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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF

JOHN RUGGIE

BY

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Transcribed by Ron Nerio

THOMAS G. WEISS: This is tape number one, Tom Weiss interviewing John Ruggie here on the 38th floor, overlooking the historic Pepsi-Cola plant, accompanied by Tatiana Carayannis. John, good morning. I wonder if we could start more or less at the beginning, if you could tell us a bit about your upbringing, your parents' background, and the extent to which you think this influenced your own subsequent thinking about international affairs, cooperation, and the like.

JOHN RUGGIE: I'm not sure I have any profound answers to that question. I was born in Graz, Austria, in the fall of 1944, during the war, in fact, according to my mother, during a British bombing attack on our city, which prevented the doctor from showing up for my birth. But, fortunately, there was a midwife nearby. So all was well in the end. I come from a poor, working-class family. My parents were divorced when I was four. I think one of the strongest impressions of my childhood was being able to get out of our one-room flat, with no running water, and out of the city during the summer, which was made possible by the fact that I qualified for a summer camp subsidized by the labor unions. My family was a strong union family.

I do remember a couple of times being required to march on May 1. There were different factions of the left-of-center movement in Austria, and once I made the wrong turn on the way home and ran into the wrong faction, who could tell to which one I belonged by the emblem on my shirt, and who chased me down the street. So the cost of factionalism, even among people who pursue roughly similar goals, was certainly impressed on me at an early age.

When I was eleven, we moved to Canada. The biggest problem was that it took much longer for my parents to adjust than it did for me. The cultural gap between us, and the difficulty for them of adjusting to the new environment, was something that we all struggled with. Then,

leaving behind my second nationality, I came to graduate school in the United States in 1967, to Berkeley, California, right in the middle of all the fun. So, that's about it.

TGW: What was it like, if you can recall, becoming an immigrant? You said it was tougher for your folks than for you, yourself. Gerry Helleiner, who was born five years earlier and had something of the same itinerary, recalled wanting to play baseball instead of going to the opera, which seemed to be his parents' preoccupation. What do you recall from that period?

JR: Well, my parents didn't do opera. They didn't do much of anything by way of high culture. I did like to play soccer a lot, and I played hooky a fair amount to do so. But I think that the real challenge was that my mother had to work immediately. She cleaned houses for the first couple of years in Canada, without speaking a word of English. My sister was four at the time, and she had to be dragged along on these jobs. Just the sheer difficulty of getting up on our feet I think is what I remember the most about those early years.

TGW: Do you recall international cooperation, or the United Nations, or any of these things that have preoccupied you since, coming into the school curriculum, or even when you got to McMaster University?

JR: Well, even earlier, in Austria still, I had two back-to-back experiences. I can't remember exactly how much time there was between them. The first one, I must have been eight or nine, I went by train to visit some family relatives in Vienna, which was still under Soviet control. When the train got to the Semmering Pass, which was where the Soviet occupation zone began, it was like crossing an international frontier. I was by myself. The Russian soldiers, looking very intimidating wearing their bear hats and with their rifles slung over their shoulders, came on the train and started barking orders to see documents. I guess I got a little frightened

because for the next fifteen or twenty years, whenever I approached an international frontier my palms got moist. So that was one sort of geopolitical encounter.

Not long thereafter, there was a knock on the door of our flat, and we received a care package which had written on it, “From the people of the United States of America.” We opened it up and found Hershey bars, flour, and sugar, and some yellow powdery stuff that we couldn't identify, so we threw it out. I learned many years later, in the Army, that it was powdered eggs. That was a very different way to encounter the two superpowers. One frightened me, and the other, in a sense, provided positive incentives and help.

TGW: What pushed you in the direction of political science and history at McMaster? In fact, how did you get to McMaster?

JR: That was one of those choices in life that rested on a truly profound principle: I wanted to be away from home, but not so far that I couldn’t visit my girlfriend on the weekends (we've now been married for thirty-six years). McMaster was just the right distance. But it ended up being just right for me academically as well. I am not sure that I would have been quite ready for the University of Toronto, which was a bit more high-powered. But I got a very good education at McMaster—and last year they awarded me an honorary Doctor of Laws degree, so I guess they're OK with my having been there too. What led me into history, politics, and political-economy was, quite frankly, to try to make sense out of my own life: why the situation in which I found myself as a young boy existed; how it got to be that way; what the prospects were for overcoming those kinds of social, economic and political constraints; if other instances in history that were like this, and what happened. So I think it was part of a personal odyssey.

TGW: And what then led you to Berkeley?

JR: Harvard turned me down. So my joining the Harvard faculty now is all about revenge; I've told them I would have been much cheaper the first time around. That was the summer of 1967. There wasn't any place to go other than Berkeley in the summer of 1967. As it was, we gleefully took off to Berkeley. I was already married at the time. I wasn't exactly sure exactly where in California Berkeley was. We didn't have any means of getting there because we didn't have any money.

We had heard about these drive-away schemes, when somebody who is on vacation and has an accident has to get their car fixed, and then pays someone to bring the car. We found one in Toronto that went as far as Detroit, which was west. So we were on our way. And in Detroit we found one that went to La Jolla, which I assumed was right next door to Berkeley. We ended up in La Jolla wondering how the hell we were going to get to Berkeley. But eventually we made it.

TGW: What do you remember from those first classes at Berkeley?

JR: Absolute intimidation. Aaron Wildavsky was chairman of the political science department at the time. He had a reception for new graduate students. The first person I met was from Yale, and Yale University Press had published his B.A. thesis. The next three or four people were from Princeton and Harvard. One had published an article with his professor in one of the main political science journals. I thought, "Oh, my God. What am I doing here?"

But having by then had several opportunities to develop survival skills, it turned out not to be so bad. The faculty was mixed, but in IR (international relations) it was the best. But, the student body was extraordinary. My fellow graduate students were intellectually stunning. You couldn't have wanted a better set of peers to interact with and learn from than I had there.

TGW: And when you went there, the purpose was to become a scholar, an academic, figure things out, as you said. Were you ever tempted to become more of a practitioner?

JR: I sort of made choices, or non-choices, I guess I should say, at several points. In addition to applying to graduate school, I had applied to law school and business school. I got into Osgood Hall, which is a good law school in Canada, and the University of Western Ontario Business School, which is the best in Canada. But going to either would have required making a commitment that narrowed the field of play. I think it was more because I wasn't prepared to do that, that I went on to graduate school, not because I knew that I wanted to be a researcher and teacher. But not going on to some kind of graduate school never figured, because the one thing I learned growing up the way I did was that you wanted to go on in school absolutely as far as you could, so that you wouldn't have to struggle in life the way my parents did.

TGW: When, during the course of your studies, did multilateralism, or cooperation, or the United Nations, become a central focus? And why?

JR: I think more or less from the beginning. The first professor I encountered, and the mentor I remain closest to even to this day, was Ernie Haas. He, as you know, was a student of multilateralism, of international transformation, and of the relationship between multilateralism and change in the world system. While I never bought into his specific formulations, the kinds of questions he asked—how did the system of nation-states get here? Where is it going? And what is driving that? I found those questions fascinating, then and now.

At the same time, among many of my peers—by Berkeley standards, I was a relative centrist in terms of political orientation; at Berkeley almost everybody was on my left—there was a lot of provocative thinking going on that drew on various strands of neo-Marxism, about the functioning of the world economy and what drives changes in it. The study of multinational

corporations was beginning. I never bought into the underlying historical materialism of the work, but the questions always interested me and were very complementary to questions I was asking. So the relationship between the state system and the global economy, which is something I do today in a very practical way, I did sort of abstractly and intellectually as far back as 1967.

TGW: When you finished, you stayed in the United States. Was there any particular reason to do that, or were the opportunities better?

JR: The opportunities here were far more exciting. My first job offer came from Berkeley itself.

TGW: And, amongst these opportunities—I don't think we'll run through all of them—there was one interesting thing that pops out, which is that you are oftentimes visiting somewhere else, or affiliated somewhere else, or you're here but you're not. Why do you find that attractive, and how do you think this reflects on your own work?

JR: I guess I just can't keep a steady job.

TGW: When you're in California, you're in Beijing. And when you're at Columbia, you're in Tokyo.

JR: For one thing, I love to travel. I like to experience different places. I think for somebody who does what I do, either as an academic or a practitioner, it is extremely important to get some sense of how people elsewhere view the thing that you are looking at. Here at the UN, that has become second nature. But it wasn't second nature for a young academic in California. You literally had to remove yourself and go somewhere else—to realize how differently the Chinese viewed U.S.-Soviet relations from the way in which Americans viewed them, for instance.

TGW: I'm going to fast-forward just a minute while we're on the academy. To what extent did you think things you were writing had an influence on people in this building, or other similar buildings, when you were in the academy? And now what would you say the impact of scholarship, or theory, is on practitioners? When does it infiltrate, and why?

JR: Actually, it is much more problematic than I ever would have dreamed. In retrospect, I am embarrassed by some of the things that I used to do, like sending somebody, who is in public office, a book, as if that person ever had time to read a book. Or sending papers off to them and suggesting that answers they were seeking to their problems could be found in these thirty-four pages if they only worked at it hard enough. The influence of outside thinking on policy is far more problematic.

The most direct carrier, obviously, is people. There is no substitute for doing what I am doing here at the UN: simply leaving the one world and entering the other world. You bring with you ideas, and there is a contagion effect among the people you're working with. For example, I can trace back some of our early ideas here in the secretary-general's office that led to the Global Compact. I can trace that back to my "embedded liberalism" article in 1982. The first time I gave that article to some of my colleagues, they had absolutely no idea what I was talking about. But after a while, going back and forth in a dynamic way, there was that contagion effect. And, of course, I learned enormously from them in the process, because they saw the institution and the system from a gears and wheels point of view, from the inside.

So individuals are the most important direct carriers. Seminars and conferences that policymakers attend can also be important carriers, particularly if they happen to be struggling with a problem at the time and luck has it that you're addressing that problem. The critical issue there is an issue of framing, however. It is rare that an academic frames a problem in the same

way as a policymaker frames it. The differences in framing may well inhibit any impact, even though they are focusing on similar things. But if you are lucky enough, and you frame the issue in a way that is meaningful and useful to the policymaker, then direct interaction in seminar settings also can be extremely helpful.

What I mean by framing is that you can lock up Kofi Annan with Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* forever, and there won't be much cross-fertilization, because the way Waltz frames international politics is not very useful to a Secretary-General of the United Nations. That is because whatever levers the Secretary-General has available are not instrumentalities featured in the realist paradigm. Understanding balance-of-power politics in a sophisticated way—while it may help orient overall thinking in a certain way—doesn't help you make specific choices or pursue specific courses of action if you are sitting in that office. It might be different if you are sitting in the White House. There you have more of the levers that the theory requires for its effects to be produced. In contrast, being an originator of so-called constructivist theory was pretty good preparation for me here in Kofi Annan's office. Both deal with norms and identities, and how they may come to shape interest and behavior. So the framing issue is critically important. Frankly, I don't think academics pay enough attention to it when they talk about the policy impact of theoretical or conceptual ideas.

TGW: What about younger staff in the policymaking community? Do they have any responsibility for doing simultaneous interpretations or translations of any of this?

JR: It is beginning to change, but the problem is that younger staff at the UN typically do not have enough responsibility to use what they know. They are much closer to the world of ideas having just recently come out graduate school. Typically, though, they do more mundane and mechanical kinds of jobs. And by the time they do rise in the hierarchy to more of a

policymaking position, they are dated themselves. This is beginning to change in the UN. And it is very different on the personal staff of this Secretary-General. Each of the major departments now has small policy planning units. And typically young staff members staff them. I think the reason that was done is precisely to acknowledge their utility in knowledge transmission.

TGW: Would one of the solutions then be to have a whole lot more back-and-forth between the academy and the United Nations or other policymaking communities?

JR: Yes, but it has to involve a fair bit of time. I initially signed up for one year. I had a lot of fun the first year, but, with one exception, I don't think I had any serious impact on the organization. I rewrote some reports. They became better reports as a result, but the really important things I ended up doing came later, when I understood the organization well enough. The one exception was my work on Kofi Annan's reform project during the first year, where my effectiveness in part resulted from my *not* being immersed in all the bureaucratic constraints.

TGW: Do you think that, from this floor or on other floors in the building, that journals have a direct or an indirect influence on ideas? Or maybe I'll ask the question another way. When do journals actually help in the production of ideas internally?

JR: Very senior policymakers don't have time to read journals articles. They can read op-eds. We get daily newspaper clippings, and they always include a cross-section from around the world of op-eds about something important that has just happened or is about to happen. The senior policymakers here read those clippings religiously. And they do learn from them. The Secretary-General frequently sends an op-ed around on which he has scribbled: "Can you follow up and find out more about this?" So, even somebody as busy as he is reads your 700-word piece, but not long journal articles.

As part of my job, when I've come across a journal article or even book that I thought was really terrific, and which related to an issue that I knew that the SG [Secretary-General] was deeply engaged in, and we were looking to develop a strategy for, I would summarize it for him. The summary would be one-page bullet-point. And it would always include how this related to what we are grappling with. So that kind of link exists.

TGW: From the outside, when you saw products of the UN, did you usually dismiss them? When it has a blue cover, or the equivalent, there is a distinct tendency to dismiss these as self-congratulatory. Would you look at these differently next week or next year, now that you have been in here?

JR: Well, this sounds like bragging, but most of the reports that have come out of the Secretary-General's office in the last four years are very different from reports in previous administrations. I think in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's time, the *Agenda for Peace* was very interesting. There were serious flaws in it, but it was provocative. But that was the exception, rather than the rule.

In the last few years, whether it is the report on Africa, or the Millennium Report (*We, the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*), or Srebrenica, or Rwanda, these are very serious policy documents that are analytical at the same time as they are prescriptive. They relate overall trends to particular policy recommendations. The policy recommendations are grounded in actual experience and analytical understanding. And they have been honest—sometimes brutally. So I think the quality of the documents, most of them in any case, that have the Secretary-General's name on them, is considerably higher. At least that is what we hear from delegations, and it is my own impression. If the quality keeps up, I'm sure I'll keep reading them.

TGW: I would like to go back to your first direct encounter with a bureaucracy—either the UNEP (UN Environment Programme) or the Office of Science and Technology, where you were a consultant in the late 1970s. How did you get there, and what were your impressions at that juncture, as a recently-minted Ph.D. encountering the things you had been studying for a long time? Can you recall that?

JR: Well, actually, I think the first serious encounter was back in June 1972, when I went to the Stockholm environment conference (UN Conference on the Human Environment) as an NGO (nongovernmental organization) representative. I lived in Geneva in 1971 during the preparatory phase, doing research for my Ph.D. thesis. I befriended several people in the Secretariat and in some of the delegations who were working on the prepcom. I got to know Maurice Strong then, who was the organizer of the conference. So the UN environment conference, and then UNEP, were initial case studies for me. I don't know what the vocabulary was at the time, but in retrospect it is clear that the intention—it never worked out that way in practice—but the intention was to construct a somewhat different approach to international organization. Today, we would call it a network-based, rather than a bureaucracy-based, approach.

Maurice Strong clearly had in mind a model whereby UNEP would basically manage networks from some set of central nodes. Where those locations were didn't matter very much. But in order to do that, in order to have a system of cooperation based on interacting networks, you need to have very clear objectives. And the various actors need to share those objectives. You need to have a sufficient resource base to help build up the constituents of the network. None of those conditions ended up holding for UNEP, and it sort of sank into the morass of Nairobi, where it has been since.

That model of organization is something that is much more intuitively graspable by most people today. We may want to talk about the Global Compact later. It is very much a network-based model, rather than an approach that seeks to centralize into a bureaucracy the things that need to be done.

TGW: In 1971 and 1972, and in the period since—one of the things that we are trying to determine whether it makes a difference—is the importance of blockbuster reports. In that time, the Club of Rome and the environment, and subsequently Palme (*Common Security: A Programme for Survival*), Brundtland (*Our Common Furture*)—it goes on and on. We could generalize about all of those, but I am wondering whether we could just stick with Stockholm for a minute. To what extent does a major study—this one by a group of fuzzy-headed people from MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), but other ones that have more political visibility—make a difference?

JR: I think the Club of Rome report (*The Limits of Growth*) is a good example. It was a mixed blessing, as are many reports like that. On the one hand, they often encapsulate a particular set of problems in a way that is very useful for social mobilization and activist purposes. They have a relatively simple approach that allows you to grasp a complex reality that you, as a citizen, only vaguely understood before. Now, all of a sudden, it is put together in a nice, coherent package. That is essential for mobilization purposes, which has spillover effects on the policymaking process.

The downside of that particular report, and some others like it, is that they have been wrong—badly so in the Club of Rome case. So they also trigger a backlash. The Club of Rome report was patently wrong and triggered a generation of resistance to environmental doom and gloom theories, some of which were right! Think of the debates today on global warming.

People who reject the scientific consensus on global warming will invariably say, "The people who brought you the Club of Rome report in 1972 now bring you the global warming scare." As Julian Simon likes to call his books, *We Have More of Everything*; and *Things are Better than Ever*—I'm loosely paraphrasing the titles of his recent books.

Similarly with the Global Governance report, *Our Global Neighborhood*—there was a lively academic discussion at the time, as you know, about the notion of governance without government. That fed directly into the report. The concept certainly had some public resonance and helped some people understand something that they hadn't quite understood before. But on the other side of the political spectrum, on the right, the distinction between governance and government was completely lost, and the report became a rallying cry against world government.

So there are often two sides to some of these reports. On the one hand, they can be very helpful in bringing together a coherent vision. On the other hand, they also can trigger a backlash, which can be equally powerful, often more so than the report itself. We have to learn better how to craft these things. It's the issue of framing again.

TGW: What about the importance of conferences as a dynamic? Stockholm was the first of the modern version of global gatherings, which some folks dismiss as jamborees. We tend to think that, at least on occasion, they have made a difference. The Millennium Summit report actually conveyed the sense that the conferences of the 1990s laid a solid foundation of goals and action plans. To the extent that you are comfortable about generalizing, when do these conferences do that? And when do they fall flat?

JR: I think many of the conferences, going back to 1972, were very useful as agenda-setting devices, putting things firmly on the international agenda. Even if the action plans never fully materialized, issues became better defined. Secondly, they provided a venue around which

social groups who cared about the issues could coalesce. They helped generate transnational networks of social groups in the different issue areas, whether it was environment or women or human rights. I think that was very useful. Thirdly, they affected at least the structure of the domestic policymaking process, if not always the content. Before Stockholm, there were relatively few environment ministries in the world. As a result of having to prepare for Stockholm and then having to follow-up on it, governments created environment ministries. To a certain extent, UNEP's rationale as an organization was to provide a platform through which these could remain linked and contribute to capacity-building in areas where it was weak.

So from a process point of view, and from an agenda-setting point of view, the conferences were extremely useful. But, I think we have overdone it now. The plus-five phenomenon is out of hand. It is even getting dangerous because in several recent instances attempts were made to roll back the things that were actually agreed to at earlier conferences, rather than to build on them. The whole thing by now has become quite formulaic, having lost its creative impulse. This means that the innovativeness that went along with some of the earlier ones is long since gone. The routinized plus-five phenomenon should be abolished, and the sooner the better.

But new challenges will arise—for example, the upcoming special session on AIDS. It should have the kind of catalytic effect that an environment conference in 1972 had. In many places, HIV/AIDS as a policy issue is still poorly defined. In many countries, policymakers would rather not talk about it. But preparing for the AIDS conference forces them to have a position and pushes the domestic wheels a bit in the right direction. It leads people like the Harvard group to come up with innovative ideas. It gets Bills Gates animated, to see what he can contribute.

So by holding these things selectively in emerging areas of concern I think conferences will remain a useful tool going forward. It is one of the tools the international community as a whole has of defining its common policy domain. Otherwise, there wouldn't be any. The General Assembly, as a routine matter, cannot do those things. Theoretically, it should be able to. But the way in which it functions, it cannot.

TGW: You mentioned the morass of Nairobi. When was your first experience in developing countries? Was it in this period?

JR: Yes. Actually, I first went to Nairobi in the mid-1970s to see what UNEP was up to.

TGW: Did that have any direct influence, not only on the way you looked at the environment and UN bureaucracies, but did the encounter with something non-European influence the way you thought about issues, or thought about what the UN could or couldn't do?

JR: I was preoccupied with UNEP at the time. And as much as I appreciated the desirability of locating a UN agency in a developing country, I thought that UNEP was the one agency that should not have been. If any agency should have been in a major UN center—Geneva or one of the European capitals—it should have been UNEP. You couldn't then, and cannot now, coordinate fast-moving networks from places that lack the communication and other infrastructure, and that are so far removed from the thing they are supposed to be coordinating. But that is water under the bridge.

In terms of my concerns with issues related to poverty, you cannot compare the type of poverty you see in Africa and South Asia with what I grew up with. But I had a certain sensitivity to it all the same.

TGW: On the 38th floor, to what extent are economic and social issues important? In Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's own autobiography—and we can find instances of it elsewhere—there

are statements to the effect that there has been inadequate leadership on the part of the Secretary-General, and the UN Secretariat, in placing the UN at the forefront of economic thinking. And when you weigh any of these autobiographies, if you were weighing security against anything else, security accounts for probably 95 or 98 percent of the text. Is that inevitable? Is that just the nature of the office?

JR: It is in the nature of the office, but it is not inevitable. What I mean by that is that in any political organization the crisis of the day is going to dominate the staff meetings and the time of the chief executive. That is just a given. There is nothing much you can do about it. But at the same time, if your economic and social policy area is well staffed it doesn't require that much from the Secretary-General, except general strategic guidance, such as, "What do you want to say about the new trade round? What key trade-offs do you want to stress? Or, if there is an LDC (least developed countries) conference, how far do you want to push the issue of trade access and debt relief?" But then what you most need is a staff that comes back with good policy proposals. In fact, it should be easier to do that in the social and economic area because you usually have lead-time, which you don't have in crisis management. Crisis management is what this place normally does on a day-to-day basis—people are literally running around with cables in their hands. It is very difficult to do long-term strategic thinking under those kinds of pressures.

In the social and economic realm, you have the lead-time. What you need is to have a Secretary-General who is interested, which this one is. And to have a critical mass of staff—it doesn't have to be large—that can formulate and polish his instincts, his intuitions and ideas, and get him to sign off on proposals, and go out and do something with them.

There are many reasons why it doesn't happen as often as it should. One is that Secretaries-General in the past have had little interest in economic issues. They haven't understood economic issues, and they haven't much cared about them, except politically or in a mushy moral way. This Secretary-General is different. Another difference is that we now have a deputy-secretary-general, and the way in which the division of labor has worked out she has responsibility and a couple of posts related to development and financing for developing. So we have some capacity here. I have frequently weighed in as well. So this administration is somewhat different.

There is a deeper institutional problem at work as well. In the crisis management area, the departments of political affairs and peacekeeping serve the needs of the Secretary-General well because they are geared in part to his role in those areas, which are pretty well defined. They know what he is after. While the quality may not always be up to standards one would wish, the substance is usually there. That is less true in the economic and social area. The main department (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is organized more narrowly to service the intergovernmental machinery. Reports to diplomats discussing the politics of economic and social issues in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or the Second Committee of the General Assembly are very different from the intellectual and policy needs of the Secretary-General sitting on the 38th floor.

So there are some institutional disconnects that we haven't managed to overcome yet. Frankly, in this administration, when we have needed to develop new policy initiatives in the economic and social area, they have come from this department or from outsiders.

TGW: Actually, it struck me while you were speaking that earlier you had said "events." It could be a report. It could be a global conference—like the LDC conference in Brussels in

May. They provide an opportunity to help redefine the way we define issues. It also makes visible, for a moment anyway, new coalitions who have come together. But what you have just said is that it also helps provide a gimmick, I guess, for people here and elsewhere to put forward their own ideas. So, in some ways, if they are done well, it can push officials to make statements or put issues on the agenda that have fallen off largely due to inertia. Is that correct?

JR: Yes, that's right.

TGW: In your own writings about governance and globalization and multilateralism, you have talked in and around regimes, and reciprocity. How do they look now, after three years here?

JR: Four.

TGW: Four. I'm losing track. What have been the UN's real success stories in putting together governance regimes?

JR: On the day the Secretary-General announced to the press that if governments wanted him to serve a second term, he was available. Richard Roth from CNN (Cable News Network) asked him, "What makes you think you deserve a second term?" The Secretary-General was a bit taken aback at first; then he said, "You know, it is not a matter of deserving it. But here is what I think we have accomplished in the first term. And here is where I think we need to build on that in the second term."

It is interesting that he mentioned only three things about the first term. I'm sure he thinks others are also important, but he didn't mention them. The first was institutional reform. The second was partnerships with non-state actors, and the Global Compact in particular. The third one was the Millennium Summit report, and the summit itself. I was tickled that he mentioned those because I had worked on all three. But I think the reason he mentioned them is

that he really defines his own legacy in terms of the strategic repositioning of the United Nations to be a more effective tool for not only states but for people more broadly, in a new globalized world. The reform effort sought, to the extent that it was under his control, to create a rational management structure and culture in the house that would be responsive to his people-centered agenda.

The Millennium Summit and the report to the summit got our political masters mobilized behind a set of substantive priorities, things that we ought to be doing out there in the real world. And the Global Compact, and private-public partnerships in general, is his attempt to provide a platform for all the relevant social actors—not only governments, but civil society actors, the private sectors and others—to align themselves behind UN goals. "All hands on deck," as he likes to say. So these were not simply three unrelated things that he happened to do in his first term. They were very much part of his own sense of what it takes to strategically reposition the United Nations so that it can become more effective. If the UN fails to do those things, it will be marginalized and it won't be much good to anybody.

Now, to the extent that I helped him translate his intuitions into words or action proposals, certainly I drew on the intellectual baggage that I carried with me. If it had not been for that intellectual baggage, I don't know precisely how these things would have evolved.

TGW: Why don't we stay with the Global Compact for a minute? Is it possible to trace when this came up, in what context, and why? We are trying to get our fingers on the process, and this idea gives us a chance to see it through your eyes from the beginning to the end. How did it emerge and then get massaged, so to speak, to be presented to states?

JR: Well, the Secretary-General's instinctive desire to reach out to the private sector and to get them mobilized in support of UN goals was there from the beginning. He was a Sloan

Fellow at MIT. He was there for a year with people from the private sector and has always had a fair amount to do with people in the private sector. I think he looked at the numbers and saw that the year he took office FDI (foreign direct investment) exceeded ODA (overseas development assistance) flows by a factor of six. He couldn't figure out a way to get ODA multiplied by six in any reasonable timeframe. So he reached the conclusion that we have to be able to redirect, to some extent, the capacities, not only financial but also managerial and technological, in the private sector if we are going to meet our goals, especially the development goals. But more than that, he saw that the private sector had truly global reach, that it thought and acted in global terms.

Secondly, I should also attribute to him an understanding that the world needed to do much more to respond to certain social issues, including human rights and environmental concerns, but that pushing them onto the WTO (World Trade Organization) agenda was highly dangerous. I think he understood instinctively that they lend themselves too easily to becoming protectionist vehicles. And if they did, the developing countries would be the first to suffer. Those were broad understandings that he didn't need anybody to tell him.

Toward the end of 1998, he was considering whether or not to accept an invitation to go to Davos. We talked about it, and he said, "I went last year. I don't have to go this year. But if you think we can put a major challenge to the business community, then I will consider it." The Davos meeting was in January 1999. The first time the world heard about the Global Compact was in that Davos speech. It was essentially a critique of globalization as we knew it, arguing that among its major attributes today, globalization exhibits unacceptable patterns of inequality, both within and among countries. Secondly, there are fundamental asymmetries in global rulemaking that privilege intellectual property rights, for example, over fundamental human

rights or environmental threats. That sort of rulemaking asymmetry is not sustainable, he warned. Thirdly, he sensed a growing fear among people of a loss of control, accountability, and even identity.

He essentially said, ten months before Seattle, that, "If you, the business community, do not do something about these, globalization will trigger a backlash. And you are going to suffer from that backlash. Governments are not going to react fast enough. They are under all sorts of constraints. It is in your long-term interest to act. You benefit more from globalization than anybody else. It is in your own enlightened self-interest to begin to behave like good global citizens. Do not wait for governments to pass more laws. You can make a big difference by promoting human rights, labor rights, and environmental principles in your own corporate domains."

That was the Davos speech. The reaction was so positive that we were compelled to make a program out of it. That's when we started to think seriously about which specific UN principles we would seek to promote: where they would come from, how they should be defined, how we would link it all together. Today we have a set of human rights principles and Mary Robinson is on board. She has to carry the ball on human rights. But, in fact Mary wasn't fully on board at the beginning. She was under enormous pressure from human rights NGOs to attack companies, not to work with them. The ILO (International Labour Organization) was more or less on board although in the typical ILO tripartite fashion, which means you don't deal with business, you deal with business associations because that's what the ILO constitution says. UNEP was very excited because they had worked with companies in the energy and chemical industries in particular. They had the experience of the ozone protocol negotiations and so forth.

So gradually we fleshed out a program, defined nine principles that we adapted from UN declarations that governments had adopted by consensus,* and allocated responsibility. We realized that what we were trying to do here, essentially, was to provide little pockets of voluntary global governance, if you will, in areas that were underdeveloped. The Secretary-General has considerable legitimacy, but he cannot claim to represent popular roots. So we brought in organized labor and NGOs. It became a partnership between the UN, the business community, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and about a dozen or so NGOs in environment and human rights.

Once the package was put together, then we worked out collaboratively what exactly we wanted the companies to do and who was going to play what roles.

TGW: Were there alternative ideas kicking around for that same speech, or in reaction to the speech, that were set aside? And why? Were the ideas better, or the people weaker? What else was going on at the same time?

JR: There were no substitutable ideas. Let me put it that way. There were concerns expressed that the SG was moving too fast in reaching out to the business community. And at the beginning we didn't have a well-defined role for labor or NGOs. The Davos speech was a challenge to the business community. It was only afterwards when we worked to translate it into a program that we realized that if this was going to become a reality it had to enjoy popular social roots. We couldn't provide those by ourselves. We needed to tap into groups that can legitimately claim to represent popular roots. The ICFTU represents 150 million workers, which I never stop reminding some of our four-person activist group critics.

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* The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The ILO Declaration on Core Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development.

TGW: There are always reactions to ideas. You mentioned earlier the reaction to the Club of Rome report. There has been some negative reaction to this idea of the Global Compact. Do you think that on balance it is just going to fade away?

JR: No. It is not going to fade away. In fact, there is an anti-corporate group—it's called Corporate Watch—that has formed an NGO alliance, at first against the Global Compact, but they have now broadened their attack to UN private-public partnerships in general. Essentially, their slogan is that they want to save the UN from corporate takeover. What's interesting is that this is really just the tip of the iceberg of a very, very important development in civil society. A major cleavage is emerging between NGOs that have actual responsibilities on the ground, whether it is Amnesty in human rights, or Greenpeace in the environment, or Save the Children, or what have you, and pure activist groups. The NGOs that have actual responsibility on the ground almost invariably have decided that they cannot do what they need to do if they haven't worked out some sort of relationship with the private sector. There are just too many resources there and too much capacity to ignore. So Amnesty has developed—I don't know whether they are calling it a division, or an office—to deal with corporate partnerships.

The anti-globalization activist groups, of course, aren't doing that, because their whole rationale is to oppose what they call "corporate globalization." So, some of the NGOs that are in the Global Compact feel a little heat from their brethren. It is not their fault, and it's not our fault. It's just something that's happening. Some of the anti-globalization groups, from a purely rational standpoint, can't afford to have the Global Compact succeed because it undermines their very reason for existing. So from a self-interest point of view, I certainly understand their position. And no, they're not going to go away. They're going to be around. I don't think they're getting any larger, but they're certainly vocal and they send a lot of emails. And we've

learned from them. Besides, without external pressure the companies would feel less reason to change.

TGW: I think that part of the conception of this project is of the UN as an incubator, of sorts, of ideas. Some of these ideas challenge orthodoxy. The question is: whose orthodoxy? It seems to me that this is one of those instances where you could argue that you are going against civil society orthodoxy; and at other points, the United Nations has to go against corporate orthodoxy. What kind of courage is required to do this on the 38th floor?

JR: Well, the Global Compact is probably the most complex political undertaking that I have ever been involved in. You have, first of all the UN itself—you know the stories about the UN, its internal divisions, and the difficulties it has in overcoming them. The Global Compact is a partnership with the ILO, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNEP and UNDP (UN Development Programme), which leads the country-level efforts. So we have four UN agencies and the Secretary-General's office. That, in itself, requires lots of managing and massaging.

Then we have the business community. But there isn't one business community. There are many business communities. They break down in terms of various business cultures. American companies are quite different from European companies. High tech American companies are very different from old economy companies. Some companies—BP, for example—have been in the corporate social responsibility game for a long time. BP has a planning horizon of about twenty to twenty-five years. Their current business model projects them transitioning into the renewable sources of energy business at some point in that timeframe. So the thinking they have done about where they need to be, and how to get there, and what the implications of that are for environment issues, for example, is light years away from other

companies in the same industry, like ExxonMobil, which remains a dinosaur on global climate change. This also suggests that leadership within the companies is a critical factor.

It is hard enough to juggle the UN and business components, but then you add in the civil society component. The human rights organizations still don't like the idea that Shell is a participant in the Global Compact, because of Nigeria. The environmental groups will say it doesn't make any sense to have a Global Compact that seeks to have business promote environmental issues that doesn't have Shell in it.

Labor has turned out to be the least problematic. They have moved faster than anybody else to use the compact productively, to promote both their and our agenda. They are used to bargaining and trade-offs. They are used to taking a half a loaf today if there is a prospect of coming back and getting more tomorrow. They have been doing this for more than 100 years. And they are much better at it than most civil society organizations. So labor hasn't been terribly problematic. There are a couple of things that they don't want us to do or say, and as long as we stay on message they are OK. But it is an extraordinarily complicated thing.

Conceptually, it is almost impossible to represent the full activities of the Global Compact, either in written form or diagrammatically. It has generated so much activity, at so many different levels. For example, some of our Scandinavian companies have decided that the rest are moving too slow for them. They want to go out front with new issues. So we have got this whole new diversity at the workplace effort going on in Scandinavia. A strategic planning group for the City of Melbourne in Australia has adapted the compact and is running with it. At the other end of the development scale we have Indian companies who have decided that they really like this idea and they want to replicate it at the national level in India.

Then you have the core institutional components of the Global Compact. The most important one for promoting corporate social responsibility is what we call the learning forum. That is also the major area of disagreement, by the way, with NGO critics. They want the Global Compact to be a legally binding code of conduct, like the UN's transnationals code was supposed to be. The model that we have selected is not a regulatory model; it is a learning model. What we want companies to do is to share with us, at least once a year, a significant set of steps they have taken to implement the commitment to general principles into corporate management practices. The submission of that case study then becomes the subject of a social dialogue, between the company and other companies, labor, and the NGO partners, to try to shape this into best practices. Then we establish an inventory of best practices on our website, and we promote them. We tell reporters that if you want a good source of information of what the best practices are for implementing the principle of non-complicity in human rights abuses into corporate behavior, go to this website. Through the power of transparency we hope that good practices over time will help drive out bad ones. That is the model that we are pushing. That learning forum already involves several business schools just to manage the cases. Somebody has got to put the cases together into comparable terms. There is so much activity going on as part of the Global Compact that it is almost mind-boggling to think that a small handful of people here, in the Secretary-General's office, are managing the process.

The thing to stress is that what we are doing is managing networks. Our job is to maintain quality control and strategic coherence. It is not to do the doing. The minute we start trying to become operational here in the SG's office, we get into trouble. We don't have the capacity. In business terms, we are managing the brand. Nike doesn't make sneakers. It manages the brand.

TGW: If one thinks back over the history of the UN's involvement with corporations, this is a major change. What would have been the threshold here? Or, how would you explain what really is a 180, or 179 degree difference? The idea that was driving the Centre for Transnational Corporations, before it was dismantled and moved to Geneva to keep it out of the way, was quite different from this. How did the UN's culture change, and when?

JR: The collapse of communism, and domestic reforms in developing countries, and an appreciation that you can't do much without the private sector. I've witnessed the change even in a matter of weeks. On general principle, India was deeply suspicious of this effort at first. When we held our meeting in Bombay (Mumbai) last December, twenty-two or twenty-four Indian CEOs showed up. They then told the Indian government what they were planning to do with this. When word got back to their UN mission, they became one of our staunchest supporters. So we are doing everything possible to promote activity in key developing countries. We even have a project starting up in China in the area of labor rights, believe it or not. That will blow you away, since there aren't a whole lot of labor rights in China. But we discovered one that they are willing to address—the problems faced by handicapped workers in the workplace, of whom there are 150 million in China. And our local champion is Deng Xiaoping's son, who, as you may recall, was thrown out of a window during the Cultural Revolution and is a paraplegic. He moves around in his wheelchair promoting the project.

TGW: Certain people are not persuaded that ideas are important. It seems to me this is a fairly good illustration of what happens to a variety of bureaucracies when something, sometimes good or sometimes bad from their point of view, hits the radar screen. It is not really an idea; it may be a mechanism. But the Millennium Summit—presumably there were lots of ways to think about celebrating the year 2000—when did this particular sort of approach come up, and why

was it adopted? How did the bureaucracy react to the possibility of holding it? Were there other processes that were on the table as a possible way of proceeding?

JR: Frankly, most people, including member states, were horrified by what we proposed to do. The only thing we had going for us was that everyone agreed that, whatever we did, it shouldn't be like the 50th anniversary, which everyone thought was an absolute flop that accomplished nothing, wasted two years, cost a bunch of money, and in the end produced a turd of a document which even the people who drafted it couldn't remember. Even people who didn't like what we were proposing agreed that we should not have a replay of the 50th anniversary.

But as far as the Secretary-General was concerned, he knew what we wanted to do as far back as early 1997. It was baked into his June 1997 reform report. I remember in the fall of 1997, when I was defending the reform proposals in the General Assembly—the General Assembly turned itself into an informal session, so there were interactive sessions to review various provisions in his reform report—they wanted to throw this one out. I fought tooth and nail to keep it in. We always knew that the summit was the second big step in the reform effort. The first focused on bureaucratic processes and creating an organization that was more flexible, responsive, and better managed. But it didn't address the substantive priorities of the organization. That required mobilizing member states' political support. For us those two were always linked. And the Millennium Summit was always seen as the opportunity for the second.

TGW: In this world of ideas, and in the world of conferences—and you have mentioned now several times NGOs and civil society—what do you think the impact of the burgeoning of civil society has been on the way officials in this institution view the institution and its products?

What kinds of ideas are coming from out there in here? What kind of pressure is being exerted? And how open are officials to these ideas?

JR: There isn't a general answer to that question. NGOs and the UN interact most effectively, or act together most effectively, in the pursuit of concrete mandates—in the humanitarian areas, in human rights, in peacekeeping, in the World Food Programme (WFP), in natural disaster responses—when you have a clearly defined mission on the ground in which the NGOs are equal partners in defining how best to do that, and then going ahead and doing it. The UN would have to shut down some of its activities if it weren't in partnership with NGOs in many of these areas.

Here at headquarters, it's a little bit different because the NGOs that gather here tend not to be field-oriented. What they really want here is to have access to the policymaking process of the organization as a whole, specifically the General Assembly. Whereas the Secretary-General has been, as you know, very supportive of closer relationship between the UN and civil society organizations, most member states, most of the time, have been deeply resistant to getting them involved in the policy process. Yes, we will have hearings and they can express their views, briefly and late in the evening. And yes, if there is a natural disaster somewhere they ought to be there. But the intergovernmental mechanisms are intergovernmental mechanisms.

So the big issue here, at headquarters, is how to square the circle of wanting to be more open to NGOs but maintaining the boundaries of intergovernmental governance. It varies by issue area too. The U.S. will say, "Oh, yes, civil society actors are wonderful," until you begin to discuss issues related to disarmament or arms control. Then they want them to go away. Every set of countries has its uses for NGOs. The other problem is that NGOs at UN

headquarters tend to be overwhelmingly northern NGOs. That poses a real problem for some of the developing country governments.

TGW: So as you look at the future then, you see greater room for cooperation at the operational level, solving problems, and about the same level of discomfort in intergovernmental processes?

JR: That's right. As the number of NGOs continues to grow rapidly there are even going to be more mundane problems. We are running out of physical space. If NGOs want to give a presentation in the Commission for Sustainable Development for example, they are going to have to figure out ways of choosing representatives, which they are, by and large, incapable of doing at this time. So the whole problem of representation, and therefore accountability, among NGOs is an issue that has yet to be resolved. It is not for us to resolve. They are going to have to figure that one out themselves. At headquarters, I see the relationship going forward as being fairly bumpy because there aren't any obvious solutions.

TGW: I was thinking, during part of this conversation, that our sidekick Jim Rosenau talks about this "bifurcated" world, and that with fragmentation and integration, this plays to the UN's favor. Do you agree with that?

JR: In what way?

TGW: He argues that the world of the future will indeed be one which the UN can take advantage of, solving problems and relating to fragmented groups, as well as trying to help set norms and rules at the global level. Some people disagree violently. I just wondered whether you thought that made sense.

JR: I guess I don't see the bifurcation as clearly. The Global Compact, for example, is a response to globalization. But it is internally differentiated, in so many different ways,

depending upon which company, which industry, which part of the world. In fact, I think companies are beginning to discover that while certain aspects of their operations can be global, there are others that can only be local or national or possibly regional, depending on circumstances. I read in the papers not long ago that Coke, which has a universally recognized brand, has recently decided that they have to back off on their global advertising campaigns, because they just aren't working. So, the most universally recognized of brands is going to be sold in highly differentiated ways in different markets, to be more responsive to the identities and preferences of different consumers. The slogan, "think global, act local," has been around for a while.

TGW: Lots of folks argue that globalization is nothing new. In your own writing, I don't think that's the way you would see it. How do you define globalization, and what do you think—the Global Compact is one instance—but what exactly has been the impact of this conceptual framework on the way individuals within the institution frame development issues?

JR: You asked two different questions.

TGW: The people at Columbia's oral history department said I should never ask two questions.

JR: There was a Victorian era of globalization. And in some respects, particularly macro-statistics—percentage of capital exported by Britain in the last third of the nineteenth century, for example—it was as high, and sometimes higher, than the comparable figures today. But there are a number of fundamental differences which make our era quite unique. For one thing, two thirds of the world that we now recognize as countries were, at that time, under colonial control. We are dealing with independent countries today. That is a fairly significant difference.

In the Victorian era, in most of the industrialized countries the working people were just barely in the process of getting organized and making their demands felt in the political arena. That made it relatively easy for a country like Britain to be on the gold standard and to allow the economy to contract or expand depending on its balance of payments. These days you can't do that, because people are organized politically and resist being the adjustment mechanism of your external balance. So you are confronting a lot more political complexity today than you did then, which makes the whole thing much difficult.

On the purely economic side, much of the investment flows in the later nineteenth century were portfolio investment, as opposed to setting up integrated systems of production and commodity chains in and across 150 or more countries. So you had Britain investing in Argentinean railroads. Somebody building a railroad in the pampas or the prairies, what do they care whether the guy who owns it is in Buenos Aires or in London? Today Nike has suppliers in ninety countries, and therefore directly links the daily reality of all these people who work in all these places to one another, to the global sphere, to NGOs, and to everyone else that comes along behind Nike. At the micro-level, at the level of firms and at the level of individuals, globalization makes its presence felt much more directly today than it did 100 years ago, when it may have affected the overall context in which people lived and worked, but not their daily existence.

TGW: One of the things that is in your work, and one of the propositions that we play with in the project, is that ideas are important in helping to redefine the way states conceive their interests. How has globalization actually altered the discourse of international relations and the way that states frame their own interests within this institution?

JR: I am impressed with the position of a number of governments in recent debates here in the house and in what they do at the national level, particularly with regard to their commitments to poverty reduction and the increased focus on Africa. I am thinking of the UK government, for example. It has been promoting the idea of a foreign policy that leads to a more inclusive world. That has translated into modest increases in ODA, but much more so into strong commitments to support poverty reduction strategies through a variety of means, including ODA, investment, debt relief, and trade access for the products of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries. Most of the Scandinavian countries have similar kinds of approaches to development.

My sense is that globalization is, in part, responsible for that. Now, let me backtrack a little and say that social-democratic countries have always felt a certain sense of obligation. The ethos of social democracy has always had external spillover effects. They rank highest in ODA figures, still today. But I think there is a scale and an urgency now that is also a product of globalization, of an understanding that is very similar to the view the Secretary-General articulated in his Davos speech—that while we benefit from globalization, it is not sustainable in the way it is functioning. To make it sustainable, you have got to provide greater opportunities and greater assistance to, first of all, the countries that are marginalized and left behind by globalization, and then, going up the ladder, to provide for trade access of those who have exports, and so on and so forth.

I think there is a certain urgency that comes with the understanding that the industrialized countries do rather well under globalization. They would like to see the system maintained. But it cannot be maintained the way it is functioning. It has to change. I can see it on the part of their companies as well. They got used long ago to being good corporate citizens inside their

countries. It is increasingly becoming second nature for, particularly Scandinavian-based companies, and increasingly UK-based and other European companies, also to understand the need to become good citizens globally. It is an enlightened self-interest. It is a definition of a self-interest that goes beyond the immediate self and stretches over a longer time horizon. The United States remains the exception, alas.

TGW: What exactly are the implications of this for one of the pillars of global governance—intergovernmental institutions? It seems to me that we are still working with a set that was designed for a different world. It is really important to speak to corporations. It is also important to get civil society mobilized and make use of these guys. But, presumably, one part of the picture is also what states do together in their own clubs. It seems to me that, in fact, the capacity of intergovernmental organizations may be the shortest leg in the stool, or the weakest link, or however you want to describe it.

JR: I think that is quite right. One of the most serious challenges is to think through what intergovernmental bodies should be doing when other actors play such important roles, and are acknowledged even by the intergovernmental bodies to be critical to achieving the objectives that they themselves want to achieve. This is one of the really, really difficult questions and will remain so for the first part of the twenty-first century. Implicitly we may have provided some answer to that in the Global Compact. What is it the governments provide? First of all, they provide the basic principles. They provide the normative framework. The nine principles of the Global Compact were defined intergovernmentally, expressing a normative consensus of the international community. Corporations couldn't have defined those principles. Corporations have lots of voluntary initiatives, and they pursue lots of voluntary corporate social responsibility programs. But none can claim the legitimacy of deriving from the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, the ILO declaration on core rights at work (ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principals and Rights at Work), or the Rio principles on environment and development (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development).

Most companies that participate understand that there is something special about this set of principles. The reverend Leon Sullivan, of South Africa disinvestment fame, has established the Global Sullivan Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, with the help of a group of American companies. The companies that have signed on to them have found that they just don't have the traction of the universal principles that have come out of the United Nations. So the whole normative dimension is quite important. Nobody else can do that.

Secondly, action has to take place at the national level, with various levels of government involved. We can define best practices globally, but things don't really change until they change in factories, villages, and cities in India, Brazil, and Sub-Saharan Africa. And they are not going to change there simply by multinationals changing their own behavior in those countries. There have to be spillover effects beyond that, and that has to involve the public sector. For example, Statoil, the Norwegian state oil company and a Global Compact participant, has just recently signed an agreement with our labor union partners whereby Statoil agreed to apply the same health and safety standards in its facilities worldwide that it does in Norway. It is an unprecedented agreement. They operate in twenty-three countries, including Vietnam. That is wonderful, because the Vietnamese who work for Statoil are going to be treated very well. But what about all the other Vietnamese? Well, UNDP has to be there—and not only UNDP, but other social actors as well—to help improve the capacity of Vietnam, other factories in Vietnam, other employers in Vietnam to gradually extend the same kind of facilities and standards throughout the economy.

I guess what I am saying is that multinationals are little pockets of activity scattered around the world, but they exist in larger seas which also need to be changed. That involves governance issues fully. It involves assistance from international agencies—the World Health Organization (WHO), ILO, UNDP, the World Bank. It's a new world. The UN used to operate on the basis of decisions taken by an intergovernmental body. Those decisions applied to governments. Governments got back home and they may have set up mechanisms to implement those decisions. Often, nothing much happened. The UN didn't really have a direct reach, if you will. But multinationals do. So we are entering through the door of the multinationals and catalyzing change that will increase the demand for similar kinds of social services by other employees. So we are taking a different approach to the problem, but it still involves governments, and it still involves the whole issue of governance, because none of this is going to work if governments don't take the task of governing seriously.

TGW: I was tempted to ask, in looking at ideas, whether the word "constructivist" ever appears on the 38th floor—probably not.

JR: Actually, Shashi Tharoor brought it up once at a morning staff meeting with the SG. I had said something and Shashi asked, "Is that an example of social constructivism in action?" The SG looked bemused: the house intellectuals having a bit of fun.

TGW: But more seriously, how do you use it in providing advice, or in taking things apart, or in reacting at a staff meeting?

JR: It's hard to answer that question, because social constructivism is not a set of screwdrivers and hammers that you pull out of a toolbox. Let me try part of an answer. As a social constructivist, you don't reify states. You don't assume that interests are fixed, but that they are continually shaped—defined and redefined. Our way of proceeding here is precisely to

identify a variety of actors who can help redefine state interests, to stretch those interests in different directions, in a way that state-centric realism wouldn't lead you to do. We've taken the same approach to business and civil society organizations.

TGW: In some ways, the whole conversation illustrates it. The second big proposition relates to the extent to which, if you have two or more norms that are clashing, one of these has to come out. I was just wondering whether we could examine the clash of two of these social facts, recently—our old friend sacrosanct sovereignty and human rights. How do these two ideas play out on the 38th floor, and more particularly—since the Secretary-General has run into a certain amount of flack on occasion for having pushed out one side of this equation—what happens inside the house when one is trying to deal with these two clashing ideas?

JR: That is an interesting story—the whole internal debate about humanitarian intervention and the Secretary-General's position. As you might imagine, there was a great deal of reluctance inside the house to go down that road. Most of the advice—not all—that he got from the traditional departments was to stay away from it. Nothing good could come of it. There was some of that here, too, by people who are no longer on this floor, interestingly enough. We have tried to be very careful to pose it as a dilemma, rather than as one principle clearly having driven out another. Essentially, most of the SG's pronouncements on this, including his speech of September 1999, and then again in the Millennium Report, are posed very carefully as a dilemma.

We are an organization of sovereign states. The UN Charter speaks of non-interference in the essentially domestic affairs of member states. At the same time, humanitarian law and fundamental human rights have become more highly prized and robust. Yet we don't have good ways of reconciling those two sets of norms. The SG believes that we have reached the stage

where it is no longer legitimate for sovereignty to be used as a shield behind which to butcher one's own people, but the organization hasn't resolved the dilemma.

We turned it back to member states and said, "Only you can solve this problem." I don't think he has gone much further than that. But there are many governments that didn't want him to go that far. As you saw, the reaction led by Algeria, and then a whole list of other developing countries, viewed this as an invitation for western intervention in southern countries, which it wasn't. Asymmetries in implementation are, of course, a constant problem. The UN wasn't going to intervene in any military way in Chechnya. The same is true of the other P-5 (permanent five) countries and of major developing states.

The practicalities of the problem are almost insoluble in the short run, and I think the SG understood that to be the case. His position was that whenever we can make a difference, we should try. As he has said over and over again, "Which one of you would want to have a replay of Rwanda?" That was a place where we could have made a difference. One thing that he gets very agitated about is the argument that if we can't solve every problem, we shouldn't solve any. That has been the implication of some southern complaints.

TGW: Right, that you have to be consistent across—

JR: Well, you can't be.

TGW: You can't be. It's the definition of politics. That's a professional malady we have. I was curious about the extent to which people on the staff, or in the house, about the use of these two big sets of ideas. That is one, the codified and normative thing about sovereignty. And the other related to human rights. To what extent were these weapons in the battle, so to speak, internally, as they are among states?

JR: Well, there were honest discussions and debates. They were part of a broader discussion that related also to the use of force and also to what it means to be impartial once one intervenes. Those debates were taking place simultaneously. And you saw the outcome of those debates in the Srebrenica and Rwanda reports. There are people in this house—and I am not saying this as a criticism—who came to work for the UN because they are pacifists. For them, any use of force, no matter what the purpose, is unacceptable; it is an admission of failure. And when the use of force is forced on them, as it were, they handle it badly, insisting that it be applied minimally. That position has gotten the UN into some deep, deep trouble in the past.

That was one of the debates. The Secretary-General stated his position loud and clear, that the use of force in pursuit of certain Charter objectives is not only necessary, it is provided for in the Charter itself. And when you do employ force, you have to pay attention to certain strategic elements—that a minimalist force posture, for example, might invite an attack on you, as was the case in Bosnia, whereas a more robust posture would serve as a deterrent. The SG has used an almost Waltzian (Kenneth Waltz) line on occasion, that the greatest utility of force is not having to use it because it serves so well as a deterrent. In the end, that debate was won by the, I wouldn't say "pro use of force" position, but a more strategic, Charter-based view on the use of force.

The impartiality debate was peculiar. For the longest time, impartiality in this house meant neutrality. It meant literally treating two parties to a conflict alike, even though one may clearly have been the aggressor and the other the victim. That led to some interesting discussions. I remember, on more than one occasion, saying, "A police officer isn't neutral with regard to a mugger and a muggee. But he or she is impartial." That took a while to sink in. I

think now we understand that impartiality means acting in a rule-based manner, rather than being neutral. The humanitarian intervention issue is part and parcel of that same debate.

TGW: You should lecture to the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). I wondered if we could go to the topic that we looked at earlier—this book that you edited with [Jagdish] Baghwati. The subtitle is: *The Prospects for North-South Negotiations*.[*] Was North-South the way to frame the issue in the mid-1970s and the 1980s? And, if the answer is yes, does it make any sense today?

JR: It made sense in the 1970s and 1980s in the first postcolonial generation. A large number of governments saw the issue in that way. It wasn't merely rhetoric. Over the course of time, it became more and more rhetoric, and less and less meaningful. Today, the North-South debate in the UN is largely a debate within the G-77 (Group of 77). A group of fairly conservative G-77 members—Algeria, Cuba, Libya, Syria; they may consider themselves to be revolutionary countries, but I consider them to be quite conservative in the sense of being old-fashioned—frame the issue in this way. Other G-77 members will defer to them for the sake of the spirit of the group when their interests are not directly at stake. So you get replays of North-South debates. It involves a lot of deference for the sake of solidarity: "We were all colonized at one point, and we were all victimized at one point. This doesn't cost us a whole lot, so why not?" When the issue at hand is important, you see less of it.

TGW: The main product of this North-South dialogue happened to be the NIEO (New International Economic Order). What do you think was the most important reason that explains why that was framed the way it was, in what were fairly stark terms? And then why did it fall so

[*] Jagdish N. Bhagwati and John Gerard Ruggie, eds., *Power, Passions, and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984).

flat so quickly? By the time you wrote this book, of course, the final nail was already in the coffin. But why was so much enthusiasm generated, and how do you explain its very rapid demise?

JR: I think it represented the extension into the international realm of what a lot of these countries thought they were trying to do domestically, which is to pursue relatively statist policies. They were trying to construct a particular international political framework within which the global economy would be forced to operate. It was largely a non-starter. And, of course, it was abetted by a couple of factors. One was the Soviets, who had a very strong interest—an ideological interest, if no other—in seeing this work, because it reflected their approach to things.

The other was the oil shocks, which gave the South a false belief that natural resource power could be manipulated to bring the negotiations around in their favor. The only problem with all of that was that it didn't reflect the laws of supply and demand, and didn't make any economic sense. It ended suddenly. I remember the Carter administration didn't like any of it, but they didn't want to call it quits, either. So they dragged negotiations out endlessly. The Common Fund negotiations, for example, seemed to go on forever.

Then Ronald Reagan came into office. He said, "What? You guys must be joking. I am not negotiating this. Forget it." Then [Margaret] Thatcher came along. And another few years down the road the Soviet Union collapsed. So there went the impetus.

TGW: In your own piece to that edited volume, you certainly talked about how the NIEO was hardly a success, and no developing country argues that it was. Yet, you said the dialogue keeps the ideas alive. What ideas from that document, or that period of frenzy or euphoria, or whatever you want to call it, are still with us today?

JR: The idea that there has to be a greater sense of social solidarity in the world; if we are going to live together on this planet, rich countries have to provide greater assistance to poor countries, particularly poor countries that are trying to help themselves. I think that lives on. As I mentioned before, we even see it expressed by some corporations that have defined their global citizenship and global corporate responsibility in increasingly broad terms.

It is instructive to differentiate between what I call the "one billion people companies," and the "six billion people companies." What I mean is that there are companies who are perfectly happy catering only to the billion people in the world who can afford to pay for their products today. But there are others who would like the whole world to be their market. They realize that they cannot get from here to there without taking a much greater interest in social issues and being much more supportive of anti-poverty activities and public sector capacity building. Cisco is out in twenty-four of the forty-nine LDCs (least developed countries), helping to build network training academies. This is not because Rwanda is going to buy a whole lot of Cisco equipment any time soon, but if and when the day comes, there will be somebody there who is trained in using their switching equipment. Cisco is a "six billion people company." I also think the notion that there is an element of common humanity that does, or at least should, provide some sense of mutual obligation animated the NIEO to some extent and still animates the debates today. It animates Claire Short, in her work at DFID (Department for International Development), and it animates the Secretary-General.

TGW: In talking about the assigned reading you gave to your colleagues, you mentioned embedded liberalism. To what extent would you still argue that the normative framework of embedded liberalism is, and will remain, a central feature of the existing order?

JR: The problem is that the embedded liberalism compromise was designed for a world of national economies, engaged in external interactions. The global economy doesn't fit that model. So the challenge for us in this area has been to write the next chapter. The vehicle we chose here was the multinationals, as the most global of economic entities. The SG has sometimes put it like this, "Look, we have created a single global economic space. But it lacks the social infrastructure that is necessary to sustain the market. What we are doing with the Global Compact is trying to enlist multinationals directly in helping to build that missing social infrastructure." So it is certainly the spirit of embedded liberalism, but projected into a globalized world, in which you don't have the levers of a central government available. So you have to find surrogate mechanisms to work towards the same ends.

TGW: We don't have the same view of the state, I hope, as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s. But I am wondering, like the question earlier related to the feebleness of the intergovernmental part of the governance equation, whether the role of the state was so downplayed, and whether we are—not just the UN but everywhere else as well—coming back to a more balanced view about the role of the state. That is, that not everything the state can do, multinationals can do better.

JR: That certainly was never our point of view. Governance is critical. Look at the small European states, which are the most open economies in the world and have always, in the post-World War II era, done phenomenally well. Whether it is Switzerland or Austria or Sweden, if you are going to have an open economy, which you need to have as a small economy, the only way to survive is to have a smart and active state. Having a smart, active state cuts across ideological predispositions because you have can have social-democratic ones and you can have right-of-center ones. And it doesn't seem to make a whole of difference to this point.

But you need to be actively engaged in social policy, in education, in promoting research and development, in social and physical infrastructure, and so on.

The so-called Washington consensus really sold a bill of goods to the developing countries. The issue was not to do away with the state. The issue was to reform the state, and to make it smarter, more agile, and more responsive to social needs. I am not sure the "Washington consensus" exists anymore. But while it existed, it did a great disservice to developing countries who paid any attention to it, or were forced to.

TGW: You actually have oftentimes referred to the importance of—and it has come up a couple of times—information technology (IT) in the diffusion of ideas and norms, et cetera. How important has this factor been within the UN, and within the UN system that you have seen?

JR: This is the most technologically challenged organization I have ever worked in. I have gotten to know a little bit the people who run our IT. The problem is we really do have competent young people who know everything about the technology, but they have no idea how the users use it. Therefore, they cannot interface with them. And we don't have senior members who are exposed enough to the technology to be able to interact with the techies to provide that interface. So we have, in some cases, the most extraordinarily sophisticated but dysfunctional system. For the longest time, I couldn't get at my email from home because it was so heavily encrypted; it's only my email, for Pete's sake.

But it is a management culture issue. Many senior managers in the UN still dictate to their secretaries. This is a problem we have just begun to deal with. I have been advocating for the last two years that we need an information technology czar. But we keep muddling along

with little reform groups that are supposed to interview users, and relate to the techies, and so forth.

Can I backtrack? After we set up our strategic planning unit in the Secretary-General's office, Andy Mack became the director. We wanted to have it become the hub of a strategic planning network. Each major department was asked to set up a strategic planning unit, or a policy planning unit, whatever they chose to call it, and designate a leader or focal point. They would come together periodically under Andy's chairmanship to provide a mutually supportive network. Andy wanted to create a virtual organization inside the house, to use information technology as the main vehicle for communicating with them, and he worked for weeks to get the techies to explain to him how to set up a bulletin board, for example. Nobody ever posted anything on it. There were zero entries. It really perplexed the hell out of us. Both of us, being outsiders, didn't realize the obvious answer until somebody once put it to us in very blunt terms over lunch. He said, "If I attend a meeting with you, and I say something stupid, I can easily deny it after the meeting. But if I post it, it's there forever." There is still a great caution not to put things in writing because it lives on and can travel.

TGW: It can be reproduced and sent to all your friends. When do you think that the notion of women in development, or gender and its impact on UN programming, became real and entered the system? We have various people talking about Mexico City in 1975. Other people say it was much earlier, and others say, "No, I only did it in the 1990s." So it is hard to bring out a document these days that doesn't at least pay lip-service to this. But when did this norm sort of penetrate, and therefore become somewhat real for the bureaucracy?

JR: Well, I don't know precisely a date. But I do know that in my own case, when I first began to take it seriously—and I suspect I wasn't the only one—was when serious research

became available that demonstrated the actual consequences of development policies that were aimed specifically at women: the consequences for the savings rate in the family, for nutritional standards for the children, for civic organization in villages. Norms don't really take a hold while they remain purely at the level of concept. I think there has to be an experiential basis for them before they take root.

My sense is that that was certainly in place by the mid-1980s, if I had to put a date on it. By then it was no longer simply, "I would like this to be the case, and therefore I believe it." It was an acceptance that this was the case, and we really ought to pay attention.

TGW: How is this issue treated on the 38th floor? How does it come in in the context of least developed countries, the context of peacekeeping? How does it bubble up? When did it come up, and in what form?

JR: I would like to say that it is so thoroughly mainstreamed that it doesn't have to bubble up, but that wouldn't be entirely true. We have taken it very seriously, in terms of senior appointments. That's where the SG has most direct authority. And he has been very serious in asking for women candidates, not only when we set up a deputy-secretary-general's position, or in choosing a high commissioner for human rights, or supporting a candidate to head WHO, but also for panels and Secretary-General's advisory groups. We don't always do a good job, but you would never send a list to this Secretary-General that didn't have an adequate representation of women on it. So that's the way in which it most directly manifests itself out here.

The one gender-related initiative that we actively pushed in the Millennium Report was the Girl's Education Initiative. The SG went off to help launch the Girl's Education Initiative in Africa last summer; it is something he feels very strongly about. Gender has also come up in the context of peacekeeping, and the tribunals of course—both the Yugoslav and the Rwanda

tribunals—the SG gave strong support to the efforts to have rape and other forms of victimization of women be defined as a war crime in those contexts.

TGW: I think one idea that was probably outside of the system, but that has now been integrated into the system, is the expansive notion of security. How useful is "human security" as a tool for this institution?

JR: Well, it has such an elastic definition it is hard to answer the question. The case we tried to make in the Millennium Report was an outgrowth of the whole reform effort; you remember the SG's statement there that we have to put people at the center of everything we do. That means that we have to become a more results-based organization, and we have to measure results not in terms of how many meetings we have had or declarations adopted, but in terms of real measurables like a reduction in poverty rates, or an increase in girls' education, or the number of AIDS victims who get treatment, or whatever the case may be.

In the peace and security area the major expression of that has been to argue that we find ourselves in a situation today in which the state is often the major source of insecurity for its own people, and this is where the humanitarian so-called intervention issue comes into play. If you define human security in terms of enhancing the welfare of individuals, I guess we believe in human security, although we have never applied the term "human security" beyond the security realm.

TGW: You mentioned elasticity. That is certainly one weakness. What are the other weaknesses, and what are the strengths?

JR: If it is pushed too far it becomes useless as a concept. Anything that means everything means nothing in particular. My worry about some of the more elastic definitions is that they don't mean anything. There have been valiant attempts to define an environmental

definition of human security, for example, but I am not sure how satisfactory they are. I once sat down and thoroughly read the literature on environmental causes of conflict. There were a couple of cases that were obvious, but beyond that the route was pretty indirect.

Reflecting on what this administration has done, there is great comfort with the idea of talking about human security in the security realm, and addressing the issue that threats to the physical security of the individual human can come from a variety of sources, including his or her own state. But I don't think there is a whole lot of sympathy up here for expanding the concept of human security to mean all the ways in which an individual can be adversely affected by anything.

TGW: To be unkind, I think that's actually the Canadian model.

JR: Yes.

TGW: One of the things that we have been trying to do through the project is to look at big events, like oil price increases and the NIEO. But I suppose that, in our lifetime, the end of the Cold War is one of these events. You have mentioned this in terms of producing a new view about transnational corporations. But I am just wondering what this collapse actually meant in terms of the institution's openness to ideas, and whether this had any direct impact on the way that you, yourself frame ideas for the world.

JR: The impact was pretty profound, at the level of the Secretariat as well as intergovernmentally. At the level of the Secretariat, as long as the Soviet Union existed there was an enormous degree of self-censorship. There weren't a lot of people in the Secretariat who were utterly convinced by the NIEO negotiations, for example, but they felt obliged to go along with it, not only because the southern countries supported it, but also because the Soviets supported it. Moreover, the whole development agenda was fundamentally warped by the

existence of the Soviet Union because you couldn't talk about macro-fundamentals. The whole UN development effort was channeled into a project basis to avoid ideologically infused macro-debates. A project was a project; you drilled a well and water came out. It wasn't question of ideology.

But what you couldn't do was to frame those issues in the context of what the appropriate macro-conditions have to be to make all of it work. You couldn't talk about the constructive or productive role of the private sector without making an apology for state-owned enterprises, and God knows for what else. So there was sort of *Alice in Wonderland* quality to economic discussions for much of the Cold War—not the very early days of the UN's history, but the further you got into the late 1950s and the 1960s. That stemmed from the fact that there was a Soviet Union, and it was a very powerful member of the organization. That nonsense obviously stopped with its demise.

Huge changes also took place at the level of member states. Within the former Soviet bloc, countries wanted to know, "How do I attract investment? What do I need to do?" And there were economic reforms in the developing countries. So it was a very, very significant development. There are still Fabians running around this house—LSE (London School of Economics) graduates from the 1950s and 1960s—but no more central planners.

TGW: Are there any Keynesians?

JR: Aren't we all post-Keynesians now?

TGW: I'm kidding. What about on your own thinking? Did this open up anything new? Did it surprise you? Thinking back to your experience in the late 1940s, what did this mean?

JR: I always understood that many of the things I was writing about as an academic only applied to a part of the world, not the whole of it. There wasn't any huge surprise in store for me

there. But I have become far more impressed with the whole civil society project. Let's go back for a minute to the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The way in which that happened triggered a very interesting debate between realists and constructivists. As we constructivists never cease to point out, it happened entirely without the use of force. The actual process happened almost entirely through expressions of civil society. And it happened very suddenly. The morning after, Russia and the former Soviet republics still had as many warheads as they did the day before. So that didn't account for anything. But an ideational change took hold. Staring civil society in the face at a certain point led even the most recalcitrant leaders, including the East Germans, to say, "I guess the game is over." They also understood that the Soviets weren't going to come to the rescue because they were trying to prevent internal collapse there.

TGW: As you get prepared to pack your piles of documents here, how would you compare the rewards of being in the Secretariat, versus the rewards of being at a solid university and doing your own research? Are they totally incomparable? What do you like and dislike?

JR: In some ways, they are alike; and in some ways, they are very different. Not long after I got here, the SG and I were going down the elevator to go to a meeting. He said, "John, you seem to have adapted very quickly. I would have thought it would be harder for you." I said, "You know, the UN is really very much like a university. Survival is all about ego management." So it certainly had that in common. Having been a dean before I got here, ego management had been 80 percent of my job.

But seriously, the kind of satisfaction that you get, of course, is very different. Ultimately, as an academic, you satisfy yourself. You are happy or not with an idea that you generate and work out. Obviously, if it gets published and it gets cited you are happier than you would otherwise be. But if you believe in yourself and your work enough, it is the intrinsic

satisfaction that's important. At the UN, obviously you also want to satisfy yourself, but you get so many more direct stimuli about whether what you do has been worth it or not. For example, my biggest projects here, apart from the Global Compact, were the Millennium Report and the summit's declaration (United Nations Millennium Declaration). I engaged in endless discussions with member states in the process of writing both. It wasn't any secret what they liked and what they didn't like. And no matter how attached I was to an idea, it wasn't a good idea if it was going to seriously divide the summit. It had to get into the declaration if it was going to mean anything in practice.

In both cases, you are trying to persuade. I think that is one very powerful similarity. That's what you do with ideas, you try to persuade. But in the first instance, as an academic, you can live with just persuading yourself. You can convince yourself that sooner or later others will catch on to how smart this really is. But you can't do that here. If you don't persuade others right away there isn't any tomorrow. So it has to be much more of a dialogical than a monological process. That isn't as easy as one might think for an academic. You think to yourself, "Hey, I'm right on this. What do they know?" It doesn't matter what they know. They count. They have to be persuaded.

The other thing that I found so different was the multiplicity of ears that listen to you, and all the different things that they could possibly hear in what you say. I always have written reasonably well for an academic, and I would do press statements for the Secretary-General on occasion or statements for Security Council meetings. The first time I drafted something on Iraq—it was just before Desert Fox started—I talked with the SG on the phone. I think it was on a Sunday. He asked me to draft a statement he could deliver at the press stakeout after the Security Council meeting. All of a sudden I said to myself, "Sweet Jesus! Jesse Helms is going

to hear this. Saddam Hussein is going to hear this. And so is everybody in between. How do you talk to all these people at once, get your point across, make sure it isn't misunderstood, can't be exploited by them for their own purposes—and still say something meaningful?" That's hard. No academy prepares you for that.

TGW: It could have been a very brief statement.

JR: It was a brief statement. Those statements tend to be brief. But one of the many things that I really love about this Secretary-General is where he falls on a scale developed by Ernie Haas forty years ago. Haas had this set of concepts about what the possibilities are for decision-makers when faced with serious conflicts of interest. You can split the difference, you can settle on the lowest common denominator, or you can upgrade the common interest. And this guy—Kofi Annan—will invariably try for the latter. He will invariably pitch a principled answer, rather than trying to compromise between conflicting interests. He will try for a principled answer that makes it damn hard for anybody to come out very strongly against him, because he isn't favoring one side over the other. He is promoting and favoring a principle for which the organization stands. He has incredible intuition about how to do that. It took me a while to learn. But he's a great teacher.

TGW: This may be an unfair generalization, but how do you think the quality of the international civil service compares with the quality of good academic institutions you are familiar with? What would you like to have more of on the 38th or other floors of the building, and what would you like to have less of?

JR: The problem with the UN is not a lack of good people; it is that the systems are still so screwed up. And the systems tend to be screwed up largely because of extensive micromanagement by government. I am talking about the personnel system, for example, or the

reward system. On the 38th floor, it is different. We are here to serve the Secretary-General. This particular Secretary-General is one who is very open. He wants to surround himself with good people. He is not threatened by anybody. He is so secure in himself that it is humanly impossible to threaten his ego. It can't be done. He is relaxed enough about himself.

So he surrounds himself with good people and he runs his shop by positive expectation. There are leaders who rule by fear. There are others who rule by tit for tat. There are a variety of ways in which a leader leads. Kofi Annan rules by positive expectations, so everybody wants to do the right thing because you couldn't possibly want to disappoint him. You would be so heartbroken if you ever disappointed him. So you go all out because you want the best for him. By and large, everybody up here has that ethos. And, by and large, everyone up here is very smart. So it has been a fun group to work with. There has been surprisingly little elbow pushing, or back-stabbing, to speak of. That is strictly a reflection of his personality. It certainly wasn't like that under Boutros.

Elsewhere in the house, I am always surprised at the high quality of people that you can encounter in the different departments. To be sure, there are a lot of what Kofi calls "passengers," people who are along for the ride. But there are some really, really good people in the house. But they are good despite the systems, not because of them. We have no real incentive system. The UN is Lake Wobegone to the extreme. Everybody is above average. Everybody consistently exceeds expectations. That is what it says on everybody's personnel assessment form. So there are no incentives. If people don't want to, they don't have to. And if people are exceptionally good, and they are young, they still have to wait until they reach a certain level. And there is still the nationality issue, et cetera. So the house as a whole does not yet operate as well as it could and should. But it is not because of the quality of the people. It is

because the systems in place are so lousy. And it is hard to change them because member states control the rules, by and large.

TGW: Earlier, you actually alluded to stories about competition and turf, and institutional rivalries. To what extent have rivalries with the Bretton Woods institutions come into the framing of economic issues related to the Global Compact or other instances? Is one looking over one's shoulder at Washington?

JR: Well, if one is in the UNDP one looks over one's shoulder all the time at the World Bank, because the World Bank is the 800 pound gorilla, while UNDP's resources keep shrinking. But having said that, the relationship between the UN and the World Bank is far better today than it was five years ago, and far closer. We do more things together. The IMF (International Monetary Fund) head now shows up at ACC (Administrative Committee on Coordination) meetings. The WTO head shows up. And, of course, the World Bank president does. That is unprecedented. It is again a reflection of the respect Kofi Annan enjoys, and in part the recognition that the UN has legitimacy that can help those organizations. The World Trade Organization is very interested in talking to us and working with us on labor issues, and the relationship between labor standards and trade, and so forth. We have popular legitimacy that they feel lacking, and the same is true, to some extent, of the World Bank. So it is a push and pull phenomenon. Obviously they have their own independent governing bodies, and there is not much we can do to force them to change their behavior. But we can certainly define initiatives and projects in such a way to get them very interested. The World Bank is thoroughly committed to using the Millennium Declaration to frame poverty reduction programs. That ought to make life easier in the relationship between the World Bank and the UNDP. But we still have members inside the family who can sometimes be as much of a problem.

TGW: Is that good for the production of ideas?

JR: People are much more used to working with one another and to having the various funds and programs work together than ever before. The UN Development Group really does exist, and they do share and do develop common policy frameworks to inform their activities at the country level. But we are a long way from having an integrated system of programs and funds.

TGW: Is there some question I should have asked?

JR: I'm not telling.

TGW: We are about one minute from where we were supposed to stop, and I would really like to thank you for having subjected yourself to our interrogations.

JR: I hope it was useful.

TGW: It was. Thanks.

INDEX

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 14
Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), 54
Africa, 15, 33, 35, 46
Algeria, 38, 40
Amnesty International, 23
An Agenda for Peace, 10
Annan, Kofi, 8-9, 18-22, 28, 33, 46-47, 52-54
  and the private sector, 19-22
  and UN reform, 18-19, 28, 47
arms control, 29
Australia, 25
Austria, 1, 43
Baghwati, Jagdish, 40
Beijing, China, 6
Berkeley, C.A., 2
Bombay (Mumbai), India, 27
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 10, 53
BP, 24
Brazil, 35
Bretton Woods institutions, 54; *see also* International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization
Brundtland Commission, 12; see also *Our Common Future*
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 32
Cable News Network (CNN), 18
California, 2, 6
Canada, 1
Carter, James, 41
Chechnya, 38
China, 27
  and the Cultural Revolution, 27
  and labor rights, 27
Cisco, 42
civil society, 20, 23, 25, 28-29, 50; *see also* non-governmental organizations
Club of Rome, 12-13, 23; *see also The Limits of Growth*
Coca-Cola, 31
Cold War, 48-49
  and the UN Secretariat, 48
Columbia University, 6, 31
Common Fund, 41
Common Security: A Programme for Survival (Palme report), 12
communism, 27
constructivism, 8, 36, 50
  debate with realism, 50
Corporate Watch, 23
Cuba, 40
Davos, Switzerland, 20, 22, 33
Deng Pufang, 27
Deng Xiaoping, 27
Department for International Development (DFID), UK, 42
developing countries, 27, 30, 38, 44; *see also* least developed countries
  and humanitarian intervention, 38
  and neoliberalism, 44
development, 33, 45-46, 49
  women in, 45
Detroit, M.I., 4
disarmament, 29
embedded liberalism, 7, 42-43
environment, 11-14, 20-22, 24-25
  and corporations, 24-25
ExxonMobil, 25
Gates, Bill, 14
gender, 46; *see also* women
Geneva, Switzerland, 11, 15, 27
Girls' Education Initiative, 46
Global Compact, 7, 12, 18-27, 31, 34-35, 43, 51, 54
  activities of, 25-26
  and human rights, 21-22
  and ILO, 21
  and NGOs, 21-23
  and the private sector, 20-22, 24
  and UNDP, 24
  and UNEP, 21
  divisions among members of, 23-24
  principles of, 22
global governance, 13, 22, 34, 36; *see also* the Global Compact
Global Sullivan Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, 35
globalization, 18-21, 23, 30-33
  and corporate citizenship, 33-34
  and inequality, 20, 33
  and NGOs, 23
  and states, 33, 43
  conception of, 31-32
Graz, Austria, 1
Greenpeace, 23
Group of 77 (G-77), 40
Haas, Ernie, 5, 52
Harvard University, 4
Helleiner, Gerry, 2
Helms, Jesse, 51
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 14
human rights, 15, 20-22, 37-39
  and the Global Compact, 20-22
  and state sovereignty, 37-39
human security, 47-48
humanitarian intervention, 37-40, 47
  impartiality regarding, 39-40

Hussein, Saddam, 52
ideas, 7-10, 12-15, 18, 21, 23-24, 27-29, 32, 41-42, 44, 51, 55
  and commission reports, 12-13
  and information technology, 44
  and inter-institutional relationships, 55
  and journals, 9
  and nongovernmental organizations, 28-29
  and state policy, 32
  and UN conferences, 13-15, 17
  and UN reports, 10
  impact of scholars on practitioners, 7-9
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principals and Rights at Work, 35
India, 25, 27, 36
information technology, 44-45
  and the UN, 44-45
intergovernmental organizations, 34
international civil service, 52-54
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 40
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 22
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 46
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 46
International Labour Organization, 21, 24, 36
  and the Global Compact, 21, 24
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 54
Iraq, 51
La Jolla, C.A., 4
labor issues, 54
labor unions, 1, 22, 25, 35
least developed countries (LDCs), 42, 46
  and women, 46
Libya, 40
Limits of Growth, *The* (Club of Rome report), 12-13, 23
London, UK, 32
London School of Economics (LSE), 49
Mack, Andy, 45
Marxism, 5
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 12, 20
McMaster University, 1-2
Melbourne, Australia, 25
Mexico City, Mexico, 45
Millennium Report, 10, 13, 18-19, 37, 46-47, 51
Millennium Summit (New York, 2000), 18-19, 27-28, 51
  declaration of, 51, 54
multilateralism, 5, 18
multinational corporations, 36, 42-43
  and corporate responsibility, 42
Nigeria, 25
Nairobi, Kenya, 11, 15
neoliberalism, 44
  and the state, 44
network approach, 11-12
New International Economic Order (NIEO), 40-42, 48
Nike, 26, 32
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 12, 21-23, 25-26, 28-30; *see also* civil society
  and the Global Compact, 21-23, 25-26
  and globalization, 23
  and the private sector, 23
  and relationship to UN, 28-29
  cleavages among, 23, 25
North-South relations, 40-41
Norway, 35
Osgood Hall, 5
Our Common Future (Brundtland report), 12
Our Global Neighborhood (Global Governance report), 13
Palme Commission, 12; *see also Common Security: A Programme for Survival*
peacekeeping, 29, 46
Perez de Cuéllar, Javier, 15
Power, Passions, and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations, 40
Princeton University, 4
Reagan, Ronald, 41, 43
realism, 8, 37, 50
  debate with constructivism, 50
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 35
Robinson, Mary, 21
Rosenau, James, 30
Roth, Richard, 18
Rwanda, 10, 38-39, 42, 47
Save the Children, 23
Scandinavia, 25
Seattle, W.A., 21
Shell, 25
Short, Claire, 42
Simon, Julian, 13
South Africa, 35
South Asia, 15
sovereignty, 37-39
  and human rights, 37-39
Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10, 39
Statoil, 35
Stockholm, Sweden, 11, 13-14
Strong, Maurice, 11
Sullivan, Leon, 35
Sweden, 43
Switzerland, 43
Syria, 40
Tharoor, Shashi, 36
Thatcher, Margaret, 41, 43
Theory of International Politics, 8
Things are Better than Ever, 13

Third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (Brussels, 2001), 17
Tokyo, Japan, 6
Toronto, Canada, 4
UN Centre for Transnational Corporations , 27
UN Charter, 39
  the use of force in, 39
UN Commission for Sustainable Development, 30
UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), 11, 13-14
UN Conference on Least Developed Countries (Brussels, 2001), 17
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 17
UN Development Group, 55
UN Development Programme (UNDP), 24, 35-36, 54
  and the World Bank, 54
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 17
UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 11, 15, 21, 24
  and the Global Compact, 21, 23, 24
UN General Assembly, 15, 17, 28-29
  and UN reform, 28
  Second Committee of, 17
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24
UN Office of Science and Technology, 11
UN Secretariat, 15-17, 48, 50
  and the Cold War, 48
  and social and economic issues, 15-17
  departmental relations in, 17
UN Security Council, 38, 51-52
  permanent members of, 38
UN World Conference of the International Women's Year (Mexico City, 1975), 45
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 1, 41, 48-50
  collapse of, 50
United Kingdom (UK), 1, 31-32
United States (U.S.), 2-3, 6, 29, 34
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 35
University of California, Berkeley, 3-6
University of Toronto, 3
University of Western Ontario, 5
Vienna, Austria, 2
Vietnam, 35
Waltz, Kenneth, 8, 39
Washington, D.C., 54
We Have More of Everything, 13
White House, 8
Wildavsky, Aaron, 4
women, 45-47; *see also* gender
  and development, 45-46
  and UN appointments, 46
  and UN tribunals, 47
World Bank, 36, 54
  and relationship with UN, 54
World Economic Forum, 20, 22, 33
World Food Programme (WFP), 29
World Health Organization (WHO), 36, 46
World Trade Organization (WTO), 20-21, 54
  and relationship with UN, 54
  Third Ministerial Conference (Seattle, 1999), 21
World War II (WWII), 1
Yale University, 4