developed countries. I thought I could make a contribution by looking at the negotiations process, which no one else seemed to be interested in. I managed to set aside a time to write. Then when I left UNCTAD and went to the International Peace Academy and then to Brown, I was moving into areas where I had not

worked before. I guess I am a bit of an intellectual dilettante after all. I am interested in new things. All of the new subjects actually required knowledge—maybe not required, but it certainly benefited from collaboration with people who knew much more. So I wrote a book on peacekeeping with a soldier, Richard Norton, from West Point.

All of these collaborative relationships, I found, were really important. What came out was better, I thought, than what either of us could have done separately. Each of us could have written the thing, but it ended up being better because we were a team. In terms of edited volumes on certain topics, I actually think that if you carefully construct the volume—if you say, “OK, we need to do the following eight or ten things. Who are the best thirty people on these topics?”—you can actually get people to write on them. If you force people into a similar framework, an edited volume—even if most people say edited volumes are not worth much—I actually think an edited volume can add enormously to knowledge.

So I have been fairly cavalier, I guess, in thinking about the professional consequences of working closely with other people. I enjoy working with others and putting a book together, even though when I talk to students I try to tell them they have to publish things on their own. I am not afraid of writing things on my own, as you know. However, I respond well to collaboration. I learn more than when doing things on my own. I have no talent as a natural scientist, but I would have preferred their collaborative style to that of more solitary social scientists.

LE: I agree with that, particularly on the edited volumes. You have to work very hard to get it into a coherent framework, but then it may be better than what any of these individuals could have done by themselves. Also working as a group is a rewarding experience for everybody. It is permanent education.

Now we have found what explains the co-authorship. But this explosion—you were forty-four years old in 1990. You were over forty when the explosion started. Can you account for that, or was this just that it took some time to really get going and then you were running at full speed? Was that it? Was it Brown University where you were a research professor?

TGW: It was helpful not to have too many distractions. I was basically supposed to be writing. But in addition, after I left UNCTAD and when I moved back to the IPA, and then again when I moved to Brown for a couple of the things on which I was working, I was really in on, let's say, the ground floor. I had an original idea or at least bits and pieces of an original idea. The first one at the IPA was what the evaporation of U.S./Soviet tensions and disputes would mean for Third World conflict management. I began working on that, which ended up being quite important by the end of the 1980s.

In the middle of that period, I also thought that there was never going to be a “peace dividend.” What I thought might happen, however, was that one could use military force to pursue humanitarian or human values. I began working on that in 1986 or 1987 following a mission to Cyprus and Lebanon. That put me on the ground floor of both peacekeeping and then the use of military force for humanitarian purposes. So once I began spinning that out, people asked me to do things. In the midst of that, the other phenomenon that became quite apparent to me was the growing importance of non-state actors. Working with all of these NGOs and seeing what I thought was their comparative advantage and how they came together with the UN system led to a third part of my research, namely NGOs and private voices.

LE: So the explanation is you found your track at the end of the 1980s, and once you found it, that was it. You became known and you were asked to do things. That's clear. Now we go back to the chronological order. I just wanted to ask you these questions and I did not

want to lose them as we were going through the chronology. A final question about your Princeton period as a Ph.D. student, that was two or three years there—1973 to 1974. Were there any mentors or professors or other people who had an influence on you?

TGW: Absolutely. I was very, very fortunate in going to the right place for me—I could have gone to Harvard.

LE: Why did you go to Princeton?

TGW: Princeton gave me more money. I also thought, “Wait a minute, I know too many people in Cambridge who went there and are still working in a restaurant because they don’t think they can live outside the zip code 02138.” They become mired there. The money I thought about, but I actually think that my visceral reaction was, “Listen, you have got to go there. It is after all not a bad place.” Princeton was much smaller, much more intimate, and faculty members are around a lot more than at Harvard and are much more approachable. Particularly for graduate students it is really quite extraordinary, which is why I was quite pleased thirty-five years later when my daughter, Hannah, chose to pursue her Ph.D. there.

So of the people who were really most important to me, let me start with Leon Gordenker, who now is a dear friend, but who began as my thesis director. But I first met him teaching international organization. He struck me, and he still strikes me, as somebody who was terribly down to earth, totally unpretentious, a very wise man who started out as a journalist in Detroit working at *The Free Press* covering domestic issues. So we had a number of things in common. The second person, Richard Ullman, came to Princeton more or less when I did. He had actually been at Harvard when I was there, but I had not known him. He was in the Department of Defense. He came to Princeton and taught U.S. foreign policy and took a real

interest in me and Priscilla, because Priscilla by this time had moved to Princeton and was also a student of his.

LE: Who followed whom? You followed Priscilla?

TGW: Sort of. I will come to that story in a minute. Dick is terribly kind and intervened on several occasions in terms of jobs and grants and what have you. A third person was Edward Morse. In that crazy way that very prestigious institutions do not allow assistant professors to become associate professors—they always throw them out—when he didn't get extended at Princeton, he went to the private sector. But he was also very important because he was not that much older than I was, but was already in a faculty position. He was full of beans and took a real interest in my writing. The final person was Richard Falk, who taught international law. He had a unique organizational style, and so he was not part of my thesis committee. But he had big ideas about world order and international society and international law and organization.

So those four were all really important. All four remain friends. Gordenker and Ullman, in particular, are dear friends.

LE: So you were lucky enough to have had two, or three, or four people who stood out and—

TGW: And who took an interest in me.

LE: Sister Joseph Cecile is still there?

TGW: Yes, she's still here, undoubtedly looking down from heaven.

LE: Can we move now to your Ph.D. thesis?

TGW: You don't want to get Priscilla into this story?

LE: Yes, I'm sorry.

TGW: Remember, she was studying Arabic. She was quite interested in that part of the world somehow. She had been an exchange student in Egypt in 1965, which was before there were many exchange students anywhere. She went to Princeton because they had lots of language studies but because they hadn't enough students, particularly in exotic languages, they allowed visitors to come for their junior years. So Priscilla, who had been at Smith, wanted to do something different. She went to Princeton for her junior year. Princeton then decided that it was time to move into the twentieth century and started admitting women. Because she was there, they permitted her and ten other women who were on the exchange program for critical languages to stay and be the first women graduates of Princeton in 1970.

So she happened to be at Princeton when I applied to go to Princeton, but she was there as a visitor. I made the decision before she actually knew she could stay. But it worked out quite nicely.

LE: When did you get married?

TGW: In May 1975, just before leaving for Geneva. The UN is not very open about thinking people should be given an airline ticket unless they are married. While we had been together for quite some time, the UN job precipitated what was a very wise decision. My daughters are scandalized, but we ended up doing the right thing after a "training period" of nine years.

LE: That is often the case. Alright, the Ph.D. thesis. That was mainly on international organizations, right?

TGW: Yes.

LE: And based on your experience in ILO and UNITAR, right?

TGW: Yes.

LE: And it was quite critical. I will quote you. You conclude that “international secretariats,”—at least in 1975, I would add—“are counterproductive to the welfare goals they were created to pursue.” Now can you quickly surmise whether you still believe this. At the time you wrote this, can you remember—it’s a long time ago—the arguments, the reasons? Also, did you give some remedies, some solutions?

TGW: Well, what I was actually intrigued by was the notion that you could organize a group of people on the basis of international or global—or at least something beyond state—interests. That’s the theory of the international civil service. So I became fascinated with the juxtaposition of what was supposed to be the principles or the theory of how you put this thing together, and then what I saw as the day-to-day reality. There were people who were not pulling their weight. Some of this may have been overly weighted by being in Geneva and spending so much time in Geneva because it seemed to me that the local culture in which an institution is located really contributed a lot to the flavor of an organization and to productivity. But I for one just found far too many people who were not pulling their weight. Their service had nothing to do with the welfare of the people for whom they were supposedly working. It had everything to do with UN perks—education grants, home leave, retirement.

So being a young man who didn’t have need for education grants, and home leave, and God knows what else, it seemed to me that the whole system had gone wild in terms of personnel and administration being more important than service. Then I began studying bureaucracy, and obviously federal bureaucracies are not all that different, and corporate ones have their own flavors as well. But I thought, as I always thought, that the ideology of an international institution was different and therefore the people ought to be attracted by idealism, by the chance to help. As somebody who had worked for the Quakers in terms of draft counseling, I saw

dedicated people who had volunteered. I just thought, “Boy, there is a total disparity between the way this thing is organized and is remunerated and what we are trying to do.”

The next overlay happened to be the politics of recruitment, which when I looked at it and saw what happened during the [Joseph] McCarthy period on the American side and saw what the Soviet Union was doing with its officials—basically, the notion that you were going to recruit people on the basis of some sort of independent—criteria seemed to have gone out the window. That was then subsequently complicated or exacerbated when developing countries wanted their piece of the pie. Independence and competence were set aside in favor of cronyism.

So it seemed to me that we had strayed a long way from the 1930s. So I went back and looked at the League of Nations and all the principles. The two case studies happened to relate to the ILO and UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund). It seemed to me that—I can’t ever say this too loudly, because if Richard [Jolly] hears it we will never hear the end of it—it did seem to me that UNICEF, because of the quality of people there, and because they didn’t really pay all that much attention to where people were from, the results, the way I measured them anyway, seemed better. So my solution was to get away from quotas and to emphasize, as the theory said, independence and integrity. And also to get away from permanent contracts. So those were the solutions.

I still believe that probably one could come up with a lot of different quotas other than nationality and the rigid notion of gender. I also believe that if you have permanent contracts, you are just sort of stuck with what you have. And that’s what we were stuck with.

LE: I agree. But you started out with a very limited sample. I supposed in the years—because you spent several years on that—you went back and visited, maybe UNICEF.

How did you succeed in generalizing the conclusions that initially you had gathered from a very limited experience?

TGW: The conclusions were, as I said, based on these two case studies—on technical assistance in the ILO and UNICEF, and recruitment. Much of the empirical information came from looking at U.S. and Soviet and Third World grips on the secretariat. Clearly, for most senior, as well as some very junior posts, qualifications were one of the last things that were considered. It seemed to me that there were some good people, but how they ended up in the Secretariat was never clear to me. And it seemed to me, at least when I wrote the book, that the weight of the bureaucracy was such that it made creative, interesting thinking and action virtually impossible. The biggest change in my own approach came as a result of my own ten years in the UN. I don't think it's just self-justification, but I suddenly realized that individuals can sometimes make a real difference. If you've got the right person at the right time with a small group of people, you can push out research, you can do some useful technical assistance, you can engage in normative resolution-drafting that makes a difference.

I still feel strongly that one could do a whole lot more with the people and the recruitment of people than we've done. And I do think that one should go back to those idealistic origins, rather than largely bureaucratic and political ones. In any case, I gave up a cushy position to pursue my career outside of the UN.

LE: So the strong conclusion which I read to you twice, that "international secretariats are counterproductive to the welfare goals they were created to pursue." You still think that's valid today, maybe even more so?

TGW: No. Today I'd say "are too frequently counterproductive." They could be a whole lot more productive. That's the prose of a twenty-eight-year old.

LE: Sometimes a twenty-eight year old may be clearer and closer to the truth.

TGW: I must admit to having my doubts when I show up in Geneva and go to the *Palais des Nations*, and it's 12:30. If you bomb the place you would probably kill only 10 percent of the staff, unless the bomb was in the cafeteria. It does strike me that one does not get enough from the substantial expenditures on people. It's a little different in New York, because it's politically more visible. But if you go into some of those offices, you just say, "My God, if any NGO operated this way, they would be out of business in two weeks."

LE: Tell me, do you see anything in the UN reforms of recent origin that would remedy that situation?

TGW: No. I must say that a large disappointment in the approach of the present Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was that I thought when he first came on board, as a child of the system, somebody who had run human resources, that he would have chosen to make his legacy shaping up the staff, changing the way people are evaluated, the way they are recruited, from A to Z. In fact, basically as a result of the Oil-for-Food scandal—which has been blown out of proportion, but still—the flavor that is going to be left is that he presided over a secretariat that is sloppy, mismanaged, corrupt.

In 1997 when he became Secretary-General, I actually thought, "Here is somebody who is going to go back to those origins, who understands the way things operate, who has been in the belly of the beast so long he will make a difference." But he has not chosen to do that. So the reform of last year, it seems to me that very little is going to happen, part of which can be explained by the clumsiness of the United States in trying to push various proposals.

LE: We will come back to that. But the short answer is—

TGW: No.

LE: In light of your strong conclusion as a twenty-eight-year-old, now that you will be sixty in a few day's time, you are still pessimistic about the administration.

TGW: More that way than I would have liked, yes.

LE: This is tape two. OK Tom, in 1975 the Ph.D. thesis is finished.

TGW: And I am married.

LE: Yes, you both got your plane tickets and you are back in Geneva. We have already discussed why you, in the end, decided to go back to international organizations, so we don't have to go over that again. Gamani Corea came on the scene in 1976, shortly after you had arrived yourself, and stayed during the entire period of your own stay. He brought in Jan Pronk a year or two later as one of his two deputies, which resulted in the joke that UNCTAD now had two deputies from the developing countries. Wasn't Alistair McIntyre one?

TGW: First it was Bernard Chidzero and then Alistaire McIntyre.

LE: Now we will talk about Gamani Corea in a minute, but there were some quite extraordinary personalities in UNCTAD, highly intelligent but exotic characters. Were there any of these people who struck you? Can you remember one or two names, apart from the top, who were trying to revolutionize the world?

TGW: It was a very interesting moment to be in that—or perhaps any—international secretariat, but that one at that juncture, right when we were about to institute the New International Economic Order (NIEO). We had the North-South dialogue, and for me it was a fascinating place to be, to look at North-South relations. Later, I left when I decided that I didn't want to be the “house nigger,” which was kind of what was happening to me in terms of professional promotion. I clearly had no support from the U.S. government. I was never going to have a U.S. position. Even though people liked me, it was not a place I thought I should stay

because I wasn't going to be promoted quickly enough, and lots of mediocre people would because they had the right nationality or skin color to fit a preconceived quota.

But I enjoyed the period, especially because some of my closest colleagues were really very flexible—they gave me enough rope to hang myself. I mentioned Jack Stone's being one of them. He allowed me to do my own research. He allowed me to contradict him. He liked being challenged on issues. He sent me off to the field. I spent several months a year traveling in least-developed countries. So for me, this was an incredible exposure to a variety of countries and problems. So that in and of itself was really quite worthwhile.

Of the people inside the secretariat who made the strongest impression on me, one was Pronk because he in so many ways is a no-nonsense guy. He would always end a meeting asking: "If we are going from A to B, what is the shortest path? Who is going to be responsible for getting us there?" Then he raised hell if the results were not there on time. He wasn't quite able to change UNCTAD's culture, but he made a real difference for the things he had his hands on. I was really impressed with somebody who was able to take what was a pretty unmanageable and ill-kept secretariat and get the most, or at least a lot more, from it. So I was really impressed with him and his approach. As I say, he is one of the people who persuaded me that in spite of the sclerotic bureaucracy, you can make a difference on the margins.

I remember a whole series of people in the famous Trade With Socialist Countries Division, which was a sort of "keep the socialists on the farm" part of the organization. I remember the shipping people. What I remember about shipping is that I knew nothing really about shipping, except I knew something about the role of technology in development and change. My first conversation in the shipping division was—it is a little like dealing with the [George W.] Bush administration—totally ideological. Facts didn't matter. What they wanted to

do was get rid of containers because they were going to put Africa and Asia at a disadvantage. I said, “But wait a minute here. You can’t say, ‘We don’t want containers.’ This is the death knell for these countries. What are you doing?” But their lemming-like reaction was to outlaw containers.

There were a similar group of people working on transnational corporations (TNCs). Sure you could paint them black and evil, but if you looked at any of the financial data about how much money was going anywhere, it was not by increasing aid that we were going to do anything. Another example was the transfer of technology, with Surendra Patel. The brain drain was a nonsensical notion—we were going to tax the West for taking people away from India! It seemed to me that this was not actually going to work, that maybe you ought to make India a little more attractive and then their brains would stay there. Indeed, at present, being an entrepreneur on the subcontinent is probably at least as attractive as in North America and Europe.

So there were a lot of shibboleths that came directly from the UNCTAD rhetoric. And there were a lot of really sensible things that I thought got quite buried and that we made a sort of modest difference on. The area that I worked on was least-developed countries. Over time, in terms of preferences and in terms of less tied aid, we made a modest difference, I think. There were other parts of the house—the financial division looking at how to modify what the Paris Club was doing and trying to help countries get better information so that they could actually negotiate. There were a lot of useful things that went on that made a difference.

I also, however, felt that if you had a social science faculty that was the size of UNCTAD you would be expected to produce far more. Let’s assume that you had 300 staff and half the people were general service and half were professional, and let’s assume that one-third of those

were brain dead. Still, if you had one-hundred social scientists, or let's say twenty social scientists, you would turn up a whole lot more interesting, original stuff than we ever did. I kept trying to figure out, "Why can't we turn these people loose?" Several of my colleagues were putting articles in journals, but in-house, every time we had to produce a publication, the first rule was that we called on a consultant. The staff couldn't produce anything original, which I always found pretty bizarre.

LE: Surendra Patel was—he was an extremely bright man who has written extremely interesting things in independent academic journals. But yes, I remember when I met him in my days. He was a little bit wild. His hair was a little bit wild. He was a handsome man, though.

During the entire period, you were working on LDCs?

TGW: That's right. It started out in the Research Division, and it was in a section devoted to LDCs.

LE: Jack Stone was in charge?

TGW: He was the director of the Research Division.

LE: So that unit organized the first conference in 1981?

TGW: It was in Paris at UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) headquarters.

LE: I was there, but invisible. Now, Gamani Corea. He was a minister until the end of 1977. He joined UNCTAD after that. He is a bright, interesting, experienced man. How did he work out according to your inside view?

TGW: He only relied on his closest advisors.

LE: Who were they?

TGW: At that point, it was Gerry Arsenis. Actually, Michael Zammit-Cutajar was his special assistant. Michael was a kind of a traffic cop. I think I actually shook Corea's hand only once or twice in ten years. He was totally separated from his staff. He kept in his own, internal circle. All communications went through—it was really quite a British/Asian bureaucracy, with memos only from the directors to the top floor. So while I thought that the organization obviously took a flavor from him, I don't really have any sense of what he was like to work with. Obviously, when I interviewed him, I spent many more hours with him and consumed much more of his cigar smoke during a few days in Geneva than I had in ten years.

LE: Did that have a negative impact on the way the organization was managed? Or did he really work behind the scenes through a group of people, when his ideas did infiltrate?

TGW: His ideas certainly went down and a few ideas, came up. I think Arsenis, in trade and finance, produced lots of things. It was a very loosely managed shop. Each of the divisions was pretty much on its own, except for the conferences every four years, when people came together or were trotted out for the Trade and Development Board once a year. But other than that, I basically went on my merry way, as my colleagues did, trying to run all these exploratory missions for least-developed countries and afterwards to put together some technical assistance and training related to policy and planning of the external sector.

LE: So the intellectual atmosphere in UNCTAD, as far as your period is concerned, and your view is concerned, was not—

TGW: Was not great. No, I didn't think it was very exciting. I actually began—when I said I wanted to write things, there seemed to be an open door at least with Pronk. He said, “Go ahead and do it, I don't really care.” But other people—I had some talented colleagues, like Gary Simpson, Alexander Yeats, and Ed Dommen (who had been at Yale with Richard), a whole

lot of people with a lot of talent who basically were not writing much independently. They were producing mainly routine documents. For me, I just needed to write something besides these reports, which in fact I could write before we went on mission, or a report before the conference occurred. They were so predictable. I really needed to do something slightly more imaginative—which is why I edited two books and wrote two others during the ten years that I was an international civil servant.

I always have maintained that there is much more talent and much more room for research and writing. Obviously, you can't talk about the Secretary-General's personal negotiations on some high political issue, but if you are Shashi Tharoor, you should be able to write a novel. If you are an economist working on technical issues, you certainly should be able to keep active professionally, which I think would attract better people and keep them.

I am going to tell one story, because I think it is indicative of why I feel so strongly. The year I spent at UNITAR, as I mentioned, I wrote a book on the World Food Conference. When I came, I said, "There is only one thing I want." "What's that?" "I want this book to be published commercially. I don't want it to be published in-house. However, since you need copies to give to governments, my guess is we could get it published and you could buy the paperback rights." "Brilliant idea." So I get a book contract. The book comes out. I will show you this here, I have the only copy of the paperback. UNITAR buys the book from Praeger. And since we were going to print more than 5,000 copies, we put a little UNITAR label on the front—exactly the same book and same pagination, but we can give it away and we don't have to sell it.

By the time this came out, the Group of 77 (G-77) wrote a letter saying that this book was nasty, and they sought to have me sacked and the book suppressed. I was telling the story of the conference as I saw it. They didn't dispute the facts. They just said I shouldn't write them.

Remember, there was Sayed Marei from Egypt and John Hannah from the U.S., but also a Soviet whose name now escapes me. We had to have a U.S. and a Soviet as deputy Secretaries-General of the conference. I pointed out that the Soviet had absolutely no experience in agriculture, or in food, or in anything else—unlike Marei and Hannah. In fact, he was a KGB agent, the usual stuff. The Soviet Union said I should be hanged. And the Soviet deputy-director at UNITAR literally disappeared, because he was supposed to be responsible for keeping me under control.

I said, “Wait a minute, guys. You hired me. Here’s the contract. We said we were going to publish this commercially.” To make a long story short UNITAR burned the book. Actually, after it was printed, they took it out and shredded it. I grabbed one copy. It’s the only copy that exists of this book. It must be worth a fortune!

I was then hired by UNCTAD. The Soviet and G-77 gang pursued me to Geneva, saying I had no right to write this kind of book. Fortunately, the legal advisor at UNCTAD could say, “Whoa, he was a consultant then. Now he is an international civil servant. He will behave himself now.” I just thought, “This is not the way to run a circus.”

LE: No, but that is how it was and still is. It has probably deteriorated rather than improved. Now, these were the days of the New International Economic Order—1974. You came on the scene in 1975. The whole place was still trembling with excitement. Did you, as an insider, really have the impression that UNCTAD was the champion of the NIEO, that there was no doubt in spite of certain distant forces that UNCTAD was 95 percent behind the New International Economic Order? Were there no tensions within the secretariat, no in-fights saying, “But we cannot go this far? We should exchange this or that?”

TGW: My impression was that everyone assumed this was the UNCTAD party line. And UNCTAD political correctness dictated being absolutely in favor of preferences, stopping the

brain drain, and on and on. For me, one of the problems I always had was that some of these actually, I thought, made sense empirically and spiritually. Some of them only made sense in somebody's imagination. Well, across the board, there was not a single position that diverged publicly from the New International Economic Order party line. I found that a little strange. But for me, since I was working on least-developed countries, and I really thought one needed to do more for the people on the bottom, it didn't really present any moral or intellectual problems.

I was stunned by the conferences—I remember my first UNCTAD conference in 1976 in Nairobi. I said, “My gosh, this is just one big jamboree.” I knew exactly what was going to happen. All of the documents had been prepared by the secretariat to be fed to the regional caucuses. And the secretariat basically acted as a service institution for the Group of 77. It was really quite clear. That somewhat changed later, in 1980s and 1990s, when the UNCTAD secretariat become somewhat less partisan.

By the time I left, there was a lot of disgruntlement, not so much in staff but amongst governments. Maybe I am reading too much into history, but it seemed to me, starting in the early 1980s, after Cancún, after the assertiveness of [Ronald] Reagan and [Margaret] Thatcher, basically people started backing off a little. In the conferences the debate was a little more sensible. And UNCTAD itself felt threatened, which was another explanation for why people—

LE: Sure. But the 1970s were a very special period, of course. It could be compared to the [John] Kennedy period. Everybody was enthusiastic.

TGW: I think that's right. It reminded me of a conversation with my kids. My impression of what universities are and should be is based on the 1960s. I believe that it was my younger daughter who said, “It sounded like it was more fun then. It's kind of boring now.” My

exposure to international sparks was in the 1970s, when I came on board at the UN. It was really fun. But by the time I left, it was more boring.

LE: Jan Pronk had been a minister. He had been 100 percent behind the New International Economic Order as a young minister. I hope that already by the time he came on board in the late 1970s, he was already a bit more realistic.

Now you were on the LDCs, so indeed, as you say, if ever there was a need for a new order it was for the poorest countries and the poorest people. You were probably a little bit isolated from the rest. But did you feel any tension in those days—I am now talking about the second half of the 1970s, your first five years—tension between UNCTAD on the one hand and other organizations, in particular the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund), that UNCTAD was looked upon as a kind of wild group of people? Or did you not feel that?

TGW: We were certainly perceived that way. I did a lot of field missions. And always the best sources of information were the Bank and Fund people floating around Tanzania or Burundi or what have you. Yes, they didn't mind having a drink with you, but they didn't think we were very serious.

LE: You, as an American, would people come and say, "What the hell are you doing in this organization?"

TGW: Since I have never had any contact with the U.S. government, I think people sort of wondered about that: "What are you doing here?" There were a handful of us. But I never felt particularly uncomfortable. What I felt a little uneasy about was dealing with the donors. I actually sometimes thought they had something sensible to say. But some of my colleagues—it would be this kind of *ad hominem*, "Well, he is one of them," or something. I thought it was a

little foolish, but that was a way to stop an argument in those days: “He is part of Group B, or somehow he is a spy from OECD.”

LE: Did you get the impression that some of the ideas of UNCTAD spread to other international organizations, or really nothing, or very little? I’m pushing you a little bit.

TGW: I’m honestly not sure. Certainly in terms of the area in which I was working—in least-developed, land-locked, and island developing countries—the policy pronouncement eventually found their way everywhere. I think the generalized systems of preferences (GSP) eventually found its way into Lomé and other places. On the idea of debt relief—who takes responsibility for that I’m not sure—certainly the UNCTAD voice was enunciated and listened to here, there, and elsewhere. So it does seem to me that UNCTAD was a place that hatched a lot of some loopy and some sensible ideas, and they were picked up elsewhere.

LE: Gamani Corea, of course, as he also says in his interview which you did with him, pursued the commodity agreements very much. This is an old idea, really, but some of it has remained. OK, how was life in Geneva. There you were, Priscilla, you, and your children?

TGW: They were both born there.

LE: Swiss?

TGW: My daughters have both indicated that we should have been a little more adventuresome. We lived in France, but there was no good hospital in France near us at the time. The closest one was in St. Julian, really, with the full equipment in case of any complications, and the stories about it from French neighbors were harrowing. So, had they been born in France, of course they would now have European Union (EU) citizenship, which they don’t have because they were born in Switzerland, and you have to be there for eighteen years before you can be anything. That’s too bad as it would have opened possibilities for work.

For us, however, it really was a delightful time. I can say that with great conviction. I think one of the reasons we stayed so long, ten years, was that it was so comfortable. It was such a good place to have small kids. We could get childcare fairly easily. It was relaxed. People were genuinely happy to see kids. If you go back to that period in U.S. universities, for example, women having children were supposedly selling out the cause and abandoning the revolution. So it was really, for us, a wonderful ten years. We still have our old neighbors whom we go back and see. They are very different, obviously, from friends we have here. But I'm very fond of them. We lived in Echenevex, about twenty minutes at most to the Palais.

LE: We overlapped one year, in 1975/1976. I had a ball. I thought Geneva was a marvelous place—good restaurants, the ambience was fine, an exciting period.

TGW: Absolutely. And it was centrally located. It was easy to vacation.

LE: Now, it's 1985. There you go. You finally decided to go back. Why did you go? Was it the attraction of this International Peace Academy?

TGW: Actually, I had decided two or three years before that—maybe in 1982 or 1983—that I really did not want to spend the rest of my life as an international civil servant. I kept hearing bitter older colleagues—some with talent, some without—complaining about having been passed over. Promotions were mainly political. And I didn't want to stay in Geneva forever, partially for family reasons. I thought that several kids who were the offspring of my colleagues, they seemed to be a little groundless. They were not near families. They spoke three or four languages, but really did not master their own. We really didn't see enough of the grandparents. So we actually took a conscious decision to move back to the United States.

I then had a great amount of difficulty. I could have gone to the UN in New York, but I did not want to do that. I wanted to do something different. I kept finishing second in job

searches. One was the director of Oxfam U.S. One was director of a research institute. It turns out, I think, that mainly people thought, “You have to be brain dead, spending so much time in Geneva in the secretariat.” There was a clear bias. For example, there was a vacancy at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. I remember the search committee sitting around the table. Basically, they said something like, “Anybody in his right mind could never have stayed in Geneva, never have stayed in the UN secretariat for this long.” To make a long story short, I didn’t get that job.

In 1985, I was on mission to Rwanda. It was winter in Geneva, so maybe it was January or February. I got off the plane after that terrible flight that went Geneva, Brussels, Athens, Cairo, and several others, and eventually ended up in Kigali, seventeen or eighteen hours later. We were supposed to have a meeting that afternoon. We got in at about 10 in the morning. My French colleague of course wanted to have a seven-course lunch. I said, “Philippe [Cabanius], I really can’t. I’ve got to get some exercise. I’ve just got to get some fresh air and do something.” He said, “Ah, les Amerloques.”

So I walk out of the Hotel Milles Collines—yes, the one that figures in the film, *Hotel Rwanda*—to go for a run. I get about 75 meters from the hotel and I am attacked by a dog. My leg is ripped to shreds. So fortunately, my colleague is a friend of the French ambassador, and he took me to the embassy—they had a much better health service than the UN did, they bandaged me up. He said, “I told you, you should have had lunch.” I guess on this occasion he was correct. There was a new rabies shot which you didn’t have to take in the stomach. It was an intramuscular one, and that at least was fortunate. The plane was still on the ground going back, so I just got back on the plane and went back to Geneva.

I show up at the house. Literally that evening before, Ed Morse, who was by then the chair of the board at the IPA had called about a job. When I returned the call, he said, “Listen, we have an general who can’t manage anything, can’t get any research moving. Would you consider coming in as the deputy?” I replied, “I think so.”

When I went there and met the board, it was once again an adventure. I knew nothing about peacekeeping. I had moved away from security when I was a graduate student. It was 1985. It was really quite a fascinating moment with the changes going on in the Soviet Union. So I said, “Listen, yes, I will take the job.” So I resigned from the UN, and we moved to New York. That was for me a real opportunity, because once again I could do what I wanted to do. I ran conferences I wanted to run. I raised money to do the research I wanted to do. So for me it was a total shift. Part of the explanation for so little writing, your earlier question, was also I didn’t think I knew much about what I was doing from about 1985 to 1987. I was learning that side of the UN.

LE: It was again one of those decisions. Mainly you felt that you were in a cul-de-sac, that there was no future for you in UNCTAD. You probably ended up as a P-5, which is not bad.

TGW: No, no, no, but I had so many colleagues around me who were so bitter, who were twenty years older—mid-fifties, ready to retire: “Nobody loves me. No one has ever taken me seriously.” I said I didn’t want to be one of those UN curmudgeons.

LE: So it was a negative feeling: “Ten years in a cul-de-sac, and I have to go back to my country and do something.” But was it not the positive feeling that you really wanted to stretch back to peace and security?

TGW: It was an opportunity. One of the things that attracted me was working on a new topic. It was still international relations. It was still the UN. But it was an area I hadn’t looked at

since graduate school. It was changing then, so I thought, “Why not? Give me a transition. I will be back in the United States, and then I can go from there to a university.”

LE: You spent what, four years there?

TGW: Yes.

LE: Tell me a little bit about how the place was created, and what the major activities were, and something about this strange General Indarjit Rikhye.

TGW: This organization was funded by U.S. foundations. The main individual donor and founder was Ruth Forbes Young, whose husband, Arthur Young, invented the Bell Helicopter, which is at the MOMA (Museum of Modern Art). Her father was a big trader in China. She endowed the place. It was a simple idea begun in 1970 or 1971—that it was important to get diplomats and academics out of their usual context and to think about conflict resolution in a new way. The second part of it was that on the UN’s security side, the main invention had been security, and it was important to train soldiers and diplomats in the nuts and bolts of basically traditional peacekeeping—buffers between parties and observers.

So she thought this was a very concrete thing to do. She provided a lot of money, and it got going. Rikhye had been U Thant’s military advisory, had been in the Sinai, was an Indian brigadier. Then he walked across the street. The office is in the Church Center, on the other side of First Avenue at Forty-Fourth Street. He began the organization. It got money mainly from foundations and a few governments in addition to Mrs. Young.

They did training programs and off the record discussions on crises. So when I arrived in 1985, it had been going on for fourteen or fifteen years. The training part for soldiers and diplomats in Vienna had been going on for years, but there was no particular research agenda, and there was no trace of any of their meetings. So I was hired to try to pull them together and to

try to get some publications out. So during this period, there were several books of papers and proceedings that I authored or edited anonymously.

I was attracted because it allowed me to do what I needed to do to get back to the United States. It was a new research area. I was basically spending a lot of time with people in universities who were doing research about Third World conflicts, whether it was Southern Africa, Central America, the Middle East, Asia, and with UN officials, and with diplomats from missions, mainly.

LE: It must have been quite refreshing and a relatively small institute.

TGW: Absolutely, totally the opposite of the UN. It was small and I enjoyed the change in substance as well.

LE: Was it populated by former UN officials who found it a wonderful place to do some real work? What did this general do there?

TGW: As I say, at that time the board thought they needed a Third World face on a U.S.-financed institution. Rikhye had genuine peacekeeping experience as well. He had done it himself on the ground. He had commanded UN troops. He had worked for the Secretary-General. He was a logical appointment, and, to his credit, he made it happen. But he couldn't really write quickly and was not a researcher; and he couldn't respond to donors and to foundations who wanted narrative reports and liked a publications from time to time as well. So I was brought in to make those specific activities happen.

Also, it was at that point in time that change was occurring. [Mikhail] Gorbachev was coming to power in the Soviet Union. There was new thinking. So it was a spectacular period in terms of growth in the prospects for UN management of armed conflicts.

LE: You were kind of lucky in a way, because you had contacts with the UN, of course, and with peace and security activities, universities, et cetera. That is where you developed your gifts for fundraising, I suppose, and writing to these people. In these three or four years that you were there, what were the pressing issues of the day, and what were the relations with the United Nations?

TGW: The pressing issue was that this was the beginning of the thaw between Washington and Moscow. So all of a sudden in 1987/1988, the Iran-Iraq conflict was being settled, and in short order Southern Africa, and Central America, and Afghanistan came together. The Soviet Union hadn't quite fallen apart, but it was clear that there was a new breath of fresh air, and that there were new possibilities for the U.S. It was all very exciting. For me, it allowed learning in depth about the analysis behind the conflicts, whether it was in Namibia, or in Honduras and Nicaragua and El Salvador, whether it was Afghanistan.

More importantly, it allowed me to get back to an independent research environment. Many of the papers we commissioned were from academics, independent researchers; and the interactions of secretariat officials and diplomats and academic *kibbitzers* were really productive. It was something I then wanted to continue. I didn't want to go back to abstract research, but I thought this was an interesting halfway house to bring to bear some of the things that really interested me.

I went there thinking I would stay for three years to five years. Actually, it was interesting as hell. The organization doubled in size and budget while I was there, which then represented a real problem for the general, because in fact there was one reason this was happening. And it was not because he was writing or doing anything. I remember distinctly, when we were together in Moscow to set up what would prove to be my last meeting, a call came

in from the MacArthur Foundation. We were both in the lobby. The MacArthur Foundation wanted to speak with me and not with him.

LE: That was normal.

TGW: Exactly, it was normal. But he became apoplectic. After the meeting was finished—and it was a meeting that got lots of publicity in Washington and elsewhere—the participants were enthusiastic. The Soviets were enthusiastic. We came back to the United States. I thought I was going in to be told that my pay was being doubled or something. I went in, and the chairman of the board and the general were there. He said, “You are getting a little too visible and you are writing these op-eds. You are doing this stuff.” I was sitting there and asked: “What exactly is the problem?” Then he started his spiel again. I interrupted and said something like: “You have a problem with my doing what I’m doing and getting credit for it. Is that what you’re saying?” There was more mumbo-jumbo, and I just said, “Life is too short.” I pivoted and just walked right out and resigned—or perhaps I was fired. I just thought that it made no sense to waste my time and energies in such an atmosphere of mediocrity, in a place run by someone who was so insecure and inept. Indeed, the board replaced him shortly thereafter.

LE: You resigned and then became unemployed?

TGW: Exactly. So it had been a wonderful period. IPA was a good launching pad, but it clearly was time to move on. One of the other people at the final meeting happened to have been the president of Brown University, who was standing down. He had just retired as president and starting the Watson Institute. His name was Howard Swearer, and he was succeeded by [Vartan] Gregorian.

LE: That is amazing. But what I think is really interesting—but that is my interpretation of these years—was that those were the years you found your track. That is where you decided

to really be a peace and security man in a wide context, and where the publication explosion started. Thanks to the—

TGW: International Peace Academy. That's true, absolutely.

LE: See, so this is the thing to remember. Not the general.

TGW: He must be close to dead. I've run into him at a meeting or two over the years. I've said, "Indar, let's not go through this charade."

LE: But the institute still exists and is doing well?

TGW: Absolutely. It's doing incredibly well. In fact, I'm on an advisory council for a history project they are doing. It has become much bigger, much better. The presidents who followed Rikhye—not so much Olara Otunnu, but certainly David Malone—managed to recruit really top-notch, younger scholars who have run their own research projects. They are putting out books. So they are still doing some of the same things, but during the 1990s, UN involvement in peace and security once again became really front and central in the operation. So they are going great guns.

LE: Well, the moment you walked out the Soviet Union collapsed. It was 1989, the end of the Cold War. I suppose you were—this was your field. You should have known, but you were probably as surprised as everybody else. If we pause a moment between the International Peace Academy and Brown University, how do you see that moment in history, the impact on ideas, the impact on peace and security? What is your opinion about Gorbachev?

TGW: That's right. Somewhere I think I once read that on the eve of a revolution, everyone says it's impossible, and the next day everyone says it was inevitable. Certainly the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the fall of the Berlin Wall—I'm sure some day maybe we

will find some documents in the CIA or the KGB that said this was on its way. But boy, it certainly took everyone—everyone—by surprise. I certainly am among those.

It also, as you just said, changed radically the landscape and the possibilities for the areas we care about. On multilateral cooperation on security, I think the impact was more rapidly noticeable and positive than on the development side, because certain things that had been totally beyond the pale suddenly became mainstream. I think we became a little too enamored with the possibilities for the UN and ignored some of the basic and underlying problems. But it was a very, very exciting moment.

LE: About Gorbachev, how do you see him and his legacy? Some people—I'm among them—believe that he didn't know what he was doing. He never wanted to blow up the Soviet Union, it just happened because of stupid policies. But others think the contrary. There are people who know him much better than I do, who think that yes, he did know he was running big risks.

TGW: I don't think I have any particular insight. My feeling is that it was a kind of *boule de neige*. He really needed to survive. He saw that the military expenditures and the economic decline couldn't continue. And they needed to do something. He opened up. I don't think in his wildest imagination he would have thought that four years later the Berlin Wall would fall and six years later the Soviet Union would be no more. I think he had no clue. I remember actually, during September 1987, an earlier meeting when I was in Moscow. In the old Soviet Union, the general secretary's speeches were everywhere in five or eighteen languages or something. I got into a taxicab, and there was a French and an English version of Gorbachev's speech that he was supposed to be giving in the General Assembly. He cancelled it, because—what was it? There was an earthquake or—what was going on in 1987?

LE: Probably Chernobyl.

TGW: No, Chernobyl was in 1986, but it was some kind of natural disaster, maybe in Georgia. In any case, the speech was published in *Pravda*. I read it in translation, and I thought, “Bingo! Something is afoot.” He said the Soviet Union would pay back all its peacekeeping arrears, wanted to place the UN at the center of a new foreign policy, and wanted to get the hell out of Afghanistan—it was this wild speech that was never given orally, which our friend [Vladimir] Petrovsky claims he wrote. I don’t know who really wrote it. But in any case, reading that I thought, “The agenda in New York is really going to change.” I became quite excited by that prospect. I guess you could say I was a bit prescient.

LE: Through my wife, we got quite a lot of information through the Bulgarian mafia, so to speak. I remember the day in the late 1980s, when I was very surprised to be informed that most of the Eastern European countries were walking on their last legs, as we say in Dutch. There was a real big problem going on.

Now, about Reagan and Thatcher—actually, it applies to both. It applies to Gorbachev, on the one hand, and the Reagan/Thatcher, on the other. How do you think that these three people will be viewed twenty-five years from now? Let’s do a little bit of speculation before we go back to the nitty-gritty.

TGW: My sense is that, at least in terms of these issues—not in terms of the domestic legacy, but in terms of international issues—one will look upon Reagan and Thatcher as having precipitated the end of the Soviet Union. I am not sure that it was only U.S. military spending, although that is what conservatives think. It was also western economic and technological advances. My guess is that Gorbachev was reacting to a new reality. In some ways, one has to give Reagan credit for basically presiding in a fairly dignified way over that end and not really

exacerbating what could have been a real problem. I would have to say that [George H.W.] Bush, the father, managed to handle the transition extremely well. So in terms of superpower relations and in terms of the legacy, it seems to me that those are clear. I see Margaret Thatcher—and maybe this is just part of my American arrogance—but I see her as a kind of a sidekick in this international adventure, although domestically I think she had really a very substantial impact in changing the U.K.'s welfare state.

LE: You wrote something in the mid-1980s—according to all of the reading I've done—that “States are no longer the most important actors in the international system.” I'll repeat it again: “States are no longer the most important actors in the international system.” You wrote it twenty years ago. Do you still think that today?

TGW: States are still the most important actors, but the most interesting new actors are non-states. Whereas states used to have a total monopoly on decision-making and power, there are now many other sources, and in some cases they rival states. But I would amend that statement. It's like my earlier dissertation statement, an overstatement by a youngster. I would alter it by saying that in trying to institute change in the future, I guess I have become slightly more of a Grotian than a cosmopolitan. I think that we need to strengthen intergovernmental mechanisms in law, because states, after all is said and done, are going to make decisions, make rules that allow the other players to be more or less effective. I would have to say that I was wrong then, but that the balance definitely is changing. States are still the most important players on the world stage, but the others are becoming more and more important in more and more ways.

LE: It's clear. The answer to my question, “Do you think that today?”

TGW: “No.”

LE: But there is certainly a shift taking place away from states who are still very important—maybe even the most important, that’s an open question—but there is a shift taking place away from states to a host of other nonstate actors, to big firms, NGO communities, civil society. That is what you wanted to say.

TGW: That’s what I wanted to say but didn’t say clearly enough.

LE: Alright, it is now 1989. You are unemployed. In 1990, you go to Brown University. Unless you stepped out of the door of the International Peace Academy on the 31st of December 1989.

TGW: There were six rather uncertain months. I don’t regret the impulsive decision, but I should have actually negotiated a hell of a lot better. That’s what I regret—the money—but certainly not the decision. I was able in relatively short order to do a whole lot of consulting and, in fact, was making a lot of money. But I didn’t like it. I was doing things that I didn’t always want to do. I never knew when the next assignment was coming. I also didn’t like being on the make all of the time. Every person I met, I was trying to think, “Does he need me in two months?” So I didn’t find it very comfortable or pleasant.

I needed the income. One of my daughters, I believe the younger one, had a dream. She was studying about immigration in grade school, and she dreamed that we were taking a boat back to Europe because dad was unemployed. It was really quite amazing. And they began—this was really funny—they began a “fund.” Their mother would send them out to the store. She always trusted them. She would send them to the store and when they got the change, they would put it into a big bag to save for us. So it was our own contemporary “depression” story.

But anyway, after a few months, as I said, Howard Swearer, who had been at the discussion in the USSR and who thought it was terrific was starting up a new institute for international studies. He was an arms control, Soviet/U.S. expert. This was after he became president of Macalester and then president of Brown. He wanted somebody who had a sense for Third World affairs and development in the UN. So I seemed to be a perfect fit. We got along well. So he said, "Would you be interested in the job?" I said, "Yes, as a matter of fact."

So I began in late 1989, and by early 1990 he had found a way to regularize my position there. This subsequently became a problem because he brought me without asking anybody. People were irritated because the ex-president had simply hired somebody he wanted. Who is this guy? I was dumb enough not to understand, or I had forgotten, what went on in universities when people are brought without searches and committees and all of this other stuff. So that was that.

LE: The day you are forty-four years old, February 1990. It was again not a reflective decision, neither the impulse to walk out of the International Peace Academy nor the landing at Brown. It was all a question of, as so often, you meet somebody in the street, you talk, he says, "What are you doing?" That's about it. But what was the job, exactly? It was a research professorship?

TGW: Well, yes. Tom Watson was Brown's biggest donor, formerly the ambassador in the Soviet Union, and very interested in arms control. He had barely gotten out of Brown—unlike another Brown undergrad, Ted Turner, who was tossed out but got an honorary degree—but was quite fond of the fact that he had gotten a degree. And wanted to endow something. It was called the Institute for International Studies, and it became the Watson Institute for International Studies a few years later. Howard wanted a deputy-director. It was the same kind of professional

relationship I had had with Rikhye, only Howard was a very intelligent and very genuine human being. And he was not threatened by having someone around who thought independently and had his own agenda. Howard asked me to come on and basically set up a program of conferences and a research program. Also, it was a nice position to be in. There was an endowment, with money to spend to do what you wanted to do and to attract faculty.

Unfortunately, Howard died of cancer about twelve months after he hired me. In fact, I stopped smoking in 1990, the same day that Howard was diagnosed with tongue cancer, and a good friend of mine with whom I had written one of those books—the guy from West Point, Dick Norton—either the same day or the next morning. But within twenty-four hours, the two had been diagnosed with tongue cancer from smoking a pipe. I have a pipe now about twice a year, but I used to smoke as much as they did. I stopped from one day to the next in 1990.

Howard was a terrific man, and I basically watched him die for about a year while he tried to hold the fort together. So all of a sudden, I was acting on his behalf. It was at this point that the fact that Howard had hired me became problematic. I was supposed to have the first new endowed faculty position at the institute. The fact that he had brought me—before dying but without consultation—irritated the political science faculty who were collectively in charge of deciding who should take over and who should have that first faculty post. It was clear that I shouldn't be that person because I had somehow come in through the back door.

LE: But you came in and remained the deputy-director of the institute, and as a—

TGW: A research professor, a title usually reserved for people who are retired and become research professors. About 1993 or 1994, I decided that when my younger daughter graduated from high school—because we had all moved there and were settled—it would have

been unfair to move. I wanted to be somewhere else. She graduated in June of 1998 and I came to The Graduate Center in August 1998.

LE: At least leaving was a conscious decision. So here you are. You are an academic, actually really for the first time in your life. You were an academic in a wonderful place—Brown University, the Watson Institute. You had a friend who was the director. He had appointed you, the hell with all these other guys. You had been for all these years an international civil servant, and of course the International Peace Academy, which was already a transition. How do you see the rewards, if any, of being an academic after all these years you spent slaving away in cold Geneva?

TGW: I actually quite liked being back in a university and in a university town. It is stimulating to be around the kinds of people with whom you spend most of your time, including the best students—not all of the students, but the best students—and the ancillary activities, whether it's movies, or lectures, or what have you. I felt as if I was back in a place I really wanted to be. It was comfortable. And the financial rewards—I mean, I was making less money than I had made in Geneva the first year—were adequate but it was much more congenial. I really felt I had time to read and write. I spent time with people with whom, not all, but most I enjoyed or enjoyed the encounter. So for me the real rewards were intellectual and having the time. Somebody was basically paying me to read and write.

LE: Quality of life?

TGW: Providence is a terrific small town. Not New York, of course, but a fine place for the family.

LE: Priscilla during all those years, she mainly concentrated on the children? She had not much time to work?

TGW: Our first daughter was born in 1978. From 1975 to 1978, she worked in what was called World University Service, which was an NGO in Geneva that was channeling money from kind-hearted Scandinavians to Southern Africa. But after Hannah was born, she began working part-time and stopped after Rebecca was born in 1981. When we were back in the United States, in Pleasantville, she went back and got a certification so that she could teach. In the later 1980s—probably 1988—she began teaching English at the time, and then global studies at the public high school in Chappaqua, New York. When we got to Providence, not the first year but the second year, she began teaching again in Providence, this time English and French and some social studies. She likes Providence.

LE: Now tell me, you continued to work on peace and security, basically, in your Brown years, because you had found your groove. So that was the way you went. You did a lot of consultancies during those years, I suppose.

TGW: Perhaps not a lot, but some.

LE: Including for the United Nations?

TGW: I did some work for the United Nations, but I mainly worked for foundations and other NGOs who commissioned research. I did a couple of things for the UN, but I mainly wrote UN-related papers for conferences organized on the UN; for example, a study on the UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan commissioned by the Refugee Policy Group.

LE: If you take into consideration your entire experience between 1990 and now, some academics as consultants to UN agencies have no impact whatsoever. Others, with the same quality of intellect and of writing have a lot of it. You must by now know what makes for an academic who has an impact on the UN and on other organizations. Can you say something about that?

TGW: It seems to me that a big part of it is in cosmetics, the presentation. It is the language you speak. It's the way you make the argument. It's certainly not hanging findings on abstract theories. It is really speaking straightforwardly, presenting information in a way that makes sense. I also think, however, what makes one effective is being somewhat close to the reality as an international official lives it. So if one is talking about problems of aid administration, it means that you have seen it, you've felt it, you've breathed it, and you've talked to a lot of people who tried to grapple with the real problems, sometimes successfully and sometimes not. So you have a certain credibility that you are not constructing things from afar, out of thin air in the stacks of a library rather than based on reality.

The second thing, I believe, is to try to communicate directly. That is, do not assume that you sent the report and somebody is going to read it. You somehow get a gimmick—a meeting, a seminar, or coffee, or dinner, or something—so that you can actually throw these things at someone who can make a difference and then tell his assistant to maybe pick it up. Much of this, I think, reflects somewhat my own experience with people in Geneva. But it also reflects my own subsequent exposure, at the IPA in particular where one put together mixes of people. The high kinds of highfalutin presentations and language that might go over well in some scientific journal or at a professional meeting but don't go down well at all with practitioners. They don't understand what the hell you are speaking about. If you can't say it in a way that they can understand, you shouldn't be saying it.

I tried to apply this in my own research. Starting in the late 1980s and 1990s on humanitarian issues, for example, because I had never worked for these organizations myself, I felt the only way I could understand what was going on was to spend a lot of time with officials, not just in headquarters but in the field. It was in that way that one had either the anecdotes or

the concrete experience that would allow you to highlight and illustrate what you were trying to say.

LE: So it is straightforward language, a certain credibility which you must have built up prior to that and indeed, communications skills. Most consultants write the report, they drop it, and that's it. You must prepare your audience. I think that is quite true, although some of these people in organizations do read. I recruited people by reading journal articles. Keith Griffin is one. I read an article by him on agriculture and rural development and I recruited him. Now, during your Brown years, you directed the Humanitarianism and War Project. What was that?

TGW: Actually, I co-directed it. The research effort in that project was actually a clear manifestation of my answer to the question about how you make a difference and who reads what you write. In 1989, during my "unemployed" period, one of my consultancies was on Operation Lifeline Sudan, which was the UN's first effort to find a way to operate in a civil war. Larry Minear, who was the team leader, was a guy I had known for years. In fact, he was at the World Food Conference in 1973/1974. He was one of the NGO delegates and fed me all of the informal documents that were coming out. So he was a really good source of information for me. And we stayed in touch. He was doing a study of the Sudan. I knew nothing about the humanitarian part of the UN but I knew a lot about the rest, which he lacked. He said, "Why don't you join?" So we were back in touch and collaborating in a concrete way. Our collaboration over the next decade was very rewarding, personally and professionally.

After that study, he said, "Listen, there is a real need for people who can do first-hand research. This is a growing area." It was already clear that the post-Cold War was going to lead to a huge number of conflicts, wars, and humanitarian debris. He said, "Why don't we try"—I don't know whether we called it "learning the lessons" but anyway—"try to figure out what the

hell is going on and to see whether one can improve the delivery of aid and the protection of human beings?” He was familiar with my military stuff and he said, “Let’s try to put together a research project.”

He was then at the Refugee Policy Group in Washington, whose chair was Lee Gordenker. So we put together a proposal. We got funding. The funding came—much like UNIHP (UN Intellectual History Project)—from foundations who thought this was a good idea. It also came from agencies, including UNICEF and UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), who said, “We need help.” And it came from governments. So we put together a collectively funded research project, which led to a whole series of monographs, some of which were country-oriented, some of which were issue-oriented: human rights versus gender, and this kind of thing.

This was a very productive period, and it allowed me to put together my interest in conflict management and negotiations, and the use of military force, and a growing number of humanitarian crises. So this grew out of a concrete experience, and we put together a project which he and I co-directed for years, initially with him in Washington and me at Brown. I then managed to get him to come to Brown for three or four years, before I left. Then he continued at Tufts University. He just announced that he will be retiring in June.

LE: It’s been going for what, fifteen years? I was told that a lot of NGOs were involved in that project.

TGW: Yes. Some of them funded it—modestly, but they were involved—and they still are involved. With a little money on the table, they also were more likely to listen to the recommendations, or at least show up to meetings. At the end of these missions, and with our publications, we would always pull together—if it was WFP or UNHCR—a meeting in their

headquarters. We would always try to get together with a group. There is a group in Geneva, and a group in New York and Washington, of NGOs. So we would call a meeting. Fifteen or twenty of their emergency relief directors would show up. We also, in terms of the conference circuit, would do more academic things for books, or journals, or what have you.

LE: I think we should continue for about another ten or fifteen minutes about NGOs. In general, you have had this experience with NGOs for many years. Do you see a growing impact of the NGO community, civil society, on the UN and on the Bretton Woods institutions, in terms of developing ideas, including humanitarian ideas? Or do you say there has always been some influence, but it is not really on the increase?

TGW: The Bretton Woods I know mainly from what I have read, and that is mainly about the environment. My sense is that at the UN, they definitely have had an impact in the past, and it seems to be growing. There are two big functions for NGOs, at least as I see them. One is operational and one is advocacy or education. I actually see the advocacy and education as critical to the answer to your question, but that kind of activity accounts for only 1 percent of NGO budgets. So the bulk of what we talk about is really the operations. There, in the humanitarian arena for example, NGOs are responsible for the bulk of the business. The UN's money basically gets handed over to NGOs who do the work.

Now, it seems to me that NGOs that have operational experience also can speak more authoritatively on policy issues, in trying to change governments' decisions. Such NGOs also have a little more authoritative voice, I would say, in speaking in UN gatherings in contexts. So I see the advocacy and idea role increasing, but that's not really the bulk of what they do. The bulk of what they do actually equips them to be legitimate representatives, in the same way that a researcher has a little more legitimacy by actually being close to the problems.

LE: But do you see the NGOs having an increasing influence on the operations of the UN or not very much difference?

TGW: They are accounting for much more of the throughput. UNHCR would not exist without NGOs. Even the Commission on Human Rights—and the new Human Rights Council—would not function without NGOs to do the monitoring work. So I see them as real partners. In the future we are going to see a certain kind of meshing of these two institutions. In terms of values, they're fairly close, actually. I see them coming together and being far more important. Our own work on ideas and NGOs in this advocacy arena is quite clear. In international conferences, for instance, they have pushed ideas on the UN, which has pushed them on governments. So I see them as essential collaborators for the UN.

LE: But the NGOs community is terribly heterogeneous. Since we have to quote our research at one point in the interview, do you see that there is something like a "Third UN?" Are we on our way to a UN that is so influenced, so open to the influence of civil society—not only to certain governments—that one can start speaking soon of a third UN?

TGW: I actually think that the framing of this issue is one of the things I've learned from Richard. However, it is not all NGOs, and it is not all individuals who are part of this "third UN." It is particular groups and individuals, including engaged researchers like us. As I said, the main UN operational agencies wouldn't survive without the NGOs. And on certain normative issues, NGOs are amongst the most important players. There are lots of flowers blooming. The group that got together to ban landmines was really quite important. There is a variety of views—for instance on population issues, the dominant weight of views towards women's reproductive health, seems to be pushing in the same direction as the UN. So I see them mainly as real allies, and in some cases they push the secretariat in ways that the secretariat doesn't want

to be pushed either. So I see it as a kind of a train with NGOs and individuals ahead of the secretariat, which nonetheless is usually ahead of its member states. What we agree is a mixture of all of the above constitutes the United Nations of our times.

LE: Before we finish for the day, I would like to talk now about the transition to The Graduate Center. I have learned during this interview that you decided several years before this that you wanted to leave Brown. But Brown University is a prestigious university, isn't it?

TGW: It is the least well-endowed of the Ivy League, but it is an Ivy League school.

LE: Which is not the case with The City University of New York (CUNY)?

TGW: No.

LE: Is CUNY a more interesting place in some ways because it has always catered for the less-advantaged students?

TGW: That's right.

LE: Is that still the case today?

TGW: Absolutely. That is one of the main strengths and weaknesses of the institution—running risks on people is praiseworthy, but there then also are poor students who slow everything down and dilute the quality and reputation. There were several things that pushed me toward making the decision. One, I really like New York, and for the work I am involved in, New York is the best place. In fact, when I was in Providence, I always felt obliged to spend as much time in New York as possible. There are only a few ways to get information, which is mainly to chat informally with people and pick it up. So I was here a lot for consultations and meetings and what have you.

The second thing, I was intrigued by the notion of working in a public institution. Much of my own education, my wife's education, and my kids' education has been in parochial and

private institutions. I knew very little about CUNY, but I knew the reputation. The provost—now president—of The Graduate Center basically said, “We would like you to come. What you do best is wander around and write. There will be modest demands on teaching.” I enjoy interacting with students, but on a research and one-on-one basis. Pontificating in the classroom holds limited attraction for me. So he made that possible.

The other element that came in here was starting our project. It needed to happen in New York. So the things all came together in a more serendipitous way than my previous decisions. I had something to do with each of the elements that came together. So, when the offer was made, I decided to take it. I’ve actually been delighted about being here.

LE: So do I understand it that you did not find them out, they came to you?

TGW: Yes. There was a vacancy, and the former chair, W. B. O’fuatey-Kodjoe, and Ben Rivlin contacted me.

LE: That seems to have happened a lot in your life.

TGW: Yes, it’s very nice actually. It makes me feel loved, at least occasionally.

LE: You are blessed. Maybe it was the three months in the seminary. God looked with tenderness on you. Now, The Graduate Center—is there something unique about it?

TGW: I actually don’t think that I sufficiently appreciated how unusual a place this is before I came here. I mean, one tends to overuse the term “unique,” but there is no other equivalent of this institution in the United States. That is, you have a big system in which all of the graduate work is done in one spot, or at least all in the social sciences and humanities. In addition, while most of the faculty is out on the other nineteen campuses, there are a handful of people—and I happen to be lucky enough to be one of them—who are only here. There are about 125 of us.

When I was teaching, I always think I did better with talented undergraduates, the ones who were really seriously interested in what they were doing, not just sort of floating through. It is great fun to have—not all of the students, as I said—a handful of students who are really serious. They are sophisticated. They have worked. They are really passionate about what they are doing. So those are the people I like.

LE: And very international.

TGW: Very international, yes.

LE: The tuition fee is much lower, of course.

TGW: Much lower. I have some colleagues left over from the 1960s who think that recent tuition hikes are immoral. I am sort of left over from the 1960s, too. But the idea that students are paying \$5,000 in fees when Priscilla and I went broke putting two kids through private universities, this strikes me as bargain basement! Yes, I do appreciate that not everyone has \$5,000; but nonetheless, it seems to me that the benefit/cost ratio is really very, very high here. It's cheap.

LE: The tuition fee is \$5,000 For two semesters?

TGW: Yes. So when people are up in arms with placards on 80th Street or in Albany, I am baffled, "Sorry guys, get real."

LE: Now when you were recruited here, or when you let yourself be recruited here, was it already in the pipeline that you would become the director of the Ralph Bunche Institute?

TGW: That was not in the contract, but it was clear that that would happen in relatively short order. It was the reason we put the project in the same location. We won't necessarily comment on other aspects, but it was clear that I would become the director at one point.

LE: By now it is quite a big operation. There are lots of activities going on, sparking all over the place. How do you now balance all these duties you have—administrative/managerial duties, teaching duties, lots of research stuff going on, and probably 200 activities which we have not touched upon? How do you do it?

TGW: Priscilla thinks that I would have been diagnosed as hyper-kinetic had I been tested. But I actually think we can trace my juggling skills back to those high school years with the Jesuits. There has never been a point in my life when I wasn't trying to juggle several things, and hopefully doing most of them reasonably well. I occasionally work on only one thing for ten days, or two weeks. But for the most part, I like biting and chewing on bits and pieces. If one thing is late or stalls, there is always something else. Now I can't always say that all of the administration or all of the management is great fun, but I actually enjoy most of what I do. And I say this to my kids: "You've got to do something that you like, where for at least three or four hours a day you really are having fun or you enjoy it." I certainly can say that about here. I think I can switch gears fairly easily from one thing to another. With the time I have, I really try to make concentrated use. An hour for me is an hour, not thirty-eight minutes.

LE: Your friends tell me that you are very focused. So indeed, you have an hour on Project A, it is an hour on Project A. When you switch to Project B, it is thirty minutes on Project B. That is a gift, of course—concentrating fully, because that is what you have to do. Otherwise, you would not be successful. But the management aspect, that is not really your cup of tea, is it?

TGW: I guess I have always done it. I think I do it reasonably well. But the best way to get things done is to have solid people to hand them to, and to basically trust them to get it done. I think for the most part—with one or two exceptions in my career; I've made a couple of really

bad decisions about people—but for the most part, I think I’ve always been really lucky to have good people around me. I try to treat them with respect, and they usually respond well.

LE: OK, Tom. I think we should call it a day. We will start tomorrow on the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), on which you have played a role. Shall we do that?

TGW: Excellent, thank you.

LE: It is Wednesday afternoon, the 22nd of February. We are on tape number three, after the two tapes we consumed yesterday afternoon.

TGW: Along with two bottles of wine.

LE: We are still at the Ralph Bunche Institute of The Graduate Center on the fifth floor. Now Tom, we have covered quite some terrain yesterday and quite a few years. Actually, we have already arrived at The Graduate Center at CUNY. It was our last stop yesterday afternoon. We are now entering the period of the last ten years, which have made you—if that wasn’t already the case before—a pretty well-known person in certain circles. Now, give us an idea about the substantive topics, policy issues on which you have concentrated the last five, ten years. Can you give us an idea, without modesty? Just say, “These are the topics where I am now an authority and on which I have written and may continue to write in the future.”

TGW: Thank you for allowing me to toot my own horn. My sense is that based on those years at the IPA, I began writing about peacekeeping, the use of military force by international institutions. That is probably the way that many people were first introduced to things that I write. I began examining a lot of related issues. Those flowed neatly into the use of military force for human protection purposes, or humanitarian intervention. Probably the most cited articles are related to something I said early in the 1990s: “Sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct,”

referring basically to the fact that human rights on occasion were more important than state sovereignty. Thereafter, I have tried to parse the connections among international military forces, the United Nations and its set of agencies, and private nongovernmental actors in the humanitarian arena.

I believe that the textbook that I coauthored on the United Nations is a contribution to the classroom—it will go into its fifth edition in two or three months, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. The first edition came out with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is now probably the best-selling textbook on the United Nations in the United States. So I think people associate me with the behavior and the misbehavior of the UN and the UN system. I like to think that people see me as a constructive critic, not a card-carrying member of the fan club. I hope that they see me as somebody who is supportive but whose support is backed by some facts, with some sensible things about what the institution does, can do and cannot do. So I would say the UN, private actors, nongovernmental institutions, the use of military force, and certainly human rights and humanitarian intervention.

LE: Very much related to the United Nations. You are seen as a person who was one of maybe the first to talk about UN military operations to protect human beings, about sovereignty as no longer a shibboleth. That was far before certain other well-known people started talking about this. So in a sense, you are a precursor. See, we have to get these things out. I have to drag them out of you because you wouldn't say so yourself. Now, talking about peacekeeping, is that still a viable idea right now, or should you and the UN focus more on early warning, prevention, and peace enforcement?

TGW: The traditional mode of third party peacekeeping, acting as observers or buffer forces with the consent of the parties, still has a role, but a small role. Most of what the United

Nations did during the 1990s and is called upon to do now, whether it is in the Congo or in Darfur, has really almost nothing to do with the kind of traditional peacekeeping for which the UN was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1988, which Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson called “Chapter Six-and-a-Half.” Those really are still very useful skills, but they are not what’s in demand.

What seems to be in demand is the usual—in other peoples’ minds—use of force, namely war fighting, something beyond peacekeeping and short of all out war, but in which serious military force is the question and not sending lightly-armed soldiers with the consent of governments. The problem is that the UN itself obviously doesn’t have any of those forces. Countries are not keen to turn over such soldiers to the United Nations—and especially the United States, which is completely allergic to the idea. So the UN in this arena has become the authorizer of military force, to issue sub-contracts, to coalitions of the willing, which I don’t see as a bad idea, frankly. Pulling in regional organizations when they have wherewithal is, for me, a sensible division of labor. The notion of “sub-contracting” is also one that I was among the first to play with.

LE: The illustration here, of course, was NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) getting permission, I think from the UN—or maybe not—to start bombing Serbia and Montenegro, no?

TGW: The long history of UN involvement in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s was a pretty sad story. Eventually, to end the Bosnia conflict, there was UN permission and NATO moving into action. But it was really the Croats, taking matters into their own hands, who spurred NATO on. Then the Kosovo intervention in 1999 was done without UN permission, because the Russians and the Chinese would have vetoed it. But picking up the

pieces afterwards, in a more traditional peacekeeping sense, was then handed over to NATO with UN permission. And of course, the peacebuilding phase—once the page has been more or less turned on war—is a comparative advantage of the United Nations.

But of course, the examples one thinks of more readily are the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the invasion—which was U.S.-led, but included the French, the Brits, the Dutch—in northern Iraq as being the first of these interventions in April 1991. But so too were the international responses in Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, and on and on and on, as well as the operations in West Africa that were subcontracted out to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). So it is not only NATO. NATO happens to be the best military force, and probably the one that acts in the most coherent way and involves lots of countries, although clearly under U.S. leadership.

LE: Now is that shift slightly away from peacekeeping towards the prevention and more military force, is that also reflected in your writings?

TGW: Yes. I started out trying to parse the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Analysts tended to throw them all into one basket. And in 1992, in probably the most cited report by the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali was very sloppy. It was just one big use of military force, and he actually applied the term “peacemaking”—which formerly had applied to Chapter VI efforts with the consent of governments—to *making* the peace, meaning peace enforcement. So everyone was confused. By 1995, the Secretary-General, with his tail between his legs, basically said, “We do not do peace enforcement, because we need to hand that over to regional organizations or coalitions of the willing.” In the year 2000, the Brahimi panel on UN peace operations basically called for a division of labor where serious military operations would be done outside of the UN, and the UN

should concentrate on both mediation and negotiation beforehand, on prevention, and picking up the pieces afterwards, and putting together something like a post-conflict peacebuilding effort. But in the eye of the storm, it should leave the use of military force to constellations of national governments.

LE: Now this presents a kind of general framework in which we can put a case study on the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and its implications and aftermath. I think you were the director of research of that commission. Did you write a fair share of the report itself?

TGW: With a young Canadian colleague, Don Hubert, I essentially wrote the accompanying research volume, but the report of the commission itself, *The Responsibility to Protect*, was written by Gareth Evans, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur. This 2000-2001 assignment was a really professionally rewarding period, although I still have the scars on my back from dealing with one of the chairs. There were two chairs, Mohammed Sahnoun and Gareth Evans. Gareth is a very sharp, very hard-working, very articulate man who has vision. He, however, does not suffer fools or anyone else very gladly. But he was an essential spark plug to get the commission from point A to point B. I am happy to have known him, but I also would not relish the idea of working for him again.

The starting point of the commission essentially picked up on some of the ideas that I had been playing with, starting in 1986 or 1987. In fact, I am going to go back just a minute, because Mig Goulding, Sir Marrack Goulding who was the head of the UN peacekeeping office at the time and was also on the board of the IPA, thought I was off my rocker when I first proposed doing a first look at the use of military force to help out in humanitarian issues. In the board meeting, he said something like, "This is just quite beyond the pale." I said I thought I had a

foundation that was interested, and I presented the reasons why I thought it was sensible. He said, “If you can get somebody to pay for it, go ahead. But I really don’t think this is useful.”

That was the first book on this topic, which I believe was published in 1987. James Jonah had an essay on the importance for Africa in taking such an approach. To his credit, Mig—when I ran into him in early December 1992, in the elevator at the UN as he was leaving the Security Council after the decision to authorize U.S.-led forces in Somalia—looked at me and said, “You were right.” I sort of appreciated that, and his honesty.

Moving ahead, it seemed to me that during the 1990s, the idea that human beings mattered on occasion as much as state sovereignty, and that human rights, under the appropriate set of conditions, could trump the sovereign rights of states, seemed to me a growing concern. Certainly the notion was controversial, but we had more and more illustrations, as I said beginning in northern Iraq in 1991. It seemed to me that a set of circumstances at the end of the Cold War both made the Security Council able to act in civil wars but also made civil wars more prevalent. There was human suffering. People began mentioning the Genocide Convention, which referred obviously to the most egregious case of human rights abuse.

As a result of the failure in Somalia and then the absolutely horrendous failure in Rwanda, it seemed to me, and to lots of other people, that we did far too little too late to stop the killing of something like 1/10th of the population and leaving 40 percent of the population to become refugees or internally displaced persons. So it was really awful. I began writing with some passion about this. The Canadian government began to take the lead when Lloyd Axworthy was the foreign minister—Lloyd and I were at Princeton in graduate school together, and his thesis advisor was the same as mine. Before he stepped down as foreign minister late in the year 2000—this was in the spring and summer of 2000—he said, “I want to make an

approach on this whole issue of trying to talk about the use of military force to protect human values.” The two linchpins were Rwanda, where obviously too little was done too late, and then in 1999, the fact that in Kosovo there was no UN permission, and some people argued that NATO moved ahead too soon and maybe did more harm than they had intended, by creating a lot of refugees. But in any case, it was without the approval of the Security Council.

Lloyd asked whether I was interested, and I was. The Canadians put together a commission and raised the necessary funds. It was rather fun working when someone else, for a change, had already raised the cash. I was named research director. During this period, the notion of “the responsibility to protect,” which Gareth had coined for the title, from the very first meeting made a lot of sense. It made a lot of sense to me, morally, but it also seemed that a growing sentiment was emerging, both in terms of words and action—and in this case the action seemed to be ahead of the idea. They had done it in northern Iraq, they had done it in Haiti, they had done it in Kosovo; but the norm wasn’t quite there.

But there were lots of people talking about the idea. Two of the main people happened to be Francis M. Deng and Roberta Cohen at the Brookings Institution. They were talking about “sovereignty as responsibility,” which was reframing sovereignty to include not just the traditional things about control of your territory and a population and authority, but they also said there is a human rights dimension. If a government is unable to take care of its citizens or is unwilling to take care of its citizens, an international responsibility should kick in.

So the commission basically built on that idea. It didn’t quite give credit where credit was due, but that is neither here nor there. The idea itself, which began as something that seemed absolutely unthinkable in 1991 and 1992, by the publication of the report in the year 2001 had become the new middle ground. Now, there were lots of countries that disagreed. But there were

lots of countries, lots of experts, lots of legal and other practitioners who were working on the idea, and it had already been used here, there, and elsewhere. The culmination, at least in normative terms—obviously not in operational terms—was at the World Summit in September 2005, in which the idea remarkably was signed off on by 150-plus heads of state and government who were there.

So for me, in historical terms, it seems to me that no other idea has moved that quickly. Maybe there is the possible exception of the Genocide Convention in 1948, right after the war and the Holocaust, but the term had been coined in the 1930s. It was a similar kind of development because the idea is front and center. It is, once again, the political will that is lacking.

LE: I seem to remember that the African countries were quite quick on the uptake. How do you explain that the Africans were so quick in adopting the idea of a responsibility to protect?

TGW: It doesn't hurt that Francis himself was a Sudanese who had pushed this idea. But it seems to me that the more important dimension is the fact that there are lots of countries that are torn apart by such armed conflicts. That is the place that brought us genocide in Rwanda as well as severed limbs in Sierra Leone. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, depending on how you are counting, we have witnessed four or five Rwandas in the last five or six years. We've got Darfur at the present moment. So Africans have been actually fairly bullish about the concept, but frankly the military wherewithal to back up their convictions or rhetoric.

So in this instance, they really do need outside help. That may be clear for investment and other things, but in terms of the projection of military force, other than Nigeria and South Africa, there really are no countries, and there certainly are no regional institutions, that are capable of projecting military force. They need help. They want outsiders. And it seems to me

that the present operations under discussion for Darfur, suggest groping for such a solution. The African Union has sent 7,000 ill-equipped troops. It may have made a slight difference, but it has not halted slaughter and mass flight. But they are at least there. On that basis, the UN perhaps over the next year, will put together a UN force that is maybe three times that size. Unfortunately, everyone seems to worry more about the reaction in Khartoum than the lives of millions of Sudanese.

LE: Are you surprised that President Bush reacted positively? He, I think, promised to send American troops.

TGW: No. He promised *not* to send American troops there. His rhetoric is powerful; his actions non-existent. But he promised to try to get NATO do something. The U.S. is otherwise distracted in Iraq and Afghanistan these days. Actually, one of my real concerns is that unless the U.S. gets involved in these serious military operations, nothing much happens. Europeans complain, but there is no European parliament or population that is clamoring to spend more money on the military. There really is not much of a serious alternative to the United States. So without the United States' climbing on board, we don't actually do much in these hellish situations.

LE: You may have followed the discussions in the Netherlands' parliament about sending 1,200 Dutch military to southern Afghanistan. There was a debate. It took weeks and weeks and weeks, and it almost created a governmental crisis. But in the end, it was approved. So yes, if the United States would get out of Iraq and maybe deploy more troops to protect people elsewhere, that would also help the UN.

TGW: Absolutely. If I were—an unlikely proposal, admittedly—providing advice to the Bush administration, you would think that as a cheap public relations enterprise, they would at least send a battalion or two to Darfur just to say, “We care about Muslims in the Sudan.”

LE: So the idea of creating this commission, the ICISS, came from your friend and former fellow Ph.D. student, Lloyd Axworthy, the minister of foreign affairs of Canada. He had the idea. The purpose was to put flesh and blood on this idea of responsibility to protect. Why didn't Axworthy get himself into the chair?

TGW: I think he had already decided that he was not going to stand for reelection at the end of 2000 in Canada. He told me he had been in politics for twenty-five years. He needed to make some money. He became then the head of a new institute at the University of British Columbia. Subsequently, he has become the president of the University of Winnipeg. I still suspect he might be tempted to come back to power in Canada after we get finished with the conservative experiment at present, but we will see.

He actually had also played a similar role in both the International Criminal Court and on the convention to ban landmines. So a fairly obvious next question was an agreement on the protection of civilians. But his thought here was that the time was not yet ripe for such a political decision. What one needed to do—I am trying to recall whether he said this or the chair said it at the first meeting—the idea was how to square the intellectual circle. You had these two principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a state, and you also had calls to stop the most egregious forms of human rights abuse. And they framed it that way. In the same way that the [Gro Harlem] Brundtland Commission had this assignment of conservation of resources and the need to develop, we need a way to put those two things

together. Sustainable development was that squaring of the circle, and the responsibility to protect was the equivalent for the notion of humanitarian intervention.

However, the discussion sought to get away from the term “humanitarian intervention.” One of the important aspects in terms of packaging was to shift the focus away from the rights of interveners to the rights of war victims, or populations on the ground. Then the responsibility—obviously not the obligation or I should say, “unfortunately not the obligation”—but the responsibility of outsiders to come to the rescue. So it was an important reframing that then makes the notion of the use of outside military force somewhat more palatable even to the harshest critic. It is to protect people and not the right of the interveners. The rights of people on the ground to such assistance and protection become the focus.

LE: Do you explain the success of that report, and the success of the reception of its ideas, to this reframing the issue? What was the vetting process that went on to get the report to the attention?

TGW: Well, this was the first commission that had hearings, or something like that, around the world. So the commission gave me a lot of frequent flier miles that I could give to my wife and kids because we were going everywhere. It seemed to me that it was somewhat a public relations exercise, to say, “We acknowledge the views of the people in Asia and Africa.” But actually, I think that I am being a little unfair. Some of the commissioners themselves who were not frankly close to a lot of these issues—a couple of them were, but not all of them—heard the passion with which Africans say, “Dammit, do something.” The clarity of the African view may actually have been important in overcoming the rather undifferentiated notion that in the Third World intervention is viewed as wrong in all circumstances.

We have plenty of instances when outside intervention was framed in humanitarian terms for reasons that were anything except humanitarian. One has to acknowledge that. The idea was how do you overcome that in order to get these countries to take seriously stopping genocide when it occurs. So this reframing, I think, allowed us to have a conversation that was actually impossible otherwise. To go back to Francis Deng, who was an ambassador and a deputy foreign minister, he understood that all countries, industrialized or developing, took their sovereignty seriously. But he found that newer countries—recently independent countries, all 125 or so that came on stream since 1960—were particularly uneasy about the idea of providing a grounds for more intervention. But he did find that reframing was essential to start a conversation—a sovereign state has a responsibility to protect its citizens, and if that sovereign state cannot do it or doesn't want to do it, then outside or international responsibility kicks in.

So, actually this reframing was important. The idea was to avoid the term “humanitarian intervention,” even though that's the term that exists in the legal and political literature—the commission wanted to move away from that term, to “responsibility to protect,” to embarrass outsiders if they did nothing in the face of mass murder.

LE: Did you write the whole draft, and then it was commented upon by the prima donnas on the commission?

TGW: No. As I mentioned earlier, there were two parts of the report. One is the report of the commissioners themselves. Gareth Evans, Michael Ignatief, and Ramesh Thakur were the main authors. They were the people who really, late at night—and after some pretty bad drafts were done by another member of the research team—just threw it out and started over. What I tried to provide were the intellectual underpinnings for their argument. The second volume was basically the research volume that replaced the originally commissioned papers. But the papers

made, as one might suspect, no sense; they were done in a huge hurry. People basically merged parts of ten articles they had written and threw it on the table and collected their \$5,000.

I still remember, one of the more memorable quotes from Gareth Evans. After reading it, he came back into the room and said, “This is the largest pile of stinking poo I have ever seen.” I agreed, but you can’t ask twenty-five people to write things in a few months and expect any coherence. The only option was rewriting.

So at that point, Don Hubert, a young Canadian who had been a post-doc with me at Brown, who was then working for the Canadian government but who had gone on leave because his wife was posted overseas, was available. We essentially wrote from scratch the mammoth second volume, which then tries to provide the background for what we mean by intervention, why people like it or don’t like it, and about the nuts and bolts of prevention. What is non-intervention? What are the normative, what are the legal, moral, and the political elements that go into some states pushing a notion and a lot of others being against?

The second volume, which a lot of people have used in teaching, has had a lot of mileage. But the document that most people cite is the very thin commission report, which would not have happened without Evans, Thakur, and Ignatieff.

LE: I have just given you a copy of the article by Amitai Etzioni, who goes a little bit through the history of this notion of responsibility to protect, sovereignty as responsibility. He starts with Francis Deng. Actually, he takes this from 1996. But just to rub it in, you were actually one of the first with your “sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct.” You should ask somebody to write an article about the longer history of the idea. I’m not joking.

TGW: I will take just a moment here on Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen. They represent, somewhat like our UNIHP project, a way of being on the inside while being on the

outside. So Deng was the representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons. Internally displaced persons are at least as badly off as refugees, but they are still in the country that repressed them in the first place. So essentially you are talking about protecting the human rights of people in countries with awful regimes. And how do you do that?

So he used this tack. He was named the representative to the Secretary-General, paid \$1 a year, given no staff, a tiny travel budget, and told, “Make a difference.” By having a blue hat when he needed it, but staying outside—he was the director of the Africa Program at Brookings—being on the outside, raising money from governments and foundations, putting himself together as a team with Roberta Cohen, he was obliged to donors to show that he was doing something different, new, that he was pushing out an issue.

When he appeared before the Commission on Human Rights or the Security Council, he would act a little like a UN official, be more discreet. But he was able to milk the official role for what it was worth. But then on the outside, at least in terms of research, he was generating original ideas, original data about these people who now outnumber refugees by two-and-a-half or three to one, depending on how you are counting or who’s counting. On the legal front, they put together something called the “Guiding Principles,” which have become soft law. And they have been pushing the UN system and NGOs—which do not like to come together on this issue because it falls between stools and interferes with institutional turf—to change the way that they do business.

His sidekick, Roberta, was very important, because she pushed Francis not to be a diplomat. I recall one person whom I interviewed for a new book [*Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its Consequences*] calling her a human rights “fox terrier.” Coming from the human rights advocacy arena herself, she pushed him, while he made her behave in less

abrasive ways than she would have on her own. So the two were a dynamic duo—Richard Holbrooke once introduced them as the “IDP couple.” And it was true. It was really a partnership in which there was complementarity, and it has been really quite successful. Now he is no longer the representative of the Secretary-General. That ceased in 2004.

LE: Now, Kofi Annan also played a role, of course, in pushing this concept. He gave the speech in 1999, I think, about the two concepts of sovereignty. He was bitterly criticized in many quarters. Who handed this idea to Kofi Annan? It was a few years later, after the commission and after the ICISS became widely accepted.

TGW: The *New York Times* correspondent, Anthony Lewis, has called it the “international state of mind,” a fair summary. It is basically the snapshot, the new way we conceive the issue. The Secretary-General, when we presented the first copy of the report to him in December 2001—and he had already been briefed about what its contents were—he basically said, “I wish that I had have thought of that idea. It would have saved me a lot of grief.”

Actually, I didn’t say this as part of Axworthy’s reason why we needed a commission. There were not only Rwanda and Kosovo, but the Secretary-General in 1999 had given three very controversial speeches, the most controversial being his opening remarks to the General Assembly. The week before, he had thrown this idea out in *The Economist*. No Secretary-General’s speech has ever received so many comments, some positive and lots of negative ones. I think ninety-some delegations took the floor after his speech to basically jump on it. So he was looking for a way to reframe the argument. So my explanation for why this commission’s output was picked up is that there was a demand for it. It was not a supply-driven but rather a demand-driven commission, as opposed to one that somebody thought up and said, “Let’s try to be way

ahead of the curve.” There was an issue, a burning issue. Action had already been taken. And there were lots of notions kicking around. So when the report came out, people were ready for it.

Actually, the “what if” here relates to September 11, because the report was finalized in mid-August 2001. We had dotted all the “i’s” and crossed all the “t’s” at a conference center outside of Ottawa in the middle of August. The report was going into production, and then September 11th happened. The chairs said, “We have got to get together again to make the report relevant.” I said, “You may want to get together again, but we are talking about something totally different. You have a coherent, sensible product. This has nothing at all to do with the attacks on the World Trade Center or overthrowing the Taliban.” The commission did get together later in September in Brussels, but they basically agreed with me although they put in a few references to the fact that any use of military force—which had already been said—should follow these same criteria: the “just war” notion with proportionality, reasonable prospects, and the like.

But by December 2001, the dust had literally not settled from southern Manhattan. Certainly the political blowback was far from over. So my guess is that we might have even seen faster movement in the General Assembly had it not been for those tragic attacks. If we fast-forward just a moment, both London and Washington, somewhat disingenuously—not just somewhat, but disingenuously—and after the fact, justified the intervention in Iraq in humanitarian terms: “Yes, we didn’t find these WMDs. Yes, we didn’t find any link to 9/11. But oh, by the way, it’s a good idea to get rid of a thug.”

That actually would have been a very interesting argument to have made before the invasion in March 2003. It seems to me that probably, in looking at either the collective record of [Saddam] Hussein, or certainly his actions in 1989, you might have made a very good case.

But nobody made the case. So as a result, the same countries that were very hostile to the Secretary-General's speech in 1999 and were not all that comfortable with the responsibility to protect, could say: "Wait a minute, this is not the moment we want to provide new ways to justify outside intervention, because we know what outside interveners do. They call it humanitarian. It has nothing to do with humanitarian action. It is a Trojan Horse."

LE: But that confusion after 9/11 and after the invasion in Iraq, is that continuing? Or are these two totally different things? The responsibility to protect is one thing, and a plane flying into the World Trade Center and America's invading Iraq is another thing.

TGW: You are totally correct. However, when the most reluctant of the big developing countries—the Cubas, the Chinas, the Indias, the Egypts—want to forestall debate, this is a very good thing to throw on the table. Frankly, it is hard to dismiss out of hand. But it is now quite clear that the triggers for responsibility to protect, which are mass murder and large-scale ethnic cleansing, are quite distinct from unilateral intervention to pursue ill-defined national interests.

LE: Now, you have been involved in some commissions before. You had an important seat at the table, and there were some quite distinguished people there. How was it to work with a group of prima donnas like that? You already talked about one of the co-chairmen, but in general how was it?

TGW: It seems to me that important people, there frequently are many of them who have egos that are out of proportion with—or maybe in proportion with—their skills, but for which there is no justification, frankly, for being impressed with themselves. The commission had some very nice and genuine people who did a lot of work. The best brain in the bunch is Michael Ignatieff—there's no doubt about that—who has now become a member of parliament in Canada. Who knows what happens with him next.

LE: He won the election in his district?

TGW: Yes.

LE: Good for him.

TGW: Ramesh is great fun and not full of himself. Cornelio Sommaruga, the former head of the ICRC (International Commission of the Red Cross), was one of the people who really went to the plate in the 1990s and made a difference. Klaus Naumann, who had been the deputy head of the German Ministry of Defense and was the deputy force commander (next to Gen. Wesley Clark) in Kosovo, was a down-to-earth soldier.

LE: Who were the nasty ones?

TGW: It was not a question of behavior, but people who show up at the last minute. Lee Hamilton, the former U.S. Congressman, missed all the meetings until arriving for a lively day-and-a-half of the final session in August. If you say you are going to do something, you should do it. That's my old Catholic training, again. When he was there, he was very useful. I just can't justify his earlier absences; everyone is busy. Fidel Ramos, the former president of the Philippines, was mainly smoking cigars or playing golf. Cyril Ramaphosa the South African labor leader, showed up for two half mornings of two meetings. These commissions are a little like the UN; you have this cosmetic ark that has one of everything in it, but the real work was done by a handful of people. They are the ones from whom I learned the most and who actually made a difference. And even those I had the most trouble with, I respected them enormously because late at night when all hell was breaking loose and we had to do something, I would go down and get a drink from Gareth because he too was up in the middle of the night drafting away. He was down in the trenches with the staff.

LE: Now would that commission, in its success or its report, be an example, an illustration, that a commission is more than the sum total of its influential individuals—the Michael Ignatieffs, the Gareth Evanses—none of these influential people could have achieved by themselves.

TGW: That's right. The chemistry of the group, and particularly the main players, was important. The topic itself was one, as I said earlier, for which there was a real demand, for a new way to think about the issue. And it was front and center on most governments' foreign policy agendas. Basically, all of the UN operations in the 1990s had a humanitarian dimension, if not justification. Therefore, even if you weren't involved, you needed to seem informed. So there really was a widespread thirst for a way to think about the issue in a way that built bridges, not dug chasms.

LE: Would the commission's report and its success be an example or an illustration of the things you yourself introduced in our own project: influencing discourse, forming coalitions, changing interests? Would that report be an illustration that it has had an impact on discourse, on coalitions, and on changing interests?

TGW: The idea that a state would now say, "It is in our interest not to have ethnic cleansing as a policy option"—for [Slobodan] Milosovic, or someone of his ilk—seems to me a really substantial change. If including respect for human rights is part of national interests, it seems to me that the definition has really changed. The way that the UN and NGOs look for money is certainly now framed in those terms. And I would say that especially because at the World Summit the notion of the responsibility to protect was enshrined—Evans was also a member of a high-level panel, so it is explained in some ways by his determination, but it is also explained by the fact that the idea itself is one people are ready for.

But the other notion—there were probably two other concrete ideas that came out of the summit, one related to the Human Rights Council, which will probably get off the ground this spring after much debate. The other was the Peacebuilding Commission. Basically, the panel said—they didn't use the term "states" because we can't say that; it is politically incorrect—but anyway "states in trouble," with not enough institutional wherewithal. There is an incoherence in the way that we provide military support, humanitarian assistance, and then development afterwards. There has to be a better way of pulling the system together. The Peacebuilding Commission, therefore, is a manifestation that there is a new institutional way of thinking about issues. We have a problem and there has to be a new institutional mechanism to act upon it. States are not the only entities that fail.

LE: So to conclude this long discussion—it has taken us about an hour, but I think the subject was worth it—the conclusion is that the concept, the notion of a responsibility to protect, has already had an impact. Would you agree with that?

TGW: Yes.

LE: It is not going to disappear. On the other hand, rhetoric is not reality; and Darfur and the DRC still haunt anyone with a conscience.

TGW: No, it is certainly not going to disappear.

LE: OK, now we are moving, if I may, to a concept that is certainly not unrelated to what we have just been discussing. That is the notion of security. Let's start by getting your opinion on how the understanding of security has changed over time.

TGW: When I was in graduate school, I looked at security the way that everyone looked at security, "bombs and bullets" notion. Then the ten years I spent working on development issues, I thought of development as a discrete objective and not part of security. Then I began

working on security issues, on peacekeeping around 1985, and at that moment there was an important article written by one of my old mentors, Dick Ullman, on the definition of security. He wrote that article in 1983 in the journal *International Security*. He wrote something like, “Listen, some of the challenges facing the United States in its security are related to problems like the environment, population, so on.” We—that is, the people who think about international security—were obliged to start thinking about a larger basket or something in which to put all of these notions. It seemed so obvious, but it wasn’t among card-carrying members of the analytical club. People were thinking about international security, and it was really about the number of soldiers, bombers, missiles.

Basically, from that point onwards, although I don’t think I ever used the term “human security,” it just made sense that you really ought to provide better lives for people because they are less likely to come back and bite you. And by the way, let’s take care of the environment. It all seemed like part of a very commonsensical approach to me. So when the term “human security” became popular sometime in 1993 or 1994—

LE: In 1994, after the *Human Development Report*.

TGW: The *Human Development Report* was there, but I was trying to recall when other people started using this term. Anyhow, it seemed like a sensible step forward, that in thinking about protection, it was important to protect people as well as boundaries, to protect the ozone as well as the national economy. So I never basically thought about this much, it just seemed that it was quite a logical extension of what we were doing.

The debate that has grown up subsequently is when do you think in narrow and when in expansive terms. It is clear, for example, that if you are trying to develop a policy on the control of nuclear weapons, there isn’t, frankly, a whole lot to be gained by throwing your net as widely

as possible. I think you have to be quite familiar with the nuts and bolts of nuclear weapons: who's got what, how much throw weight you need, the whole theory of deterrence. It seems to me that working in that arena, there is an argument to be made for being quite narrow in what you are doing and then putting that narrow piece in a larger framework.

So I think much of the debate about human security consists of spinning wheels. I actually do think that our own project's contribution—the Neil McFarlane and Yuen Foong-Khong contribution to our history series—will make a difference. They are basically trying to say, “When does this make sense? In which context does this make sense? When are we going down a path that leads nowhere? When are we opening up more and more conceptual options but without any of what is called intellectual or policy traction?” So I think that protecting human beings is part of the security equation, it is just that I try to slice it in smaller slices and try to do one little piece as opposed to thinking about the whole.

LE: Your initial reaction was positive, which is that it does make sense to broaden the concept. But then when the enthusiasts started broadening it really wide, you came back a little bit. As I remember our authors, MacFarlane and Yuen Foong-Khong, in their final chapter sum it up quite nicely. They say, “Anything that is not deliberately harming individuals is excluded.” So for example, the Tsunami—that is an example they give—the Tsunami will be excluded. I don't know whether they would put Katrina in the same category, because of course there you have an interesting situation with the dikes being relatively weak and neglect maybe of maintaining infrastructure, which we had in Holland also a little bit. But you would go along with that, a trying to accommodate the human security concept but trying to find a dividing criteria between what can be excluded and what should be excluded?

TGW: That's right. I also, just thinking in a somewhat down-to-earth fashion—I can't call myself a practical politician—in looking at what we have managed to do and not managed to do, we were unable to do anything in Rwanda. We have had slow motion genocide in Darfur for about three years now. So the idea that we can't get enough international political will mobilized to just say, "Halt!" We've got millions of peoples' lives at stake in mass murder. Will examining desertification in Darfur as a security threat actually help? I doubt that sincerely.

Even more distant is the idea that we should empower shopkeepers, and that this should take the same pride of place—I just don't believe it. I would like to say that there are some things that we have got to do first, and then we can move along. I do not actually see what is to be gained by arguing that we have got to do everything. It is a question for me of trying to say, "Some things are more important, either sequentially or they are more possible to work on, and therefore you've got to start with them." I don't like to start with the whole.

LE: But you would agree with our two authors in our human security book that they enlarged the concept, but as I said put a stop somewhere. For instance, they would argue, I think, that if a government deliberately neglects agricultural policy, which creates a famine, that would be included in their human security concept. When you have a government that does everything, all the good things in agricultural policy, and there are rains or whatever, and the crops fail, that would not be.

TGW: I think that's right. But there is little value in trying to expand it infinitely.

LE: So you see, as they do, the weaknesses of enlarging the concept of human security. Could the concept be interesting as an organizing concept for UN activities, which could bridge the gap between peace and security on the one hand, and economic and social development on the other? Would there be something in there?

TGW: That is an interesting question. In fact, that is what the Human Security Commission, the commission that followed ICISS, sought to do. As chairs you had Mrs. Sadako Ogata, who actually reflects my acute sense that you at least have to stop slaughter on a large scale, and Amartya Sen—there is no topic that doesn't enter into the lenses of his *Development as Freedom*. They are at opposite ends of the spectrum. The idea that they could put these two perspectives together was daft.

I don't think the report managed to do so. There is really quite a distinct dividing line between these two issues, and that commission didn't really put them together. So is there a way? I think maybe the new Peacebuilding Commission could perhaps do this. The logic is that after ending a war, you don't want to return back to violence. Therefore, how do you design everything from humanitarian protection and assistance through the initial development, and how do you make sure that you don't start this whole cycle over again? Is there a way to design development assistance and investment to build a slightly different society in which people matter? It seems to me that is probably where we are headed.

LE: I think it deserves more thought, and it could be one of your next articles. It would be extremely helpful, I think, because the UN now is involved in such disparate activities. It goes all over the place. There is no organizing principle at all, as far as we can see. If you could identify a concept which is broad, and which we might call human security, which includes the economic and social field, but within specified limits, I think this could help the next Secretary-General to think about the structure of his organization.

Alright, I think we have exhausted in a productive way your work on the ICISS and the topic of security. By the way, did you ask Richard Jolly questions about the human security

concept? Did he defend that concept as vigorously as he did in his fifteen pages to our two authors?

TGW: Well, actually I think we ran out of steam by the time we got to human security. Or maybe I thought we had already heard about that. Richard is clearly an enthusiast. I think it is his basic humanistic side and his aversion, actually, to things military.

LE: We are now moving to one of the topics that we have had on the table with most of our victims, our seventy-three personalities—the topic of global conferences, global reports, and global governance. Now, global conferences: of course the Summit conference was the last striking example. It is grandiose, it is striking, it assembles a great number of very important people. If you look back over the 1970s when you were in Geneva, and the 1990s, which of these world conferences—whether they were at the ministerial level as in the 1970s, or at the summit level as in the 1990s—which of them do you think have really had a lasting impact, or which were the most successful and the most important?

TGW: One of the problems is that I know more about some of them than others. It seems to me that the first batch were in a different category—Stockholm (UN Conference on the Human Environment), Bucharest (World Population Conference), Rome (World Food Conference)—because there hadn't been such a beast before. I think they were dealing with relatively unknown policy issues and got an attention that the later ones had to work harder to get.

I tend to think that the ones in the 1970s were really, perhaps all, quite important in taking a new problem, commissioning some research, getting governments to focus on it for two or three weeks, and trying to come up with new ideas and programs. I think with each of them, you would probably try to say, “OK, what happened to the topic afterwards? How seriously did governments take the recommendations?” It seems to me, at least in the way that we have

tracked them, that they all in that period were fairly important because we didn't have ministries of the environment, we didn't have women's programs, we didn't have IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), and so on. Both the international and the domestic institutions began to reflect what really had been ideas that were just floating around prior to the conferences.

I guess I am a little less sure about revisiting the issues with the same kind of conference, which is what happened in Rio (UN Conference on Environment and Development) and a couple of women's conferences and another population conference. Obviously, lots of things had happened in twenty years, and there is probably a case to be made to revisit issues. I think most observers would say that Rio was a step forward—much larger, a different period, got others involved, and new excitement about the issues. I guess I have more problem with the third, or fourth, or whatever it is, women's conference. Do we need yet another one, and then five years later a follow-up, a plus-five and plus-ten? It seems to me that at some point one gets—I sound like the Bush administration—a little fatigued at having these large conferences. One should say, “Can we get the same mileage elsewhere?”

I would have made a different argument, I think, about the World Summit.

LE: The Millennium Summit?

TGW: No, not the Millennium, the September 2005 World Summit on the Sixtieth Anniversary. The Millennium Summit actually put together the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 which, in terms of giving institutions a new way to measure what they are doing and trying to embarrass governments for not doing what they said they were going to do, was probably a useful moment. But I thought that the 2005 one was off the wall—why do we need another one five years later? We get the mother of all conferences in 2000, and we get to have

another one half a decade later. In addition, in 2005, I just thought that the combination of the cloud hanging over the UN with the Oil-for-Food Program and the absence of Washington in a leadership role was ominous. I couldn't understand why one would go through all of those efforts.

So I said, "Why are we bothering with this? Maybe you want to have a set of regional meetings around the world or something to sort of remind people there is a UN and this is the sixtieth anniversary." I didn't see the benefit from having yet another millennium summit five years later. Maybe I will be proved wrong. I don't believe that the results that one can point to are very dramatic. It seems to me that one could have agreed to the Peacebuilding Commission without the summit—it is after all a sub-commission and required a decision by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, or both as happened in December 2005. Maybe one would not have had a decision on the Human Rights Council, but I am not sure we are going to have a really worthwhile Human Rights Council in any case, or that the Human Rights Council will be different enough from the Commission on Human Rights to make a real difference.

We have the blessing of *The Responsibility to Protect*, but it doesn't seem to me that there really were a lot of decisions that couldn't have been made some other way. So I think at some point one has to say, "Why are we having these summits? What are they actually supposed to lead to? And in particular, is there a better way of doing this?" So I think they ought to declare a moratorium on them for a while.

LE: Let me interpret your answer. You said that most, if not all, conferences of the 1970s were important. Now why were they important? Because they brought to the attention of a wide world audience problems that were not yet really perceived widely as problems. It is the environmental question in 1972, the food problem in 1974, it is the employment problem in 1976

(World Employment Conference), the habitat problem also in 1976 (UN Conference on Human Settlements), the women's question in 1975 (UN World Conference of the International Women's Year). So these were all issues that were put on the table for the first time. There was a reason for them to be put on the table, and that's why I think you said most of them were important, even if they were not entirely successful—but definitely important.

In the 1990s, a kind of routine set in. It's a little bit like my notion about the Human Development Reports. I was very happy to hear that Kemal Derviş wants to reevaluate this whole thing. Rio in 1992, twenty years after Stockholm, was still important. But in 2002, why Johannesburg (UN Conference on Environment and Development)? Would you agree that it only makes sense to have this huge, big conference if there is an issue where the UN or another organizing organization really believes that it is underestimated—climate change or what have you—and therefore we need a vehicle to draw attention to that.

TGW: Yes, and that there is new information to put on the table. It is not just that women are still 51 percent of the population and we haven't revisited these issues since 1985, and it is now 1995, and if we are serious we have to have a conference. It strikes me that there must be another way to try to push out policy and programs on gender and women besides having a global conference. So at some point, one says, "*Basta!* That is enough!" It seems that was basically the only thing the Thirty-Eighth Floor could think of for the year 2005: "What else can we do? We had a big summit in 2000, what else can we do? Let's put together a commission to tell us everything is wrong and let's convene heads of state." Did the Secretary-General and his staff actually think that this jamboree was going to create the institution for the twenty-first century?

I think that, for whatever other reasons you probably wanted to do it or not do it, the total absence of Washington as a leader, or a willingness to go out on a limb, was an important consideration that too few people in the secretariat thought about in advance. The summit certainly didn't do U.S./UN relations any good, and it doesn't strike me that the results of the summit did the UN any good. The Secretary-General wrote "The glass is at least half full." I personally was happy that there was at least a glass.

LE: Now of course the Millennium Summit produced these targets: in 2015 a whole series of very specific targets. As we know, one of our co-directors, Richard Jolly, is a strong believer in setting targets and a sequence to meet them. In the case of the Millennium Summit, in spite of Jeffrey Sachs's very intense efforts to wake up the world, it is totally obvious that these targets are not going to be met. Do you think there is a danger? If you set targets which you know you are not going to meet, is there a danger that people will not take things seriously anymore? Or, even if you know you are not going to meet them, is it good that it creates an effort, which would then lead to more people being lifted out of poverty, for instance, than would have been?

TGW: You know, actually I think Richard has been very persuasive on the importance of trying to set targets. In one of my earlier jobs when I was at the World Law Fund, I actually worked with a group of people who thought they were visionaries—Ali Mazrui, Johann Galtung, Dick Falk, Rajni Kothari. I actually think that some of what they were saying really gets reflected in targets. That is, you need a vision. You need to have some idea of what you are aspiring to, or you will never get even part of the way there. So it strikes me that that is probably what targets are all about.

When we get to the year 2015, we will evaluate all of the reasons why we missed all the targets. Of that there is no doubt. However, we should also ask about the null hypothesis: “Where would we be in 2015 without the MDGs?” I don’t know if there is a way to do that, but my hunch is that they will be helpful to people in aid ministries who want to do more for water, or they will be helpful in an NGO board meeting in saying, “We ought to shift to do this, that, or the other thing.” So people use them for what they are worth, and on balance I would say they are worthwhile.

LE: Particularly if you have people like Jeffrey Sachs. Let’s give the man his due. I think, with Richard, that he made serious errors in the 1980s and 1990s in countries like Bolivia and in Eastern and Central Europe. But with the Millennium Development Goals, I find his efforts admirable. Now, the final question on these conferences: of course the women in our group all want me to ask, “When did you become aware of the women issue, of the gender issue?” Was it really 1975 that Mexico made you aware? You had just arrived in Geneva and had other things on your mind?

TGW: I was quite aware of women when I was in the Jesuit seminary! That was long before the Mexico conference. In all honesty, I was totally unaware of the UN efforts on women. It was not an issue that I was following. I was following other issues in the UN, and I was unaware of the 1975 conference even though I was in the UN. I do recall having to do some sort of background note before I left UNCTAD, looking at women in least-developed countries for the 1985 conference (Third World Conference on Women). So I suddenly knew there was a conference, but that is not how I became aware of the problems of women.

I became aware of women because of the domestic politics in the United States in which a goodly number of women said, “Wait a minute. We are half the population and we don’t have

the same access.” A number of things that now seem terribly obvious when they were first said were anything except terribly obvious to somebody who grew up in a traditional family.

Fortunately, I was in an interesting climate when all of these issues broke. When I was in college, I was surrounded with, if anything, women who were sharper than my jock roommates and I. There are a lot of junior colleges in Boston with lots of women who certainly were there to find husbands. But for the first time, I really encountered very sharp women at Radcliffe, Smith, and Wellesley, and these encounters rather coincided with the awakening of whatever you want to call it, “women’s liberation.” There were a lot of silly things that I never gave any thought to, but there were some very serious issues.

And my own wife was quite important, because there was never any thought that somehow she had fewer brains than I did. In fact, I always wondered why the hell she didn’t go into the academy as opposed to teaching youngsters. It always struck me as screwy. So for me, it really was the domestic U.S. context that made me very, very aware of taking advantage of the so called weaker sex. Then, having two daughters, there was never any question that I treated them as second-class citizens. So, the UN’s women and gender things sort of came on top of far more immediate and personal and concrete realizations. The women’s conferences were after the fact, so to speak, at least for me.

So the UN’s work on women really has had very little to do with the way I approach professional issues. In administering programs, or in building a board—let’s say at the IPA or at ACUNS (Academic Council on the United Nations) or in hiring staff, I think I can honestly say that I really look for good people. I remember at a board meeting, or a business meeting of ACUNS, when I was the executive-director. We had a fifteen person board, and some daffy NGO stood up and said, “Why are there only six women on the board?” All six women were

there not because I wanted six women, or five women, or eight women. They happened to be the best people available at the time. And it is the same thing when I recruited people. I never really think in terms of quotas.

When I got into the Brown University, affirmative action was *de rigeur*, because then you had to fill in forms, and if the total pool had 25 percent women, you had to have 25 percent of females in interviews. So it became a mechanistic way of looking at the numbers. But I just basically approached the issue on professional and human grounds. And the UN's work on gender was just not anything that I particularly thought about. It was really as a reflection of the domestic context and my own life that I became aware of women and their concerns.

LE: I was quite impressed with the final chapter in Devaki Jain's book in our series where she says, "Look, men may say that we are intelligent. They recognize our intelligence. But even in the case of emancipated men, there is still something that"—I don't remember the exact words she used—"there is still something of a world which men create, more or less consciously, which is hindering us to flourish and to develop to the full extent of our abilities." I think there is something in there—not in your case, of course, and certainly not in Richard's case, and maybe not even in my case. But I think she has a point there. There is still a kind of wall she calls "the unchanged mind of men."

TGW: But I think women also create it as well as men. It seems to me that I don't think we are ever going to get away from sexual differences by trying to talk about gender. There are certain complications that arise from male-male, female-female, and male-female interactions. You can try to safeguard against them, but you are certainly not going to get rid of those complications by saying that this is all in my head and only constructed and there is no biological basis for any of our tensions, or dynamics, or what have you. So you just try to be aware of

those things, but you are not going to define them away. I don't know if that's what she was meaning, but if that's the case we're not going to get rid of them.

LE: In any event, it was not the UN conferences that made you aware of the importance of women's emancipation. You knew it well before this. It's an interesting point. Did we—did I—in 1972 realize the environmental problems? No, I did not. Food? There was a food problem, and then also the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) price hike.

TGW: I would probably say the same thing about the 1972 Stockholm conference. I certainly was aware of the environmental conference in Stockholm, but I was probably made aware of that by many of the events that were going on in the United States—for example, Earth Day, and a growing environmental movement. So the Stockholm meeting seemed a good way to think about interdependence—if there is one issue that you can't think about in domestic terms, it certainly is the environment. Therefore, that really, for me, made an intellectual difference as well. How do you think about doing something across borders on the environment?

LE: Alright now, if you still have the energy to continue for another ten or fifteen minutes before we have a break, I want to talk about “global governance.” You have been the editor of *Global Governance*—you know what's coming—for five years. But my impression has been that you still seem to be pickled by the meaning, the definition, and implications of this concept of global governance. This is not a critical observation. Is it true? After all these years where you had to be thinking about it, and now of course you are writing the book and so you have given it even more thought, you still seem to be of two or three minds about the concept.

TGW: Absolutely. When I think back to founding the journal, because I actually—

LE: Oh, you founded it?

TGW: I raised the money for it. I was the executive-director of ACUNS. We were involved in putting out occasional papers. I said, “Wait a minute, people can’t get their hands on these. In academic and in distribution terms, it would make much more sense to have a refereed journal,” particularly because there was no journal that treated intergovernmental organizations. The journal which had been started in 1947 called *International Organization* started out by looking mainly at the UN and UN system. Then it started looking at the European Union. It really was about international organizations.

Sometime in the late 1960s, it was taken over by a whole series of international relations theorists who were looking at “international political economy”—in the U.S., not the European sense. The journal was hijacked by these people so that every article that came out had virtually nothing to do with the institutions, but rather was about abstract theories about how states cooperate. There is an entire literature, and every article that appeared had to cite all the members of the editorial board in the first footnote, otherwise it didn’t get accepted—I am being a little unkind here, but that was more or less it.

If you tried to get an article about, let’s say a UN conference—Rio in 1992, or the women’s conference in 1985—or if you wanted to talk about UN peacekeeping (there wasn’t a peacekeeping journal, but subsequently there was), there was nowhere to put it. And here we had a group called the *Academic Council on the United Nations System*. We were printing occasional papers and nobody could get them—this was before pdf files on the Internet. So I said, “Let’s do a journal. We can’t call it *International Organization* because that is copyrighted. What the hell are we doing to call it?” So we set up a committee that went around, talked to all of the leading academics.

Shortly before that, there was a book brought out by Jim Rosenau and Ernst Czenpiel, called *Governance Without Government*. It was really about the range of ways that governments and civil societies—not so much the corporate world, but that was a part of it—the ways that together they try to help solve global problems. Intergovernmental institutions were a huge portion of that puzzle. So what we ended up calling the journal was *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateral Organizations*. So we were clear that the journal was going to talk about bigger issues, but our focus was going to be more or less on the UN and other international organizations. That's how it got started.

At that same moment we were trying to figure out how to advance people's academic careers by making a vehicle available for them to publish refereed articles. And at the same time I wanted to get out of the publications business and mailing all of these reports. So it came together, and at the same instant we had the Commission on Global Governance. UNU (UN University) gave some money, and we were off and running with a journal. When we wrote the terms of reference at the back, it was basically we didn't want to talk about security, human rights, or development qua topics; we wanted to talk about the institutional ways of advancing work in those areas. We wanted the institutional focus, and that's what the journal became.

As the journal got off the ground and was named "best new journal" in 1995 by the American Publishers Association, we were quite happy. It still doesn't have enough subscribers. But now actually lots of people read it. I never knew, for instance, that Bob Berg has been a subscriber from day one and he is very keen on it. So there are lots of people who read it, and I think the journal is making a difference even if you have only 1,500 subscribers—there are many more people who read it in libraries.

I have already mentioned the increasing role of the NGOs and civil society. Then at the Millennium Summit, the Global Compact brought in the private sector. So for me, tracking this period, global governance is this coming together of a new set of actors to try to solve problems. It is the sum of efforts by important actors trying to solve global problems.

It really means it is a recipe for a little indigestion, because how do you get your hands on that? It was like what Potter Stewart said about pornography, “I don’t know how to define it, but I know it when I see it.” I think I am having the same kind of problem with trying to say what is global governance and how are we going to discuss it in a way that will make a difference for the UNIHPP book series. But don’t worry, Ramesh and I will finish the book.

LE: I think that is very interesting. You stumbled on the title of *Global Governance* before it became something of a fashion. You stumbled on it for the wrong reasons, so to speak. It is a good excuse that you are still struggling to define the present meaning of global governance. But I have a quotation for you. In the year 2000, you wrote somewhere that “global governance is as old as human history.” Now if you don’t know exactly what it means, how do you know it is as old as history?

TGW: The notion is that it is the sum of the ways human beings organize themselves to solve international problems. There weren’t “states” before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, but to solve problems you had to go beyond your own jurisdiction by calling upon individuals, collectives, public and private. So the real problem for me is that within a domestic context, governance is an add-on to government. Civil society and corporations sometimes don’t help to solve problems. They create them. But a government creates rules that make it possible for these people to produce or cooperate. So governance is sort of government plus governance: you get the way that society operates.

At the planetary level, we have basically governance and we have no government. So we are stuck with governance-minus government. So the real problem for me, in dealing with global governance, is that we have a lot of NGOs. We've got corporate actors. We've got a lot of individuals. And we also have bits and pieces of something that is not anything close to a world government, but rather a flimsy excuse for a world government. So for me, the real challenge is in strengthening intergovernmental institutions, which are never going to add up to be a world government but may play some of those regulatory functions that we need if we are not all going to either suffocate to death or blow ourselves up. So I like the term "governance," but at the global level we don't have the authority that would make governance a complement to government. We only have governance.

LE: I agree with that, and so the issue is, "Is it realistic to start thinking about an authority?" I suppose you would say, "It is pie in the sky." I would say, "Even if it is today pie in the sky, it is not too early to start thinking about it."

TGW: Absolutely. What I would do is strengthen the present generation of intergovernmental organizations in the hopes that if they do function better—if Bretton Woods works better with the UN, for example—that we are not going to have a world government in my lifetime, but you will have a demonstration that these things can actually be really quite useful. And eventually, even if you don't get a world government, you will get something more authoritative than we have at present.

LE: Right. You can divide it up in different sectors on international trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is indeed moving into global governance in that area, not very successfully because the Doha Round is a disaster. On peacekeeping, on the security issue there

has been progress in advancing toward something like global governance. And on human rights, the same thing. Would you agree with that?

TGW: Yes. We are moving fitfully but the direction is clear. It's just that if you extrapolated the pace we've had in the last sixty years, you would not think that we are going to have a global government before—

LE: Never extrapolate. That is one of the lessons I've learned in econometrics, where there was a lot of extrapolation. Concentrate on turning points. Try to identify the turning point.

TGW: The tipping point, yes, a very powerful notion.

LE: That is very difficult, but it happens. OK Tom, we are going to have a break. We have talked for one hour and fifty minutes. There are two or three issues that are still on my agenda. One is about UNIHP. I am going to throw at you some of the questions you threw at me. Then there is, I think, a very interesting section on U.S. heavy-handedness and your feeling about that, including in your academic writing. Finally, I think we will have to say something on your legacy, now that you have reached the sixty-years mark. OK, this is the end of tape number three.

TGW: Terrific.

LE: This is the beginning of tape number four. We are still on Wednesday afternoon, the 22nd of February 2006. We are opening a chapter on our own project, the United Nations Intellectual History Project. I remember at the beginning I interviewed Francis Blanchard, the first interview we did, in October 1999. That is now more than six years ago. So we have been going for a long time. But we have published eight books with only seven more to go. Within an hour we will have done seventy-six interviews, seventy-three already summarized in *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice*. And the three co-directors had to be

interviewed on the insistence of Richard, who thought that we had so many things to say and to show to the outside world that will be reading the transcripts who we are, so that they may take into account our own biases and histories. So it's fair.

On the United Nations Intellectual History Project, after more than six years, did you think we would go this far? Of course, there is a double meaning in this. Did you think it would take more than six years, but also are you impressed or not with what we have been able to do so far?

TGW: Actually, before this got going, it was a bit of a pipe dream. After Richard's lecture at the ACUNS annual meeting, Richard and I first had that drink in the restaurant in Torino and were trying to escape a local poor excuse for Edith Piaf—we came back and said, “We have got to see what people around the table think about that.” You joined us for a meeting in New Haven. Then we sat down and put together a project proposal, and went to see the Secretary-General. I thought we would raise a modest amount of money. I thought we would probably do twenty-five interviews and half a dozen books, maybe. We actually managed to put together enough money to almost finish the job we said we would do. I actually thought that we would have had more books out—that we wouldn't have had so many early, and that there would have been eight published this year or something. It turns out that some of the books were quite on target and came out in a timely fashion, and we now have a bunching at the other end. We may have four or five books come out at one fell swoop next year.

So I actually think we have come an enormous way. I have had fun. I've learned from the process. The attraction for me when it started was moving back into this arena of economic and social development, which I hadn't abandoned but had moved away from. I actually do feel that I cover the UN waterfront. I mean, you can't cover everything, but I have worked in peace

and security, human rights, and development. In writing the UN textbook, I could have written any of the three parts of the book. So for me, this has been a really fun way to go back into those economic and social issues that preoccupied me from 1975 to 1985 in UNCTAD.

The most important thing, at least for me, is having opened up the arena of ideas. What we call an intellectual history, we all thought “this is a little highfalutin.” It probably is overselling what we are doing; nonetheless, the focus on things that I’ve always focused on but have never called intellectual history, but in a more structured way, looking at norms, ideas, principles, how they develop, and what happens to them, for me has really opened up probably what I will be doing from now on in terms of future research. So the small book I just did on *Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its Consequences* is a story that, without our project, I would have have written the way I wrote it. I now have new lenses to look at the issues.

LE: I hope you have noted that in a big footnote. So as far as you are concerned, you have found it productive. You have found it actually even fun. You could go on for another six years.

TGW: I thought about this when we brought out *UN Voices*. If I thought there were an original way to do some more oral history, I would. That is, not just getting seventy-five other people to look at the same issues, but could we milk this technique for something more? I think I would be tempted, because I actually learned a lot from it. Given the fact that very few people actually put themselves down on paper this way, I believe that there would be something to be learned. That may happen, but I wouldn’t want to do a son or a daughter—thank you Devaki—of *UN Voices*, and extend it, for instance, to less renowned staff members. I would like

to do a similar, totally subjective, sample of people who were interesting, fun, were sitting in some of the right places at the right time, but on a different topic.

LE: You remember that I started out this interview yesterday afternoon by saying, although one can never be sure, this is supposed to be the last interview. Already, a day later, we have another twenty-five in the pipeline. But I agree with you. Now, have you had any surprises in those six years we have been going—pleasant surprises, disagreeable surprises? Was there anything you learned you did not know earlier? You answered that to a certain extent when you talked about the booklet, but have there been any surprises in these six years—certain things you didn't expect, either in terms of substance, or in terms of people, or in terms of events, interviews that struck you?

TGW: The amazing thing about selling this oral history idea is that we actually sold it, and we didn't really have a clue as to what we were doing. I mean seriously when we framed the project—even when we got training from Ron Grele and Mary Marshall Clark at the Columbia Oral History Office. We had all done interviews. We had read Studs Terkel, but we didn't really know what we were getting into. So what surprised me most was learning how to do that and learning to make sense of it. I also really felt touched by the lives of several of these people and the way they expressed themselves. Now part of this, of course, is related to getting others to go back and visit some very professional highlights when they were key players.

But at the same time, it was more than that. It was getting a little close to some people I had worked with, heard about, read about, known in some contexts, and just seeing them let down their guards or something in a different way. I actually felt in a couple of interviews—I think the single most touching interview was the one I did with Noeleen Heyzer. I really thought that that was—at the end of that, I was really dazzled. I also thought that Lourdes Arizpe was a

very, very fun interview. I learned a lot from it. So there were surprises to the extent that I didn't know the people very well. You both knew them better than I did, but I enjoyed them and learned a lot.

The thing that most surprised me—because we talked about my organizational bent—the thing that most surprised me was how difficult it was to make sense of the material. You have these piles and piles, and hours and hours—350 hours of recordings. There was a lot of drivel, but there was a lot of really important material. There was funny stuff, insightful stuff. But how do you put it in a fashion that's digestible? I learned an immense amount from that because I thought I knew what I was doing. I mean, I knew nothing.

When we tried to make sense of the first twelve interviews at that meeting in Geneva, we had one outline. Then we had another twelve interviews, and the first outline made no sense. It was very important that actually it all came together for me on that vacation that I took with my daughter in Cabo. I had thirty of the interviews and I just spent a week looking at them and trying to categorize the material: Where would I put this if I were new to the material? How could I make sense of it? What I came back with from Baja California was more or less the outline that we ended up working with, although we broke a chapter into two or made two into one.

So synthesizing that bulk of material in an original way: I was surprised at how difficult this was. Then when it was all said and done, I think that comments we have received have been largely favorable. People like what's there. They can dip in and out or read it seriously. So I learned something.

I don't think there were any other surprises. The one thing that I was quite persuaded about, and I will record this for the future—as I said in describing myself, I thought I was

supportive but highly critical of the world organization. I had met some international officials and some international institutions I didn't like. I don't think that everything we do is beyond reproach. I recall the only real fork in the road we ever faced was when Richard seemed tempted to have the project be more closely associated with the UN—be it UNITAR, or UNU, or something like that. That was one part of it. The second part was the extent to which we would have private money in this as opposed to just government money. I recall, when we went in to see the Secretary-General, I said, "Richard, it has to be totally independent. It can't be inside. We have to get some private money, or people will say 'these are government stooges' or something like that."

The two first things out of the Secretary-General's mouth were those two. He said, "Your proposal—nobody has done this. How can we go along for fifty-five years without having already done it?" He continued, "You've got square brackets. I've got to tell you that if you put this in UNU, it is going to be dead." He basically said that. The second thing is, "I will help, but you've got to get a couple of U.S. foundations in this so that the money is mixed up and that you can say genuinely, 'There is no UN money. We've got private money and we are doing what we please, because otherwise nobody will take it seriously.'"

So that actually was really, really important. That is the way we operate, and we couldn't operate otherwise. I think Richard is such a kind man, and he loves the UN.

LE: Too much.

TGW: It is not a love-hate relationship. It is a love relationship. I think that that sort of celebration of the coming together of peoples and cultures and languages can cloud his ability to see the warts, or at least how big they are.

LE: That's true. He is a UN man. He is in love with the UN and therefore not always objective. He has a subjective-objectivity, if you can put it that way. Alright, we didn't know anything about oral history interviews, and look how I am doing now. I shut up. I listen judiciously to you, which is totally against my habits. I agree about Noeleen's interview, I had tears in my eyes. Her grandmother was your Sister Joseph Cecile. I have no doubt. And *UN Voices* I think is a miracle. Somehow Sister Cecile is still looking at you and inspires you. That's why I think it is such a success, because nobody expected that this could be pulled off.

How do you explain that there is Kofi Annan saying, "My dear, this hasn't been done yet, but this is incredible," on the one hand, and the IMF having an in-house historian, the World Bank having two huge—particularly the second one—two huge volumes. How do you explain this relative indifference on the part of the UN, in spite of Sidney Dell, in spite of Brian Urquhart and what he said in his interview?

TGW: I think it is a little—maybe this is too far-fetched—but I think it is a little like our discussion yesterday of international civil servants: "I am too busy. I can't attend that professional meeting. I can't read professional journals. I can't write this. I don't have time. I'm too busy." The UN itself basically doesn't consider the archives—the UN here meaning the Secretary-General on down, the senior management. If they thought the history was important, if they thought the archives were important, if they thought that historians were important, they would put money into them. There is no doubt about that in my mind. For years, when I first got involved with peacekeeping, there were no files. There were no evaluation units. Someone working on a project of mine showed up in Cambodia after a mission into Southwest Africa, and someone in Phnom Penh said, "We are going to design the referendum for the vote." He said, "Wait a minute, the UN just did this in Namibia. Would you like a copy of the ballot?" "Oh

gosh!” So there is an absolute—there is no attention paid to learning from the past. There is no institutional memory, and there is very little invested in this type of learning.

Over the 1990s in a couple of places, feeble efforts were made. The UN set up “lessons learned” units. But as we have said in several places, nobody is rewarded for doing this. I actually thought that, frankly, if you look at what went on in World War II or anywhere, you could learn from the military—and people will say “Ah the military has too much money.” Yes, OK, but they always assign historians before, during, and after to look at what is going on. I said, “Why don’t you get some graduate students? Give them a Ph.D. dissertation. They are going to be your historian in Cambodia, your historian here, there, or elsewhere.” “Oh yes, well, this would be paid for by the West and nobody would like it.” So there is always an excuse not to do what makes sense, but frankly there is just no priority given to building up institutional memory and to learning from the past, including even modestly organizing anything besides the Secretary-General’s papers.

LE: Would you imply then that the Bretton Woods institutions are closer to the military experience than the UN?

TGW: Somebody was just reviewing an advance copy of the book in press—*Sword & Salve*—in which we actually call upon humanitarians to learn from the military, a humanitarian science like a military science. My friends in humanitarian agencies are not going to like that comparison. Drilling a well and providing another plastic sheet for shelter are the most important tasks, not trying to think through seriously what has happened, not trying to document what worked and didn’t work, not trying to build up information systems, and not rewarding people for a better performance. I mean, the way you reward people is that you run from here to there and start a new project, not taking six months off and trying to figure out what the hell went

on. I exaggerate only a little here. It seems to me that, to use a fancy term, we need a “learning culture.” We need a learning culture within institutions, which takes the past seriously.

LE: Now that we talk about this, I think we should say something about this in our final volume. How can we avoid that this is going to be a one-shot affair? We must make it clear that it has taken us so long because, among others, there were no archives, there were no precedents. We should have something to say about what this implies and means—money-wise, but also human resources-wise for the UN as a whole.

Now, I have two difficult questions for you at the end. If you want to think a little bit about it, I can turn off the machine. After all these years and our thinking about what the UN has done or not done, what do you consider to be the major intellectual contribution or contributions of the United Nations over its sixty years? Not the whole thing we have said in all these books, but the top three so to speak.

TGW: All of this is going to be colored by what I know better or less than other things, but it does seem to me that the fundamental human rights of individuals clearly has to be on that list—and taking those seriously; and trying to think through what that means for men, and women, and children; what it means for authoritarian states and democratic states. Obviously you could say, “Well, there is still a long way to go.” But in this case, the glass was totally empty and now there is something in it. So I actually would put that at the top of my list of UN ideas that have made a difference.

I am not sure that there is anything else that is quite in that same category. There are issues that might come close. I actually think that eventually they might include the environment, and everything from global warming to alternative sources of energy—those issues about which Rachel Carson was thinking and writing in the 1960s. Certainly when I was

growing up, there was no realization that there were any kind of limits, that we couldn't just rape and plunder the countryside, that there wasn't going to be enough oil, and that the air we breath was toxic. It seems to me that that has become central now. We've never said who's responsible for hatching this. That is really kind of irrelevant. But it does seem to me that the world would be a worse place if the UN had not taken that issue on quite straightforwardly and seriously. So I think that those would be the two that I would put at the very top. I don't know how full the glass is, but—

LE: That's fine. That's OK. Now, the second difficult question is, we owe it to Richard to talk about the paths not taken, right? Has there been an important, crucial path that the UN has not taken, should have done something about, and did not?

TGW: I'm trying to think. Is there actually an issue that is not on the UN agenda? It seems to me that one of the problems is almost the opposite, that for anybody's pet problem anywhere in the world, we must have a resolution, and we must have a conference, and we must have a secretariat. There is not a sense as to what is more or less important. There is almost no path that is not at least partially broken. And the way we deal with problems is to at least put them on the agenda. So I would almost say that there is no path that we sort of haven't gone along. The problem is that we haven't gone along some of them very far, and that we have sort of started and stopped. So I don't actually think—what Richard has in mind at lot of times are the political counter-factuals: "If human beings in OPEC had been less myopic and had put more money on the table, would the developing countries have started a fund and been able to make the NIEO a reality." There are a lot of those. My father used to remind me that "if a frog had wings he wouldn't bump his rear end on rocks." On almost any issue you could say, "What

would have happened?” But that line of questioning itself doesn’t strike me as a fruitful path—I actually don’t think the paths not taken are all that important in shedding light on issues.

LE: What you say is that the UN may have taken too many little paths and maybe even too many dead alleys, culs-de-sac. This is an interesting reply and something to think of. Now, we are coming to a very important, and almost last, chapter. It is called “U.S. heavy-handedness.” Let’s start out by asking the question, “How do you view the unipolar world we are in?” This is a unipolar moment in history. Is it good for the UN and in general? Is it bad? How would the rise of other powers—and there is a lot of talk about this these days—change things? Would it change them positively, negatively, or would it be neutral. That is the first set of questions.

TGW: I think one of the problems with the unipolar “moment” is that it has now lasted for a decade-and-a-half since Charles Krauthammer first used the term. That is a very long moment, and I don’t have the impression that we are at the end. So this is, at least within the UN’s history, a really unprecedented quarter of its history in which the United States, which has always been an important player, and in many ways champion of issues, in the last fifteen years has been the only act in town on several issues. We talked earlier about the military arena: unless the U.S. is on board basically nothing happens. There are others as well.

So I see this as a bad moment, both for the United States and for the United Nations. How do you control the uncontrollable? You have 40 percent of the world economy; you have over half the world’s military expenditures. There is no countervailing power that can be easily put together. Yes, we can talk about Europe—if they could only decide upon the same electrical outlet—or China someday. But for those of us who think that states oftentimes behave because they are obliged to do so, one has to count on the goodwill of Washington and the United States.

And wow, there have been moments in the past in which if the Soviet Union had been in the role, it is clear that we wouldn't be living in the world we live in. There have been some very benign and some very far-sighted policies—we can talk about the Marshall Plan, and we can go on and on and on.

But I don't think that's the way the world is operating now. I think that, on balance, this sort of untrammelled power, with no counterbalance, is really dangerous for the United States, overstepping bounds and making enemies needlessly, and for the United Nations, limping along. In fact, I think I might almost go farther and say that the current U.S. exceptionalism—which has always existed in the literature and in fact—is truly exceptional. For the most part, exceptionalism in the past came out in unusual circumstances. It wasn't the routine, it was, well, "exceptional." Now, the sort of arrogance that comes with unbalanced power and clumsiness, has become the common bill-of-fare. So I see this as sort of feeding on itself, and it being a very, very unhealthy moment for both multilateral institutions and, frankly, for the United States.

LE: So you would conclude that the rise of other powers—not only China, but the Russian Federation, India, Brazil—would rebalance the world situation, would be a good thing? Would you agree with that?

TGW: Certainly. I never thought that when I was reading Henry Kissinger, and reading about the nineteenth century balance of power. But it strikes me now that without some kind of balance, you basically have a country in which you have to hope that you get a leadership that is sensible. We clearly don't have that now. So I see it as really dangerous. Therefore, some countervailing constellation would be a positive development, for the United States as well as for the UN and multilateralism

LE: This U.S. arrogance has been going on for a long time, and was already there before 1989. In November 1970, they stopped paying the ILO, to blackmail the ILO.

TGW: But it didn't happen weekly or daily. As I say, it was in exceptional circumstances, but now it is routine.

LE: This change in attitude of the United States vis-à-vis the United Nations, as a matter of routine being arrogant, how has this affected U.S. scholarship about the UN compared to that of other countries—Europe or elsewhere? In other words, has the critical attitude, the arrogant attitude, of the U.S. government, has that created a bias in scholarship in U.S. academia?

TGW: I don't believe it has. But what one has to keep in mind in thinking about the global production of ideas, or even global publication, is the importance of the Anglo-Saxon market. I thought about this when our friend K. Jomo was here talking about getting Indian publications of UNIHP volumes. If you are an academic in Egypt, if you are an academic in India, basically what you have your students read is what is readily available and cheap, and that is almost always a book published by a large U.S. or U.K. firm. The publications that are most frequently cited, the place that helps your promotion is getting your book published with a reputable press somewhere in North America or in England. It is the same thing with scholarly journals.

It is the power of the U.S., but indirectly, that influences the way the academic world operates. So one can try to legislate this and say, "We have got to have 20 percent of the footnotes from non-English-speaking, non-North American publications." But that is very, very difficult. I find it difficult to get my hands on other things. The number of quality things that are published elsewhere and are readily available—I don't see them. What is readily available that is not produced in these major markets is actually quite minimal—and there have been a couple

of analyses of these—on international relations ironically demonstrates the power of the British and U.S. publishers. No one can make a prominent career without basically reading all this stuff and publishing theirs in prominent places. So I think basically that the scholarship is skewed by the presses and the locations of the journals. The U.S. is a big place and so there are lots of Americans looking at it, but for years nobody was looking at the UN. So I don't think there is much of a bias here based on the current Bush administration.

LE: I would have thought that it is almost normal that there is an unconscious reaction on the part of an academic, when he is in an environment that is highly critical of a body like the United Nations, where the UN is ridiculed every day that it creates a bias. You don't want to be the out-lier, the strange person who has something positive to say against the whole world—you would agree with that?

TGW: I don't think so. In fact, the critics have made a field day of what would undoubtedly be a pro-UN bias in universities in the U.S. There were some studies done recently about how many registered Democrats there are amongst faculties. And in certain places, at Stanford for instance, it was nineteen out of twenty, really wildly disproportionately of what one would call "liberals," at least in the U.S. context. So there are more people in universities who actually take the UN and the World Bank seriously than on the street in Detroit, or even New York. There are a disproportionate number who are actually enthusiastic about it. So I would see it as almost the opposite within the academy. You can say things that would not fly in the *Detroit News* or the *Chicago Tribune* because there are people who look at information and actually take these institutions seriously.

Now within the discipline of international relations, the predominant school has always been the so-called realist one, which basically posits that institutions don't matter—that states

and their self-protection are the only issues of any consequence. But over the last thirty years, the newer and more interesting published works are by people who take interdependence seriously, who take institutions seriously, who take ideas seriously. So if you measured the field of international relations in the United States at this moment, you would probably find fewer realists, or those who are so classified, than in that famous real world. They would probably be in the minority within international relations in many universities. Realists are obviously in the majority in Washington and in that corporate world, but they are not in universities.

LE: This next question came from Richard Jolly, who is looking over my shoulders. He wants to see any question, anything that is being prepared for this interview. Let me read it out for you: “In your work, have you ever felt caught between supporting the UN and maintaining your academic standing in the United States by adopting a more critical stance?”

TGW: Never.

LE: Never. That’s the short answer. You must have read this question.

TGW: This actually goes back—it is more a reflection, I think, of Richard’s fervent convictions about, and even passion for, international institutions. Let me be slightly fairer about my reply. For a long time, there was not much of a career to be made by looking at things UN. I was a bit of an oddball when I finished graduate school. I think I did a search one time—out of all the dissertations in international relations that were on file one year, there was only one that had UN in the title. Maybe some of them touched upon other UN issues, but clearly international cooperation was not a topic to jump-start an academic career. This was in the 1970s, and I did this because I was curious about the absence of jobs advertised. Whereas in the 1940s and the 1950s, there were six or eight people at Columbia alone who were teaching the United Nations.

LE: Richard Gardner was one.

TGW: I think Dick was a bit later, but Oscar Schachter was there, so was Lee Goodrich, both of whose books are on my shelves. There was an army of people who were not only teaching international organizations, many were actually UN specialists. Then there came a precipitous decline. The actual founding of the Academic Council on the UN System in the mid-1980s was because a group of people—Lee Gordenker, Ben Rivlin, Gene Lyons, Elise Boulding—looked around and said, “Hey, we are getting very long in the tooth. There are virtually none of our students and very few graduate students who are going into this field. And there are no jobs. There are no journals. Publishers aren’t interested. What is going to happen?”

So ACUNS was essentially founded by a group of people who said, “We haven’t reproduced.” As a result, we have now turned that corner. My last graduate student at Brown and former right-hand at Brown, Melissa Phillips (now, Labonte) did some tabulations. There were some thirty jobs in international relations when she was looking two years ago, and at least half of them mentioned UN kinds of topics, whether it was mediation, or conflict resolution in Africa, or links to regional organizations. There were all kinds of things in job descriptions that are considered serious topics of research now that were considered beside the point and certainly not mainstream twenty years ago. There also are students who are interested in UN studies. With Rorden Wilkinson, I am the editor of a new Routledge “Global Institutions Series.” This is encouraging because if there is a market, we must have turned a corner.

I should have been intimidated—sorry Richard—when I was looking for dissertation topics, because anybody in his right mind would not have looked at international institutions. But I was just interested. So I was not intimidated, or maybe I was just slow. Had I been more

career conscious when I was starting out, I should have avoided the UN. I think that's true, but mainly because of the market.

LE: But that's different. Once you had made the choice, it has not influenced your substance, your content. Alright, now we must say something about Kofi Annan and the Oil-for-Food crisis. How do you feel Kofi Annan has handled this? What effects may it have on his legacy as well as on the UN in general? What is your opinion about this?

TGW: I mentioned yesterday that I thought that he actually would have made the reinvigoration, so to speak, of the civil service one of his priorities. He did not. I thought that could have been the legacy. I think the answer would have been different had you asked the question in 2001/2002—remember, he was reelected early, six months before the deadline because he was so popular and everyone (big, small, African, non-African) was impressed with him. So had he stepped down in 2002, his legacy would have the Nobel Prize, moving in the direction of helping to fight terrorism, the first Secretary-General who took human rights seriously, and so on.

LE: He would have been called back.

TGW: He would have been like Derek Bok at Harvard. He would have perhaps returned after the next guy fell flat on his face. If you ask the question now, as one must, my answer really would be quite different. Some of his positive achievements are still there. But the dominant image is certainly not that. He will be remembered for a secretariat in disarray and depressed. There was just the first-ever vote of no confidence in him by the Staff Union. The Oil-for-Food scandal hangs very heavily over the secretariat. I think it will mean a very short leash for the next Secretary-General. It already means that anything that resembles change—the Group of 77 (G-77) sees this, or at least a lot of members of it—see reform as a kind of western

subterfuge, or U.S. subterfuge, to get control of the Secretary-General and therefore we have got to take everything back to the General Assembly.

For me, the proposals related to, for example, choosing a Secretary-General and getting the nomination away from the P-5 and into the General Assembly, I don't think that would actually bring a better result. The result would be worse than what's going on. And then things that we forgot about the Secretary-General—Rwanda, Srebrenica—these things were overcome by what seemed to be steps forward. Now those ugly memories come back, and it seems to me that unfortunately his legacy will not be a secretariat and an institution prepared for the twenty-first century, but one hobbled by the sense that it was mismanaged, and that we have to do things differently.

So I would suspect that the next Secretary-General is going to have to—I don't know quite what the term is—is going to have to ensure that the secretariat is run as a far tighter ship. So my sense is that the next Secretary-General is going to come as part of a team. If I were running for Secretary-General, I would look for a—

LE: A chap like me. You would say, "I am with Louis."

TGW: It would be preferable if you were a woman of color who had run a Fortune 500 corporation. The second person—well, I still think the Secretary-General has to be the top political negotiator, the secular pope—should be in charge of the store. So my sense is that the deputy, which has not been what he's done for his deputy—her job description has basically been anytime he is out of town, she does what he doesn't do; or if he can't go somewhere, she goes. He talks to her about every issue. It seems to me that the deputy really has to be someone who will be held accountable if we have anything like the Oil-for-Food scandal. He or she has to be on top of the way the institution is run in terms of personnel and finance. That would be more

than enough of a job description. So if I were running, I would actually say, “Here is the person I am going to appoint.” You don’t have any veto control, but this is the kind of person I want to have with me.”

LE: [Paul] Volcker mentioned this number two position. Was it a CEO or something?

TGW: His proposal, or the proposal from the commission, the three of them, was that the second position—and it would require a Charter amendment—would be like a Secretary-General, nominated by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly. The post would be a COO, or chief operations officer. That is more or less what is going to happen, because the major powers are going to be consulted and they will have to be happy or the person will never be appointed. So my sense is it would be good to just put that a little more on the table. In fact, there is a Canadian proposal kicking around to make the entire election process more transparent and accountable.

The only proposals related to selecting the top person come out normally in the year of the election. So there were a whole series of proposals by Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers in 1991, perfectly sensible. I remember Brian saying something like: “The Ford Foundation spends more time and money selecting a junior program officer than the world community does in selecting a Secretary-General.” He was and is perfectly right. But then as soon as the person comes on, that is the end of the story. I actually said to Alan Rock, the Canadian ambassador because Canada is leading the charge on this topic, “This is going to go nowhere this year, but could you at least get states to agree that we are going to discuss this next year for the next time around, four years later.” I think that this may happen.

LE: How did Volcker call this man? A UN Chief Operational Officer or something?

TGW: The Secretary-General in the Charter is called a Chief Administrative Officer, in the British sense. He is really a CEO. Volcker called for a Chief Operational Officer.

LE: Yes, a COO.

TGW: What we would probably call a Chief Financial Officer, sort of, but including more than finance.

LE: Would you agree with that?

TGW: Yes, I do.

LE: Coming back for a minute to the Oil-for-Food problem, you have looked at this much more carefully and comprehensively than I have. I can't escape the impression that Kofi Annan and his advisors have not stressed sufficiently that the scandal was rather outside of the UN, including in the P-5 countries, than it was really in the UN. What have they found within the UN? A guy who brought \$160,000 from his aunt. I laughed about it, but that really seems to be true. Isn't that a public relations problem? And it is surprising, because we have Mark Malloch Brown there.

TGW: The spin master. He should have done more spinning, and on 1 April he will replace Louise Frechette as Deputy Secretary-General. It is certainly true that if you are trying to figure out where the bulk of the blame in the scandal should be placed, it is on the member states whose diplomats signed off on all this nonsense. Those of us who were around said, "Wait a minute, everyone knows about this." The former Dutch ambassador, the one before the last one, Peter van Walsum, was clear. I remember being in The Hague when he was giving a press conference because he had chaired the Security Council. He basically said, "We brought all this stuff up, and everybody just swept it aside." So it was general knowledge.

So it does seem to me that member states got off easily here. However, the UN is a very good scapegoat, which is facilitated because the Secretariat was so incompetent. If you read closely—you don't want to, because there are five volumes, and each looks like a New York telephone book—there were a lot of excuses. If you only read one chapter, it should be "The Thirty-Eighth Floor," in the fourth volume. You have the Secretary-General saying, "I wasn't aware of this." And the Deputy Secretary-General says, "Well, I should have done this, but I didn't. But I wasn't aware of that." And the chef de cabinet repeating more of the same. I don't think anyone was corrupt. It was a job that none of them had done and they couldn't do; but they also didn't pay enough attention. But it does argue that a different kind of person, or at least a couple of different kinds of people, ought to be on the top floor.

I think that it is always much easier for journalists, or for me, to understand an individual's problems than to understand massive political ones. So the idea that the Secretary-General's son was using his family name to make a little extra money, that seems understandable. Everyone could believe that [Bill] Clinton was involved with an intern, but nobody can believe that the current president lied about going to war. That's too important. We don't do that stuff. But it seems to me that the real problem with the Oil-for-Food scandal is that it is easier to understand mismanagement, incompetence, and modest corruption than to understand that states approved the mess.

LE: I feel very uneasy about this. Take the case of his son. He worked for a while for a company that was involved in the Oil-for-Food problem—not "scandal" but "problem"—and he resigned, or he got kicked out. He got, for a certain time, a certain number of months, a retainer fee. That was \$2,500 a month. That was just not advertised enough. I mean, this sum is ridiculous!

Now, a final question about this topic. You have constantly maintained that Security Council reform is dead-on-arrival, hopeless, an “illusion,” quote unquote. Now I understand why you, and even I, would say that, but shouldn’t we look? What would be the circumstances in which a reform of the Security Council would be acceptable? Would it be only after a disaster of some kind? Do you really think that whatever proposal, or whatever happens, any proposal to do anything about the Security Council is dead on arrival?

TGW: I think the politics of changing the Security Council are such that every proposal creates as many problems as it solves. Moreover, I do not see that any of the changes in the Security Council would actually make it more businesslike. In fact, you could almost make an argument that—I am not going to go this far—we should go back to the 1963 version, when there were eleven instead of fifteen members. Adding more voices and more consultations would help if a decision ever were made. Clearly that decision would be more legitimate. But it strikes me that decisions are going to be fewer and farther between with more members. The big powers are not the only ones that pursue their perceived national interests in the Security Council. Every state does.

It almost strikes me that you could probably get as far with doing a lottery system, that basically, “We have got ten other seats. Each year we are going to draw five names out a hat. Maybe we are going to have an Africa hat, an Asia hat, whatever.” You would probably get more for that, because then at least Barbados would have a chance to get on, as would Brazil. But the Security Council functions better than another parts of the system. Do we really want to “fix” it?

The only way that a decision could be made, I think, would be in a case like that of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which actually broke so many rules that the Security Council was

quite united. A couple of countries abstained, the way some usually do. But the fact of the matter was that there was such unanimous support for doing something that the Security Council moved ahead.

Trying to do something in the Congo or Darfur, or trying to take action in East Timor in 1999 without the Indonesian government's approval would be problematic, without a reformed council and probably even more difficult with a 25- or 26-member council. We are trying to find an institutional fix for what is a political problem. So it is not going to work. I don't see that we are going to solve the problem by adding members. I understand why Germany would like to be on. I understand why Brazil would like to be on. But I don't see why this will actually solve the problems that we are trying to solve.

LE: One way of solving the German problem is—and that is bound to happen in the next ten years—that the European Union will take the seat. Therefore the seats of France and the UK will be saved, and Germany will then argue for a seat. So we will have four permanent seats—the European Union, the United States, Russia, and China. Don't you see the European Union in the end taking the seat which is now being—

TGW: Obsolete by two? I don't think Paris and London are quite in agreement with that. They would have to sign off with that solution. But it seems to me that really, if there is anything sensible on the horizon, that would be it. If France and the UK took such a step, it might unblock the rest of the log-jam. But don't hold your breath.

LE: The day will come that a future president of France will see the light. Alright, we are coming to the final one or two questions. This is about legacy. You will be sixty years soon. It is time to start thinking about what you have done and the few years that remain to do additional work. We have, of course, been talking about your legacy implicitly throughout this

interview. But if we could sum it all up, which of your ideas have had the greatest impact on the UN? We have mentioned it, but you may mention it again so that you will be absolutely sure that you believe it yourself. Secondly, in the few productive years that remain, do you see something on the horizon that you may put your teeth in and that may have also an important impact on the UN and beyond?

TGW: Let's start with the latter problem. I don't see anything right now, or I would probably be doing it. In the past, there were a handful of things that I thought were original. The use of international forces for humanitarian purposes is one of those. That idea actually was preceded by my thought that the warming between Moscow and Washington was going to lead to a totally different equation at the UN, that Third World conflict dynamics were going to be totally different. I first wrote about that in 1985 and the humanitarian-military dimension in 1987. That sovereignty includes an element, a modicum, of respect for human rights came a little bit later. And the final one, I believe, would have been something related to the importance of some subcontracting, including NGOs and regional institutions, of how one goes about that, and why it is important. I think that those ideas were original thoughts, or at least that not very many people were thinking about them. But I think that those were fairly original thoughts for me and for international relations at the time.

LE: You will be remembered for those and celebrated.

TGW: Probably the only real legacy one has, I think, is subsequent generations—not just your own children, but hopefully those too—but I mean professionally, having made a difference to the careers of younger people. While I am not somebody who lectures to thousands of people—in fact, that really doesn't interest me—I believe that I have made a difference to some students. More importantly, I think, through those years in ACUNS and elsewhere, I have gotten

fellowship funds started. I have gotten dissertation awards for people. I have gotten people jobs or internships in one place or another. So my guess is, in another fifteen or twenty years, when I look back, I hope some of them are still around and want to bullshit with me; and I certainly will be willing to let them buy me a Guinness. So my sense is that whatever ideas will still be kicking around, there will be more articulate or eloquent folks to take up the relay.

LE: You will be celebrated for substantive contributions on the one hand, and for human contributions on the other. It will be this younger generation having gone on that will still think of you and mention you. That is an interesting thing. But as you know, I have a suggestion for you. You might wish to sort out this whole human security business. But on the human security volume which we have, I think there is something to look into. If you don't do it, I will do it for the synthesis volume.

Alright now, is there anything in those long hours we have spent—although they went by very, very quickly and agreeably—is there anything I have not asked? When I mentioned that to Blanchard, he started on a two-hour thing.

TGW: We may not have spent enough time on those early years and my parents. It seems to me that my father was a perfectionist. There was nothing I ever wrote that he thought was good enough—or at least he did not admit it! I showed him things. He would always rewrite and rewrite it—and my staff thinks I use a lot of red ink! I even won a prize when I was in seventh or eighth grade—a fundraising prize. I wrote a mock letter for the Diocese of Detroit. There is a picture of me with the Archbishop giving me a check for \$25. My father still didn't think the essay was good enough. So there was a sense of continually trying to improve that I certainly got from him, and a sense of warmth and human kindness from my mother. And probably the combination thereof is a foundation of sorts. In any case, I am deeply thankful.

I left Detroit, however, because I felt threatened by what I viewed as limited horizons. I couldn't articulate this at the time, but I clearly voted with my feet. But as I look back, many of the things that happened—as we mentioned yesterday, happened for God knows what reason—but as I look back at both my decision to leave Detroit and the legacy of the Vietnam War, in a strange way I say, “I don't know who I am supposed to thank for this, but I feel grateful that I was able to take advantage of things that were in Detroit, but to get out and to take advantage of other opportunities I have been given.” I think for me, some of the saddest things have been going to a reunion, like my college reunion at five-year intervals. I am always struck that there are a lot of people for whom those magical college years were the highlight of their lives. I scratch my head and say, “Yes, I had a great time. It helped me to get to here and there. I met a lot of people, including my wife.” But I don't think, “My God, everything's been downhill since.” So for whatever reasons, whatever good fortune, one thing led to another. I've made decisions. Perhaps some of them weren't the right ones. But anyway, they mainly have worked out. So quite simply, I just feel grateful.

LE: I am convinced, after this interview, that your father had a strong influence on your sense of concentration, on your discipline. But why did he want you to become an economist? What was the reason behind that?

TGW: I think because he was a frustrated businessman. He is a guy who has a really fine mind. But he was never able to pursue education. The world he knew was business. That's what makes the world go round. Someone who had the opportunity to, I suppose, make a lot of money and do well in the corporate world and did not, to him that seemed shortsighted. Now that's why he felt passionately back in those days when I cavalierly left Lincoln-Mercury for \$50 a month in VISTA. I think he has now changed. My mother has always supported me, virtually

without question—that is the definition of a mother. But my father, I think, has come to peace with my decisions. He sees that I enjoy what I am doing.

LE: You have brothers or sisters, haven't you?

TGW: One brother and one sister.

LE: Are they doing well, too?

TGW: They are both in Detroit.

LE: You can do well in Detroit.

TGW: Well, my sister has married a couple of times, my brother once. They are both successful at what they have done professionally. But neither had my opportunities, and both feel strongly, I think that somehow I abandoned the Motor City and the family. I guess this is an accurate description in that I left because I felt there was a planet beyond the Detroit River.

LE: Well, you were right, and it is all to your advantage and the advantage of the UN and the world. I am not going to ask you when the UN appeared on your radar screen, and I am not going to ask you about Bandung (Asian-African Conference), as Richard encouraged me to do. So as far as I am concerned, if there is nothing else, this is the end of tape number four and the end of this interview. Thank you very much, Tom. Have a very good sixtieth birthday.

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