

UNITED NATIONS INTELLECTUAL HISTORY PROJECT
The Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York
365 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10016

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF

ELISABETH REHN

BY

THOMAS G. WEISS

New York, 24 October 2006

THOMAS G. WEISS: This is Tom Weiss, interviewing Elisabeth Rehn on the 24th of October 2006 at The Graduate Center. Elisabeth, I would like to start at the beginning, if you don't mind. I wondered if you might tell me a little bit about your parents' background, their professions, your upbringing, youth, and also try to say how that might have influenced your international career.

ELISABETH REHN: Of course, we have to go very far back in history because I'm old. That means that there are many different periods in my life. I would say that when I was studying, first of all, in my own home, my father was an ordinary country doctor—a medical doctor in a time during our war, when you really had to work hard without assistants. So we three daughters were following our father very much, just visiting his patients and helping and so on. So you learned that everything in the world and in life is definitely not about having a good time. We went around to all these different families in quite terrible circumstances. By the way, I think Finland was one of the first countries that was helped by UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) after our war.

When I was studying in the School of Economics, we had a professor of economic geography. He opened my eyes to the world around us. Coming from nowhere to start my studies, I didn't know much about Africa and Asia or what was happening there. I didn't know all the names of the states there. They have changed since then, of course. But that made me aware of the world around me.

Then, of course, there was my work for UNICEF, for the Red Cross, on the national level, in the leadership there. I was the vice president of the Finnish Red Cross. At the same time, coming into political life in 1979, all of this in one way made the road very clear for me to

be more involved with what is happening in the world. So I would say that was pretty much all the background.

TGW: How would you describe that period during the war? How difficult was it? What kind of memories come up when you think today about war and peace issues? How does that time enter into your own current thinking?

ER: I think there are things that are always the same with wars, even if the wars have changed in nature and they are so much more directed toward civilians. Civilians are the direct targets, especially when the wars are not between nations, as our war was. It was the Soviet Union—Joseph Stalin—who attacked us in 1939, in the Winter War. Nobody thought that we could make anything out of that. It was quite glorious that we could fight so strongly. We lost a lot of lives, but we were never occupied like other countries in Europe. That was something very important for us.

I would say the similarity is how we are afraid. I was four in 1939, and I remember very well especially the mood when we assembled. Father was then in war as a doctor in a field hospital. We assembled around the very old radio—that old type, when you could hear very badly what was said—when Field-Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim was speaking to us, when we got the latest news from the frontline. That was something. We were all around this radio. So it was very much that radio that was significant for that time, to get the news from the frontline.

We had an organization in Finland. It was called the Lotta Svärd organization. It was quite a special effort to train women in crisis management. It was not especially created for war. It was created for crisis-management in order to be able to function in difficult times—for food, for preparing shelter for people, for house animals, for everything—if something were to go

wrong. That is, it was meant for the home front, not for the frontline. But many of these Lottas—as we called them—consisted of young women, some of whom were taken to the front. These seventeen, eighteen-year-old girls had even to wash the bodies and melt them, because they were frozen, so that they were able to be sent back home. I remember that, as a small Lotta—I was nine as the war was over—we were standing, we small Lotta guards, at the graveyards, when our friends, the boys from that village, were brought home from the frontline. We were standing there as some kind of troops of honor at the funerals.

All these made such memories. I was taught that if bomber planes were coming, you were to throw yourself—if you are coming from school—to jump in a ditch, or whatever, to try to find shelter. But I was living in the countryside. We had one bomb attack, and that was, of course, very thrilling. But nobody was hurt. It was just somewhere in the forest. I think it was a mistake that the bombs were falling there.

But what I would say was so significant was that we learned to be afraid of something you cannot explain. And it is around you all the time. That also has made it so—what would I say? “Easy” is the wrong word. But in all these different missions I have had, I have so well understood people and their feelings because I had the same feelings when I was a little girl. I think it has been helpful for me to be accepted as someone who really cares, someone from that wonderful, international community which sometimes doesn’t care very much and is more interested in getting their own salaries than results.

TGW: You haven’t mentioned your mother. What was she doing during the war?

ER: My mother was a fantastic person. She was really a traditional “matron” who kept together the whole family, up to the day she was ninety-one. She was paralyzed for the last two years. Father was the mild one, who was helping people and so on. Mother was really the one

who was very active with many different organizations, with the Lottas and with the Red Cross. She was even out in the forest where there were some Soviet soldiers, who were thrown out from planes. Some were just thrown out there in our forests, and she was asked to be there also searching for them. She was very hesitant. Should she leave her small girls and go out into the forest? But she was a brave one, so she went out there.

As I said, she was in the Red Cross, in all different organizations, and politically very, very interested. So until old age, she always got her daughters or grandchildren and great-grandchildren in hectic debates about politics. We all have been involved in politics—my two sisters and I—I on the highest level, on the national level in parliament, and the others on municipal councils and boards. So she got us to be really interested.

TGW: You went then from the countryside to Helsinki?

ER: For studies, yes.

TGW: What was your impression when coming to the big city for the first time? What led you to study economics, or economic geography, as opposed to politics, or history, or literature, or anything else?

ER: There is a very undramatic explanation. My eldest sister started to study philosophy and got married at nineteen and left her studies. The next one studied biology—microbiology, especially—and has been very, very good as a professor, of course retired now. But you don't have a very big future in that. So the two sisters told me, "You should start to study economics because then you have a future. It will guarantee your future." I haven't done much with economic studies, but at least they were good. Interesting enough, my main object was really geographic economy and political economy, so that the politics came there in one way. But I have never been really—oh yes, I was working with my husband in his small company,

importing and exporting goods. We together worked on that. So there I had some use of my economic studies. Of course, we studied together, my husband and I. We were married at twenty. But I finished my studies, even if the children started to drop in—

TGW: Drop in?

ER: All four of them within seven years.

TGW: That's a good transition. How did you manage to juggle your responsibilities as a mother, as a wife, and begin a political career?

ER: I would say that I added wisdom to my knowledge sitting around the sandbox with the children. I am really very unhappy that young women today—or men—cannot spend several years just sitting there with the children. We have such a wonderful relationship with the children. We really have a good time with the children, with my grandchildren. I have thirteen of them. We all are such friends with each other, helping each other, supporting each other. But of course, it was tricky to put all these together.

I am very pleased that I waited for such a long time because I was just asked to be a candidate. I had been already from 1972 on the municipal council, but it was such a small city. I was involved with sports, with the school, and home, the corporation, and everything. So it was not difficult to be elected to the city council. But then, in 1979, when I was elected to the parliament, it was very much because I was known as one who cared about children, about what should be done for them, for education, for medical care, for daycare, for everything. But also, at the same time, I was very strong on economic questions, especially private companies, small enterprises—their situation, what should be done, because then we can get more jobs. It was about taxation policy. That helped me not to be only—as we say—interested in women's issues, but also in “real” politics.

But just as I was known as interested in all this, there was also sports. I am still a strong fan of football—normal European football. I even was the team leader of a girls' football team—one of the first in Finland. My own daughter was one of the best goal-makers.

When I was elected, my own party didn't want me at all. There was a professor of taxation who should have been the one to be elected for my constituency—a very smart professor. I never thought that I could be elected. But I got an appetite when eating, and I found the campaign very thrilling, very funny. And it was not difficult for me to talk with people. I use normal language and not these very fine words that nobody can understand. So to the big, big surprise of everyone, of the three seats for my party I got the third one. The first one was with our party leader for that time and then one who had been for a long time there. It was not with more than nineteen votes that I won over the taxation professor. I do not think that he has been able to forgive me so far—thirty-six or thirty-seven years ago!

Then my own party said that this would be for one four-year period and then the dumb blonde will just disappear. But for every election, I got more and more votes. In the end, I was some kind of queen of the votes. They had to make me minister for a short while, defense minister—the first woman in the world to have such a position. They thought this would be tricky and nothing could happen in the world during the nine month period I would be minister of defense. Unfortunately, there was the attack on Kuwait and the first Iraq war. Finland was in the Security Council then, so we were much involved with this. Then the Soviet Union crashed, and there had already been the fall of the Berlin Wall.

So the defense minister of Finland could finally be a free person to express herself. I was so popular that they had to give me one more tenure. So I really served for five years as defense minister during two different governments, and also at the same time as the minister of equality

between the sexes. It was quite an interesting combination—defending the women and the country at the same time.

TGW: You held simultaneously two ministerial portfolios?

ER: Yes, and the portfolio was of course a little bit on the social end—social security ministry. So I had a small portion of that. That was a typical Finnish story, as we have coalition governments. Then the Swedish People's Party, of which I am a member—it is non-socialist, even if it sounds like that—is a liberal party in the center. We got very little. We should have had a little bit more when the government was created. There were two parts of the administration that were still free. One was hunting and fishing and the other was gender equality. The center party was bigger, and they felt that hunting and fishing was much more important than gender equality. So gender equality was left to the Swedish People's Party, and I got it. That says a lot about how people are looking at gender equality, doesn't it?

TGW: So instead of reindeer you had women?

ER: Exactly. It was very good. You can't imagine how much I could do in the defense ministry. It is the most patriarchal institution that you can imagine. People learned that they can come to me when there are troubles of any kind. So I had a couple of cases when there was sexual harassment against our women serving in the defense ministry. They would never have had the guts to come to a male minister to tell about this. But of course they were not afraid of coming to me. I could solve the problem. The medical doctor officer who had really harassed the women was reprimanded, but we did so without any press. So we could just make it in a way that he knew—and everybody knew—that this was something you don't do. But we didn't have it as this yellow press thing.

TGW: From reindeer to minister of equality, that makes a nice story. But why minister of defense? That obviously isn't handed out just to fill any quota. That is a difficult assignment.

ER: It was a situation where we had two ministers in the coalition. We had education and defense. The education minister was our party leader. He decided to leave politics for the private sector—a big Finnish company. So he went to commercial life. Then, when the new party leader was elected, that was the one who had been our minister of defense. He thought that he would rather have the Ministry of Education—very important for us. They retained much of the power over the minority Swedish-speaking people—we are 6 percent of Finland—and it was really more important than defense at that time. So there should be some other one.

Then the boys thought they were smart—that for this short period of nine months nothing could happen, that a woman couldn't destroy everything. Then they would get rid of me. I was always difficult, I have to admit. I have never been the one who is prepared to do just as the boys are telling. I wanted to keep some kind of my own mind of how things should be, and also some kind of consciousness.

People liked me. Of course, I have to admit that when I had the first visit of the generals when I started my job, they looked at me a little like something the cat brought in during the early morning hours. And of course there was a lot of interest from all around the world, from South Korea, and Australia, and everywhere around the world. Magazines came and interviewed me. But, on the other hand, it's a job just like any other job. We are a very democratic country, so we have always civilians as ministers of defense, definitely. It is not a military dictatorship in Finland.

So I was not afraid of admitting that I didn't know enough, as I have not done military service. It was the 10th of June that I was appointed, and everybody was on summer leave. I

went from one department to another—both on the ministry side and in headquarters—and sat there like a nice pupil, learning. After those two months, nobody could just take me with the trousers down around my torso, because I knew the answers. I knew it, but it really needed to learn a lot. And I would say that that is exactly what I have tried to do also within the United Nations—to learn before I started trying to make a lot of clever announcements that were not really clever and could backfire.

TGW: I am curious. What portion of your time as minister of defense was devoted to UN affairs? I have lectured in Niinisalo, so I know that there is a traditional role for peacekeepers. But given the changing face of Finland in relationship to Europe, I just wondered whether the UN part of the defense portfolio was falling, staying the same, or rising? How much of your energy went into UN peacekeeping?

ER: Much more than my predecessors because I was interested in the world around us. So I immediately started with all our missions. I went to each and every one of them, and the big ones every year. I went to Kashmir. I went to Kuwait, to our mission there between Iraq and Kuwait. I went to many different places, and of course to UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon), UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force), and UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus) We only had one officer left, but he happened to be the commander there. So I really went around, and I found this the most important part of our work. I had very, very good support from old General Ensio Siilasvuo, who is in heaven now, and then, of course, Gustav Hägglund.

TGW: I took a sauna with Gustav in Lebanon!

ER: Ah, yes! I think he created them because wherever Finns were—I think that was a little bit shocking up there on the government House in Jerusalem and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Within those walls and in that climate, they also created a

sauna. Also, I was encouraged by them that I have to make it possible for women to be serving in the UN troops from Finland. There we had a problem, because we didn't have the possibility for women to serve, even on a voluntary basis, in the military. But I decided that we should make it possible for women to attend the United Nations.

There were problems with the ranks, because for soldiers it's so extremely difficult to look at people—that is, how should you handle them if they don't have a rank? These Finnish women who were serving were without rank, and that was a problem for some of the commanders. So we solved it. They were very popular. They accomplished wonderful work. But later on, I had a big committee looking at the pros and cons: should we allow women to enlist in military service? It ended with yes. After that, we in Finland had no difficulties with women's participation in UN peacekeeping missions. And we have had quite a few who were really very good, who did good work.

So you can see, I really worked with these questions a lot. It was then during my time as defense minister that we decided also to join the European Union (EU). I remember that I gave a speech when we opened one of our civilian security courses that are special in Finland—for people in politics, in the military, in economic jobs, and so on, and all at a senior level. They are called "total defense courses" and "security courses"—three weeks long and very well attended and prepared. The minister always opens those courses.

When we were about to join, I said in a speech, "I also find it, from a security point of view, important that we are joining the European Union. It is not a concrete thing, but, so to say, security through osmosis, that we are in a bigger crowd. That gives some kind of security." There was hell coming out from that. The prime minister had to answer the parliament during the question hour, whether this was the attitude of the whole government or is the defense

minister just talking on her own. The prime minister said, “Yes, that is her own opinion.” Now, afterwards, it is something that we all admit. Even if it is not a concrete security question, of course when you are in a bigger crowd you have more security.

TGW: I am curious about the evolution in your own thinking about the attitudes towards Europe. When I first began studying politics—and probably when you did also—the term “Finlandization” was used by some people negatively. This meant that you kept your mouth shut on certain issues, that you did not make life too complicated for the Soviets. But for others, this is the extent to which you can push out the envelope or expand the notion of neutrality. Then, all of a sudden, you are a member of Europe just like the other countries in Europe. This must have been an extremely interesting itinerary to follow. So I just wanted you to go back and think about “Finlandization” and what kinds of possibilities there were and then how they opened up. What did it represent for your?

ER: I was one of those—and my family as well—who were very strongly against creeping for and bowing to the Soviets. We had lost a lot—my family not so much. One uncle was killed in the fighting, and he never was found. So I understand also very well the missing persons and how difficult it is when you don’t know what really happened. As a defense minister I really put them to look for him, and it was found that he was killed. But it was such a battle that it was impossible to get his body out, because we normally try to find and take with us all our fallen comrades.

My husband’s family—his brother, his adoptive brother, the husband of his sister—were all killed within two months. So we didn’t really love the Russians—the “Soviets” at that time—very much in our family. But of course there were so many families who had the same.

Afterwards, now of course I have to admit that Urho Kekkonen, who is now very strongly criticized—there is also book after book about the president [Mauno] Koivisto. Now is the time when they are starting to write very nasty books about them. Perhaps Kekkonen had a policy that was in one way wisdom. It was important to really remember that we never were occupied. We could keep, in that sense, our independence. But you know that still—of course, I should not say it—when old people in Finland have had a lot to drink, late in the night, comes this: “A Russian is a Russian even if you are boiling him in oil.” And there are all these sentences you can hear. So there is mistrust, still.

Now, with President [Vladimir] Putin, it is still remaining there. Most of the Finnish people kept their mouths shut, but didn’t like it very much, even if it perhaps was very clever policy. Something we have to admit is that, because of the enormous amounts of money we had to pay after the war, when we lost the war and had to pay reparations to the Soviet Union, we actually developed our economy, because we were forced to build up our industry. In that way, even if we, so to say, lost it—we had to pay it away—we had our industry built up. So because of this tragic situation—no one helped us, no Marshall Plans were extended to us, and we didn’t want them, either—we were very proud that we could make it because of this.

I am, as I said, one of those who didn’t like it with us being on our knees so much. But perhaps it was wise. I understand those who talked about “Finlandization,” but perhaps they should have been in the same situation. It is very easy to criticize from outside.

TGW: When did it become clear to you that there was a new Soviet Union? When [Mikhail] Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and there were rumblings of new thinking? When did you imagine that November 1989 would occur? In November, or did it seem things were moving beforehand?

ER: I was just an ordinary parliamentarian in 1989, so I would say that all of us knew that something was going to happen. But we were not prepared that it would happen like this. When Gorbachev had been in Finland and was very popular, something quite interesting happened. I first met, in December 1990, with Defense Minister Marshall Yasov, who was my colleague. It was a fantastic meeting, because I came there as a newly appointed woman. He was standing. He had a very broad chest, which he needed—he had one million medals.

We sat down on both sides of the table. It was an unofficial meeting. Can you imagine? That was the time when, for our national day—the 6th of December—always one Finnish minister should be present in the Finnish Soviet embassy on the national day. That would have been my first one to be invited as minister to the presidential reception in Finland. I was sent because I was the youngest, and I could be pressed to be sent to Moscow. At the same time, I paid my reverence to Yasov. We sat down, and he started to talk about architecture, culture, paintings, and so on, in Russia. I said, “Thank you for your nice, welcoming words. But shouldn’t we now go down to business and talk about defense?”

He looked at me, and we started to talk. I was well-prepared and knew a lot of things. He was so taken by this that he invited me immediately to come on an official visit with my husband the next summer. In July, I came. Then we had a plane that took us to the Black Sea. It was very glorious, and he was very, very charming to me. It was a very interesting program. Then on the plane, the colonels from the Soviet side talked a lot with my husband and drank a lot of vodka. Then they said, “The situation is so terrible here in the Soviet Union now, that it is absolutely necessary to get rid of Gorbachev. He doesn’t understand anything about the military. We need now some colonels, some kind of troika for a little while, because now we can’t continue.”

He listened to this and told me afterwards. But I heard also myself from a variety of sources that they were not happy with Gorbachev. It was not much later when we had this coup with Yasov, who I think was an honest man. He just, from his very military thinking, went on also with a voice. But I had a feeling that I got a little bit of history beforehand.

TGW: It wasn't much later—December 1991—when the Soviet Union imploded. I just want to go back a minute. This role of Finland between East and West as a kind of a hinge or bridge—do you think having played that role also facilitates a different kind of diplomacy in contemporary Europe? For instance, my recollection is that Finland, during the Cold War, played an unusual role in North-South relations and also in East-West relations. I am also wondering whether this is distinctive Finnish contribution to international relations.

ER: It is a Finnish role. It has always been very much a Finnish role. But unfortunately, we are not as important anymore. We are a part of the European Union, and the big boys outside want to play, perhaps, with the bigger players. Now, we have had a very important role, and I think we have handled it in a fantastic way. I have to pay tribute to our prime minister, who handled these high-level meetings during our presidency in 2006 between the EU and Russia in a very, very good way. He also had the guts to be quite strong in his speech to Putin and could raise all these important questions.

But I think we have to admit that we don't have that important role anymore, like Kekkonen and Koivisto had. Even during [Martti] Ahtisaari's time, there were meetings with the United States and Russia. But I don't think we have the same importance anymore. And the knowledge about Russia that we used to have, I think many others are getting that knowledge. Germany is working very hard, especially on the commercial side to get that knowledge—perhaps not so much on the political side. But also there I think Angela Merkel and

[Vladimir] Putin are cooperating quite well. I would say—and I hate to admit it, but I think it's good to be honest—that we don't play that important role anymore, as we used to play.

TGW: So the Helsinki Accords of 1975 can be explained by a peculiar geopolitical position that you occupied?

ER: Absolutely. But the geopolitical situation we have is, of course, not disappearing. We still are there next to Russia and have our famous 1,200 kilometers of borderline that we can see every time the trucks are queuing for one week to come to the Russian border authorities. That is a problem, too. But still, where we could have an influence is, of course, in regional cooperation—just the parts of Russia that are close to the Finnish border. We have already started with very good cooperation and in one way know a lot about the Russian soul and habits—those things that are quite important, too.

TGW: Why did you get out of politics?

ER: Out of politics?

TGW: In the sense that you are no longer a member of parliament. You went on to other things, but would you have liked to have continued?

ER: I think that I had such fantastic results in the 1994 presidential elections that they forced me to try once again. Nobody expected that a minority representative, from a small party with less than 5 percent of parliament—we had just five then, and just the minority language—would get 46.1 percent of the vote. We are quite, what would I say in Finland—“racistic”—so that the 46.1 percent result against Ahtisaari went far beyond our dreams. But I knew that I couldn't make it, that my momentum had gone. And I had seen too much in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Balkans, to be fascinated with internal Finnish problems

anymore. My campaign was half-hearted, and we couldn't count only on my popularity anymore.

It was so clear. I went to this European Parliament for a couple of years. I hated it, because I could never make myself think that I am in any way important amongst those 626 others. We were 626 then, and now there are 700 plus. I had a feeling that a lot of people were rushing around corridors, meeting each other in corridors and trying to explain to themselves and to people back home that they are doing a lot of important things.

I think that the parliament has gotten a bit more important since I left. There has been a renewal of parliament's different parts of their work, and so on. But for me it wasn't the place—definitely now. And I had started with human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. That was, of course, certainly crazy, because that was an honorary mission like all of the special rapporteurs. I wasn't paid one penny for that. I got my travel paid for, but on the lowest level. That meant that Finland really paid for my security, because it was a demand from my husband. He thought it was absolutely terrible that I was moving around in that region without any kind of security that others normally had. But my security detail was paid by Finland, so he could in principle pay for a more expensive hotel than me because of UN regulations. Of course, he did not.

TGW: This is a good transition to your assignment as a special rapporteur. I have tried to explain to students that there is this thing called a special rapporteur who is essentially a volunteer. And this is not unusual, whether it is torture or genocide or internally displaced persons (IDPs). It is a voluntary assignment and you get a half a staff member and a bit of a travel budget. What do you think was the impact of your assignment? Did you get a sense that

your reports were consumed by the then commission, or that the General Assembly paid any attention to them? What was the uptake of your ideas as a special rapporteur?

ER: I have made so many speeches afterwards when I have been talking about early prevention and all of these things: Why the hell do you not pay any attention to the messages coming from those special rapporteurs? Like my reports, of course, they were shaking, because they went into very many horrible details. But like the case of Kosovo, from my first report in 1995, I warned that something terrible would happen in Kosovo, that women were telling me that men are carrying back home more and more weapons, and they don't want any more to be handled like they have been by the Serbs. They are coming with their weapons and, more and more, Serb police were being killed by bombs in their cars.

It went more and more in this direction. And women told me that there would be something terrible happening. Then I got these resolutions as an answer. First of all, Russia said that Elisabeth Rehn has no right to talk about Kosovo. It is a private business for Serbia. Slobodan Milo_evi_ and I were shouting at each other, and then finally he stopped receiving me at all because he said I was telling so many lies to CNN and others when I was visiting Kosovo. So he didn't want to meet me. Russia, of course, said that I had no right to talk about Kosovo at all.

Then there was a resolution saying that Rehn is quite right in talking about these problems, that something should be done. And that was that. Nothing happened. I was warning that now something should be done, but nothing was done until it then crashed totally. How much we could have saved if there could have been more attention paid to the situation. Of course, I don't know what we could have done. What could the outside world have done to

hinder all this? Bombing was not, in my opinion, the right way to solve the problems. So much suffering resulted from the bombings too. And the suffering continues.

The hatred is now the other way around. The victims are now the Serbs. I felt so sad for the Serbs living in Kosovo, because they were Kosovo people. They were a minority, like I was a Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. The administration, the bosses, came from Belgrade and so on. The leaders were not Kosovo people at all. But I met the real Kosovo Serbs. They were Kosovo-Serbs, and they were very unhappy because they wanted to live in peace without any atrocities against anyone—no violence against anyone. Step by step, of course, their situation went much worse. So it was not what I wanted to have, but I didn't have the solutions.

I felt so sad. I was then working in Bosnia-Herzegovina when the bombing started. I remember one Saturday when I was free for a moment. I drove up to the hills, to the mountains, by myself. That was something that I also had to fight about—that I wanted to drive myself sometimes, without any kind of security. I was sitting up in the mountains—I had learned from the mountaineering club where you can move without landmines—and then the bomb planes came. I was feeling just like in my home village—very, very many years ago, when the bombers were on their way to Helsinki, and I saw the lights over Helsinki. I thought, “Oh my God, now people are killed again.”

TGW: You mentioned that very little attention was paid to these reports by the Commission on Human Rights in the General Assembly. Are you any more optimistic about the new Human Rights Council?

ER: I would love to be more optimistic, because the old system was of course impossible. I would say though that, as we had the report once for the General Assembly, once for the commission—once in New York and once in Geneva—we could talk with people, and in

our presentations we could tell much more than the written report. So in that sense, I think that it had a little bit of importance. By the way, it was interesting that when I was appointed, it was on recommendation by the German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel. Finland had been asked if we had any suitable person. But the Finnish government had to answer, “No, there is no Finn.” But Kinkel asked me, then. That was quite interesting.

Yes, I really hope that they will pay attention if they are going to continue with the system. Otherwise, it’s of no use. Now, I have been interviewed by The Hague about what we wrote about the former Yugoslavia. There were killings in Croatia, and I was interviewed for two days. So if it will go very badly, I will be called to the tribunal. Of course, it’s very tricky, because as I was not there all the time. I was in the field more than such persons normally are—but only one week per month, maximum. My staff were then making the research and making the reports, and we went through them. So it is very difficult to be a real witness for what has been written.

TGW: When you became special rep, you were on the payroll. But all of this is post-Dayton, so we are picking up the pieces from the earlier, very clumsy UN effort, if I may be kind.

ER: Sad, too.

TGW: At least as I look at Bosnia-Herzegovina, the configuration of international institutions—not just the UN, but NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the European Union, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)—there is an invasion of outsiders. How did you handle the inter-institutional diplomacy? Was this a big portion of your job? Maybe all of your job as special rep?

ER: First, I would just mention, before I forget it, that I had one little interesting role with the Dayton agreement. I was invited by the European Commission to have a tour of lectures in the United States. I did this during the time of the Dayton discussions. I was invited by Carl Bildt and Richard Holbrooke to come for one day and talk about human rights. I had then already begun my position as special rapporteur on human rights. So I was invited for one day to attend the talks in Dayton. I met all the people there. Milo_evi_ was not there. He was not present. I have some remarks—I just found them—from those meetings and, of course, the contact group, too. I believe that if I had not been there, there would not have even been those few sentences about human rights—and gender, of course, not at all. That would have been very important, but that is another thing.

It was quite interesting that I really was invited—interesting in that I believe it was Torvald Stoltenberg who was also invited because of eastern Slovenia. But the United Nations was kept outside totally, otherwise. So in that sense it was interesting that I was, because of my new mission, invited there. But perhaps it was because I was not on any kind of payroll. I was independent.

Yes, as special rapporteur, it was important for me to cooperate with everyone from all those different organizations. They could give me a lot of good information, even if I was sometimes quite confused about who was doing what and why and how. It is, of course, a mess of people who are working together and against each other.

We now jump up to special representative. There, of course, the lack of cooperation was something that was impressive. I started with something that I believe was good. With all the UN organizations working there, twice a month I had a meeting—and I was very strong that I must personally be chairing that meeting—with all of them, where they could tell me what they

were up to, what new projects were underway, and so on. Then we could look at whether we could perhaps have a little bit of cooperation between UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), UNDP (UN Development Programme), and all the others because they were doing exactly the same things.

We went very far with this. I never jumped on their independence because it is very important for them. But we really could do a lot together. And that had not been happening before me. I think Jacques Klein continued after me, but he was not himself present more than perhaps a few times. The whole thing is that the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) finds it so important with what you are telling, so that he or she is himself present. So that was at least one step forward.

Then, if you look at this fantastic crowd of principals—that is, the high representative, the SFOR (Stabilization Force) commander; then the United Nations SRSG, who could take her police commissioner with her to the meetings; then OSCE; then UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees). These five, so to say, were the high principals, the real principals. We met twice a week to coordinate the work of the international community. What we talked about were small details happening in some small village. When we really did something big, then we wanted to keep it for ourselves, because we didn't want to share the credit with others. However, when somebody made an error, nobody wanted to share those problems either.

I started to cooperate especially with the SFOR commanders, because I was responsible for the security with the police. He was responsible for the military. It was very often that we had to cooperate with different missions happening, so that was the only way to do it. We had very, very much cooperation, the commanders and I. I especially admired so much [U.S.

General Eric] Shinseki, who unfortunately was side-stepped because of the Iraq war. He was too honest. I think that even a general has the right to be honest and give the right information.

TGW: In certain contexts, apparently not, however. What you are saying actually bears out—one thing that has always surprised me—namely how poor the structures of cooperation are. It is really the personalities of the people on the ground. It either occurs because the people get along or it doesn't occur because the key individuals are at odds.

ER: Yes, that is also one thing. With the high representative—his deputy, the senior deputy, there were three. The high representative was from Spain. His first deputy was from the United States, Jacques Klein, and the second was from Germany. They did not get along very well with one other. So if one of them was missing, I would say the whole agenda was different. That was a little bit confusing for all of us. The OSCE and I had a very solid cooperation. We liked each other, so we privately even had some meals together with his wife. We could have some projects together—just the UN and OSCE.

But altogether I would say that Dayton was badly created. It was created to just get us in trouble because you can't just write maps and so on. That is not possible that it can work in a way that it should. It was poor. When I was asked by Kofi Annan to give some advice from our office, when the Kosovo mission was created, my main message was that there should be one leadership and not a lot of leaderships who jealously competed with one another. We lost a lot of time with Bosnia-Herzegovina, but still they could have done a lot more and be further now. Now they are still enemies. I am involved in an educational project there, and it is sad to say that the same hate is still there between them.

TGW: Before we get to UNIFEM (UN Fund for Women), I just wondered whether we could go back a minute and ask when you became aware of the United Nations as an entity.

Some people we have talked to, for example, have memories right from 1945 or 1946. Was this part of your grade school or university curriculum? I am just trying to get a thought about when this came on your radar screen. The second part of the question was when the UN's efforts on behalf of women entered either your parliamentary or other thoughts. Was it in 1975 in Mexico (UN World Conference of the International Women's Year), or was it later? So there are two parts of the question—the UN in general and the UN on women.

ER: I would say that the UN altogether has been always very strongly on the Finnish educational curriculum. We are quite concerned about the world altogether. We know a lot about the world. So in that sense already in normal education I became—I had my student examination in 1953 and started in the School of Economics. So all the years, from the very beginning of the UN history, I have been aware of it, because it is something Finns are aware of.

This is especially because we had direct support from the United Nations after our own war. So it was very important to know that the UN is something that can help. We were very poor. UNICEF came in because of children. We were ill. We had diseases. We had measles. We died at a young age and so on. War really did a lot of terrible things to us, so it was quite natural that we knew about the United Nations.

On women's roles, I have never been any kind of suffragette or feminist, or not very much. So it has more been growing in me. My eldest sister is one who really has participated. It is through her that I have listened a lot to all of this and gotten through her very much this feministic part of the UN's role. Within the UN, there are good resolutions and different commitments. But UN member countries should take it much more seriously to really implement all those beautiful conventions.

That is also, of course, not only regarding women. It is with many other things as well. As I have said about resolution 1325—regarding women, peace, and security—it could have been just collecting dust in a corner like so many other resolutions were it not for the strength of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's and my report—*Women, War, Peace*—in 2002. And then, of course, this methodic report every year from the Secretary-General.

TGW: What intrigued you about wanting to get involved with this effort, in researching and writing this report?

ER: I was immediately interested because I had seen so much during my Balkan years of what really happened to women during wars. It was Graça Machel who had proposed that two independent experts should be appointed to make an assessment.

TGW: You mean her child soldiers report?

ER: She was married to Nelson Mandela and has made a report on child soldiers.

TGW: Through UNICEF?

ER: Yes, for UNICEF. And she has been cooperating with Kofi Annan a lot. So she had proposed to UNIFEM that Ellen and I be the ones. We had met several times with Graça Machel. So she is, so to say, an authority in those circles. So when she made the proposal it also happened. But I was involved with the history of women managing crises. We were always pressing, as women are, that something more should be done for women. But then I was one of the two female SRSGs who was invited to Windhoek, to Namibia, to the meeting in—April 2000? Dame Margaret Anstee was also invited. There were a lot of military officers, research people, women activists. It was the UN Lessons Learned unit that organized the Windhoek gathering.

Then we created the Windhoek Declaration, the Namibia Plan of Action. True, Namibia was in the presidency of the Security Council and took it as an official paper to the UN. Of course, it was watered down a little bit. But it became Security Council resolution 1325.

So in that sense, I had been very much involved already from the creation. And I was pleased that I had the possibility to contribute—my small contribution—during these hectic days in Windhoek. So when I was contacted from UNIFEM, I said “yes” immediately.

TGW: So it was a chance for the Lotta girl to come forward?

ER: Yes, absolutely. It was quite a road to walk.

TGW: I meant to ask you—because there actually is, I think, a more significant debate than appears in the report—about the extent to which the kinds of wars were “new” that you were dealing with in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Balkans, and the kinds of case studies that you did here. It says, “Attacks against women and girls in contemporary conflicts seem to occur on a greater scale and seem to have reached an even higher level of depravity.” Is there something new in the new wars? New dangers? Or is this just a contemporary version of the same old thing?

ER: It was quite interesting that one researcher said, in a NATO seminar where I was lecturing, that we have gone back to the old-time wars. When we think of Europe, of the Thirty Years’ War, Finns were forced by the Swedish government to participate, to, as we used to say, “The Swedes Die to the Last Finn.” We were a part of Sweden until 1809. They always used us as soldiers—poor people who were picked up.

During those wars, you took with you all the families, the civilians, to do your services. When you came to the villages, you emptied the villages of food and shelter and services and the

women and so on. Those were old-fashioned wars. That is what is happening in one way, today, too.

I have interviewed a lot of our soldiers from the war against the Soviet Union. I would be lying if I didn't say that no Finnish soldier would have raped a Russian woman when they came to villages and to the countryside and were tired and frightened. But it was not organized in the way that Rwandan Radio was saying: that all you Hutu soldiers, especially if you are HIV-positive, should rape all the Tutsi women and do as you can. It was almost biological warfare. So I would say there were never the commands like we have today. It is a direct part of the war. In that sense we have gone back to old-time wars. I think he was quite clever, this person who mentioned this. With all the Geneva Conventions and so on, during the big wars between nations, there is perhaps a little bit more—almost—of a respect for the Geneva Conventions.

TGW: I am interested in trying to tease out how you think the research that went into your report and the proposals that you made—how they go from your word processor in this report into intergovernmental discussions. What do you think works best after these years of experience? If you have something to say, what is the best way to get it from a piece of paper to an intergovernmental forum? From there to decision-makers?

ER: This is, of course, too much for simple members of government to swallow at one time. So you have to take bits out of it one at one time. I believe that our quite strong fight against the misbehavior of UN personnel has gone quite well. The zero tolerance is still not anything that many of the commanders or the SRSGs find very important. I heard so many times, "Boys will be boys. Men have their needs." Sometimes I was furious, especially when we had been discussing violence against minors—small girls and boys.

But also, I had to send back home from Bosnia and Herzegovina several of the people in the mission of police who had been involved in trafficking itself to earn money. Of course, using the services of prostitutes—there we have been quite strong about this. You can't perhaps quite say, "They are okay, they are on their own will as prostitutes." Because you can't say who are trafficked women against their own will and who are definitely women who are prostitutes who have chosen this career for their life.

As I have been speaking, I have met so many of these girls in the Balkans. I have talked with hundreds in Africa, in Cambodia, in East Timor—small girls who were bush wives in Sierra Leone and now have no options because they are also outside the pattern of DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) assistance. They don't get any money. So just to sell your little body for half a dollar—that, that is your own option.

I would say that this has gone quite well, because governments start to be a little bit alarmed about their own reputation. That is the best way, because if it is kicking you in your knee, then you perhaps have a little bit of time to think about all this.

It is very difficult to get through with this participation of women in peacekeeping operations in the negotiations. Especially, I have tried lately to sell to governments this national action plan—that it should go through all the ministers that they really should look at the gender perspective in everything they are doing—in their development aid, in the actions they are directing to countries in conflict, when they are training the peacekeepers. In Finland and Norway and Sweden—I am going to Sweden again next week to lecture for future peacekeepers, both military and police, about this gender question and the behavior against women on the spot.

So bit by bit, you can sell. You can also sell justice, because every country, every government, wants to be very much against corruption and for the rule of law. So if you sell this

justice, I think we have been managing quite well indeed, that this is one of the important things to get through with the rule of law—judiciary functioning, police. But it is difficult to sell a report like this, because it is also, in one way, a criticism against the government. People don't want to be criticized.

TGW: What I wanted to ask was how you sell “no impunity,” because that is one of the strongest recommendations coming out of your report. It seems to me that in lots of crises, one sees the sort of uncomfortable nature of the link between impunity and moving on to the next stage. What do you say to a skeptic who says, “Ah, it is time to turn the page on war in Sierra Leone or Uganda?”

ER: I have been very strongly mentioning it first. A reconciliation is absolutely necessary if we are to talk about any kind of peace. Many are saying, “Why are we, and why is Europe, so strong about arresting [Ratko] Mladi_ and [Radovan] Karad_i_?” But when I have been talking with women of Srebrenica, in one way it is so important for them. They can't turn the page if the perpetrators are to live happily for the rest of their lives. So to have justice and the truth settled in one way, that is one kind of condition for getting the reconciliation that we all are talking so beautifully about.

So it is important, but I am absolutely sick and tired about all these situations where really—like now, with the Indonesian army and East Timor—very few faced trials, even if we knew the names exactly. But they were high-ranking people who had raped and so on. Now the same with Aceh. I just talked with a woman who had been with the monitoring mission—how the peace is going through. And as there was nothing about taking away impunity, no militaries have been, so far at least, standing trial. That is bad, because the military, especially, seem to be above the law.

It is the same for the international community. Our brave, wonderful Sergio Vieira de Mello—when I was visiting East Timor with Ellen—had just removed the impunity from civilian police. A peacekeeper and a police officer had misused young girls and boys. He got impunity for the police, not for the soldier—that was impossible for the peacekeeper. And the police officer had to stand trial. That was so good for the whole atmosphere, because everyone in East Timor, in the darkest bush, knew about what those UN people had done. It took away all the credibility. Even if everything was excellent, and they loved Sergio, and everything was good otherwise, this was so bad. So we really have to be strong. And we should not send out people who have been given impunity. Who knows what some countries—I could name some of them, but I don't do that—will send with the next contingent back home, if with the next commission they are again on some mission.

TGW: We should probably put the Catholic Church and the UN together for a conference on impunity. Sorry, I couldn't resist. In your experiences as a special rapporteur, and a special rep, and as an expert with UNIFEM, what is your impression of the quality of the UN staff who were working for you? In comparison with the people who worked with you in the Ministry of Defense or in the Ministry of Equality, how do you think UN people rate? Do you think they are better, worse, or is it impossible to generalize?

ER: Of course, there are some totally impossible people because they have got their appointments for other reasons than quality. I remember that my staff was very unhappy with me when we made these numbers for them.

TGW: Personal evaluations?

ER: Yes. I thought that you should be honest so that you really could get some kind of differences. Nobody is worth a five (the top score) for everything. So I really tried to evaluate

them. They were so angry, because I learned that this is a way of getting rid of impossible people. You give good figures to them, and they are placed in other work. But most whom I would say that I had in my service were very good people. The only thing was the fight within the UN, but of course that is within all organizations or companies. That's terrible. They're stabbing you in the back because they want to get your position, or to get more merits to come higher up. That is something quite terrible.

Fortunately, I think I had some kind of advantage of being a woman. People told me so much, so I knew who were the backstabbers. There were those who gave such lip service in front of me and told terrible things about me just behind my back. That was not nice to know, but it helped me a lot in my work. I think, for instance, Harri Holkeri in Kosovo was too much of a good boy scout. He could not imagine that people are so bad to others. So he suffered from all those who were stabbing him. Therefore, he had such difficulties.

But I have to tell you that when I was appointed, it was really not anything easy. When Kofi Annan called me and told me he was thinking that I could be the next SRSG for Bosnia-Herzegovina, he had to call me just afterwards to say that now there is fire in hell because everyone is not behind this. It was the United States that thought that a woman could not take a position of that responsibility. I was quite surprised. So he said that I had to come immediately and talk with the permanent representatives. I went and got all of the others behind me. It was (Bill) Richardson who was the representative. He said, "Of course you have had human rights and stuff like this. But this is a tough job. Here you have to have 2,000 police." But I think that the president spoke with Strobe Talbot so that they didn't make difficulties, even if they didn't like it.

I was very pleased the last time I was in the Security Council. When I left this job, they had to admit that they were wrong. But when starting the new job, previous correspondence was distributed to me from the high representative's office concerning why Kofi Annan had such idiotic ideas that a woman should be appointed. Then somebody wrote, "He is putting forth such a stupid idea that it will be immediately shot down and then he can look for somebody more suitable."

Then it was also written, "God help us if Elisabeth is coming." It was from the high representative's office in Sarajevo. So it was really not easy for me to come to this position. And I knew all this, so it made me to be much braver, to go to all these dangerous places, to do everything to show that I am not afraid and that I can manage. But it was not easy. It is not easy to be a woman—sorry.

TGW: I wanted to speak a minute about what attracted you, potentially, about the UNICEF assignment in the mid-1990s. You had long been associated with UNICEF. You mentioned these fond memories from after the war. What would have intrigued you about heading a UN institution?

ER: It was, of course, a question that I had been working for. I had been a member of UNICEF in Finland. I had been the vice chair and then the chair for a long time. I was the chair or president of the standing committee of UNICEF. So it came in one way from inside UNICEF. But the staff wanted very strongly that I should be appointed. I was a very, very good friend of Jim Grant. I was so unhappy when I went to his funeral here and all the memorials. It was really very sad when he died.

It was also an idea of the Nordic prime ministers. They all supported me—Carl Bildt, Esko Aho, my own, then Gro Harlem Brundtland, and the Danish prime minister. Many came

personally to support it. That was just because at the time I knew so much about UNICEF and children's issues, not least because in my own big family we are very close.

TGW: Earlier, you also mentioned your association with the Finnish Red Cross. What kind of role did you see for NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) in your assignments? Were they helpful to you in the field? Were they helpful to you in pushing the ideas in the report? They have seemed to play a couple of roles in the UN system—one carrying out activities and the other as an advocate or an educator. How do you see NGOs in the UN system, and where do you see that relationship going in the future?

ER: I would say that they have a very big role, and we must really listen—honestly listen, not only to have a meeting so that we can muddle what they have to say, but honestly listen to what they have to say and what they know. They can always go so much deeper into relationships with the grassroots people. This is what I used to always say. Not until I was sitting there in the green grass with the old women who had been thrown out of their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when I was the special rapporteur on human rights, sitting with just the ordinary people, I knew what the war was really all about. I didn't learn that from all the generals when I visited the region as minister of defense. So you have to come very close to the people. I continued that also with the cooperation and with being with people on the grassroots level, even in my so-called high position as SRSG. Ministers and high-level people are the same all over the world, but the genuine people who are going through all the problems—they know. NGOs come so close to them, so they really have something to teach you and something to do.

Then we have those NGOs that are not so credible. I had to clear up several messes in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina when I came to Stolac, where people had been just moving back into one house. There had been an NGO from a Nordic country—not Finland—who had

promised them to build several houses for them, and now they were waiting. I think that little organization had used all the money for their fact finding mission. The money was finished, and no houses were ever built. We had to try to settle this. Of course, we could not give the money. We didn't have any money in the UN mission. But how much harm NGOs can do who are coming and giving promises.

Then, of course, there is another side to the small organizations if they give no promises. They can be useful if they give information to other organizations, to normal people back home. So they learn about situations. So they in one way are advocates that we should be helpful, that we should understand those people. Of course, this information part, the advocacy part, is important, too, that NGOs act very strongly. But when they are messing up things, and sometimes they are, as they always are—it's good that this is not a video.

TGW: Why not? We probably should have. One thing that I meant to ask in relation to the UNIFEM study and to your approach in the Ministry of Equality in Finland—where would you come down on the issue of “mainstreaming” these issues versus special efforts? The reason I ask this is that the debate that seems to be going on for this report coming out next month on the coherence panel on whether there should be consolidation of lots of activities and a real focus on women, or whether one should try to make sure that women and gender issues are pushed in each agency. Do you have a sense for that?

ER: First of all, I have sometimes said that the words I hate most are “gender mainstreaming.” They are used in every speech given by heads of state or others, because you have to mention it at least a couple of times, sometimes five times, sometimes ten times—gender mainstreaming. Then you think you have done the whole thing and can forget about it. I believe there is something in the combination of both of those that is needed—efforts for specific things

and people who really are, so to say, focal points for doing things, that they have the responsibility to do something. DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) had definite responsibility to look for including women in negotiations from the very beginning at all levels—not serving coffee and tea, but really being there through the processes. Also, of course, in all training there must be those efforts, too. In the judicial part, it is important. Protecting ownership—all these things—must be taken as very important.

But if you believe that you can get the gender issue, the equality issue, to be mainstreamed through everything people are doing, then you are at least naive, if not stupid. It will not work. That means that nobody has the responsibility. When everybody has the responsibility, nobody has. We know it through very small, practical things. When you have told ten people that these things should be done, then nobody is doing it because nobody has real responsibility. So it must mean both that there has been created an atmosphere that these are important things. That is something that should be mainstreamed, but to really concretely do things must be the responsibility of the right persons, whoever they are.

TGW: I don't know if one could assign percentages to such activities, but one of the themes that seems to have come out through our now seventy-seven interviews is the extent to which thinking about women and gender has moved rapidly over a relatively short period of time, along with the environment and human rights. I think the bulk of the interviews would have said these have moved faster than anything else. Is that your sense, as well?

ER: Yes, absolutely. Finally there is a sense for that. It has gone now beyond religions, and so on. In summertime I was invited to Qatar, to Doha. It was just during the time, by the way, of the Mohammed cartoons. It was about enriching the economic future of the Middle East. So there were all the Arabic countries, as well as Iran. I don't know why I was invited.

Bill Clinton was there talking about something and so on. I asked the chief of the cabinet of the Arab League, “What is the situation in the Arabic countries for the women, and the equality today?” He said, “A few years ago, it wasn’t a hot issue at all. Now it is a burning hot issue. Most of the Arabic countries have changed their constitutions. So in theory, women have the same rights as men have. But you have to understand that it takes time.”

Saudi Arabia’s Chamber of Commerce, as to my question, said that they worked for two years to get a woman on the board. Finally, they could make it, but it took two years. So we must have patience. I can understand that. But now everything is happening in a much more rapid way. And I really hope it will happen.

Now when I got to Africa, to attend a very big meeting, they have always made a statement coming out from the meeting that there must be pressure on the national governments to make a national action plan of 1325. So that is a demand that is coming from different parts. So they are aware. Remember that the African Union (AU) has introduced parity—as a matter of fact, the Senegalese and South African presidents exerted pressure because they were pressed by the women’s organizations. So the African Union has total parity. They must have as many women as men. Also in the commission, five men and five women on the African Union Commission. The European Union’s Commission doesn’t have that. So they have gone really quite strongly in this direction. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf certainly, in her election to president, will be one good way of giving an example to others.

TGW: As you look back over your involvement, since university and thereafter, with international cooperation, how has your own thinking changed? What did you think as a young woman that you no longer think now? Or do you see more continuity than change in that period of time?

ER: Perhaps it is a continuity that I have been pushing in the right direction, so to say, all the time. But it is stronger and stronger, and of course my own mind has changed either way. I have my sense of humor still. I would never have managed without it, in everything I have done, all the horrors that I have seen and gone through. You must be able to laugh at yourself, though I am much more serious about life.

I have learned to appreciate my own country and how easy our problems are, compared with the outside world. But it has also made it quite clear for me that you can get results—perhaps only one millimeter of results from each who are trying to run for them. We have many who are trying to work. But it has been worth it, because even if you can get some results for a more sustainable peace against all violence—the unnecessary violence that there is so much of—more real equality for women, so that everything women give to mankind altogether could be taken use of. I think all this is well worth working for. I think it is happening. So in one way, even if I have been witnessing such sad things, I am very optimistic.

TGW: That is very nice to hear. Is there a question that you wish I had asked that I didn't ask? There are tons of questions that I could pose.

ER: We have to end, I suppose. There is a car waiting for me. But no, I think we have been covering quite well.

TGW: Would you tell one of your grandchildren to go to work for the United Nations?

ER: Absolutely. I think, in fact, that one already has started. She is a very smart girl, a granddaughter who is starting with international relations. She is now working as a secretary for the Slovenian embassy in Finland and with different European questions. She has been studying politics and is starting now to come a bit more to the international arena.

TGW: I wish her well. I am truly grateful that you could come by this morning and share your reflections with us

ER: I hope that I could add something to what you had already before.

TGW: This has been a delightful morning. Thank you.

INDEX

- Africa, 1, 27, 35
African Union, 35
 and gender parity, 35
African Union Commission, 35
Aho, Esko, 31
Ahtiaari, Martti, 14-15
Annan, Kofi, 22, 24, 30
Anstee, Margaret, 24
Arab countries, 34-35
 and gender equality, 34-35
Asia, 1
Australia, 8
Balkans, 15-17, 25, 27; *see also* individual countries
Belgrade, 18
Berlin Wall, 6
Bildt, Carl, 20, 31
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 15, 18, 22, 25-26, 32
Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 31
Cambodia, 27
child soldiers, 24
civilians, 2
cooperation, 20-22, 35
 interagency, 20-22
 international, 35
Croatia, 19
Dayton Accords, 19-20, 22
Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), 27
Doha, 34
East Timor, 27-29
European Commission, 19
European Parliament, 16
European Union, 10, 14, 19, 28
Finland, 1-2, 6-16, 19, 23, 27, 36
 and international relations, 14-15
 defense, 6-9
gender, 7, 20, 27, 33-34; *see also* women
 and mainstreaming efforts, 33-34
Geneva, 18
Geneva Conventions, 26
Germany, 14, 22
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 12-13
Grant, Jim, 31
Hägglund, Gustav, 9
Hague, The, 19
Helsinki, 4, 18
Helsinki Accords, 15
Holbrooke, Richard, 20
Holkeri, Harri, 30
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 26
human rights, 16, 20, 30
impunity, 28-29
international civil service, 29-30
 quality of staff, 29-30
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 19
Iran, 34
Iraq, 6, 9
Iraq war (2003), 21
Jerusalem, 9
Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, 24, 28, 35
Kashmir, 9
Karad_i_, Radovan, 28
Kekkonen, Urho, 12, 14
Kinkel, Klaus, 19
Klein, Jaques, 21-22
Koivisto, Mauno, 12, 14
Kosovo, 17-18, 30
Kuwait, 6, 9
Lebanon, 9
Lotta Svärd, 2-4
Machel, Graça, 24
Mandela, Nelson, 24
Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil, 2
Merkel, Angela, 14
Middle East, 34
Milo_evi_, Slobodan, 17, 20
Ministry of Equality (Finland), 33
Mladi_, Ratko, 28
Moscow, 13
Namibia, 24
Namibia Plan of Action, 24
neutrality, 11
New York, N.Y., 18
“new wars,” 25-26
Niinisalo, 9
nongovernmental organizations, 31-33
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19, 25
Norway, 27

- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 19, 21-22
- peacekeeping, 9-10, 26-29
 - and sexual abuse, 26-29
- Persian Gulf War, 6
- prevention, 17
- Putin, Vladimir, 12, 14-15
- Qatar, 34
- reconciliation, 28
- Red Cross (Finland), 1, 4, 31
- regional cooperation, 15
- Richardson, Bill, 30
- Russia, 14-15, 17; *see also* Soviet Union
- Rwanda, 26
 - mass rape in, 26
- Saudi Arabia, 35
- Sarajevo, 31
- Serbia, 17
- Shinseki, Eric, 21
- Sierra Leone, 27-28
- Siilasvuo, Ensio, 9
- Slovenia, 20
- Spain, 22
- Srebrenica, 28
- Stabilization Force (SFOR), 21
- Stalin, Joseph, 2
- Stolac, 32
- South Korea, 8
- Soviet Union, 2, 6, 11-14, 25; *see also*
 - Russia
 - and "Finlandization," 11-12
 - collapse of, 12-14
- Stoltenberg, Torvald, 20
- Sweden, 25, 27
- Swedish People's Party, 7
- Thirty Years' War, 25
- Uganda, 28
- UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 1, 20, 22, 24, 31
- UN Commission on Human Rights, 18
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 33
- UN Development Programme (UNDP), 21
- UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 9
- UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 9
- UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 22, 24-25, 33
- UN General Assembly, 18
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 21
- UN Human Rights Council, 18
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 9
- UN Security Council, 6, 24, 30
 - resolution 1325, 23-24
- UN special rapporteur on the situation of
 - human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16-20, 32
 - and cooperation, 19-20
 - UN special representative of the secretary-general in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20-22, 30-31
 - and cooperation, 20-22
 - and discrimination against women in the position of, 30-31
 - UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 9
 - UN World Conference of the International Women's Year (Mexico City, 1975), 23
 - United States, 14, 19, 22, 30
 - Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 28
 - Windhoek, 24-25
 - Windhoek Declaration, 24
 - Winter War, 1-3, 25
 - women, 2-3, 5, 7, 10, 23-28, 30, 33-36
 - and the African Union, 35
 - and Arab countries, 34-35
 - and peacekeeping, 10, 26-28
 - and prostitution, 26-27
 - and UN personnel, 10, 26-28
 - and war, 24-28
 - trafficking of, 26-27
 - Women, War, Peace*, 24, 26, 28
 - World War II, 1-3, 25
 - Yasov, Marshall, 13-14
 - Yugoslavia (former), 15-19; *see also* individual countries