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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF

DONALD MILLS

BY

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Transcribed by Ron Nerio

THOMAS G. WEISS: This is Tom Weiss interviewing Donald Mills in Kingston on 29 February 2000. Good morning, Don. I thought we would start this morning with going backwards. Tell me a little bit about your own parents and background and how that actually contributed to the person that you are today and were during the 1970s and 1980s.

DM: Well, my parents—some time you can look at the photographs I have in my study of my parents. I grew up in a small country town, of which Jamaica has many. People ask you if you are from Kingston. I now live in Kingston, but I am not from Kingston in that sense. I grew up in a small country town. I was born actually in the center of the island. That may account for my particular interest—as a non-scientist—in the sea. Mandeville is in the center of Jamaica, and from Mandeville, when I was quite young, my parents moved to Chapelton which again is in the center of the island, in the hills—not very high hills but beautiful climate.

So I grew up there. My father joined the police force as a young man and seems to have done very well. In ten years, he reached as high as a Jamaican could go. But at that time the officer corps consisted of foreigners, or people looking like foreigners, from England, of course. And he stayed there. He remained there, very devoted to his work, but he died young. He died at just over fifty. I can remember the headmaster of my college, my secondary school, saying, "And such a young man." I was fourteen, and I wondered, how could a man of fifty or fifty-one be regarded as a young man? Now I know.

My mother was a teacher all her life. Very dedicated. She was at the school I attended. I attended a primary school in this small town. In the days when people would say, in Jamaica, primary school teachers were the salt of the earth. They were the backbone of the individual communities. They were highly respected and they really taught. So my primary school

education was the foundation of anything that has happened to me in that direction. It was really very good.

So I had a very good grounding. And on the basis of this I got a scholarship to go to secondary school and went to one of the top secondary schools—Jamaica College. I spent eight years there, and it was a boarding school at the time, patterned very much on the English secondary schools.

My mother—as I say, my father died when I was fourteen so my mother had to look after the three children of the family on a schoolteacher's salary. Talk about financial experts! Especially women, you know, who performed miracles, bringing up their families on very limited means.

So I'm very fortunate. My mother was a person who had special qualities and was highly respected and greatly loved. A remarkable woman, you know. My father was a little more reserved. But one of the remarkable things about my life is that my mother was a teacher and my father had a brother who was also a teacher. He went to the teachers training college. He did his study to be a teacher, taught for a few years and then went back and remained there and became a foundation of that very famous college in Jamaica which still exists: the Mico Teacher's Training College. A teacher of teachers—he was, in short, in the business of training teachers, but he was also very much involved in public service on a host of committees, government and other committees. Dedicated, again very well known in his time—he died some years ago—and very much revered.

So the teaching element—first of all, the examples of my parents and my uncle, and the teaching influence, it ends up with my being a member of a family that has many teachers. My mother was a teacher. My uncle was a very famous teacher of teachers. My brother is a

professor at our university—he started in public service. I have two older children, by a first marriage. Both of them were teachers. I have two young children; both of them have taught. My brother's first son is a professor at the University of Illinois, a professor of philosophy. And his second child has also been a teacher.

TGW: In order to compensate, this is why you collect books and things?

DM: That's right, exactly. And my sister, my sister's first child also was a teacher. And really, I count at least ten persons who have been teachers in my family, past and present. I have done quite a bit of teaching myself, not in primary or secondary schools but lectures for our university, extra-mural lectures and later as a part-time teacher. Not on the staff of the university, but teaching on international relations and things like that. That is a major influence in my life. With a little bit of persuasion, I might have become a teacher.

I had, I think, a very pleasant time in secondary school. It started out in the old style, small boys were to be seen and not heard—in fact, neither to be seen nor heard. And those were days when, in our school as in many others in and outside of Jamaica, there was a strict hierarchical system, age and the rest of it. But I learned to enjoy my school days and was really sorry to leave after eight years. I left and went into government service. There was not much else, apart from teaching. At the time, the opportunities were limited. This was just at the beginning of World War II.

You see, this is the colonial system—the government being run by a governor-general, who was an Englishman, and by what they call the colonial-secretary. And the top civil servants in the top jobs in the major agencies were Englishmen. It was decided, I suppose, by the British government, that Jamaica should have a facility to follow and to give information about what's happening in the war—favorable information. So they set up a War Information Office in

Jamaica, a very small one. And then someone gave Jamaica his small broadcasting unit, and that was the beginning of Jamaica having a radio station. So these were run by this War Information Office and I—a couple of days after leaving school—quite by chance, found myself working there, because I had run into someone who had been at Jamaica College, much older than me, and was now working in the government and had something to do with that office. And he suggested that I come and work there. So I worked for a year and a half or so there, and that helped to lay the foundations of my interest in international affairs. There was a lot of stuff coming in—you know magazines and stuff, mainly British, but it spurred my reading on things about the world. I took a lot of interest in what was happening in the war. I learned a lot. I read a lot of articles, including articles about what was happening in the political situation in Britain.

But it was not a permanent office, so eventually I had to move to work in a permanent government office. Again, I was very, very fortunate. I was told that the Englishman who was heading what was called the Island Treasury—but he called himself the financial-secretary and treasurer (this was in colonial days when there was no ministerial system)—he was a very extraordinary man. He was determined to make the treasury into a very powerful instrument, as compared with the colonial secretariat. And he did. First of all, he started recruiting people with A-levels, or what was called the Higher Schools Certificate. And that was the basis on which I was appointed. And after a while he established a development section and brought in four or five other persons, very bright Jamaicans, older than myself. And I had the opportunity of working with them. So that again had a very strong influence on my career. My interest in development started there.

TGW: Could we just go back a minute? You mention your father dying in the midst of the 1930s and your mother taking over. In the West, the depression was a traumatic event. In

the middle of Jamaica, in the hills or the mountains, were you aware of the Depression or was this just beyond?

DM: I do not recall being aware of the Depression during my years at Jamaica College, which is in the City of Kingston. As a matter of fact, trying to recall one's consciousness of the world outside—well, there was one connection. At the time, in a school like Jamaica College, quite a few of the teachers were from Britain, so you had that influence. In my time, there were two who taught history. They were very, very interesting people, and I eventually took history as a subject in my A-levels. I did chemistry and math as my primary subjects in A-levels and history as a subsidiary.

Would that I had done more history. One of the things I regret is the absence of a sufficient grounding in that subject. The more I have been involved in international affairs and in world matters, the more I feel the absence of this. This is a point I would like to make somewhere along the line. I think in today's world, all of us have this need. I was two years on the executive board of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), as you will hear, and I find that this very august body is making major decisions about countries and they don't have to know much about them, except their economics! The member countries' reports go to the IMF for examination at intervals. I said it would be nice to spend three quarters of an hour or so in some facility in such institutions, just reducing your ignorance marginally before discussing the reports. And I have had the same feeling in New York at the UN. At the time of the Iran hostage crisis, we were about to deal solemnly in the Security Council, to deal with very critical issues—the actions of a country with a very strong sense of grievance, of past wrongs, and a breach of the international conventions; a country which was not about to be deterred by your quoting to them the rules concerning the safety of diplomats. I really felt an absence of a

sufficient knowledge—not a specialist knowledge—of the history of the country involved and the antecedents to the incident. In my UN experience, there are a number of cases in which I felt that it is difficult to do real justice to a particular situation—even if a country, for instance, was seen to be in the wrong, or on the wrong side of the system. It would have been very helpful if one knew a little bit about the country and its culture and some of its history.

Another thing that I have found in my life—I did chemistry and math at A-levels, advanced levels, in school. The things that I remember, in terms of my lessons, are from the literature. Of course, the poetry and all the rest of it, it was all more or less British. The books—[Charles] Dickens or Walter Scott, et cetera. The poetry—[William] Wordsworth, [John] Keats, [Percy] Shelley, et cetera. And, of course, [William] Shakespeare. I have tried to collect some of the books I had at both primary and secondary school. And some of the poetry I still love. I have been very much influenced by some of the English poets, because at the time there was no such thing as Caribbean or Jamaican literature, neither novels nor poetry, in the schools. It took a long time before this came into the educational system.

And again I wondered whether it would have been more appropriate for me to have studied, say, history and literature at an advanced level and at university. But one of the things about me is the business of what influences shaped my career. I worked in the Island Treasury, and by reason of working in the development area and with these older persons, I ended up getting a scholarship to go to LSE (London School of Economics) to study economics. Because I had done advanced math at secondary school I opted to do economics with demography and statistics as my main subjects. But as I say, I could easily have made a turn in the other direction. But my movement in the area of development and related issues—demography and such—came about for a number of reasons while I was at the Island Treasury. In the late 1930s,

there were uprisings in the Caribbean over social conditions—riots, not revolutions, but riots. Spontaneous protests and that sort of business took place. This transformed places like Jamaica, but it drew attention—attention of the British authorities—to the neglect, gross neglect, of these countries. And the British, I suppose typically, appointed a royal commission. And this commission, in 1938, just before World War II, put out a report that contained some really tough criticisms of the neglect by the colonial authorities. We are accustomed, when it is appropriate, to make harsh criticisms about the colonial history of Jamaica. But the British government, early in WWII, decided to make some sort of redress, not quite reparations. That is one of the things I want to talk to with you at some stage.

They established a development and welfare program. They established offices in the Caribbean, eventually with the headquarters in Barbados serving the English-speaking Caribbean, basically a development assistance scheme. Some people would criticize and say there was not enough development, but the thing is they had funding for support of agriculture, education, welfare, et cetera. And I, looking back at it, think it was remarkable. Was it the first major overseas development project? And with a war taking place? Nothing is talked about it now, and it is one of the things I hope to write about. Because they had staff in Barbados, they had some here in Jamaica, and they were brought in as advisers—believe it or not—a number of quite eminent people. Professor Frederick Benham, a top economist from LSE, was here as an adviser to the Caribbean. So was Professor Simey, the sociologist from Liverpool University.

I got to know these people because I was working at the Island Treasury as a youngster, just beginning to feel my interest developing in this area, and discovering along with some of my friends the diploma in public administration—a University of London diploma. We had no university in the West Indies. We got together and studied together and did the diploma in

public administration exams. That was my first university course. That had economics, social and political theory, administration, and a bit of statistics. Then a decision was made that having people like Benham and Simey and one or two others here, that they should establish a social welfare course for the West Indies, bringing in people from other parts of the Caribbean in an extended course—the social welfare training course.

So I am now working in the section of the Island Treasury that deals with the colonial development and welfare scheme, because we had to establish an office that deals with the business of grants disbursement, et cetera. So, when I realized that Professor Bernham and Simey would be lecturing in this course, I wrote a letter, something like Oliver Twist, asking for a second helping before I had had a first. I said that I would really like to attend these lectures. I would have to go during work hours, and I would undertake to give back the time after hours. And my bosses agreed!

Where did they have the course? At Mona, where the University of the West Indies now is, on the outskirts of Kingston. Very few people are aware of this, except some people in the social welfare department of the university. When WWII started, it was realized by the British government that Gibraltar and Malta and places like that were going to be pulverized, possibly. So they arranged to evacuate people, just as they were moving people from London and cities in England to the countryside, to evacuate some of these people, including people from some other countries but mainly we speak of Malta and Gibraltar. They established a camp here for them at Mona, and they were here until the end of the war. So when they left, there were these buildings. The social welfare course started in these buildings during the war, as did the university later.

And I attended these lectures. And when it was decided by the government to give one scholarship to LSE, who was on the selection committee? Frederick Benham. So, I'm very

amused by the interview, because he had done a report on Jamaica's economy, on the development of Jamaica. He had had a committee, but it was seen as basically his report. They had set up a small, informal committee in the treasury, mostly by seniors, to examine the report, but I was a youngster making the notes. So I knew the Benham report by heart. Since I was going to be interviewed, I had prepared myself. So when he asked me what I thought about the report, I was ready to respond. So good fortune gave me a scholarship to LSE.

TGW: Before we get to LSE, what was it like being in Jamaica during the war? I assume there was a little more knowledge of the war than there was of the depression.

DM: Yes. You could hardly avoid that. A Jamaican had given his small radio station to the government because there was a war coming, so you got some news. It was rather British, this little radio station. It was only operating a few hours a day—a lot of loyalty to the cause, of course. Jamaicans started a fund to buy warplanes for Britain, and people subscribed. Then quite a lot of Jamaicans went off to Britain, to the war, at different levels. First of all, a number of people who were in school, friends of mine. Some of them died. Many went into the air force. Then a number of young women went into the Auxiliary Territories Services. Then they were running short of labor, so they recruited a lot of young men to work as ground crew for the air force. They started recruiting people to work in British factories. So across the Jamaican society, quite a number of people had members of their families who had gone off. The government established a war risks insurance scheme, just in case German submarines shelled Kingston.

So there were a number of things that brought the war home. And apart from this little radio station, people listened to the BBC.

TGW: This was not on the basis of any conscription. This was volunteer?

DM: Absolutely.

TGW: And during this period of time, obviously you were leaning toward the BBC and Britain. When does this large entity to the north enter the picture? When does the United States become a primary vector for communication?

DM: First of all, Jamaica has a history of migration. In the years between the two world wars, Jamaicans started migrating to the United States. So there is now a large Jamaican diaspora in the United States. Then with the depression, I think that is the occasion on which they closed off this easy access to the United States and put in quotas and visas and the rest. But Jamaicans have continued to go the United States. Go down to the embassy now and you will see quite a lot of Jamaicans waiting there. So that connection came. Many Jamaicans have relatives in the United States. They travel. There is a lot of travel and, of course, the tourism connection. Most of our tourists are Americans.

Early in World War II, the U.S. provided Britain with something like fifty old destroyers—I think it was fifty—in exchange for the right to establish bases in the Caribbean. This brought the U.S. forces to places like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, brought the U.S. into the war and inevitably sharpened Jamaica's interest. We are very close to Florida.

During World War II, the Americans and the British established a rather unusual organization, which I think has been forgotten: the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. This was a vehicle for promoting cooperation between the U.S. and Britain in the area. That commission eventually became the Caribbean Organization, with offices in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, dealing with a range of development issues in the region. Then we have, of course, American interests in the Caribbean, apart from investments. We have their interest in

Cuba, which developed critically later. They also have Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The thing about the Caribbean Organization was that it included everybody, not only English-speaking. It had Puerto Rico, it had Haiti, and all of these countries. It took many decades before you could find any institution in the Caribbean which included all the countries. CARICOM (Caribbean Community), of course, is English speaking, although there are now links being made with the Dominican Republic and others. Cable television now forms a powerful link between Jamaica and the U.S.

TGW: I see your brother, Gladstone, has actually stolen a great title for an autobiography, this *Grist for the Mills*.

DM: Yes, yes.

TGW: And he also spends much time speaking about Chapelton, in particular about the extraordinary number of people who were your peers, colleagues, older and younger, who were also there and went on to be prominent players.

DM: It was wonderful. If I had to choose again, I would not want to grow up anywhere else. And there is a strong sentiment, which still remains between some families. It was a small town and we had a wonderful time. And then you came to the time when the young ones went to secondary school, mostly in Kingston. And my brother Gladstone and I were living in Kingston at Jamaica College—and you went home for the holidays, a number of us, boys and girls. It was beautiful, absolutely beautiful. Chapelton was the capital of the Parish of Clarendon, but it did not grow. It is a little bit off the beaten track, off the hills, whereas May Pen—you cannot go west without going through it. So May Pen grew and grew and grew and eventually captured the position of parish capital. But Chapelton had a wonderful climate and it was really, really lovely growing up there.

TGW: When you arrived at LSE in a different postwar era, what was the atmosphere like being a young black man in a—I presume at the time anyway—somewhat predominantly British institution?

DM: A large number of young persons from the colonies, myself among them, went after the war to universities in Britain, France, and other European countries, having in most cases no universities of their own at the time. So England in the war and postwar years had a significant number of what they called colonial students. I ended up living in a hostel, which was full of Africans, Asians, and Caribbean people. That was a marvelous experience. That was my introduction, if you like, to what we call the Third World. Also, it was the place where the West Indian connection was nurtured. As students, we formed a West Indian Students Union, which was very active, and we got to know each other—you better believe it. Whereas in Trinidad and Grenada and those places in the Eastern Caribbean, they moved among each other—you get in a boat and in a short while you're in the next island. And intermarriage—Jamaica was not a part of that, being a thousand miles to the west. This has been a factor in the Jamaican relationship with others all along, including the federation. Jamaica came out of the very short-lived West Indian Federation. But as I say, most of us who were in that experience in London have never abandoned, shall I say, those sentiments.

The ignorance in England about these colonial peoples who they dominated and governed for all of those years—this was something that really amazed me. But they are learning. Shortly after LSE, I came home in 1950. I went straight to the Department of Statistics, because I had a degree with statistics. Quite a number of Jamaicans who had been in England stayed to study at British universities. Many who had worked as artisans in factories had got scholarships or fellowships to do technical training, very good training courses and a lot of them came home.

Headlines, the photographs of this—*Windrush* was the name of the boat—there are books about it now about these Jamaicans returning to England in 1949. That was very much publicized. That helped to trigger a wave of migration to Britain, starting in 1952, 1953, 1954, building up to the early 1960s. Planes at the time only carried a small number of people, but the ships, which were taking Italians and other people from Europe, that was a great boost to migration to places like South America. These big ships, carrying 700 and 800 passengers, would fill up in Europe and go down to South America and travel back empty—until somebody whispered in their ears that there were a lot of people in the Caribbean, especially Jamaica, who wanted to go to England. And these boats started passing here and taking 700 with them.

So the numbers built up and built up. I did, along with George Roberts, a demographer from the University of the West Indies, a study of the migration to Britain, which was published by the Institute of Social and Economic Research. George Roberts had been the demographer in the Colonial Development and Welfare Organization. So you now had England being invaded, literally. But in 1961, the Conservative government, under pressure from all sorts of interests, decided that they wanted to, if not close the door, make it much more difficult. A Jamaican who got hold of a passport, and it was a British passport, you were a citizen of the United Kingdom in the colonies—you could go to Britain. Even if you stowed away on a boat, when they found you over there they could not throw you out. They would put you in prison for two weeks, but you could live in England forever. So, in 1961, the Conservative government introduced legislation to remove that facility.

In 1961, I happened to be in Europe on summer vacation. And the government of Jamaica sent a message over to me saying that I must cease my vacation and do some work in an attempt to influence opinion, especially in the House of Commons, against this Commonwealth

Immigrants Bill. The Labor Party was in opposition, and they opposed the proposal. So I spent a few weeks trying to make some impact on the opposition in Parliament. So England now has a whole lot of West Indians. And other people are still coming from former colonies.

But the most interesting thing is that a folk poet of Jamaica, the Honorable Louise Bennett—her poetry really is out of this world—she wrote a poem entitled, "Colonisation in Reverse." You should really get a copy. It is most remarkable. She writes in the Jamaican English. It is absolutely most penetrating. And it is most true. I have used that phrase at seminars, et cetera, when the subject might come up. And it has direct impact on people because Europe is being colonized by the people who they colonized.

"Colonisation in Reverse"[1]

Wat a joyful news, Miss Mattie,
I feel like me heart gwine burs'
Jamaica people colonizin
England in reverse.

By de hundred, by de t'ousan
From country and from town,
By de ship-load, by de plane-load
Jamaica is England boun.

Dem a-pour out o'Jamaica,
Everybody future plan
Is fe get a big-time job
An settle in de mother lan.

What a island! What a people!
Man an woman, old an young
Jusa pack dem bag an baggage
An tun history upside dung!

[1] Permission to use "Colonisation in Reverse" was granted by Jamaica Ministry of Education and Culture on 9 April 2001 (on file).

Some people don't like travel,
But fe show dem loyalty
Dem all a-open up cheap-fare-
To-Englan agency.

An week by week dem shippin off
Dem countryman like fire,
Fe immigrate an populate
De seat o' de Empire.

Oonoo see how life is funny,
Oonoo see de turnabout,
Jamaica live fe box bread
Outa English people mout'.

For wen dem catch a Englan,
An start play dem different role,
Some will settle down to work
An some will settle fe de dole.

Jane say de dole is not too bad
Because dey payin' she
Two pounds a week fe seek a job
Dat suit her dignity.

Me say Jane will never find work
At the rate how she dah-look,
For all day she stay pon Aunt Fan couch
An read love-story book.

Wat a devilment a England!
Dem face war an brave de worse,
But I'm wonderin' how dem gwine stan'
Colonizin' in reverse.

—Louise Bennett

So, being in England in my students days, there were difficulties because of the ignorance and that sort of thing. But there were a lot of pleasant things. And there was a whole company of West Indians and other colonial students that gave a very special dimension to it.

TGW: What happened in the colonial students' hostel with the partition of India and Pakistan? Did it seem to all of you—Caribbeans and African folk—that decolonization was inevitable, that it was going to be quick, that it was going to be slow? Were there debates about these issues?

DM: I do not remember the students debating the Pakistan-India divide, but certainly we were very worked up about colonialism. I wonder, where are the records of the West Indian Students Union? Those records would have been most interesting because this was a first opportunity for contact on such a scale. People had been going to university, mostly in North America—that is, a few people. Many were going up to work, because you could study and work in the United States and Canada. But the idea of going to Britain to work and study was not feasible in prewar years accept for a few.

I do not recall the Indian situation so much. But we had students from India and we must have been aware. But I do recall when some of the Arab students left. Israel was established in 1948 and war exploded immediately in Palestine. Some of the students felt they should leave—maybe Jewish students also. I just recall one or two them saying good-bye. But there was a considerable level of consciousness. We learned a lot from being together.

TGW: I guess much of what we think about history is always in retrospect. In an interview, Brian Urquhart mentioned that in 1945 the founders of the Charter basically thought that decolonization would take seventy-five to 100 years. So, I am wondering when it became obvious that it was not going to take seventy-five, that it might take twenty.

DM: That is true, because I just came across something recently giving the same notion—that it was going to be a very long process. The fact is that once the idea of independence entered the consciousness of a people, things began to move quickly. The demand

came from all over the former empires—British, French, and Portuguese. Some pressed negotiations with the colonizing power, as in the case of the West Indians. Others resorted to liberation wars. And finally, we have more than eighty countries—which were colonies when the UN was established—as independent states and members of the UN. And remember that World War II was seen as helping to precipitate the end of the British Empire. Recall Winston Churchill's words: "I was not appointed the first minister of England in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," or words to that effect. Moreover, it was in 1960—only fifteen years after the UN was established—that the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It called on the colonial powers to take steps immediately to transfer power to the people of the colonies.

I recall that it was in the 1940s that the first notion about the Caribbean coming together emerged. You see, as far as Jamaica was concerned, the independence movement could be said to have emerged in the late 1930s. In the 1930s, there was the depression, and many people who had emigrated came home. One writer, a Jamaican, has indicated that in his belief some of these people had been to places like the U.S. and Latin America and seen a variety of political systems—liberal democracy, republicanism, revolutionary ideology—and so might have been a factor in this demand for independence. A group of Jamaicans in America were pushing hard for independence. In that period, we saw the establishment of the political parties—in 1938 the PNP (People's National Party), and a few years later the Labour Party. But the immediate aim was for self-government.

But as I say, I wish I could go back in my mind to some of the lively discussions on a wide range of issues in the students' hostel and the West Indian Students Union. This was really a very major learning process, that situation, for West Indians, for other colonial countries, and

for the British also. West Indians and other colonial students from Africa and Asia, meeting for the first time in such numbers—and in England, the very center of that empire, meeting the people of England in their numbers and in their territory. Add to that the fact that West Indians are in the main the descendents of Africans and Asians who were brought to the West in varying circumstances, so to speak! Altogether a historical event of enormous significance. Imagine the impact—and then these students returning home, becoming involved in national affairs, some in political leadership, in the professions, in public service, et cetera, and many involved no doubt in the independence movements, the decolonization struggle, and later in international affairs.

TGW: What do you recall in those years, if we could just reverse a moment to the Jamaica College? Was there any treatment or discussion of the defunct League of Nations, or was this just not a topic? I guess this is a segue as to how the United Nations was seen in 1945 here in Jamaica or as part of a Commonwealth position.

DM: The Commonwealth? Oh, we were not a part of that club. That was the dominions—the UK, Canada, Australia. Were New Zealand and South Africa in at that time? A club really. The rest were "the lesser breeds without the law"—the colonies. And in the UN, there was a Commonwealth group. You know in the UN, regional groups perform a useful function. Later, especially with decolonization, you had the West European, the East European, the Latin American, and the Asian and African groups.

You see, being a colony, there was no such thing as any sort of diplomatic corps or diplomatic relations. There were no foreign diplomats resident in Jamaica, and we did not have diplomatic representatives in other countries. Our contacts came mainly through emigration of Jamaicans to countries like Central America, Cuba, the U.S., and later to the UK and Canada, as well as trade—our exports of things like sugar, rum, bananas, and coffee, and the tourist trade.

And many Jamaicans had and still have strong sentiments about Africa and have traveled to that continent.

Those years, especially my early years after leaving school, were most interesting. Jamaica was in turmoil in a creative sense. The release that took place in the late 1930s, into the 1940s, the political activity, the art movement, the whole cultural movement. We had poets and artists emerging, all sorts of things. We had discussion groups, the youth movements and the rest. I was very much involved in that sort of thing.

TGW: But in that period, I guess I am trying to see whether the experience at the War Information Office, or thereafter, whether the notion of the United Nations and the Atlantic Charter, and the importance of something other than bilateral relations came on to the agenda, or whether this was really just much later.

DM: The UN was established in 1945, two years before I went to London to university. Looking back, I don't recall much about the organization in those early years. Earlier, at school in Jamaica, it was inevitable that there would have been reference to the League of Nations in my classes in European history. The two history teachers I had were intelligent and interesting, and both were British and therefore likely to be aware of these matters. As a colony, the birth of the UN would, of course, have been noted, but it would not have made a very great impact on the public. Jamaica had only just made the first steps towards internal self-government, with a new constitution, the first national political parties, universal adult suffrage, and an embryonic ministerial system. So this, along with other very interesting things which were taking place in different areas of life—early discussions on development, trade unions, vibrant cultural activity—and the war, which had created some hardships, was over. There was much to focus the attention at home.

I can remember a few things that drew my own attention to the UN later. I was sent to the Department of Statistics when I returned from university and soon found that one of my tasks was to put together some of the information required, under Article 73, of the UN Charter from countries with colonies, or "non-self-governing territories," about conditions in those territories. This type of material was prepared periodically, sent to the metropolitan country which would presumably prepare the full report and submit it to the UN Secretary-General. Such reports were examined by the UN committee on decolonization, made up, of course, of member-country delegates elected to it by the General Assembly.

And at about that time, the government obtained through the UN the services of an advisor for the Department of Statistics. And we had a few others coming in through the UN to assist in various areas of work. But in the early stages, the dominant element in terms of development assistance was the UK's Development and Welfare Programme.

TGW: You mentioned decolonization as a theme among students. I was wondering whether, for Europeans since you were based in Europe, probably the most significant undertaking was the enlightened self-interest of the Marshall Plan. How was this viewed within student circles or in the press? What is your recollection on that?

DM: Let me say that as far as any consciousness concerning major events in the world was concerned, there were in my case a number of factors and events which certainly opened my mind to some of them: the opportunity to work as a young man in the Island Treasury with particularly interesting people and especially in the new development division; the contact with the Colonial Development and Welfare Programme, and specially with the advisers such as Dr. Frederick Benham from LSE and Professor Simey from the University of Liverpool and others; to be involved in animated discussions on a number of development issues in the new social

welfare training course with these persons as tutors; to work in the War Information Office, opening the means to learn about events related to World War II from the official information received for public consumption as well as British newspapers and magazines; the discussions in the Island Treasury—I was the note-taker—and publicly on the Benham report on Jamaica's economy; access to other information including *The Economist* and other sources in the very small office library which I looked after; and my own reading which developed in that period. I recall, for example, buying a copy of *Inside Europe* by John Gunther. There were my studies for the University of London Diploma in Public Administration, and the very active youth movement of the time in Jamaica. And I owned, at that time, a small short-wave radio and listened mainly to U.S. and Latin American broadcasts since we only had this small local station in Jamaica. On this Sunday morning, on the seventh of December 1941, I heard the very excited announcement interrupting the program from the USA, to which I was listening, to announce that Pearl Harbor was under attack. In all of this, there surely would have been reference to some of the major developments in the world. And as far as the depression is concerned, this was being reflected in American films and newsreels which at the time were shown in cinema before the feature film. And there were other influences. There was, of course, the BBC—the voice of Britain! As far as the Marshall Plan was concerned, I'm sure we heard of this in London, but have no clear recollection of this.

TGW: What about Bretton Woods—not just the Bank and the Fund, but also the shipwreck of the ITO (International Trade Organization)? These are issues that you have spent a lot of time on subsequently. Was that only subsequently? Do you have any recollection of this becoming part of what might some day be—or what [John Maynard] Keynes hoped would some day be a financial system to somewhat govern international order?

DM: My first contact with the World Bank was not long after I came home from LSE, somewhere around 1950, the early 1950s. I was in the statistics department until the mid-1950s and then went over to planning, and eventually became head of the planning agency. But in about 1952, the World Bank sent its first mission to Jamaica. This was ten years before independence. A team came down and the first thing they want is information. I was at this Department of Statistics which was rather weak. I was, in a way, the only fully-trained professional statistician. I found myself, over the period that they were here, spending a lot of my time trying to put together basic information for them. Our statistics were not in great shape, as you can imagine. We did not have national income estimates, but we tried to rustle something up for their report. I have a copy of the report still. So we had two reports—the Benham economic report, which was earlier, and the World Bank report. At LSE, we had lectures in economics which touched on the Bretton Woods system, but the business of being in a colony—these institutions were far away.

TGW: I think this may have changed colony by colony. For instance, in speaking with Gamani Corea a few weeks ago, it turns out that because of Sri Lankan independence, which was on the same fast track as India and Pakistan, his uncle had actually prepared a position for the Havana conference (UN Conference on Trade and Employment). He approached that delegation in the need for commodity policy for commodity producing countries.

DM: Well, Sri Lanka, in that sense—I have heard many people say Sri Lanka and Jamaica, there are similarities. And there have been. But, of course, there are many major differences. Sri Lanka was ahead of us in terms of political development. Their independence and UN membership came in 1955.

In the Planning Institute, we were dealing with the UN and with the bilateral agencies with development assistance. I don't remember when the World Bank started its regular missions to Jamaica, but of course we became independent in 1962, and a member of the Bank and Fund. It was in 1971 and 1972 that we first got on the executive board of the IMF. Jamaica later became very much involved with the IMF. Serious tensions developed in that relationship in the late 1970s, and the [Michael] Manley government had a virtual political crisis over the issue of whether we should continue to draw on the Fund resources with its conditionalities. But Jamaicans became very conscious of the IMF. Some re-interpreted IMF to mean, "It's Manley's Fault."

TGW: When you returned from LSE in 1950, what led you back to the civil service? Were there private sector options, or did you somehow feel compelled to devote yourself to government service? What plopped you back in statistics, and then eventually the IMF?

DM: Well my family has been in public service. But also I was still in the government service. I had been on study leave. I got a full scholarship to LSE, but I was on leave. So I went straight back and the moment I arrived, before I got off the ship, I was told that I was now at the Department of Statistics, no longer at the Island Treasury. And I have remained in public service. I have had some excursions. In the mid-1950s, I had a spell as research manager in a study called *Family and Fertility in Jamaica,* a study of Jamaican working class women of childbearing age—their family histories and attitudes and education and the rest of it—and then moved into the question of family limitation. And then we ran an experiment in the field trying to see in what ways you could influence people to find ways of limiting their family. And the Conservation Foundation, a U.S. organization, borrowed me from the government service as research manager for a year and a half, but strictly on a loan basis.

Then later, the university here needed an academic registrar and borrowed me for at least a year, and still later, the Bahamas, when the Bahamas eventually got the full vote, in the mid-1960s. We got universal suffrage in 1944—twenty years later they got the vote. They elected a popular government and the prime minister came over here to ask for some assistance and he asked if I could be released by the government to spend a couple of years in the Bahamas setting up a Ministry of Development and Planning, which I did. Right after that, when I was due to come back home to my job, I was asked to go on the Executive Board of the IMF. And when that was over two years, I was ready to come back home but the government asked me to go to the UN as Jamaican ambassador. But I have been in the public service all along. Even now, though I formally retired from the public service years ago, I have been doing a lot of things. I am on the Privy Council and the Judicial Service Commission. And I was involved with the environmental issue. I was chairman of the environment authority. So, basically I have never really been in the private sector, as such.

And I have, of course, been involved abroad. I have been asked to do assignments occasionally, but I have never set up a consultancy. I have my own form of slavery, which is exacting. But doing consultancies every day, all the time, would have deprived me of some of the interesting things that I have been involved in.

TGW: One other event that I would like to try to get you to reflect back upon is the Bandung conference (Asian-African Conference) in 1955. Do you have any recollection of this? There seem to be two views. Everyone recognizes in retrospect that it was a historic gathering quite essential for the future of the Third World, but at the time the question is whether anyone was aware of it. Brian Urquhart claims, for example, that on the 38th floor there was total ignorance of this event. They were only aware of it because the Americans had shot down a

Chinese plane on the way, et cetera. Whereas, Jan Pronk, because I suppose of Indonesia's colonial status, said that in his youth this was a major event and that at the time [Jan] Tinbergen and everyone said it was essential. Do you have any recollection?

DM: I was moving from the Department of Statistics to the research project on fertility at that time. And the meeting took place seven years before our independence. A remarkable collection of leaders were there, among them Prince [Norodom] Sihanouk from Cambodia, Zhou Enlai from China, [Gamal Abdel] Nasser from Egypt, [Jawaharlal] Nehru from India, General [Carlos] Rómulo from the Philippines, and Pham Van Dong from Vietnam. The historic nature of the event and the people who were there should have made it headlines throughout the world. The question is how the media treated it and whether there would have been any impact on the political consciousness in Jamaica. The People's National Party leadership came to power in the mid-1950s. It would be interesting to look at their manifesto to see what had happened. The Labor Party came to power when the Norman Manley government lost power in 1962, just before independence. At first, it took observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and later Jamaica became a member. But I cannot recall Bandung being very special to Jamaicans. You see, it was more Asian than African, I recall, and only something like five of the twenty-four countries attending were African.

TGW: In contrast, of course, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago all became independent in 1962, and subsequently you wrote in Jim Muldoon's book that independence and eventually the increase in membership in the United Nations was the most significant change in international politics, at least as far the UN was concerned. What did you think at the time, or in retrospect what made it the most significant change and how did this change manifest itself in the style and the agenda of the institution?

DM: Well, going back to the League of Nations, I cannot find a list of members. But, of course, Africa had only four countries which were independent in 1945. So, you can rule out Africa, and most of Asia. Some years ago, when I was in New York, there was an exhibition on the League of Nations in the UN building. I really believe that people like me should know more about the League of Nations, and to look at it in comparison with what is happening in the UN. We could learn some lessons. Imagine in a few decades time, or less, someone putting on an exhibition of the UN that used to exist.

Latin American countries were mostly independent from the early nineteenth century. So, when the League of Nations came along, I suppose most of them qualified for admission. I don't have any real notion as to the part they played. That would be very interesting. But when the UN came along, of fifty-one members, twenty of them were Latin American. So, the Third World, if they ever would have allowed themselves to use that term, was in large part Latin American. Then came decolonization and the gradual acceleration of the numbers of the countries coming in. For a person who was brought up in a colonial country, over a period of 400 years or something like that, this was an enormous thing. And the colonial system had looked as if it was going on indefinitely.

To go to the UN in 1962, for Jamaica to stand before the world and claim the right to participate, and other countries also, this was extraordinary. There is hardly a change in history that can be compared to it. Add the fact that in the 1970s they tabled the proposals for the New International Economic Order (NIEO). This is not just a bunch of countries that have come into the UN and have decided to put up an economic program. If anything, perhaps looking at it critically, at decolonization and its consequences, including the North-South relationship, I think the issues did not get the focus that they deserve. As a matter of fact, anticipating myself, my

view is that the sort of changes needed in the hearts and minds of people in dealing with relations across cultures, across countries—this is not something you can deal with only by way of having a program and negotiations in the UN in a reluctant committee.

So, I see decolonization as a change almost unparalleled in the world. And the change is still taking place. I quoted, when [Richard] Nixon went to see Zhou Enlai, and they were talking generally, and Nixon said, "What do you think was the effect of the French Revolution?" And Zhou Enlai says, "It's too early to tell." Well, I believe that there are some things like that. Even the Russian Revolution, which is supposed to have now been scrubbed from history, the impact of that still goes on. But certainly, the colonial story, there are so many things on that agenda which have not really received the attention that they should receive. The business of cultural differences—I find that as, in a broad sense, the central issue.

On decolonization, a lot of people deserve credit. The Americans, for instance, were among those solidly behind the de-colonization movement. And after all, the Declaration passed in the UN in 1960 was unanimous. Interesting to see who were the participants in that unanimous decision, because as I say the UN was still limited in its membership.

TGW: You participated in this Erskine Childers-Brian Urquhart study of the early 1990s, in which one of the central problems of the UN system is that it aspires to be a kind of, if not government, governance arrangement. Yet, it has its ministries across the planet and, despite electronic communications, there are problems when people are in different cities. Do you recall debates around that committee in terms of some kind of centralization of UN existence?

DM: Well, I have been reflecting on that among other things. You see, it starts outside of the UN. The UN suffers from this lack of coherence, as do most if not all national government systems and international intergovernmental organizations. Lots of efforts have been made, lots

of special reports and coordinating mechanisms devised. ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) is supposed to provide some coordination. But the UN is a large organization, spread over many countries, with a multiplicity of agencies, some of which, notably the specialized agencies, are virtually autonomous. And don't forget that the UN membership consists of sovereign states, not quite subject to a code of discipline such as might apply within a government organization. As I said, government organizations also suffer from some degree of lack of coordination, and this impacts on the UN. Ministries of agriculture interact with the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), et cetera; ministries of labor with the ILO (International Labour Organization); ministries of education with UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and so on; and very specially ministries of finance with the IMF and the World Bank; while ministries of foreign affairs deal with the UN. Thereby hangs a tale, because perhaps the most serious gap in the UN system in the past has been this distance between these Bretton Woods organizations and the rest. In short, the lack of coherence exists in the constituent bodies—the government organizations and in the UN.

So, the UN is like any system of governance. A bad case of how do you bring things together. And I have seen one or two suggestions by former presidents of the General Assembly, that the president of the General Assembly should sit in on the Security Council meetings. You can imagine some people's hackles will rise.

A considerable amount of attention has been paid over the life of the UN to these problems of fragmentation, coordination, and coherence. There has been some success, but it is a fundamental problem. I was particularly involved in one effort and that was as a member of the Group of Experts on Restructuring of the UN in 1975 and in the following months as president of ECOSOC where we tried very hard to move forward, especially on the basis of the

experts' report. At the summer meeting in Geneva, I invited the heads of agencies to meet informally with me before they went and took their seats to make their speeches about their reports on their portfolios, because in my experience, going to ECOSOC, these sessions did not make waves. There were not really lively discussions after each one spoke. I invited them to meet with me, and the next day I invited the heads of UN regional commissions to meet with me. In each case, I said, "Tell me frankly. Over the next few days you will be speaking. What do you think of this exercise, anyway? Be frank." And I got some frankness.

I said to them, "Come and speak! You don't have to speak only about your portfolio. Speak." One of them, the head of the WHO (World Health Organization), I remember him making the point that delegates come to WHO meetings and they make what are called policy decisions. And then other delegates from the same country would go somewhere else—ECOSOC or the General Assembly—and sometimes support conflicting decisions. So it is a problem. I don't know if you see any ways in which the UN is trying to deal with this. Especially when these organizations are in different capitals.

TGW: I think the problems of a single country happen to be exacerbated by having a global reach.

DM: Exactly.

TGW: At this moment, in 1962, when Jamaica begins to play its role on the world stage, the year before, President [John] Kennedy had launched the First Development Decade.

DM: Precisely. But let me ask this, because I have been very much interested in that as one of the early expressions of this need to bridge this situation between these two worlds. For instance, Max Finger speaks of this in his book on the U.S. in the UN.

TGW: Actually, I interviewed him for the project also.

DM: Max, in short, credits the United States with the notion—Kennedy in particular. I have always wanted to be absolutely sure. I was going to mention it in our discussion because this is very interesting, in light of what happened afterwards—the First Development Decade and then the International Development Strategy. So you see I want to give full credit for the idea of the First Development Decade, and especially at that time when developing countries were just coming into the UN in numbers, along with the establishment of the precursors to the UNDP (UN Development Programme). Again, the U.S. had a very primary place there.

But when you look—first of all, the strategy. I was not there at the beginning. I came into the UN in 1973. Shortly after I came, I got deeply involved in this business about North-South and New International Economic Order, calling for restructuring of the global relations, et cetera, and putting up our own program. So, I gradually developed a big question in my mind about the strategy. When you ran into difficulties with the NIEO, and I realized the difficulties we were going to have in making any sort of significant headway, I said to myself, having come out of a planning background, I said, "How in the name of heaven are we going to get any decisions worth anything at all on a strategy, a global strategy like that, when we achieved so little on the NIEO?" And up to now—I don't want to be unfair, there are a lot of people who took the strategy very seriously and still do. But I go to a meeting, I think in 1980, when they are having the review of the strategy and I say to myself, "Is this a tragic situation in terms of the use of time and energy and enthusiasm?" Because I did not see the strategy going anywhere. There are certainly elements which people regard as sacred. But really, how can you get agreement on a global strategy that is going to satisfy, say the developing countries. It is not possible.

And I said to myself, "But we will go on forever." You come back here in twenty years' time will they still be trying to go on with the strategy?

TGW: Let's just digress there for a moment. What, ultimately, is the impact of such—since we are talking about ideas and their importance, there are lots of ideas buried in the first, second, third, fourth, and we're now going to have a fifth, apparently, strategy. Some related to norms about redistribution, some related to specific tactical ideas. In your view, what is the utility, or what is the impact of such declarations on the government of Jamaica or on the Netherlands? Do you see an important impact?

DM: Let me say this to you. If you have a world population meeting, or a UN women's conference, an action program is produced. You have special interests involved. The people who go from Jamaica to the population conferences include special interests. These include health workers and the Planning Institute in Jamaica. So I believe there is a direct connection with the sectoral interests like that. Like population, and gender, environment, food. But when you come to the overall, the broader issues of policy, my own experience with the NIEO is not encouraging. Here you have a country like Jamaica which was more involved than most countries in terms of the interest. Prime Minister Michael Manley personally took the issue on board himself. In an early article in *Foreign Affairs*, he showed that he had caught the idea before we got into the North-South negotiations. So I give him full credit, but the fact is that he is one of the few people at the level of heads who had such a full understanding of it and played an active role.

TGW: Indeed. So, the existence of the NIEO was consumed by at least one head of state, probably several others.

DM: Yes. People like Carlos Andres Perez, the Guyanese, and there are few others. But, in spite of that particular interest on Jamaica's part—as I say my delegation in New York was very much involved. In Geneva we were involved, and there are things that were written in

the newspapers about it in Jamaica—but there was far from sufficient understanding in Jamaica. And it is sad, because one of the things I have to say, and I say it to you for the purpose of this particular record, and have said it elsewhere—we did not create a constituency at home. And I start with Jamaica, but I'm sure it applies to most countries, North and South. Particular NGOs in some countries formed a constituency and supported, in broad terms, the aspirations of the developing countries. But we did not create a sufficient constituency, either in our academic communities or even the NGO communities or the public. And the point I used to make—decolonization was a street corner issue in Jamaica and elsewhere. This was something that was taken up and people talked about it. People went to meetings and said, "We want independence." So it was a popular issue. The North-South matter was not a popular issue at all, although it is an inevitable corollary to the process of decolonization and independence.

So, I found myself somewhat saddened by the fact. What I did, on occasion—during the 1970s, I was down in Jamaica on a visit and we were about to go into one of the special sessions on the NIEO. I invited some of the media people, hoping to get some senior people to meet with me. I don't even remember, frankly, if I said anything to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was quite informal. And what I had to say to them, "We, the developing countries, after all of our history, are now tackling the great overwhelming strength of the industrialized countries in order to try to change the international economic system. Please pay attention. Please listen. Please follow the thing." Nothing happened.

About two or three years later, I was in Jamaica and tried the same thing. This time we had a very interesting discussion. The result was that the editor of the main newspaper at that time sent me a telegram saying that since I have been making noises about this, he was sending

someone. He sent a reporter who spent about ten days and walked around the UN and wrote some articles. That was a good act, but that is not enough.

Guyana developed what they call the Turkeyen Third World Lectures. Turkeyen is the campus of the University of Guyana. [Julius] Nyerere visited, and they asked him to give maybe one lecture. Out of that, they developed a series in which they would invite a special person to come and give the lectures. I was invited—this was in 1978—to go to Guyana and to give three or four lectures—one at the university, one in the main town—and audiences were there. One was to a group of students from secondary schools. So Guyana is one country I know that attempted to make it a popular issue.

But regarding the strategy, few would even have heard of it. The NIEO—people know the name and have a very vague idea. But we have to learn that in any matter that is fundamental, you begin by getting your own people to understand it, to have some ideas, and have even some critical sort of consideration of it at home.

TGW: One of the things that you wrote as Jamaica moved onto the stage subsequently—you were writing "Jamaica's International Relations in Independence," the piece in the [Rex] Nettleford book. You discussed the problems of small states and the peculiar role of small states in multilateral diplomacy. What are those?

DM: Well, I talked about that era when small boys at school must be seen and not heard. Or not seen and not heard. Well, there were some people who would like that as far as small states are concerned. There was a time when there were discussions about whether we should be allowed to have UN membership or whether there should be a qualified or limited form of membership. Fortunately, good sense prevailed. How do you measure these things? But there are limitations. Size does matter.

Let me start right at home. First of all, the capability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of delegations to UN meetings. They have to try to cover all important issues. Now at UN meetings, apart from the sessions, the G-77 (Group of 77) meets perhaps twice a day because there are critical issues involved. And there are other meetings at those conferences—plenary committees, contact groups, your own delegation meetings, et cetera. So, you cannot man all of these meetings. And the size factor is there. So, it is a resource problem. I have been to meetings at which you have a procession of different delegates, as the subject changes, from the big countries. Ministry staff and diplomats of small states have to be versatile. So that is a problem. In addition, there is a political side. You can be subjected to different forms of political pressure—some quite legitimate, others less so—as you seek to enhance your country's or your group's or the general international interests. But membership in groups—such as the Non-Aligned, SIDS (Small Island Developing States), the G-77—is of particular value to small states. They discuss issues, learn, develop solutions on issues and often negotiate as a group.

There was a time when there were some people who believed that the Caribbean countries were still attached and beholden to the British even though they were supposed to be independent. They had some years ago in Argentina a training seminar for practicing people in the legal profession, in government, especially from Latin America and the Caribbean. These were people who were experienced. It was hosted by UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research) and, I think, the Argentine International Affairs Association. I was invited to participate and to address them. And after one session, at discussion time, one of the Latin Americans asked me whether in the UN we vote for Britain, whether Britain gives us aid and we vote for them—in short, putting the whole thing in terms of our being a glorified colony.

Are we subject to the British government in any way? I know that that is a perception some persons in Latin America have because of the Commonwealth. It is very difficult for people to understand this thing, which is a British invention, a free association of independent states, former colonies, which works. But I said, "On the contrary." Not that they would not like us to support some things in which they are very interested, but they recognize that as a small country, a country like mine would, in a number of matters, be on the very opposite side, inevitably. Not in any hostile way. And that in some matters, like Southern African freedom, we would take a particularly strong position against them.

I compared that with the U.S. But I think it was in the time of Mrs. [Jeane] Kirkpatrick as ambassador that the U.S. introduced this business about keeping score as to how each country votes in the UN and reporting to Congress—and votes not necessarily on resolutions which are put in by the U.S., but because the U.S. has an interest in the issue. The idea was to identify countries which voted "against" the U.S!

So, there are hazards like that. And some developing countries have been persuaded, from time to time, to support or to oppose particular proposals. There is a feeling on the part of some people that in the case of the Whaling Commission, some small countries have been persuaded not to go along with severe restrictions on the hunting of some species.

TGW: As well as the logistic problems in the small states. You wrote, and I am curious about this, that they have to balance the pursuit of their own individual or regional interests with their contribution to the deliberations on the search for solutions in respect of world issues and problems. It's that latter one. What do small countries, in particular, have to contribute to the formulation or the lobbying on behalf of larger interests, if not global or international ones?

DM: You know that small states constitute a significant percentage of the total membership of the United Nations, and of course most of them are developing countries. And in signing the United Nations Charter and becoming a member, they have accepted the obligations involved. Small states have a variety of interests and some major problems, and of course they expect to advance these interests by way of membership of the UN. But clearly they have other obligations outside of the need to look after their own interests. A lot of matters that come to the UN, dealing for example with peace, security, development, human suffering, the environment, et cetera, require the attention and interest of all states. And the UN provides the opportunity to contribute in respect of these matters through the complex of committees, starting with the General Assembly and ranging through the varied agencies, including the specialized agencies.

The votes of small states are often a significant factor at arriving at decisions on some matters. That means that these countries must pay full attention, must try to send effective persons as diplomats to the UN. A particular way in which they can contribute to these matters is through holding the chairmanship of committees of the UN or membership of the bureaus of committees. They sometimes have a special responsibility to ensure that their governments are fully aware of the need to take positions in the broader global interest where their own particular interests may, to some extent, be different. Compromise and the achievement of consensus are sometimes the best means of achieving a satisfactory conclusion, and individual diplomats, and particularly those occupying the positions of chairman, can contribute significantly to this no matter how small the country they represent.

Just start with the fact that you might find yourself chairing a committee, perhaps president of the Security Council or president of ECOSOC. Being on the Security Council at all, it means that any issue, now matter how big, you are involved. You have to think about it, you

have to talk about it, you have to negotiate. You have to contact your government, and they have to agonize and take a position. And you have to negotiate with your colleagues on the council. You have to speak.

And when you are president—I became president of the Security Council just after Vietnam had invaded Cambodia. I was in Jamaica because the Secretary-General was here, the end of 1978. Incidentally, the Norwegian ambassador told me, "You are the only person in the history of the UN (he supposes) who moved from being president of ECOSOC on the 31st of December to being president of the Security Council on the 1st of January. Well, Kurt Waldheim was in Jamaica at the end of December. Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and so I had to leave to go to start behind-the-scenes consultations in New York. Now, this was the first day that we were on the Security Council, that you find yourself in the president's chair. Many countries had special interests in the issue—the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the United States, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, the nonaligned countries. So, you have to start at a fast run. And the staff of the council are available to assist you. But it was my baptism by fire—a very different situation.

TGW: So, as a small country, is it easier to play an innovative or conciliatory role?

DM: Not necessarily easier, but you can. In those years there were seven developing country members of the council. We consulted on all issues coming before that body and sought agreement on the basis of which we prepared draft resolutions. These were passed to the other members and usually formed the basis of discussion as to what decision that council might make. This gave the developing country members some prospect of exercising some influence and was particularly critical if we managed to persuade two other members—for example the smaller

western states—to accept the draft. If no veto was used, nine votes would allow approval of the resolution.

But I tell you, if you are trusted, if the image of the country or of the particular representatives of the country is good—and it may not be the permanent representative—if there is a general feeling that this is a country that is serious about issues—frankly, I think that in the period that I was there, and before and after, there was the feeling that Jamaica was a very active country and serious about affairs, so there was quite a degree of respect. But you still have always to watch how you walk. You are being judged all the time.

Especially in the early Cold War years, I got the impression that in the minds of some people—that is not general—a feeling on some issues, wondering what influences were operating on individual countries. There were some countries which were seen—a few—as being under American influence, so that their behavior in the UN would be seen in that way. Then the question of whether the influence is coming from the other side—from Eastern Europe or Cuba—the question of whether you are doing something that will favor the other side.

I am not saying that bigger countries are not subject to that, but it can be a delicate situation. But there are many positives, because as I say, people from small countries have occupied positions of considerable responsibility in the UN system. And some of them are very greatly respected. It is not exactly a field of landmines, but there are landmines.

TGW: I think this may be a good moment to stop. This is the end of the first morning, tape number one.

TGW: This is the second tape of Tom Weiss and Don Mills on 29 February 2000, on the verandah. I thought maybe we would start off this afternoon by asking you to sing "Rule Britannia" for posterity.

DM: {Sings}

When Britain first at Heaven's command
Arose from out the azure main,
This was the charter of her land,
And guardian angels sung the strain:

Rule, Britannia, rule the waves!
Britons never will be slaves!

The nations not so blest as thee
Must in their turn to tyrants fall,
Whilst thou shalt flourish great and free—
The dread and envy of them all!

Still more majestic shalt thou rise,
More dreadful from each foreign stroke;
As the loud blast which tears the skies
Serves but to root thy native oak.

Thee haughty tyrants ne'er shall tame;
All their attempts to bend thee down
Will but arouse thy generous flame,
But work their woe and thy renown.

To thee belongs the rural reign;
Thy cities shall with commerce shine;
All thine shall be the subject main,
And every shore it circles thine.

The Muses, still with Freedom found,
Shall to they happy coast repair;
Best Isle, with matchless beauty crown'd,
And manly hearts to guard the fair.

Rule, Britannia, rule the waves!
Britons never will be slaves!

—James Thomson

Imagine singing that as a little boy, coming out of a society with a long colonial history and a considerable period of slavery. And they are not talking in that song about us; they are talking about Britons. But it is quite extraordinary when you look at the words. And imagine the

other children, and adults, all over the vast British Empire, all singing that song on Empire Day every year.

TGW: We were speaking over lunch about ahistorical senses. I think it would be worth recalling the story that you did in discussing the definitions of poverty. I think many of us are quite fond of re-inventing wheels with very little knowledge of what went on before.

DM: I had planned, in thinking about this series, to say something about history. As I told you, I have felt more and more, as I have worked in this broad area of development, international affairs, and research, my own insufficient knowledge of history. What would be interesting when dealing with some current concern or crisis would be to go back in time to see what circumstances in the past, perhaps the distant past, have a bearing on that major current issue. This links with my interest in the increasing number of calls for reparations and plans for forgiveness for past wrongs—and I hope to discuss this with you. I think that would be fascinating. And somebody could really do something in international relations, say in the UN, by picking themes and going back over the history.

But the particular case I will mention was the preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which went on for over two years. The UN established, as usual, a preparatory committee which, of course, had representatives from all countries plus others, and staff, and the rest of it. We had about four major preparatory meetings. In one of the first meetings, we had discourses on major themes, and delegates from all sides are joining in. And one of the topics chosen was poverty. We were talking about poverty, an interesting subject which has become more and more a priority item, top in world affairs. It is not new, but in desperation, almost, you know, the UN system and the governments and bilateral agencies are looking at poverty as being a number one priority.

In the discussions, interesting points were being made, and I took the floor and made the point that I thought we should be very careful in talking about poverty because sometimes one gets the impression that poverty is seen as a Third World phenomenon. I said we could never claim to have invented it. As one who went to school in colonial times, and at a time when the literature that we studied—the books, the novels, and the poetry—were mainly Western European if not entirely British, I said that I recall, vividly, some of these novels, and I remember in particular their descriptions of poverty in places like England and elsewhere. The grueling, absolutely degrading poverty is easily comparable to some of the worst conditions you will find in some developing countries today. I said these countries—Britain and others—who have been through that experience, have come mostly out of it, but not entirely. So they had that bad experience and they still have pockets of poverty. So when we are discussing poverty, we should remember that. And it would be most helpful if we could have some discussion and some documentation on poverty, past and present, in the context of these countries, which have mostly moved out of it. It would help the discussion if it were to prevent us from making the mistake of consciously or unconsciously seeing poverty as a Third World phenomenon. It would underline the fact that there are grounds for hope that others may come out of that sort of poverty in a not-too-long time.

But finally, one of the dangers, I stated, is that there is in some minds a cultural assumption, either conscious or otherwise, regarding the types of people who constitute the populations living in poverty and the reasons for their condition. And that is more dangerous than anything else. And I said we would appreciate some documentation. It did not happen.

TGW: Most people claim that the Bretton Woods institutions are quite distinct from the United Nations and the UN system. What did you learn during that time as an alternate executive-director at the IMF that you brought with you to New York?

DM: In examining the matter of the relationship between the Bretton Woods system and the United Nations we should remember that the Bretton Woods system was established in 1944 while the UN came into existence in 1945. I understand that there were no detailed discussions at the original Bretton Woods conference on the relationship which might exist between the two organizations. And though legally the Bretton Woods institutions are part of the UN system as specialized agencies, in practice they do not operate the same way as the others in their relations with the UN. What is more, these institutions are favored and dominated by the western countries who have overwhelming voting strength in them compared with the UN where each country, no matter its size, has one vote in the committees of the UN except, of course, in such cases as the Security Council.

I was, I cannot say fortunate—but exciting things happened just after I went to the Fund. I am not sure one can very often say that exciting things happened at the Fund in that sense. But I went there in January 1971, and by August the Americans floated the dollar. You cannot want more excitement than that. It meant the world was in trouble. It meant a major change from the regime of fixed exchange rates which was the basis of the international monetary system. And remember that the first major oil price increase by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) came not too long after that and had a major impact on the monetary system. The Executive Board immediately went into a round of discussions on reform of the Fund, of the international monetary system. That was very interesting. I was in the Canadian constituency with Ireland and Jamaica, Barbados, Bahamas. Canada was the leader in that group.

Developing country executive-directors wished to introduce the issue of development in consideration of reform. I seem to recall that we had some difficulty. I got the impression that there was a rather narrow view of the Fund's range of interests. Nobody would argue now that the monetary system is quite separate. Although I tell you, when I went to the UN, I found myself, for instance, the chairman of the G-77, leading the North-South negotiations on the New International Economic Order. We had a system in the G-77 whereby, having reconciled differences, the chairman would be their chief negotiator and spokesman, with a battery of industrialized country representatives opposite some of them speaking for themselves separately, although that has changed now. We had a very difficult time getting agreement about discussing international monetary matters in the negotiating committee in the context of development.

We had obtained a mandate from the General Assembly to negotiate. And that mandate had been very difficult to obtain. And I know, as the person who led those negotiations, it was difficult just to get the agreement in the General Assembly that the Committee of the Whole would be able to negotiate on NIEO matters. But when we got around to international monetary issues and related matters, the committee was not allowed to proceed. The delegates from two or three major industrialized countries just blocked it. So, across the floor, I said, "Let me draft a paragraph for our friends on the other side: 'Never, either now nor at any time in the future, shall the United Nations enter into any definitive discussions on international monetary matters, which shall remain forever the preserve of the IMF.'" One recognizes that the Fund and the Bank operate under their own articles and have special responsibilities. But especially in a world going through that sort of experience in the 1970s, when everything was in a state of re-examination, you could not have a decent dialogue involving development in general and

international monetary issues in the UN because of the division between Bretton Woods and New York.

It is well to recall at this point that after long negotiations in the UN General Assembly that body decided in 1979 to launch at its Special Session scheduled for 1980 a "round of global negotiations" on international cooperation and development, which would cover five subject areas, included among them money and finance. Of course the Cancun summit (International Meeting on Cooperation and Development) closed the door on that the following year.

Every year, the Fund goes to ECOSOC—the summer meeting of the Economic and Social Council. All these institutions dealing with economic and social affairs attend, including the Fund and the Bank. So, in my time at the Fund I trotted up to New York along with other Fund members and staff for the presentation of the Fund's report in ECOSOC. Nothing much happened in those days. There was not exciting debate, although in later times I believe it became more active. Since those years, I've gathered—and the Secretary-General, I think, has said—there has been an attempt to bring about some sort of better relations, a more constructive relationship between the Bretton Woods system and the UN. I do not know where it has reached, but it was very difficult in earlier years. So it is one of the things about the structure of the United Nations system as a whole which has been a serious disability.

In 1996 the UN General Assembly called for improved communication and cooperation between the ECOSOC and the Bretton Woods institutions at ministerial level, and the council was required, I believe, to hold high-level meetings around the time of the annual meetings of the Fund and the Bank involving those institutions. This seems to be a part of the effort to strengthen the ECOSOC and make it function as was originally intended.

TGW: According to some people, crises make institutions and people more generally receptive to new ideas and change. But your description of the 1971 decision to go off the gold standard does not seem that it led to such receptivity at the IMF.

DM: No. I found the IMF interesting. It's a very well-run institution. People are dedicated. They have very, very capable people. But somehow, it seemed to live in its own world. That's how I felt, and I'm not doing injustice to the people who are there. I had very good friends there, both on the staff and on the board. But somehow, there is a mystique, you see, that human beings have created about monetary and financial matters. Ministries of finance are seen in that way. They have great responsibilities. But this is not a closed situation in which they have some very special insights. They are part of a larger system.

Now, after that very occasion of negotiation in 1978 where we could not proceed with the discussion, I myself, on behalf of the G-77, called a halt to the negotiations and insisted we go back to the General Assembly, to reinforce the mandate.

I left shortly after that and went to Rome where they were having the first meeting of the North-South Roundtable which had been created—Barbara Ward and Paul-Marc Henri and people like that initiated it—as a parallel organization or a program of the Society for International Development (SID). A few of us were invited to be members of the roundtable, and I was on the board or the steering committee. And on the way I think I stopped in to meet my prime minister who was about to meet with Malcolm Fraser, the prime minister of Australia. They had both been exchanging views on economic matters—international economic matters. And I told Prime Minister Manley about this breakdown in the negotiations because we could not get past this obstacle of international monetary affairs.

He says, "What do we do about it?" I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, please tell your minister of finance that when he goes to Washington he must pay attention to the UN, that he must speak the language of the developing countries when he goes to the Bretton Woods system." I have heard it said, in jest partly, "Ministers of finance and central banks do not deal with all that nonsense that you people talk about in the UN." That was a notion that some people had. And some have wished to diminish the UN's role on economic and development matters in favor of the Bretton Woods institutions.

So the breech, the gulf, existed at the national and the international level between the finance authorities and the development authorities. It has in the past. Where this issue has reached in the UN and in Bretton Woods I do not know, but there have been serious attempts to improve the situation.

TGW: You could argue the proposition that the distance between New York and Washington, both physical and spiritual, actually is a force for creative adaptation. That is, that the UN has a distinct role that is quite different from the Bretton Woods institutions—the role of a critic and the role of a purveyor of ideas, that has in some ways been facilitated by being quite distinct from Washington. Is that positive?

DM: Well, I do not know. There is a mystique about it. Again, when I was chairman of the G-77 and leading this round of very serious negotiations on the New International Economic Order, I thought it would be very useful if sitting at the negotiating table—where you had the representatives from all countries, including industrialized countries, the USSR, China and the rest of it—we could have one or two people from outside of the immediate UN to come and join us, which would have helped, especially if they were people who would be recognized. And I phoned an executive-director from a developing country in Washington, and said, "I would

really like you to come and join us at the negotiations." His response seemed to imply that he was not sure it would be—proper is not the word—say, appropriate, for him. So let me say this to you. I got the impression that whereas those of us in the more mundane or "political" United Nations knew well that we were representing our countries. This may be seen somewhat differently in Washington by some. As ambassador I was not a political appointee, but the UN is a political body. And the members of the board of the Fund and Bank are actually elected representatives of member governments.

Therefore, if you are there to represent your country, you are not a member of the staff. So it would be eminently suitable if you joined others in some other negotiations, say at the UN. Moreover, a couple of years before, I think at the Sixth Special Session of the GA (General Assembly) on the NIEO, a very well known executive-director from a developing country was on the G-77 negotiating team.

TGW: In the piece that you had given out at the UN, you wrote: "Developing countries, as new entrants into the arena of world affairs, sought to challenge and change some of the structures of the UN system, as well as the relations between states." Was there ever a very clear division of labor between the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77? They grew out of a concern with security and keeping a distance between East and West on one hand, and economic negotiations on the other. But my impression is that over time, the two separate agendas really merged.

DM: Yes, it is a very interesting story and that is something on which the record should be clear. You know, some people thought that when the Cold War was over there was no need for a nonaligned group. That is a highly debatable subject, but of course the Non-Aligned Movement continues. It emerged well before the G-77. First of all Bandung, then Cairo, and it

went on. When you look at the program, the aims touched very, very strongly on the issues which became a part of the program of the G-77. So I would not say that the NAM was "the wind beneath the wings" of the G-77, but in a sense it was. It was more conscious of political issues. But it dealt also with economic issues, for instance the issue of South-South cooperation and the commodity associations, et cetera.

The launching of the NIEO was closely associated with the Non-Aligned Movement and particularly with Algeria, seen at that time as a radical country, with President Houari Boumedienne, and with Abdelaziz Bouteflika as the foreign minister who became president of the UN General Assembly. Algeria had the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in that period and hosted the fourth conference of heads of state or government of the group in September 1973. Early in 1974 President Boumedienne, on behalf of the developing countries, called for the holding of a Special Session of the UN General Assembly, and it was at that meeting that the declaration and program of action on the New International Economic Order was tabled by the Group of 77 and the negotiations on that set of issues initiated. This was seen by some as a very radical set of proposals, introduced under the chairmanship of a country with a particular image, which added to the anxiety experienced by many in industrialized countries. However, the launching of the New International Economic Order came through work in the G-77 and included issues raised by the people who have worked in the UN before 1973.

So, the association with the Non-Aligned had been clear. But also, during my time, we did not have contact on a day-to-day basis between the two, say in New York. There was a coordinating committee of the Non-Aligned, for which your country had to be elected. It was not a committee of the whole. And, of course, you had the G-77. At one stage, during my time, we talked about having some specific mechanism to foster the relationship there, and I hope it

came about afterwards. Because it is very important that these two bodies have some sort of material contact outside of major meetings.

TGW: South-South cooperation, and regional cooperation in general—how do you look back upon, or do you recall—the Treaty of Rome, I suppose, would have been the first major event of substance in the notion of southern integration, and then the treaty that founded CARICOM in 1972. Was there any thought that CARICOM, or institutions like CARICOM, would be distinctly different from the European Community (EC) at that time? Was there going to be something special about southern integration movements, or was this more of a miming of what was going on in Europe?

DM: One of the first clear expressions of South-South cooperation, of course, were the regional integration movements. I'm not sure it was branded South-South cooperation originally, but that's what it was about—getting developing countries in the same region together to cooperate. So I have always seen this as one of the first and most important expressions of South-South cooperation. And this is institutionalized. Myself, I have looked at the development of the CARICOM in the light of what has been happening in Europe, and I have discussed that in my Grace Kennedy Foundation Lecture in 1991. I looked at the European situation and I have a section there in which I point out some of the process they went through, the differences, the difficulties, the negotiations, and the persistence. I think they deserve a great deal of credit for their success. It is a lesson to us, in the Caribbean, that we have to go through a similar process and not be discouraged.

So, I would hope that we are aware. Europe is the biggest and best example of an articulated regional cooperation movement. So, I think that it must have been influencing the

people who work in CARICOM, in particular. I think so. I do not know a great deal about other regional integration movements.

TGW: The East African Community.

DM: Of course.

TGW: I know there were Latin American ones, but they were more on paper than in reality.

DM: Latin Americans have been moving in this direction since the 1950s. The Andean Group and the Central American group are operating. And, of course, now a very interesting thing is happening and that is the establishment of a formal relationship between the countries of CARICOM and the other Caribbean countries, that is the Association of Caribbean States, for which Norman Girvan from Jamaica is now secretary-general. As I say, just a couple of days ago, Alistair MacIntyre and others were at a negotiation with the Dominican Republic, and others, coming closer and closer to CARICOM—Suriname also.

Another special feature of South-South cooperation in the case of the Caribbean is the fact that the countries which initiated the CARICOM process were at one time colonies of one metropolitan country, Great Britain. So one important factor seriously affecting the development of this group is the inevitable phasing out of the trade preferences, which were enjoyed in relations with Britain.

TGW: Actually, a couple of my female colleagues have urged me to ask this question because they found quite interesting one of the things that you wrote. The 1970s saw the emergence, full strength, of the women's movement at the national and international levels. Obviously, by 1975, there was the Mexico City congress (UN World Conference of the International Women's Year).

DM: Yes, and Copenhagen in 1980 (UN Conference of the UN Decade of Women), and the rest.

TGW: Exactly. Gender equality and development are standard bill-of-fare these days. But when do you recall becoming aware of this as an issue?

DM: At the national level, it has been an issue. It is an issue inside the UN, because of the fact that the UN, like most governments and businesses, has had such a bad record in terms of women occupying senior positions. In the public service in Jamaica, we had rules by which, for instance, a woman working in the public service as an appointed person—an appointment means after a while a permanent appointment—if she got married and had a baby she was out. That changed years ago and to the point where a single woman who has a baby can get maternity leave and remains in the service. So, the slow erosion of that attitude has taken place in Jamaica. At the university level, one has seen the gradual development of the predominance of women at the annual graduation. So the UN experience helped to sharpen my own consciousness of this.

One has to be careful not to assume that everything is rosy, because there are still major obstacles. On a number of occasions, I have been told that it is ridiculous to have a group like the G-77 that has India and Brazil along with all these small countries, all sorts of countries with widely different interests. Take the women's movement—you can find every kind of woman, in terms of race, in terms of culture, religion, in terms of economic position in the movement. Why? Because they have one major obstacle to their progress. Fine, they do not have to agree on everything else, but that gives them a reason for existence and a base of power. So, I have no difficulty in understanding why developing countries of all sizes and conditions should come together in this way.

We have had a number of women in the Caribbean who have taken a very strong interest—people like Lucille Mair, Peggy Antrobus, Elsa Leo-Rhynie, and many others. And we have had gender programs here at the university and in the government. So we have come some way in this. But I would say much remains to be done. What is required in this matter is affirmative action, in my view.

TGW: In one of your books you mentioned taking over the Security Council, as you did this morning, 1 January after finishing ECOSOC in December. You used the words, "baptism by fire." I'm trying to think of what it must have been like in mid-career. At age fifty you are plopped down in Washington after a career mainly in planning and finance and statistics. And then moving to New York, whether it would be an appropriate analogy—a fish in different water, or something. Did you feel at all ill-at-ease in this kind of situation in which there is a particular culture in which there are operating procedures, and in which there is very little training?

DM: Well, I tell you, one story is that when I was at the Department of Statistics, immediately after graduating, I had gotten to know Dudley Seers. He was director of the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex. Then I heard that Dudley was coming to Barbados to establish a Department of Statistics through some arrangement with the UN or the British government. So, having been fully versed in the problems and the efforts of our Department of Statistics, I sent a message to Dudley saying: "Come to Jamaica on your way. Spend a little time with us so you can see the difficulties we are having and mistakes we are making." And Dudley came. He spent about a week and we had a wonderful time, socially as well. And we discussed my career. I said to Dudley: "My problem is that I have a feeling that I am a generalist." Now, this is at the early stages of my professional career. I said, for instance, I did

not feel inclined to go on to postgraduate work in statistics. I already was becoming really interested in development and the social and political sciences.

Dudley says, "If you are generalist, be a generalist. It's a simple matter." I have never forgotten it, because I discovered that when I went to planning, there was a tradition building up that occasionally somebody from the Planning Unit would go to Harvard to do a postgraduate degree in public administration. It looked as if my turn was coming after a while. I decided I was not going. I already had, as I say, a London University diploma in public administration. I had done a degree in economics. I discovered interests outside of public service matters. So, going to the UN was the best thing that ever happened to me. I was absolutely absorbed. I reveled in the variety. Pressures were great, but I enjoyed it immensely.

TGW: Did you feel spread a little thin?

DM: Yes, sometimes. You know, perhaps a diplomat at the UN, especially from a developing country, has to be something of a generalist.

TGW: You mentioned earlier that you did not exactly preside over an enormous delegation.

DM: That's correct. But I tell you, I had considerable admiration for the people who worked with me. They had to take responsibility. Like my experience at the Planning Unit, where we worked together, young and not so young, senior and not so senior, pooling our ideas and using the seminar system. When you consider, for instance, the positions that I had in the UN—president of ECOSOC, president of the Security Council twice in our two-year term, chairman of the G-77, and member of the group of experts on restructuring the UN. And the people who worked with me rose to the occasion. I was very proud of them. As I say, they are now at the top of the Jamaican foreign service. One is the head of the foreign service, the head

of the ministry. So we could not have managed without them. It made me able to carry these other responsibilities. And besides that, I was receiving invitations, speaking engagements at conferences, seminars, universities, a considerable number of them, many on North-South issues. So it was a very crowded period. But the team was magnificent.

TGW: When you were looking back at the period in the mid-1970s, actually not from a long distance but from a few years later at the end of the 1970s, you described—I think fairly—the attitude toward the NIEO as over-optimistic.

DM: You mean on our part? The developing countries?

TGW: Yes. How do you explain the over-optimism? I mean almost naïveté.

DM: Yes, in a sense. There is strong justification for the case we made on the North-South relationships. You see the power—you're dealing with not just power, not naked power, but with a culture, an attitude. You would recognize this occasionally—a set of values and assumptions based on a number of historical factors and relationships which go far back into the past. For instance, we proposed fundamental changes in the international economic system. And we called for fundamental changes, for equity. And I can remember, for instance, I used to go to Washington to the Overseas Development Council (ODC).

TGW: Jim Grant?

DM: No, not Jim Grant. After Jim Grant.

TGW: John Sewell?

DM: Yes, John Sewell succeeded Jim as head. There is another very interesting dimension. You see, a number of organizations took an interest in the North-South matter in the 1970s. John at one stage had a set of evening engagements. He would invite three or four of us sometimes from New York. And you would get on a plane and fly to Washington in the

afternoon, go to the ODC, and he would have a gathering of a dozen or so people—maybe a senator or two, somebody from the World Bank, et cetera. And we would talk about issues, much of this on North-South matters. On one occasion, a senator who is known to be of a liberal mind—whatever that means—we were talking and he said to me, having heard me, my propositions: "You know, what you must understand is that our taxpayers have a lot of calls on them." In short, there were limits to the resources available to help developing countries. I said to him, "We are speaking about equity, adequate opportunity, in trade and other activities."

He used the word concessions as some others have done. When you are asking for equity and somebody says or is thinking of concessions, it means you are not talking on the same level. You make concessions to those you would like to help. I found that, without making heavy weather about it, there is something fundamental there. When, say, France and Britain are negotiating, they do not talk about concessions. In that way, there may be cases where a concession may be made—development aid, for instance. But that was not the central issue in our proposals.

So I found, and this is something we should try to understand—not overdo it, and yet not ignore it—try to understand exactly what you are dealing with. Even about aid, a touchy subject. If you look at the origins of the whole aid system, there is an element of "heart" involved in it, a genuine humanitarian feeling. But also, there is a very practical side to it certainly with bilateral aid. And the practical side—the quantum of that varies in different situations—is the business of having an actual estimate of what the givers expect to get in return. Leave aside the intangibles that the giver expects to get. So it is a situation that is supposed to benefit both sides, like "the quality of mercy." But do you ever hear anything in negotiations that suggests this is a matter of mutual benefit? Developing countries do not want to be, and I certainly did not want to be,

abrasive about it. But you are not having a fair argument if this is seen purely as a concessional flow from one to the other.

And they have never come out of the woods on that. Somewhere in my records I have a report on a study in the U.S. on peoples' attitude to aid, and there was one earlier in Britain about this. The one in Britain I remember particularly well. In the first round, the people interviewed believed that Britain was giving away a considerable part of its budget in aid. When they were told the actual amounts, their responses on aid changed significantly—their attitudes. Clearly significant benefits have been achieved out of many aid programs. But this does not address the fundamental structure of the international economic system and the relationships.

TGW: You call the NIEO, or you did not call it, but you described the reaction of the West, the United States in particular, to this four letter word, which I thought was actually accurate. Johan Kaufmann, who has just died recently—

DM: Oh gosh. Oh lord. I am so sorry to hear that. He was really a very good friend. I have a couple of his books here.

TGW: Yes, he wrote. He was an unusual official in having written several books. But Johan argued—and I'm going to throw this out for you to refute or not—that in his view, the language of the NIEO was abrasive, was aggressive. And the framing of the argument in these terms made it partially unpalatable to the West. I think I would argue there was more to it than that. He emphasized, to a great extent, the vocabulary, the demeanor, the sense of entitlement, demand, et cetera, which is a little different from the equity line that you were using. Do you think that Johan was on to something?

DM: I knew Johan very well, and therefore I respect his view. But I tell you it again falls in that area which is sensitive. It is really not surprising that the initial encounters on the

NIEO would have had an element of hard talk and of deep concern on the part of those faced with a set of far-reaching proposals—this first international encounter on such a scale between one hundred or more countries, former colonies of a number of western states, recently achieving independence and a presence in the councils of the world, and determined to acquire the right to share in international economic activity and the decision-making processes on a fair and equitable basis. In any situation, when two people come from very different points of view—if you would like to put it very roughly, advantaged and disadvantaged—anything you say could seem to be aggressive. And there was some "aggression," insistence, strong advocacy, and critical expression. I think the "aggression" came out in some statements and some individuals, you see. But one would have to go over to re-examine the dialogue to make a judgement. Because we use language in the UN and you never know quite what people are thinking or hearing!

Moreover, refusal to budge by the other side in respect to any fundamental proposal in negotiation is also in its way confrontational and can be seen as "aggressive" or "abrasive." I come back to the incident, where the negotiations came to a standstill, and on behalf of the G-77 I called the whole thing off and said we are going back to the General Assembly for reconfirmation of its mandate to negotiate—the committee on the whole. I go upstairs to have a drink in the delegates lounge, and I'm sitting there with a couple of people. And the head of one of the western delegations comes by in the delegates lounge and says, very politely, "Excuse me, but can I say something?" I said, "Sure." He said—and I had made a strong closing statement when the meeting collapsed—"You made a statement and you referred to the 'so-called' industrial democracies. What was your reason?" I thought this is a very significant question. I said, "I'm most interested that you should react this way. We are accustomed to hearing about

the 'so-called Non-Aligned Movement,' 'the so-called G-77,' and so forth. If we existed for 100 years, we would still be 'so-called.' But that is not the point. I have a feeling that there are particular words and phrases that we use that cause misgivings, at least, and maybe annoyance on your side. And perhaps there are words, phrases, et cetera, that you, on your side, use that cause misgivings on our side." I said, "Why don't you, on your side, sit down and write out a list of some of those things for us, and we will do the same on our side. Then we can exchange them." Now, it was a very good suggestion but might have seemed facetious. We never carried out the suggestion.

But seriously, you use words—for example "imperialism," and "colonialism," "exploitation." There are some people who felt that was all nonsense, mere rhetoric, with no historical basis. Of course, it is pointless to keep on repeating some things unnecessarily. But you see, you never know, whether you are talking to an individual human being in your family or otherwise, whether you are really speaking different languages. And you never examine this question seriously. One of the things I want to say to you is that I felt that the UN has had opportunities for study on the basis of having a captive group of hundreds of delegates from many cultures. UN interpreters often stand between the speaker and the listener. The delegate is listening, or the staff, and the interpreter is there. If you are in the conference room, and say the Chinese delegate is speaking, the interpreter is there. You can look at the interpreter. You can look at the Chinese delegate. And you can come in between the two. You can look at the Chinese delegate—his body language, for example. And you're hearing the voice of the interpreter. But if you are in your office, two blocks or eight blocks away, and you have this little box on your desk, and you could call the UN and say: "Box Number 407, Second Committee, conference room number two, please." And on comes the voice. Even if it is the

original speaker, what are you hearing? And if it is the delegates and staff? It is a very useful device for interpreters, but it has its limits in terms of communication. It's not a simple matter of interpreting words and phrases. It is much more fundamental than that. I have spoken to interpreters a number of times and they tell you some wonderful stories about the business of trying to make a reality of what a person is saying for the benefit of listeners from other cultural and language situations.

So at a conference at The Hague, at the Academy of International Law, some years ago, I made this point. And I said, "I have asked interpreters whether they have ever been invited to give their views formally about their experience in this regard." Afterwards, at coffee break, the interpreters came to me and said, "Nobody talks to us." Do you have any recollection on this?

TGW: No, but I have some very good stories. I think the best one is George Sherry, who ended up in the peacekeeping department, but he started out as an interpreter who was interpreting for Khrushchev and took off his shoes—his own shoes—in the interpreter's box.

DM: Yes, some interpreters have had exciting experiences. I really would like to believe that some attention has been paid to this issue. I mean, some people speaking the same language have difficulties. And here at the UN, you have an example where the use of language is absolutely critical. This is very, very important, especially in negotiations. I really believe that that is one of the areas in which the UN could do some research.

TGW: I wanted to come back to—I wrote myself a note this morning—you mentioned that Prime Minister Manley had taken seriously much of the call to action on the NIEO and in fact hosted what you thought was the first North-South summit, in Jamaica. What exactly was your own relationship with Michael Manley, and what was he like to work with?

DM: First of all, we were at school together. But I was his senior. I am a couple of years older than he. So, at school, as I said, size matters in terms of age and association. But we ended up in the LSE together. He had been there a year before me. Of course, we saw quite a bit of each other there. I came home, and a couple of years later he came home. He was active in editing the newspaper *Public Opinion*, and then he went into the trade union movement. We really did not have very much to do with each other in those years. I was at the Department of Statistics and then Planning. I knew his father as premier from 1955 to 1962. He established the planning unit in the premier's office, so I knew him well. I knew his family quite well. I went to the Bahamas for two years in the late 1960s and then straight to the IMF. And while I was at the IMF, a two year period, Michael Manley came to power, in 1972. Sometime later in 1972, he sent word that he wanted me to go to New York as permanent representative to the UN.

Having been out of Jamaica for four years, the ministry—after I had been in New York for a while—at my request arranged for me to go home, mainly to see Prime Minister Manley, who was minister of foreign affairs. I told him that I would not wish to take on this responsibility in New York without having a direct understanding of how he, himself, and the government saw Jamaica in the international sphere. And he proceeded to give me, succinctly, a very good—it was very good—exposition about how he saw this. Here is a man who had thought about international affairs and developed his own view, and this was helpful. This was coming out of his own thinking and whatever policies or approaches the government had in mind. His political party, I believe, in their manifesto had discussed something of Jamaica's role in international affairs.

So we had encounters occasionally. It took us a little while to develop an effective rapport, even though I knew him before. After all, he was now prime minister. There may be

people who work at the UN as ambassadors who become difficult, because you are there on a daily basis and your authorities are away from it, so between yourself and your authorities you have to learn that you are speaking from a somewhat different perspective, although you are subject to instruction. But, after a while, we overcame that. I tend to speak my mind, not bluntly but clearly and definitely. As an official, all my life, I expect to be heard. I expect that the reason I am there is to express myself. And I had worked with his father when I was in planning. And the gravest offense of all—he was a very eminent barrister—was if you had a view which was different from his and you did not express yourself. That was, he said, your job, your responsibility.

So it took us some time. I believe that with the UN responsibility, you have to express your thoughts, even if there is the risk sometimes of running into some difficulties with your authorities because you are on the spot. This is especially so with small delegations. So, we developed a good working relationship. We met on those occasions in which I would come to Jamaica for discussions on issues, or when he came to these meetings, whether it is at the UN, a Commonwealth summit in London or in Lusaka, or a Non-Aligned meeting, or otherwise. What would happen is that myself and four or five senior officials would be in the entourage, would be his advisors. I found those occasions interesting and very constructive.

The thing about it is that he, first of all, starts out with, as I say, a basic interest in international affairs, a lot of his own thinking, and an ability to absorb a brief, do his own thinking and make his presentation in a way that was exceptional. And this was greatly admired in the UN and other forums. So I would say, in that sense, we had a constructive relationship. But in some ways he was difficult, very sensitive. I enjoyed the business of having an unusual

prime minister who took a considerable interest in international affairs. But, of course, some of his policies and actions were very controversial in Jamaica.

When he was leaving, when he was voted out of power at the end of 1980, he paid me what I considered was a great compliment. He said thanks for all I've done, that he recognized that I had established my own international reputation, meaning that I was not just a reflection of Michael Manley and his policies. I tell you, that was a very generous statement to make, and from a man who was aware of his own international stature. That was very nice.

TGW: That was nice. But did other people perceive things the same way? Was your departure from the UN in any way related to his?

DM: The fact is that early in 1981 the government informed me that they were making a change in the UN post in New York and that they wanted me to take another important diplomatic post—in fact London. I told them that my wife and I had planned to return home, having spent twelve years abroad, and if they had discussed the matter with me I would have informed them that I would not wish to take up the new post. We had been abroad for twelve years on official assignments, we had young children, and it was time to go home. In addition, I had promised myself early in my career that at some stage I would repossess my time in order to indulge other interests which had been neglected, and I felt that the time had come to do that. Unfortunately, the timing of the decision by the government left some persons believing that I had been a political appointee! Me—with a lifetime public service career. Of course I expressed myself on that matter.

TGW: Well, it certainly was an exceptional period. One of the things that I wanted to explore is the importance of OPEC in 1973 and 1974, and the importance of the "oil weapon."

DM: Yes, I wanted to link—well, the business of energy. Of course, there was the situation before that where OPEC existed. It was the ambassador then of Iran who said, I think, something to the effect that oil was cheaper than Coca-Cola or cheaper than a truckload of earth. The drama of the oil embargo, when things in Palestine and the Middle East were coming to a boil, OPEC established the embargo, put up the price and then put it up again, and shocked the world, including the industrialized countries. There is an editorial which I have, somewhere in my files, from the *New York Times*, I think, which said that one year's reserves accumulated by the OPEC countries as a result of the oil price increase could buy a controlling interest in a number of the major corporations in America. So you can see that expressed the fear that these actions generated, that apart from anything else, they could really take over major interests in industrialized countries. Of course, it never happened—far from it. But at least it perhaps was the first time, certainly in modern times, that the countries of Europe and North America felt their position seriously threatened.

And for countries like Jamaica, oil importing developing countries, whereas we felt OPEC was justified in doing something about the control of their own resources—and the price was ridiculous anyway before that—the fact is that we felt that this could cripple us. So Jamaica and Guyana in the Caribbean got together. I came down to a meeting here with the prime minister and the Guyanese minister, and they sent missions to some of the oil exporting countries to say to them, "We are not quarrelling with you over what you have done. But we, especially the small oil importing developing countries, find it exceptionally difficult." So we made a proposal, which Jamaica worked out, suggesting a sort of rebate system on the price, which would create a fund to help the oil importing developing countries. You cannot have two prices, because that would lead to black market business and all sorts of other things. Our visits did not

produce the result we had hoped. But later, we had further consultations in the UN with a few OPEC countries in an attempt to find a formula.

Still later, Carlos Andres Perez, who was president of Venezuela, invited me when I was chairman of the G-77 at the UN to Caracas at the time of a meeting of OPEC. He wanted to present a proposal to the OPEC countries to find a way to help countries like ours. It was December 1977, coming to the end of the General Assembly, and as not only the head of my delegation but as the chairman of the G-77, I had responsibilities at the UN. I could not go. But in February I went. This time, of course, the OPEC meeting had passed. And I spent a couple of days meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez and some of his ministers. But what I am saying is that this was a search for an accommodation for oil importing developing countries. One of the things is that, of course, the declaration and program of action of the NIEO was launched in the context of the oil crisis, as it was called. And that added quite a bit of sharpness to the whole proposal.

In the mid-1970s, the French in particular tried to establish a conference on energy between industrialized countries and OPEC. And they were met with a straight refusal by the OPEC countries. They would not go into such a thing unless the agenda was widened to include issues on the New International Economic Order and unless other developing countries were invited. So said, so done. And Jamaica was one of the countries at CIEC, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris. We had a very good delegation and this was something like eighteen months. They all did some very good work. I went to those meetings which were attended by the ministers of the participating countries. But clearly CIEC was a disappointment, although good work was done.

So, a little bit later when we met in Geneva for the ECOSOC summer session, in my policy speech at ECOSOC I referred to CIEC, gave it some credit, but said it was a case of going from an unwarranted assumption to a foregone conclusion—in short, to expect that outside of the UN, the issue of North-South relations could be settled in that way in such a forum. But, one of the things that happened is that energy became, at that time, a very sensitive issue at the UN. And I can remember, in ECOSOC, as chairman of the economic committee—I was faced with objections on the part of some of the OPEC members of ECOSOC, objecting to the discussion of a report on energy! This was a report, a regular report, of a UN committee which dealt with natural resources and had to report to ECOSOC. And there was a strong objection to this being dealt with at all. Of course, in the early 1980s the UN held the major conference on new and renewable sources of energy.

TGW: That is certainly one of those—and political scientists are forever exploring counterfactuals—but certainly a path not taken, this special fund or kitty to compensate or at least partially compensate NOPEC (Non-Oil Power Exporting Countries) countries is an important aspect of what we have seen. It seems to me that my reading—correct me if I'm wrong—is that OPEC looked upon these efforts as a kind of sleight or an attempt to weaken its position.

DM: Certainly there were some in OPEC who felt that the efforts of some oil importing developing countries could weaken the position of OPEC countries. This was an awkward situation, but some funding arrangements were put in place by OPEC to assist developing countries. And Venezuela and Mexico also established programs of assistance toward the purchasing of oil supplies by some Caribbean states.

In more recent years, another difficult issue has arisen. In the face of the prospect of global warming and sea level rise, and the International Convention on Climate Change, a group of countries formed the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to represent their interests, which are seriously threatened.

In Berlin, in 1994 at the first meeting of the parties to the convention, the question of fixed targets and timetables for the reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gases by each industrialized country was a contentious issue. It is the small island developing countries who put in the draft protocol proposing fixed targets and timetables. We battled with it in Berlin, in the G-77, and found ourselves in the position where first of all you had the United States and North American oil interests, and other industrialized countries objecting, and so were the OPEC countries. So in the ranks of the developing countries, we could not agree on the issue. It was an instance in which the G-77 could not agree. We met frequently about this and tried to narrow the division and could not. The OPEC countries felt that their situation was seriously threatened by this proposal. As Jamaica's representative in the Berlin meeting, I found that situation very difficult.

Now I don't know where it has reached. I believe that some western countries have changed and are supporting the idea of targets and timetables. But energy remains a critical factor in international affairs and a contentious one, as prices and supplies fluctuate.

TGW: But certainly the position in 1973 and 1974 contributed to a—you used the word yourself, naïveté—but certainly a euphoria about how things were going to work out.

DM: Oh yes. A euphoria, a feeling that significant change would result from our efforts in respect of the NIEO—matched by the fears on the other side. But it just did not work out. And then, you see, the issue was associated with the business of the leverage. For example,

commodities were seen as one source of leverage. And the elaborate programs which had been worked out in UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development)—Integrated Programme of Commodities, the Common Fund. And there were the various commodity associations—oil, bauxite, et cetera. Then commodities just disappeared from the scene as a major factor.

But the failure to make significant progress on the North-South issue in the 1970s left the world, in my view, with a serious imbalance, a major danger. The issue was not an issue of the 1970s. Its roots developed long before that time. And it emerges in different forms at virtually every major encounter between developing countries and industrialized countries, and in other spheres as well.

TGW: You mentioned small islands, and you also mentioned the G-77 concept. During the 1970s and 1980s, a whole series of sub-categories emerged, whether least developed countries, or landlocked countries, NICs (newly industrialized countries), oil-producing, etc. In some ways, this is a fairly obvious development in terms of countries with similar interests putting themselves together. At the same time, how do you keep all of these people under the same tent?

DM: It is not at all an easy task. The maintenance of unity in the G77 in the face of wide differences of size, condition, interest, et cetera—that's a job. But with these special groupings, it makes the task more complex—unity in diversity. One sees this challenge elsewhere—in political parties, in the Christian ecumenical movement, within countries, in the women's movement, in families—everywhere. All require management of diversity—skill, sensitivity, and understanding. But on the international stage, this presents special problems. All parties are sovereign states—and you have a major overriding aim—to gain for developing countries a more advantageous position in world affairs and especially in international economic matters.

So it is a pity in a way, that, as I say, the focus at the national level on issues in the UN has not been adequate, because this burden falls upon mainly the diplomats who happen to be in the UN at the time. And some of them are there for three years, and they are gone. I wondered in New York what can we do to maintain some sort of contact with people who have worked hard in the G-77 when they return home or are posted elsewhere? When I was leaving New York, the G-77 had a farewell lunch. I said in my farewell speech: "I challenge the group. I am interested. I will always be interested. Will the group keep in touch with me, or will I be able to keep in touch with the group?" Occasionally, I had some contact. There have been a number of encounters between interested persons from the South, sometimes including others with particular interest in those matters. There is the Group of 15 developing countries which meets formally from time to time, and recently there was a G-77 summit. The Non-Aligned group continues. There is the South Centre, following from the work of the South Commission. And there have been occasional encounters such as the meeting convened by the Indonesian chairman of the G-77 in Jakarta in 1998, a similar meeting set up by the Guyanese chairman in Georgetown in 2000, and the Reflection Group convened by former Jamaican ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Anthony Hill. The Society for International Development and the North-South Roundtable, which bring persons from different areas together, also carry on their activities. And there are other such activities, I am sure.

For a long time, I received the G-77 bulletin. There was also the report published daily by the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, in cooperation with Inter-Press Service, which gives information about what is happening in the international system in economic affairs and finance. Very useful. It still exists, but it must be a smaller circulation now, due to lack of a sufficient number of subscribers. Quite frankly—and I'm not absolving my

own country in that respect—we all have not made sufficient resources available to back the G-77 in the UN, who have been working so hard all these years. So the work of the group, and keeping the harmony between various sub-groups, like the least developed, is quite a job.

TGW: One of the things that you actually criticized in the essay in the [James] Muldoon volume[2] was related to problems of perception. You rather dismissed the notion that there was a virtual conspiracy between the socialist bloc and developing countries. But it certainly appears, if you are looking at the East-West struggle, that the Soviet bloc voted rather mindlessly, I would have to say, with the G-77 on every issue for its own reasons.

DM: There were a number of developing countries which had a formal association with the Soviet bloc. That was clear. That bloc gave voting support to proposals in the NIEO in which all developing countries had a very special interest, and in a situation in which most western countries were against these proposals. As I recall, they argued that their countries had not participated in the colonial system and in the exploitation of the colonial territories. That argument did not go down very well. Clearly their motives had a significant political element. They saw it as an opportunity to criticize the western countries as well as to elicit support from developing countries. They also supported those who were struggling toward the overthrow of the white minority regime in Rhodesia and the apartheid regime in South Africa, and gave material support to a number of liberation movements in that period. But to say that there was a virtual conspiracy between the socialist bloc and developing countries—that's ridiculous.

There were at that time over one hundred developing countries in the UN. Can anyone imagine a conspiracy involving so many states and their governments, a group with such

[2] James Muldoon, ed., *Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).

diversity in size, economic, political conditions and systems, and interests—a large number of them democracies?

Some critics implied that developing countries were "in the pocket of the Soviets." The Soviet bloc countries had bilateral aid programs directed at developing countries, as are the programs of western states. All such programs are expected to bring benefits also to the donor countries. It is interesting that western states repeatedly criticized the Soviet bloc's much smaller programs. Hardly the basis for buying out the developing countries!

TGW: I wonder, before I move on to a couple of other things, there was one item that I thought was important but I would like to know whether you thought it was simply a sideshow—the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO and then later on UNESCO. Was this seen from your perch in New York as perhaps a dangerous harbinger of other more inward-looking trends in the United States, or was this just seen as a trade union dispute?

DM: No. I think it was a very serious matter. The U.S. is sometimes confusing in such matters. One is aware that there are people in the U.S. who are devoted to the UN. What I am saying is that there is a body of people in the U.S. who are enthusiastic about the UN. Yet, there is often, in earlier years, a hard line attitude which, for example, used to come out particularly in some Security Council business. And the U.S., every time you look back at the record, you realize what a tremendous contribution the U.S. made to the establishment of the UN. So I am trying to hold the line there. I do not believe the U.S. should be allowed the bully the UN. But I do not know what one can do about it. And I was very disappointed when they left UNESCO. I really wished that they could have managed to use their influence, to the extent that there was anything objectively very wrong, to persuade others that something has to be done about it. So it

was very disappointing. And the British went also after a while, but I believe the British have gone back to UNESCO.

TGW: Yes. And the U.S. has gone back to ILO but not to UNESCO. Singapore is still out also. In speaking about putting together parties that share something, or seem to share something, but also have very different interests, in some ways the creation of ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), after ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), makes sense. On the other hand, there are linguistic and cultural differences, and different-sized economies involved. Does this make sense? It may have made political sense, but does it make sense in terms of research, discussions, and the like?

DM: First of all, there is Central America, then Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, et cetera—small countries like ours. And when you add them up, they outnumber the rest of Latin America, for whatever that is worth. The membership of the commission is extremely diverse. Somehow they have to make it together. Maybe there is need for some special institutional structure and procedures to deal directly with the differences. What they did some years ago was to create a Caribbean division of ECLAC based in Trinidad and Tobago. When the Caribbean countries came into the Latin American group in the UN, this was not something that had been anticipated, because we are different. Decolonization precipitated that.

TGW: In fact, you wrote that this was rather sensitive.

DM: Yes, very sensitive. And that is a very carefully crafted word. And even the change of name to the Latin American and Caribbean group was a sensitive matter. And with the English-speaking Caribbean states—there are almost twelve now—they *had* to change the name, but that was not easy. Latin America and the Caribbean have not done terribly well in the past, historically, in terms of interaction and cooperation, in spite of their proximity, in spite of

migration from the Caribbean to some Latin American countries early in the twentieth century. But this is changing.

Sometime in the 1980s, I was approached and asked if I would do a study of Caribbean-Latin American relations required by ECLAC. At the time I was all over the place, being the generalist. So the idea of spending four or five months on one such thing was out. So I said no. Then they came back to me and said if Dr. Vaughan Lewis, a very eminent academic of the Caribbean, was available would I do it, both of us? I agreed. The essence of the relationship is that there are differences historically, in terms of demographic structures, culture, language, legal systems, et cetera. And we do not really understand each other. The thing to do is to prepare us to move on the path of understanding, to remove some of the misinformation, and some of the biases we harbor in respect of each other, and to find creative ways of doing this. Our report also examined relationships in the regional institutions.

Now we have got the Association of Caribbean States, which includes Central America, CARICOM states, and Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. This is a major step, historically speaking. Also, going into the OAS (Organization of American States) for Caribbean countries—that took some doing, and for Guyana in particular, because of the territorial claims by Venezuela. Guatemala also laid claim to territory in Belize. What is also sensitive is that Latin America is the home for a large number of people of African origin. My own feeling is that this is a factor that is not unknown but certainly is not something that is very obvious to the world. But it is a factor that will become more obvious over time. The United States of America has had its experience in that direction. One would hope that Latin America would, over time, arrive at an accommodation in regard to these different peoples there. That factor is a very interesting one when you look at the demographic composition and cultural

diversity in the Caribbean. We have a delicate job to do in the region in terms of creating harmony. And this Association of Caribbean States provides an opportunity to bridge the gap between at least two sets of cultures. Jamaicans have migrated to Cuba and to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. There are pockets of Jamaicans in those countries.

There is a Center for Latin American Studies at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. And some of the Latin American countries are taking an increasing interest. I believe that the cultural dimension is the critical one. It is difficult to pursue with really great success relations on the economic side between peoples who do not understand each other. We have different legal systems. We have different languages. Spanish is now the second language in Jamaica in schools. When I went to school Latin and French were taught. Now it is Spanish. And some of the Latin American countries are assisting Jamaica in terms of the teaching of Spanish. I think we have an interesting task ahead of us in the region.

TGW: Actually, the Jamaican student, Diana Cassells, who did research for me on this pulled out the fact that Jamaica took a stance very early against apartheid.

DM: Yes.

TGW: Would you explain this through cultural, racial—

DM: Oh, yes. And Jamaica was, I think, the first country to impose a trade embargo. Well, it was Rhodesia where we imposed a trade embargo, in 1965, three years after our independence. You see, sheer numbers have something to do with it. The U.S. has had the experience, but the descendants of the slaves are a minority. They are very important. But in Jamaica they are the vast majority, unlike Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. The interest in Africa developed from—well it has never ceased presumably, but certainly after slavery. I mentioned to you these teachers going to Africa in the early years of the twentieth century out of

sentiment. And this is a major thing because they were very well respected there. They helped at a time when Africa did not have many of their own teachers. But Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican who I mentioned earlier, developed a philosophy about Africa. He developed this massive organization, the United Negro Improvement Association, in the U.S., Central America, and elsewhere. And he is seen as the father of pan-Africanism. Two presidents—Ghana's [Kwame] Nkrumah and [Nnamdi] Azikiwe of Nigeria—both acknowledge his strong influence on them and on others in those countries.

In the early 1930s, there emerged in Jamaica the Ras Tafari movement, coming out of poor areas in the city of Kingston. The people developed their own philosophy and lifestyle based on their belief that Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia is a deity and that Africa, and in particular Ethiopia, is their rightful home. They have demanded that the government of Jamaica repatriate them to Ethiopia. The movement has grown considerably over the years, and its influence has spread beyond Jamaica, propelled also by the music of the internationally famous Bob Marley. All of this has greatly heightened the interest and the sentiment in Jamaica in respect to Africa, an interest which is well known on that continent and greatly appreciated.

I should tell you that Haile Selassie made a grant of land to people of African origin in the West in gratitude for their solidarity and support when he was in exile following the Italian invasion in the 1930s. A number of Ras Tafarians have lived there. And I should also say that I have been a member of two official missions sent by the government of Jamaica to countries in Africa, including Ethiopia—in 1962, before Jamaica's independence, and in 1972—to discuss broad issues of common interest. In 1961, the government sponsored, largely because of Ras Tafarians' interest, an unofficial mission which included Ras Tafarians and representatives of other groups with a special interest in Africa. So you see, the feeling about Africa is very strong

among many Jamaicans, and this has been expressed in many ways, not least in the country's positions in the UN, and in other forums such as the Commonwealth.

TGW: In terms of historical links that take different forms, how do you feel about—and this occurred during the same period of time—the negotiation of the Lomé/ACP trading arrangements between the Europeans and Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP) and the Lomé Convention? Because in some ways this actually does go against the grain of collective G-77 points.

DM: It is interesting that you should say that. The matter really came to prominence about 1973. I can remember, for instance, *The Economist* came out with an article about Lomé and they quoted me. The magazine has asked me what I thought about the scheme now that they had arrived at an agreement. So I made a positive, but not overwhelmingly strong, statement, but a positive statement. I recognized some of the motives behind this extension of the colonial link, because I saw what it was—the colonial powers with some of the ex-colonies. Fine. It has been extended on the part of the Europeans. Some of the countries involved are not colonial powers. But it was essentially based on the former connection. They have also extended the recipient group to include Ethiopia and some others, who were not colonies. I recognize the efforts which have been made and the benefits which have been gained, but I have always felt that we have not made any real connection that I know of between that operation, which is a major operation involving the South and the North, and the NIEO in the UN. This is a mistake.

Clearly, there could be ways. This is a different forum. Well, resources. Developing countries have had to put resources in the field, and in respect of both exercises they have had problems with that. I just feel that the Lomé initiative deals with some of the same issues. As far as I know, they have not been connected.

One of the problems in the early days was that Latin Americans—some of them—felt that here was a group of developing countries getting special preferences. That feeling may have disappeared except in the case of banana exports to Europe. And Lomé is going to end sometime. I don't want to be difficult about the benefits, which have gone on for such a long time, but it will not last forever. The thing about it, we talk about restructuring of international economic relations between North and South in the UN. The Lomé Agreement is not designed specifically to achieve that. Jan Pronk, the Dutch minister in ECOSOC in 1974, made a statement in his speech, and in reference to the NIEO. He said that we can carry out all sorts of emergency operations; we can relieve all kinds of suffering; but we cannot achieve anything fundamental unless we bring about real changes in the distribution of power, income, and property.

TGW: One thing you wrote that really struck home here in terms of our project on ideas, because it is the extent to which ideas are distorted, the extent to which ideas take on a life of their own. And you wrote about the NIEO, and I think you had in mind, you were referring in the passage, if my recollection serves me correctly, to the rhetoric of the West when you said that there is a danger of the convergence of rhetoric, not a convergence of substance. But it seems to me that perhaps this quote could refer equally to members of the G-77 as well as the West. That is that it was important in terms of structural change not to take advantage of particular opportunities like Lomé and what have you.

DM: Quite frankly, I observed this development and the first time I probably said this formally was at LSE, my LSE presentation at their conference on the North-South Dialogue in 1978. There is a feeling which emerged that the Sixth Special Session on the NIEO was a bit confrontational and much was made of that—in a way, too much. As I have said to you, you cannot come into an encounter over an historical issue like this, where one side feels that

historically it has been a great disadvantage—more than that. You cannot come to the table without some heat, whether it is a trade union encounter or whatever. This does not justify excess, but it is not going to be a nice soft talk the whole way.

So I found that whilst there were strong words, I thought that the term confrontation was overdone. We talked quietly, for the most part. The situation was confrontational, if you were confronting an historical issue where you are asking for or demanding fundamental change. We put forward far-reaching proposals and there was deadlock. And a negative response is also, in a sense, confrontational. And remember, this was in the time of the "oil crisis."

The Sixth Special Session was really tough, especially because one or two of the major countries were not prepared for it. They did not realize in time that this was that serious. Later, we got to the Seventh Special Session in 1975, and what we did in the year in between was to have a series of informal encounters, lowering the rhetoric on both sides, talking to each other nicely. By the time we came to the Seventh Special Session, things were less tense. We ended with a consensus resolution.

Johan Kaufmann reports that the session produced a real consensus decision with a new program of work. He quotes U.S. ambassador [Daniel] Moynihan as saying, "Things will never be the same." And I think that it was a UK delegate who said—words to the effect—that while we had not made a great advance in concrete terms, we had crossed the philosophical bridge in terms of agreeing to move in the direction of change. The UK representative also said that, on the face of it, we have reached what is called a consensus, but that perhaps it could better be described as a collective acquiescence in the major parts of the two documents concerned. Of course, a number of western industrialized countries recorded reservations on some issues.

When you are in negotiations, when you feel that change is likely to take place, you are on the road. And I felt that some of the language which was used from that time for a while gave hope. If I look back at my own speeches, there was an element of hope that we were moving. But I found later that this was disappointing, that the hard line position, in terms of major change, was still there. It is my firm belief that in any negotiating situation, one has to be careful about the choice between avoiding confrontational language and, on the other hand, creating an impression which is not fulfilled when you come down to the nitty-gritty. It is better to maintain a position of disagreement.

And I am not accusing people of deliberateness. It is something that happens in negotiations. It happens between husband and wife. It happens between people in different circumstances, where the language gives the impression that a change has taken place. And it may have been a change of attitude, but not a change of substance. I felt very much that that was the case. So the disappointment continued. It definitely continued. I must add that in spite of deep differences at the UN on a number of critical issues, I had very cordial relations with virtually all the diplomats, at all levels, with whom I was in contact, and that goes for the members of my delegation. This was one of the things that made my eight years at the UN so satisfying.

TGW: Let us pursue the negotiating strategies a moment. If you had a new Jamaican or a new U.S. diplomat being parachuted in to New York for negotiations, what would you tell him were two or three most important things to keep in mind during conferences and negotiations?

DM: Well, of course what I would say to him is that as he knows, the U.S. has made a major contribution to the establishment of the UN system. The U.S. is a superpower. And it is inevitably seen in a different light from other countries because of its power in what is now

virtually a one superpower world. One acknowledges this. It is a difficult position. But the issue of power in the UN, not in the world necessarily but in the UN, which is made up of a very large number of independent sovereign states, is that one has to live with the community, yet without sacrificing one's interests. And whether the country is very small or very big, one has to treat with them, and disagree with them as much as you like, but the system works best on the basis of some understanding that how you use power and how you exercise your interests has to be governed by reason of the fact that it is a diverse community with diverse interests or circumstances.

I would say something like that, not for a moment denying the right as has been said by more than one U.S. representative, to defend themselves. As I've said, that is their right. But the UN is not a place where countries come purely to defend their interests. I do not think that Jamaica's interests should loom so large that we omit to make our little contribution to the wider global society. So, how you balance these two things is a delicate matter. And personalities differ. Power does not have to be exercised always in an obvious way. Very delicate. And the position of a country like the U.S. is a difficult one. No question. But I've seen some representatives handle it particularly well.

TGW: Would you tell this invented diplomat to pay attention to ideas coming from outside of the UN? From the academic arena? From the NGO (nongovernmental organization) arena? What is the importance of ideas in their lives?

DM: Very definitely. One of the interesting invitations I received was from the University of Texas. The LBJ School has a chair, the Slick Chair, endowed by someone from Texas. And each year they appoint someone in the field of international relations to occupy that position. The person must, during that year sometime, have some sort of conference. I have

been invited three times to them. I think it was at one of those, after an excellent discussion, I said something and tried to put it as tactfully as possible—I believe something that applies to my country, but it applies I think more perhaps to a large country, a country like the U.S., because of certain special features of the U.S. It was the sort of discussion we had where we were not in the business of agreeing with each other necessarily, or negotiating. I was impressed by the level of the discussion in terms of the content and the ideas. But I do not get the impression that the ideas and the thinking you encounter in situations like that have an easy time reaching the high levels, say, in the U.S. administration.

I got the impression, quite frankly, from many such encounters that in academic circles and other circles there are people who are really well-informed, with creative ideas on issues we deal with in the UN. But to what extent do ideas filter through in the way that you asked? I wonder whether in my own country it might be any different. When I was going to the UN, when I was asked to go, I came home for a short while. I wondered to what extent our authorities were involving persons from academic and other areas in terms of dealing with some of the issues in the UN. And I got the impression that at that time there was not much of that. It may have changed since then. Certainly in the case of a small country with limited resources, we have people who can be called on. And we do put such people on delegations occasionally. But I wonder about the extent to which we are drawing on these resources to introduce that content, those ideas into the efforts of the government.

Of course, the UN does have persons from outside the system on a number of committees, such as the Committee on Development Planning. And there are organizations like the UN Institute on Training and Research—this was never given the status and resources to

match the stated functions, and the UN University. And there have been the occasional special groups of experts on various issues.

TGW: It really does take time for an idea to penetrate an institution, a bureaucracy, consciousness. When I was reading some of your things, I came across this statement on interdependence which I totally agree with. You suggested that it is the *perception* of interdependence which has advanced more than interdependence itself. It is something that has existed for some time but it takes a very long time with people talking, writing, discussing the subject for interdependence to take place.

DM: Yes, indeed. I was thinking about interdependence this morning too, but I did not go further than that because we are now talking about globalization. Interdependence has almost disappeared from the vocabulary. It was in vogue in the 1970s, but the word is hardly used now. That's very interesting. Is it because it has become not only accepted, but a reality? Or has it been overtaken by large developments and concepts, such as globalization and regionalism?

TGW: Just at about the time, maybe shortly before you left New York, Margaret Thatcher came to power in Britain.

DM: Yes, indeed.

TGW: Shortly after you left, Mr. [Ronald] Reagan appeared on the scene.

DM: And Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

TGW: Was it clear—and this was undoubtedly complicated by the debt problems of many oil importing developing countries—was it clear to you by Cancun in 1981 that global negotiations had finished?

DM: Jamaica was not invited to the Cancun summit. The government had changed in Jamaica and I do not know if that had something to do with it. But these twenty-two leaders

went off to Cancun. It took some time for President Reagan to agree to go, clearly. The president of a superpower is not going to a meeting like that unless he is pretty sure that he will be on strong ground. By that time, I had become somewhat pessimistic. The UN General Assembly in 1979 had agreed that the Special Session of the Assembly in 1980 would launch a new round of global negotiations on international cooperation and development. The G-77 saw this as an opportunity to renew the North-South negotiations. But in the discussions on the arrangements for all this, some countries from the North were calling for a "neutral agenda" on the issues. That is neutral as compared with the proposals the G-77 had put forward in previous negotiations on the NIEO.

I took the floor and said, "I am amazed to hear that." I said, "Does the women's movement operate on the basis of a neutral agenda? Did the civil rights movement in the United States—does it go forward on the basis of a neutral agenda?" I realized then that we had lost. Well, we had not gained as much ground as we might have hoped for, even modest ground. As far as I am concerned, by the time Cancun came I was not optimistic. After Cancun, when the results were announced, Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi and four or five other leaders were asked what they thought of it. It seemed to me that they made a desperate attempt to be polite, saying things like, "Well, you know, it wasn't bad." It was horrible, in fact.

You know the story, the priest on a Sunday morning hopes that somebody will invite him to breakfast after service. Well, on this day he is invited to breakfast. They have boiled eggs. When he comes around to having his egg, he realizes that the damn thing is rotten. So he is fooling around and pretending to enjoy it, but not eating. Then the host says, "Reverend, is your egg alright? How is it?" He says, "Yes, good in parts." So the phrase "good in parts" is used when you have a rotten egg, a bad outcome, and you are trying to be polite about it.

I think the one frank statement I came across was Guyana's. Cancun closed the door on global negotiations. It brings into question. All of us have to question, and I have to question myself, our side, our mode of operation, timing. Sometime during the 1970s, a group of developing country persons—about twenty of us—met. Tanzania was chosen as the meeting place—not Dar es Salaam but Moshe, a quiet place where we would meet to talk about Third World affairs. It was not a political meeting. It was not a meeting of representatives. It was a variety of people—academics and other people. Sonny Ramphal was there, and others. And we talked for two or three days. And then President [Julius] Nyerere came and visited us. He refused to sit at the table. He said, "I came to listen." And he sat in a corner and listened. At the end of the day, we persuaded him to say something, and he spoke. My recollection is that one of the things he said was that if you are advancing towards a certain aim, whether as an individual or a community or whatever—and this is absolutely imperative—and you find yourself faced by an impassable obstacle, and you have to stop or retreat, he says, "Make up your mind. Are you stopping because you cannot go further? Are you turning back because you have to at that moment? Or are you abandoning your aims?" He says, "It is imperative that you understand that."

I think I must have told this story to the Group of 77 at one time, to try to get the point across that those most fundamental aims—not the detailed prescriptions—you do not abandon them. If you have to retreat, if you have to stop now, for ten years, twenty years—I believe sometimes that this is not fully understood. The matter requires a lot more thinking than we did at that time. We felt forced by circumstances and by the institutional imperatives. We were in the UN and had to proceed apace. One has to think this issue through. What are the fundamental aims? Identify them, and decide where you go from there.

TGW: I was interested in returning to a couple of scenes that we visited earlier, to really talk about the dynamics within them—that is, ECOSOC and the Security Council. Most people, myself included, do not look upon ECOSOC seriously. There have been reforms talked about for ECOSOC for as long as there has been an ECOSOC. How did you face assignment there when so many people dismissed it?

DM: First of all, ECOSOC occupies a special place in the UN system. It is a main organ. It is a matter of sadness that it has not functioned in the way in which it should. But it is there. UNCTAD was established because the developing countries decided there was need for a forum in which they were there in some strength. And there you could talk about development and trade and things like that. Some people saw it as a substitute for ECOSOC, which has a limited membership. It couldn't be. But, the thing is that there had been much talk about ECOSOC before—recognition that it needed some boosting.

In 1975, developing countries put out this resolution on restructuring the economic and social sectors of the UN and the Secretary-General appointed this group of experts. We talked a lot about ECOSOC, about cutting away subsidiary bodies. So, having been a member of that group, having been very much involved in that, I know we tried. There was some sort of hope that ECOSOC would emerge stronger from this restructuring exercise. At the time of the summer session of ECOSOC, we had meetings in Geneva in 1978, informal meetings, and all these efforts were made. Since leaving the UN, I have been curious, and occasionally I have seen something about ECOSOC.

What I am saying is that the period of my presidency of the council was one in which there was some activity about ECOSOC. Of course, it was not the first time. Mark Twain once said that the rumors of his death were greatly exaggerated. I would say that the rumors of the

death of ECOSOC are somewhat exaggerated. But it has been sleeping, not really dead—waiting for something to awaken it. Why is it that this vital space in the system has not been effectively used? What is it that prevents this coordinating function, with other tasks attached to it, from working in an institution when there is such great need for something that brings the system together? For myself, it was a very interesting time because we had the restructuring discussions which went through most of that period. But still, in all, when you draw the line and add it up, it was a disappointment. Recently, looking at the *UN Chronicle*, they have had special thematic sessions and other special things. But I don't know if these have brought the council to life. Has it something to do with the broader structure and nature of the UN system?

The trouble about the UN—I suppose you have to be careful about dismantling too much. It's been said that if God did not exist, we would invent him. Well, if the UN did not exist, I tell you it could not be invented now. There would be no possibility of agreement. So, we have to be careful how you dismantle.

TGW: What would you say to the proposal that has actually come from a number of quarters—I think most recently from the [Shridath] Ramphal/[Ingvar] Carlsson Global Governance Commission—that there should be an economic security council? That is, elevating something like ECOSOC to a super status.

DM: In 1993, the North-South Roundtable proposed a development security council. I have thought about it. I was asked to give my opinion through Inter-Press Service on the governance commission's report. In the case of ECOSOC, the idea of an economic security council, I have to hear more of the suggestion. It is difficult to see how such a body would work, if it is supposed to be parallel to the Security Council. But to the extent that it points in one

possible direction of making ECOSOC come alive, then it is a matter that should be on the table for discussion, as long as you do not develop the illusion that it is going to be literally like the Security Council. Not at all. What membership? What size? And with the veto?

TGW: My limited enthusiasm would reside in the fact that this would be a place to push norms, ideas, and principles at a level that would be taken more seriously. One of the ideas that came out of that restructuring exercise—it was a committee of eighteen?

DM: The eighteen came in the 1980s. Before that was the restructuring group, twenty-five of us. And let me tell you, to have agreed was a miracle. The first couple of meetings, it seemed impossible. And it was in New York, so I invited the group to my home for lunch. And we had a long lunch in which we talked. We were meeting for the first time as human beings, having met at first as strangers in a conference room. We had not yet made the real contact with each other. After a long lunch, I produced not only Jamaica's famous cigars and coffee, but twenty-year-old Jamaican rum. And we sat there and talked. Someone suggested to me afterwards that that is where we began the real meeting in terms of meeting as human beings, and the process of understanding each other. Of course I am not proposing that Jamaican cigars and coffee and rum should be served at all major negotiations in the UN, but the experience says something about the negotiating process.

And in the end, after the very limited time that we had, we came to a consensus. The report has its merits. Of course, one also has to remember the work other people did on the issues. This was not the first time that some of these things were looked at. But the report created some interest. The General Assembly established an ad hoc committee of all UN member countries, which finally reported to the General Assembly. And some things came out of it. But some of my friends at UNCTAD were not happy about some aspects of the report.

TGW: But it seems to me that the most important proposal that came out of that was the director-general and the idea to somehow elevate the status of the economic and social. How did that idea percolate through the group?

DM: We had a very interesting group of members—from North, South, East, and West. Richard Gardner, a former U.S. assistant-secretary, was a member and our rapporteur. I cannot now remember exactly where the idea of the director-general (DG) post came from, but it was an inspired one. Certainly the group recommended it, and the Group of 77 countries endorsed it strongly. As I said, it was the G-77 which proposed the restructuring. But the French were not enamored with the idea of the DG. The fact is that France traditionally, it seemed, had held the position of under-secretary-general for economic and social affairs. The result was that we had difficulty in trying to have this higher post accepted as we proposed, and it eventually was set at a level somewhat diminished in terms of the way the appointment would be made. This affected the director-general's status, especially vis-à-vis the matter of the attempts to achieve greater cohesion and coordination.

TGW: I think a similar experiment recently was the creation of the so-called Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. And without any financial wherewithal, it is impossible to crack the whip. You have the bully pulpit, but it was not much of a bully pulpit.

DM: They have also been wrestling about the environment and where to place it in the UN. They have the under-secretary-general, [Nitin] Desai, and the Commission on Sustainable Development. There were other ideas. I don't know where those have reached.

TGW: If ECOSOC is at one extreme, another main organ, the Security Council, is at the other extreme. This was after you had been at the General Assembly. What was it like to come

into that closed sanctum in which there were fifteen countries? And which decisions, to a greater extent than anywhere else in the UN system, are actually decisions in which there is a binding power? Do people conduct themselves more seriously?

DM: Yes, I think the Security Council has an aura. It is seen by a lot of people as the top of the UN system. The president of ECOSOC has office accommodation in the UN, but the Security Council president has a special office and a staff available to him. Incidentally, I had this experience, which does not often happen I suppose, of being in the president's chair on the very first day of Jamaica's membership in the council. I tell you, it was something else—quite an experience.

When the formal open meeting started, I am in the president's office, behind the scenes, because diplomats are coming in one after the other to see the president just before the meeting starts. When I enter the chamber, the place is crammed with people. There were a lot of diplomats standing and the public galleries are there. And you take your seat, the first time you are sitting in the Security Council, apart from the occasions in which you have come in and spoken as a nonmember, by permission. The issue was Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia—a very difficult meeting. But I managed. You know the council chamber is like a theater-in-the-round, the cast—the fifteen-member country representatives of the council sitting at an oval table in the center with their supporting staff behind them, the other diplomats seated on the side, the press, including TV cameras, and the public in the gallery. There is often the air of a theater, and this was certainly the case in the meetings on that particular issue. In fact, there is never any doubt about the seriousness of the issues, and I think that more than with any other UN committee, the media are there to report. For members of the council, as well as their countries, it is literally a highly-exposed position. You are seen, you are heard on every issue, and you

have to vote. In some matters, you are very much aware of the power factor, the special interests of the major powers.

What I found in my two years there were very good personal relationships with all members. There were seven nonaligned members on the council. Then Mexico came on when there was an attempt to exclude Cuba from membership, a successful attempt. As I said before, the nonaligned members worked together. Every issue that came up, we met. We reconciled differences as well as we could. We drafted the resolution, which meant that the rest of the membership—we negotiated with them on our draft. And that worked very well. It gave you a little bit of influence, not exactly leverage. And if you could get two—say two western countries—to join with the seven, it meant that you had enough to win approval, if there was no veto. So it gave you a feeling that you were really contributing.

I must say, there were some really unusual developments. The second time I was president, we dealt with a problem involving the Palestinians and all fifteen members voted against Israel. A couple days later, President Carter repudiated the vote. He said there was a fault in the communications, or a misunderstanding about the instructions from Washington. And U.S. secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, and Ambassador McHenry got the rap for that.

TGW: To fast forward a minute to actuality. Last month the Security Council had a special session on AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome), and I would say that this was billed as unprecedented, although I would say that actions against Rhodesia or South Africa, and basically the humanitarian and human rights issues of the 1990s, also verge on being quite close to other concerns, non-security concerns. But anyway, this is clearly a social concern. Do you think this is a good idea for the Security Council to expand in these directions?

DM: I believe that to a certain extent this is inevitable because everything is connected to everything else. You see, the word "security"—there has been quite a bit of discussion about what you mean when you talk about security. There is the growing focus on human security—that is, individual security. So I have a feeling it is inevitable, but one has to walk very carefully with this, because when you consider what went into the creation of this Security Council—its role, back to the beginning—it already has trodden on delicate ground recently by allowing some interventions in internal affairs on humanitarian grounds.

In that book on multilateral diplomacy and the UN, I quoted Brian Urquhart, who has stated the UN Charter proscribes such intervention on matters which are within the jurisdiction of any state. But he went on to remark that the UN has been forced to act because of the terrible developments in a number of countries. I have read the words of Kofi Annan, who clearly wishes the UN to move in that direction. So, as I say, one hopes that the UN does not rush forward too quickly in the face of pressure coming from any particular quarters. This matter requires very careful thinking because it is a major change in the practice. But I have a feeling that, to a certain extent, there is an inevitability about it. You see, the human rights issue, in the broadest sense of the term, is becoming such a dominant theme, and it is a delicate matter.

TGW: Just to go back for an instant to the Security Council. I guess I would like to hear whether you think this is a sensible direction to head. That is to expand the coverage, so to speak, of the Security Council to include "soft" issues. Not so soft when it comes to AIDS, but issues that are clearly economic and social. On one hand this could mean they will be taken far more seriously—it is the Security Council, therefore the aura of seriousness. On the other hand, it does mean that the kinds of transparency, the kinds of issues related to more widespread participation, et cetera, are going to be lacking. On balance, is this a good thing?

DM: Difficult. What decisions would come on such matters? I suppose up to now, with the decisions on matters which come before the Security Council, you agree or you disagree, but you know what the decision is about. When you get into the softer areas, I'm not quite sure. And when it comes to a serious case of infringement involving sanctions, it is something that one has to think about very carefully. But is the idea of having these in the Security Council, to invest the Security Council with the power to deal with them in the way in which it deals with other matters of peace and security? Well, perhaps there will have to be a time when the Charter will have to allow the Security Council specifically to deal with those humanitarian issues. What if there were a challenge to any amendment of the Charter for this? Already the Security Council has been moving into the "soft areas," with special debates, subjects assigned to particular delegations to lead, and new committees, et cetera. You may recall that Jamaica is on the council. At the same time, the pressure increases for an increase in the size of the council and for greater transparency—inevitable as they move into the soft issues. Frankly, I am not sure about the economic issues. We have talked about the idea of an economic security council. Well, we will see if any "soft" economic matters come up.

But I wonder—as the council moves into these new issues, what then is the position of the General Assembly, as well as the agencies which deal with these matters? Again, how will the broad body of the UN membership feel about the new situation? Will there be a significant increase in requests from delegations that are not current members of the council to participate in some debates? And would the council have to meet much more frequently?

TGW: It seems to me that in thinking about ideas that it makes a difference when developed over a long period of time. Human rights certainly provides a slow and steady intrusion on state behavior.

DM: Yes. But we talk about intervention. I have thought about this for a while now. You see, in a sense, the IMF has the power of intervention in certain circumstances. And there are other ways—the human rights case, yes. There are the many other international conventions. Gradually, the international organizations will be moving toward intervention in internal affairs, it seems. Perhaps we should find another word for some of these activities. Some are, or will be, more benign than others. For example, when they are carried out with the willing, or even the unwilling, agreement of the state concerned. Perhaps the word "intervention" is not quite appropriate in some cases. Certainly what develops is the involvement in the internal affairs of countries—for example, when a country has ratified a convention or has found it necessary to draw on the IMF's resources. Nevertheless, this type of involvement is surely increasing.

TGW: We were mentioning over lunch a touching incident, when you were about to leave the United Nations, of taking one last stroll through the building, the General Assembly and the Security Council.

DM: Yes, I really found that the UN was, in all my career, this was my *metier*. And this has been detected by other people. Eight years as ambassador there was a long time, and they were eight very interesting years. One of the interesting sets of encounters I had was with the UN International School, where my younger children went for years. I was once asked to come down to the school to speak to a group of students who wanted to put on conferences in the UN General Assembly on major international themes. I rushed down there and spent a very exciting hour talking to them, encouraging them to go ahead in spite of their worries about whether that was appropriate. They put on the conference—in that case on the New International Economic Order—prepared their paper, made all the arrangements, had it in the General Assembly, invited a number of people like myself to participate. And it went extremely well. Year after year they

would have a conference—on disarmament, women's affairs, things like that. One of the senior teachers would send me reports on each conference, keeping me in contact after I left the UN. We had a very strong sentimental connection because of my original involvement, so that kept up.

When I was leaving New York at last, after eight years, the very last day, I was leaving the General Assembly building, and I decided to look into some of my old haunts—the Security Council chamber, which was not in use at that moment, and the last one, the Economic and Social Council chamber. I opened the door, expecting to just stand there for a couple of minutes in silence. And the room was full of people, students and some adults, but mainly students, including students from the UN International School—in conference. And before I could creep quietly outside I was summoned by the people at the table and invited in. So, I went in. They greeted me very warmly, and I told them that I was leaving. They demanded that I make a little farewell speech, which I did. It was marvelous, you know, to leave the Economic and Social Council chamber to these young people. It was really marvelous, symbolic.

TGW: This is a good spot to end tape three, on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 29th of February.

TGW: This is tape number four, Tom Weiss interviewing Don Mills in Kingston. Today is the first of March, the year 2000. How do the 1970s look from the year 2000?

DM: In some respects, they seem to be very far away. There are lots of people who have not heard of what people like myself regard as the major events of the 1970s. They have not heard of them. And I perhaps include a lot of people who are in the diplomatic system. This comes back to the matter of memory, not only on the part of say an organization like the UN—an organization's memory and history—but also the public, governments, the diplomatic

community. Not just at the UN, but everywhere. To what extent has there been a failure, a failure on the part of the South, if you like, to make sure that the consciousness of critical issues does not disappear? The North-South issue, for example, because you are not still negotiating in the UN on it. If that has not been registered, then that is a very serious loss. And there has been a virtual decision not to talk about that issue.

Later, there was the *Agenda for Development*, presumably a "neutral" agenda. My impression is that it has not been a great success. But it seems to me—I hope I am not being unfair—that the idea was that we can agree between us without all this stuff about North and South. And I have been told as much by a few friends from the North—not all of them, but I can remember one particular representative of a particular country, one very strong country in the North, who said, "This North-South thing really does not apply." That is extraordinary, because if you were to stop talking about economics and you were to talk about other things—globalization, population movements, cultures, environment, climate change, biodiversity, all sorts of things, you would find you are once again faced with significant differences in interests and in conditions between North and South.

And if you were to bring in the historical background, the difference would be clear. So what do you do? But in spite of this—almost a vow of silence—the fact is that, I venture to say, at almost any encounter involving the whole community in the UN, inevitably some of the major issues divide on a North-South basis. You talk about the composition of the Security Council. You talk about the whole business of the exploding technology, information, and communications. It comes back to that, you see. As I said, if the UN did not exist and you tried to establish it, there would be great difficulties. And the greatest would stem from the North-South divide, which could provide an insuperable obstacle.

And this is what I said earlier—a question of not giving up the essential aim. And one could define the aim as simply to establish a better world in terms of the accommodation of the interests of two, very broadly speaking, two groups of people in the world whom history has divided. There are places in the UN where they are addressing aspects of this issue. But it is not being addressed under the same sort of broad framework. It might be that the framework should change and elements of the agenda, and you don't quite go back to exactly the same approach of the 1970s where you put in a whole program of action, a package like that, at one time.

So I am interested, and sometimes intrigued, by the persistence of this North-South issue. But one of the interesting things is that there have been changes—well, access to markets, debt. There was a time, I remember, when a few countries, Jamaica included, in the 1970s said that it is important for the international community to sit down and discuss the debt issue because it is a serious one. And some of our own colleagues and friends in the international community said, "Not me! Not my country." They did not want to be tarnished by seeming to make a case for that. But some of those countries, in a very few years, were in serious trouble on debt. Now what is happening? We are having the impetus on the debt business coming from the North, so to speak. It took a long time, a painfully long time! And a very interesting thing is that civil society took an interest in North-South—universities, a lot of NGOs, a lot of organizations, a lot of international institutions, like Marc Nerfin's International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA), institutions in the North, and some which embraced both North and South, like the Society for International Development. There is the Third World Forum. Many of them either came into existence in the context of the NIEO dialogue or took on the issue.

And this is a very interesting thing. I was involved in some of them, like the Center for Research on the New Economic Order. I was on the board of that, and of the SID, the North-

South Roundtable and the Council of IFDA. And many of them, if not all, got some funding from the North. Many of them lost financial support with the end of the Cold War, and the almost total disappearance—temporarily or otherwise—of the North-South dialogue. Some of these organizations have gone, and the enthusiasm is gone. But the melody lingers on.

So my comment on how the 1970s look now—I say the agenda in some fundamental ways has changed. Other things have loomed very large. Debt has taken on a respectable aspect and debt relief is being espoused. And what about access to markets? A very interesting thing happened in Jamaica some years ago, in the 1980s. I became interested in the fact that there was some action in the North, places like the Netherlands and one or two other countries, which established, in the government sector related to the aid connection, some facilities for helping developing countries to penetrate western markets—European markets, for instance. I inquired about it, spoke to Jamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), our organization here which promotes investment and trade. Somebody from that organization had been to the Dutch organization for a short training course. What eventually happened was that that organization sent a small team to Jamaica to hold a training seminar on how to penetrate the European market. Because of my interest—and I by then was outside of the official system, I was then not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or anything—I was asked to make the opening statement at the seminar. And I had to say how much of our efforts in the UN expended in negotiations on this issue of access to markets and complaining about the difficulties in getting access to the western world. And now they have officials in the western world who are coming to show us!

So there have been changes of that sort. What we really need—and maybe somebody is doing it, or has done it—is a very critical and objective assessment on the basis of the question that you have asked me—what has changed? What has remained the same? Some things have

changed. In some respects, the agenda on North-South relations has changed, but no North-South negotiations exist.

TGW: In looking back at the period in the 1970s and the origin of ideas, many of the issues that were on the platform, did these emanate, in your view, from national delegates within the G-77? Did they emanate from members of international secretariats—I have in mind, in particular, UNCTAD, in terms of trade and finance—or was this a two-way street?

DM: It would be very interesting to trace the origins of various ideas. The UN has been in existence from the mid-1940s, and some things, like the question of development aid, came to life early. And then, as developing countries came in, with decolonization, they started making their initiatives, like the issue of the imbalance in the distribution of power and opportunity, for example, in the Bretton Woods system. These things were discussed, a lot of things. Then the nonaligned—Bandung in 1955 and the first summit in 1961. And through the 1960s, talking about a number of economic and political issues, including South-South cooperation, which became a major element in the whole complex of the New International Economic Order proposal. UNCTAD came in 1964 and was the center of studies and negotiations on trade and development.

And you had people like Raúl Prebisch who was a giant of the UN system from Latin America. Again, that is another interesting fact of history. As I said, Latin America was there as the bulk of the Third World in the early years in the UN and in the League of Nations. Raúl Prebisch became the secretary-general of UNCTAD. You remember his notion of the world market divided with center and periphery—a reference to the North-South divide. So the NIEO program of action in 1974 then draws upon these sources and ideas. The UN itself was committed to establishing some opportunities for these new countries. So there had been

elements of negotiation on individual matters in the Second Committee, in UNCTAD, and in ECOSOC and the rest of the system.

It would be interesting, as I say, to take the main areas in the whole program of action on the New Economic Order and to see how they originated. But I don't know if that has been done thoroughly. That is critical. Some ideas fade away, for good reason, or they diminish for not so good ones, like the commodity issues. These things need to be tracked and documented. Otherwise, I suppose, people like myself will seem to some to be just talking about the 1970s, trying to relive it all—Rip van Winkle's waking up in the year 2000.

That's the purpose of such meetings as that which Tony Hill and others are trying to arrange in Geneva—the Reflection Group. And there have been other meetings like that, to reassess the 1970s engagement. But what one needs to do is have a regular process of recording and tracing back through time, up through the present and possibly into the future—the ideas, the initiatives, the process through which they go, the outcomes. That's the UN intellectual History Project!

TGW: How important were the so-called like-minded countries in trying to build bridges during the 1970s?

DM: There were countries of the North which seemed to be more positive in their attitudes to developing country aspirations. Of course, one can examine their votes and any reservations they may have made in respect to elements in resolutions on the NIEO and other matters. I would say that on our side we did not make enough of the positions of a country like Sweden—who were guests at the Non-Aligned summits—and Norway, the Netherlands, Canada. In the South, there was evidence—without overdoing it—of positive feeling among some people of the North. There are some obvious cases—NGOs of the North, in particular, and even some

of the governments. But we did not cultivate them. I do not believe that we used sufficiently the means available to us to cultivate in the North—whether the governments themselves or others—their support. I don't think we did.

For myself, I got a lot of invitations from all over, from universities, from NGOs, from a lot of organizations, to speak, and that was a great opportunity to give our aims and to explain them. But apart from some of the nongovernmental organizations I have mentioned I cannot recall any deliberate program of cultivating those interests, or even trying to impact on those who were not inclined to take a positive view of what we were trying to do, for example by contacts at the bilateral level—except in a few cases.

Of course, another change since the 1970s is the question of which developing countries will move into—what's the place you get to before you get to heaven?

TGW: Purgatory?

DM: Purgatory sounds like punishment, but there are some religions that have a sort of—

TGW: A halfway house.

DM: Yes. Mexico, I believe, is a member of the OECD (Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development). In that week I spent at Chatham House, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, the OECD secretary-general—there was a seminar in which he was one of the speakers, and he said, "The OECD is open." And I certainly took note of that. Because the possibility—I wouldn't use the word co-opting because that is pejorative, but being annexed. And then a touch of ambivalence. There was a time when some Latin American countries looked like not wishing to remain in the G-77. But I have seen occasions in which it is

very clear that they still have strong interests there. But there will be a tendency for countries like Singapore to move—you see I don't know where Singapore is now in that relationship.

TGW: Actually, you wrote, and I think it is true, that it is South Korea and Mexico who are now part of OECD, and this certainly cuts across certain North-South lines.

DM: Of course it does. And should one rejoice? I don't know. It's one of these things that is almost inevitable. But there are some countries that are going to find themselves trying to live in two worlds. Without putting the spotlight too much on any particular country, I'll select one which has spotlights all over it. That is South Africa. Up to about five years ago, what was South Africa? It was a white establishment sitting up on the heads of a large population of blacks. So what if anybody had been tempted to invite South Africa into, say, the OECD then? South Africa was seen as an industrialized country with this unfortunate baggage. But now it is certainly turned upside down. So would they be invited now? There are other Third World countries—I would say there are Mexico and Brazil, which have large populations—the majority of whom would, in conventional terms, be seen as having the characteristics of a Third World society. And what of the oil rich countries with high per capita incomes and advancing industrialization but very different in cultural terms?

TGW: We have spent a lot on the G-77, and you have now mentioned OECD and, of course, the European Union (EU) earlier. To what extent have these bodies been important, in your view, in helping the global North to get their collective act together?

DM: Oh, I think considerably. What I have said—I made the point that the OECD—

TGW: First the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation).

DM: Yes. I quoted Brian Urquhart, who in one of his books referred to Dag Hammarskjöld's critical comment about the new OECD attempting to usurp the position of the

UN by claiming a responsibility for dealing with development of the Third World countries. But there is no doubt about the OECD being a very valuable instrument for the North. In talking about the South secretariat, or the G-77 secretariat, people would often mention the OECD as a parallel. This is a major, major advantage to western countries. And then when you put beside that the process which I have described—all the difficulties and negotiations. Laborious, to have gone through all the years from the 1940s toward the aim of European cooperation and union. And the gradual acceptance, apart from Mrs. Thatcher and some Conservatives, of Europe coming to be one family and removing borders, removing all sorts of inhibiting processes. And facing the rest of the world more and more as one bloc.

TGW: I found it. You quoted Johan's 1980 book in your contribution to the Muldoon volume, saying that the European Community has become a lobbying and caucusing group of importance in the UN. What kinds of measures were discussed about establishing a Group of 77, or a southern, secretariat? How serious were they? And would it have helped?

DM: Yes. Well listen. I was in the UN for about three or four years before I became the chairman of the G-77. I observed the other chairmen before me. I was elected chairman in 1977 and I had no staff, except my own delegation. You know, none. Well, you had a G-77 working group of twenty-four delegates, eight from each region—Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. And they do a great deal of work on G-77 matters. But in terms of the central responsibility, it was myself and my delegation, and not even all, because I could not have all of this very small staff doing work on G-77 matters. So that was a very heavy burden.

And during my time, we were arguing the case and making efforts toward having a very small secretariat, starting with the idea of getting countries to make a small contribution so that you could have a very small staff. Then, having to retreat into a situation where—I think after

my chairmanship—two or three countries contributed persons to work with the chairman. But in the meantime, we pursued the idea of a full secretariat.

However, there were some countries, a few major G-77 countries, who were not happy about the idea of having a formal secretariat. They saw it as a move to institutionalize the G-77. That is very interesting. Secondly, the business of contributions. And I would say, we failed to recognize that such a group with a large agenda, including the challenge to an existing power structure, and you want to change it to make it more equitable—you have to put adequate resources into the effort. Resources in terms of manpower, of diplomats and all that. And you must involve your interests at the national level which can add strength, including your intellectual resources. Already governments have to finance delegations, to pay fares, expenses to go to meetings, and all that. But when it comes to that core resource pool, we did not do it. And it seems to me that that was a major weakness.

And then, after many years, we got an office on the 39th floor of the UN Secretariat. So if you go there now, for some years now, from sometime in the 1980s, you will see, they have a couple of rooms, and they have a very small group of people working. That is a revolutionary change. And then there is the Perez-Guerrero Fund, a fund created in the name of Manuel Perez-Guerrero, the Venezuelan. He was a minister, and at one time chairman of G-77. He had also been secretary-general of UNCTAD. So they have a little bit of resources. Then comes the South Centre. There was the South Commission, in the tradition of the Brandt Commission, et cetera, chaired by former President Nyerere. And, of course, a secretariat was established, and the idea was to maintain the existence of the South secretariat, which has been done.

TGW: With the same principle, namely, that states contribute. However, my recollection, because I spoke with Branislav Go_ovi_ recently about this, is that in fact they are—

DM: They are having problems.

TGW: They are having real problems, because the only real contribution came from Indonesia a while back. And they now have problems—

DM: Indonesia had the chairmanship of the G-77 in 1998. So, I recognize the difficulty facing countries of the South. There is not only the UN contribution, but they have their own regional and sub-regional organizations—the OAS, the OAU (Organization of African Unity), et cetera. So it is a burden. But at the same time, it is a simple matter. You have to put resources in. So that is the dilemma of the South.

The fact is that the G-77 in the UN has gradually moved to forms of delegation of work among diplomats and working groups—a major change from earlier days. This was absolutely necessary as the issues grew in number and complexity. So these small groups work on issues serving their ideas to the full group—and doing all this in addition to their delegations' duties. The chairman and his diplomatic staff have always carried major responsibility and a heavy workload as far as G-77 issues are concerned. Much of this could be facilitated with the right group of persons in a secretariat—of course, with well-chosen persons—working closely with the chairman of the group.

One problem the group had was keeping track of G-77 work—discussions and decisions, speeches, communiqués, position papers, UN records—relating to past matters, to current ones. Because, of course, the thing about the UN and the diplomatic services is that delegates come and go—you have to develop a collective memory and perhaps an intellectual history.

There was the matter of contact between what we call the different chapters of the G-77— in New York; FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) in Rome; UNCTAD in Geneva; UNESCO in Paris; UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization) in Vienna, et cetera. We started, in my term as chairman, contacts with these, and that has developed nicely over the years. But a full secretariat could facilitate this connection. As I said, there has been for some time a small secretariat which works well on behalf of the group. And the South Commission secretariat has continued to work—but I think there is still a great need for more substantial organization.

TGW: What about the notion that UNCTAD could have, or should have, become—

DM: Ah, it is that sort of thinking—if I may say so—which has helped to make UNCTAD, which was not exactly blessed and favored by some, the object of suspicion on the part of quite a few countries. And there are those who feel it should be abolished. Now, here you have ECOSOC not functioning really as it should, and people are talking—including, as I say, the commission on governance, about abolishing UNCTAD. UNCTAD is serving a purpose—always has—but not allowed to really function in a way which certainly the developing countries would have liked. But it has done a lot of very good work and still does. You see, take WTO—many developing countries, I believe, do not have permanent delegations there. Even UNCTAD—the fact is that there are a number of countries who do not have a delegation in Geneva for UNCTAD. But the G-77 has always been very active there. UNCTAD does training. It gives some technical assistance. Not so many years ago, when the issue of the link between the environment and trade emerged as a major concern, UNCTAD had a series of encounters. I went to one of them, at which they had a few ministers and all sorts of people,

talking freely about the implications. UNCTAD has a function, and it brings trade and development together. That's particularly important.

So it would have been a great mistake to try to make UNCTAD an instrument of the South. And yet it got that image, partly because of some negative views in the West, and partly because of some persons in the South, who felt it should be seen and used as a Third World secretariat.

TGW: The secretaries-general of UNCTAD always resisted this notion. And I agree that even talking about it has tarred and feathered the secretariat and prevented it from doing its job. The real question is, perhaps in the light of Seattle and the World Trade Organization, it is conceivable that UNCTAD could come back into the mainstream. There is even some speculation that Bangkok—UNCTAD X—is a kind of bridge between the World Trade Organization and southern issues.

DM: Yes, I heard that that meeting was somewhat positive, particularly in that respect.

TGW: Actually, you mentioned a couple of times during our conversation NGOs, and you have actually written that the role of NGOs at least in the last twenty or thirty years has developed far beyond the founders' vision, and that is a quote of yours. What are the pluses and the minuses of this development and where do you see this going?

DM: But of course, NGOs have been active, increasingly, probably in most countries, including some in which they are not regarded with favor by authorities. They have reached out into regional and international spheres, and are engaged in a widening range of activities. They interact increasingly. They interact with governments at the local and national levels, with regional intergovernmental bodies, and the UN system. Some of this interaction takes place by agreement, but in some cases they perform their tasks independently, act as advocates, or as

critics of official positions or behavior. They represent a somewhat new dimension in public and international affairs. Governments, the UN, regional organizations, as well as private business have in many instances moved to accommodate the relationship with NGOs, some because they see the wisdom and recognize the advantages. All of this is bringing about significant changes in the concepts of governance and of management.

In this respect, the UN has come a long way. It started with the Charter. Article 71 authorizes the organization, through ECOSOC, to establish some relationship with such groups. And there is a long list of those accorded that status. Individual UN agencies have established relations with NGOs, which have a special interest in their work. It is particularly interesting that the World Bank first, and lately, I understand, the IMF—both of which have been the targets of strong criticism by NGOs—have organized relations with such groups.

I personally have had quite a lot to do with these organizations. In particular the North-South issue attracted a great deal of attention on the part of many such groups, and I was given many opportunities to speak at their meetings. And I have been an active member of a number of international NGOs. As interest on the part of NGOs in international issues increased, as the number of groups in developing countries grew, it was becoming clear that with the pressures on the UN system from that quarter something had to be done about access. It was at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on Environment and Development that the matter came to a head. The motion to allow much wider participation was strongly opposed by a number of delegations. The chairman proposed a negotiation on the matter, and as a vice chairman, I was given the responsibility to conduct it. The negotiation was long and difficult. But in the end, we reached a decision which has been acknowledged as constituting a major advance in respect of the access of NGOs to the UN. By the time that we came to Rio

(UN Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED) in 1992 there were some 1,400 NGOs accredited to the conference, including indigenous people, who had been specifically listed in the decision. And, of course, there were thousands at the NGO forum held in Rio at the same time.

More and more NGOs are acting in concert. There are a number of umbrella organizations, some involving national groups, some reaching across regions, some international in membership. This enhances their capacity for action—for example, in respect of UN issues. It also represents a coalescence of civil society interests, a particularly potent force in the light of the growing demand from civil society for an effective role in governance. I believe that this is happening in the relationship between NGOs and the UN. Individual countries are witnessing the same movement, in part, it seems, coming out of what appears to be a disenchantment with the political process and government effectiveness, and this in many democracies in both developed and developing countries. A number of studies and programs dealing with this movement in civil society are under way. Among them is the Commonwealth Foundation's extensive field study in a large number of countries in that group, to be followed by a program designed to support and encourage citizen action in this regard.

So I think these movements will continue and have a fundamental impact on the UN and other organizations as well as governments. Of course, there are problems associated with all of these developments. Just how, for example, and to what extent, can the UN, an intergovernmental body with nation-states making up its membership, accommodate a large group of NGOs and satisfy their desire for effective participation? Again, the UN will have to remain aware of the fact that a number of countries are more than sensitive concerning NGOS, and in some instances regard them as subversive, or in any case, strongly opposed to the

government. Incidentally, I recall a meeting of the board of a UN organization at which, in reaction to a reference to NGOs, the representative of a country from Eastern Europe objected firmly. There was no such thing in his country! Apart from direct accreditation to a particular UN meeting, an NGO can participate by way of having a presence on their country's delegation. There is also some sensitivity here, for example, where the country takes a position not at all favored by the NGO. But that device has worked well in Jamaica, the government frequently having persons from NGOs on delegations to major UN conferences. At the national level, countries and their governments have to work out some acceptable relationship with NGOs. To name just one area of potential difficulty, there is the matter of granting of funds by foreign agencies, in particularly governments, through their bilateral aid programs, directly to NGOs—useful, but sensitive.

Coming back for a moment to your mention of Seattle, the WTO, and UNCTAD, it is interesting to look at what is happening at these major international meetings on economic issues. I am referring to the demonstrations organized by people, some of whom travel long distances to express their concerns. We have seen demonstrations at the WTO meeting in Seattle, the Western Economic Summit in Melbourne, the World Bank/IMF meeting in Prague, and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, involving world political and business leaders, and the European Union meeting in Nice. Is it possible that an international constituency is emerging? What is the central issue? A number have been named—capitalism, globalization, the debt burden, the North-South divide, the increasing gap between rich and poor? That would be particularly interesting. Well, we shall see.

The issue of the age? Everybody is talking about civil society now. The UN has to come to terms with that, which is a major political step, to embrace this development in an organized way and an effective way.

TGW: I agree. The Secretary-General, to his credit, I believe has indeed highlighted the role of business and the private sector—the profit sector as well as the non-profit sector.

DM: Yes, that is exactly the point, because there are some people who use the term as if you are talking entirely about the non-profit sector. But the fact is, you look at the list of NGOs who are at Rio, there were many organizations concerned with business interests, whether in individual countries or international in scope. The International Chamber of Commerce—very much present there. These organizations are not seen as part of civil society by some. You had, for example, organizations with business interests in energy—coal, electric power—in engineering, law, et cetera, from many countries, including India, Japan, Australia, the U.S.

TGW: We have mentioned, somewhat obliquely, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. What is your impression about the role that development, or economic and social development, plays in the day-to-day work program of a Secretary-General? Whether the Secretary-General is from the Third World—U Thant, [Javier] Pérez de Cuéllar, Kofi Annan—or Waldheim or Hammarskjöld. Can economic and social affairs ever come squarely onto the agenda, or is this a residual item?

DM: You mean the personal agenda of the Secretary-General?

TGW: The day-to-day. Is there time for this?

DM: I think it is very interesting to reflect on the extent to which social and economic factors have featured in the work of the UN and its agencies over the years. A number of special events and developments have been responsible for this. I have the impression that, as far as the

Secretaries-General are concerned, the nature and degree of their involvement varies, perhaps depending to some extent on their previous involvement in such matters nationally or internationally. First of all, the UN was established in the context of a world coming out of a devastating war. And so inevitably, the first major preoccupations were peace and security and related matters, as well as the reconstruction of war devastated countries. The Cold War era arrived and gave greater urgency to the issues of peace and security. But two other developments emerged early, which were to lead to major changes in international relations and the balance of effort in the UN—the issue of aid and the deeper matter of development; and the initiation of the decolonization process and the entry of a large number of former colonies into the affairs of the world and the UN. These new countries immediately set about placing their very special circumstances and concerns on the global agenda. Of course, many of these had serious political concerns—Africa especially, with the liberation struggles.

The Bretton Woods system was established at the outset, in fact before the UN. The Bank was at first preoccupied with reconstruction of war-torn countries—hence, the "reconstruction" in the name—and then moved into broader development issues. The Fund's task was to establish an orderly international monetary system. The specialized agencies of the UN system came into existence early. Some, like the FAO, were devoted to development. The regional economic commissions also came early in the life of the UN. The ILO existed before the UN. The first steps toward the establishment of a system-wide program of development cooperation and aid were taken. Then the 1970s, the crisis of the floating of the U.S. dollar, the Arab-Israeli struggle leading to war, the oil embargo, and steep rise in the price of oil—and in that critical moment the tabling by developing countries of the declaration and program of action

for the New International Economic Order. So, economic issues came to have a major position on the UN agenda.

It seems to me that the Secretary-General of the UN, whether a person well-grounded in economic and related matters or not, has to show, especially on certain occasions, a serious interest and some understanding of development and economic issues. In fact, the same applies more and more to presidents and prime ministers nowadays! Of course, the SG (Secretary-General) will always keep a close watch on political matters, especially those related to peace and security, and be ready to discuss these issues with knowledge, to meet the press, and to appear in the Security Council. He must be in touch with governments when necessary, and other interests around the world, monitoring events so as to be ready at a moment's notice in the face of any serious development. Things are somewhat different in the economic field. Moreover, there are a number of UN agencies which on a day-to-day basis carry the weight of such issues. The SG presumably is briefed on these regularly. And the Bretton Woods institutions press on, armed with their mandates.

It seems that for many persons, the Secretary-General was not seen as the number one official where economic issues were concerned—responsible in a general sense, present at the right times, but not in the driver's seat to the extent that he would be where political matters were concerned. We have talked about the post of director-general for international economic affairs, established in the 1970s. In spite of the fact that his status was not quite at the level we had intended, he was often in the front line on economic issues and at meetings on those issues.

TGW: Dag Hammarskjöld had a Ph.D. in economics.

DM: Well you see, there you are.

TGW: And he tried.

TGW: There is a wonderful chapter in Brian's book on economics—one chapter out of thirty. And when I asked Brian what it implied, he said it implies exactly what happened.

DM: The case of Dag Hammarskjöld seems to have been an unusual one, although I don't know too much about the early holders of the post. There is quite a lot that has been written about him. I have Brian Urquhart's book. Hammarskjöld, before he came to the UN, had worked in the economic and social field in his country, and later he worked in that area internationally. So, he came to the UN with a more than adequate preparation, as far as that area was concerned. I must say that the study of economics was not always as widespread as it is today. For many persons in past time, it was not at all a popular choice. Things have changed in that respect, but there are many persons in top positions in government, in the business world, at the national level, and the international, who have not had formal training in that subject area, but who have found themselves having to cope with sometimes complex or sensitive issues in that field. And in the UN—and I can't speak of today—but certainly when I got there, I learned that as a rule ambassadors or permanent representatives worked mainly in the First Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with political affairs. In my case, with my background—my training and work experience in economics and development—I had no difficulty in deciding to work mainly in the Second Committee dealing with economic issues, and of course in ECOSOC, and other committees dealing with economic matters and UNDP, et cetera. Later, of course, I was for two years Jamaica's representative to the Security Council.

TGW: Hammarskjöld had an interest and technical qualifications. It was just impossible to spend any time on these issues. That's why I think it is important—I hadn't thought about this until you mentioned it—but the creation of a deputy-secretary-general from the DG (director-general), in the sense that the deputy-secretary-general is obliged to fill in for the Secretary-

General on all issues, which probably means that her time—that is Louise Fréchette's time—is spent on political matters as opposed to economic ones.

DM: Yes, in reading the short statement made about the functions of deputy that I came across recently, there was nothing there—I shouldn't judge by that—which seemed to suggest that there was consciousness of a need to put some emphasis on economic matters. So that is a very critical point, you see. Again, I think of the way in which the Charter arranged the UN structure, the extraordinary position of the specialized agencies, and the reaction of some of them to the previous ideas of a director-general. The Secretary-General carries a certain stature which cannot be denied, even if he is not a terribly good Secretary-General. If he were a person whose mindset very much included economic issues, as well as political and security, what difference would it make? It must make some difference, for example, his relationship with the specialized agencies, especially those dealing with economic affairs, his relationship with the Bretton Woods system, and his approach to North-South issues.

TMW: Were you disappointed when one of the first things that [Boutros] Boutros-Ghali did upon arriving in the office was to eliminate it?

DM: I was really amazed when I heard the news. The fact is that, as I said, I was very much involved in the whole process of getting the post of director-general agreed and finally established, as a member of the group of experts and as the chairman of the G-77. First of all, I recognize that the task of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was a delicate one, not least because of the growing pressure on the UN from the U.S. for reform. But a number of changes were made at that time, which seemed to me to cancel some important steps, which had been taken earlier. The establishment of the post of DG was one of these. It was the result of a clearly articulated process. For developing countries, in particular, this is always very important.

The process began with the G-77 motion for the restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the UN, the aim being to prepare the organization to meet the responsibilities which would be involved in respect of the New International Economic Order. This was in 1975, the period of considerable activity on that issue. The resolution was approved by the General Assembly. On that basis, the Secretary-General appointed a group of experts to make recommendations on the subject. The group met. Among the ideas considered was the need for a special high level post next to the Secretary-General dealing with economic issues. This was thoroughly discussed and the members reached agreement on it. The report went to the assembly, which established an ad hoc committee of all members to conduct negotiations on the proposals. After a great deal of argument, the committee reported to the assembly, which eventually gave its approval. The post was duly established and attracted some amount of media attention. An appointment was made. That's what I meant by "process." I did not get the impression that the removal of the post involved anything comparable.

Well, I put all this with the business of transnational corporations (TNCs). That issue was coming from the 1960s. The matter became a very contentious issue, with developing countries feeling that the power of the transnationals was awesome, and all the arguments about transnationals having resources much greater than so many countries. That argument is still being used. And some industrialized countries have to deal with the power of their own transnationals within their borders. So a group of eminent persons was established—was it by Robert McNamara, the president of the World Bank? They put in a very good report. All of us were learning something about this phenomenon. And it came to the UN. ECOSOC discussed it. I remember, it was probably 1974. A very, very good discussion.

It went to the General Assembly. A decision was made establishing a commission of about twenty or thirty people. Jamaica was elected to membership in the first round. The center was in New York and the meetings. And also a center for TNCs, a center to do research so that people can get information on these organizations and their operations. They put out reports on nationalizations and all sorts of things regularly. And one of the changes that was made under the new SG is that it was transferred to UNCTAD. Now, UNCTAD is not a favorite among some western countries. So when the center was transferred, I saw it as being somewhat diminished.

I may be wrong, but my impression is that it does not have quite the same status. And I know that there were interests in the world which objected to some of its work. Again, I say, it took a complete process of study, discussion, and negotiation to establish it. And it was given a special status by being put in New York at UN headquarters. And I was not happy about some of the other changes that were being made at that time. One got the impression that the new regime started with or was given a list of things that were going to be done. I have been told since then that Boutros-Ghali struggled hard in the face of the pressure on the UN, mainly from the U.S. I don't know. I have to confess ignorance on that.

TGW: In 1981, you became a very active retiree. What was it like getting back to Kingston and reclaiming your time?

DM: Well, first of all, the government seems to have had some idea of my going to another diplomatic post. But, as I say, it was very much my intention both to retire from government service and secondly, not to take a particular job which would occupy most of my time—in short, to repossess my time to pursue other interests. And I was really serious. But, of course, my time quickly became repossessed in many directions. I have always done some

teaching at our university, a bit of teaching. And at one stage, I was made an honorary research fellow at our university.

My lectures were mainly on international relations, the UN system, and environmental issues—as part-time lecturer, not a regular member of the academic staff. More recently, I have been designated an associate professor. I have been involved in Jamaica in a lot of different activities—chairman of the Natural Resources Conservation Authority; executive chairman of a small Jamaica Centre for International Affairs; chairman of the Jamaica School of Music, et cetera. For many years, I've been a member of the Judicial Service Commission and the Jamaica Privy Council and, more recently, of the Jamaica Council on Ocean and Coastal Zone Management. Up to a point, I've maintained contact with the UN, including the agencies here, especially UNDP. And I have been a delegate to a number of UN meetings, particularly on the environment and on climate change. I've done a few UN assignments and was for a while involved in some UN University matters in Tokyo.

There have been other activities outside of Jamaica. For a while, shortly after I left the UN, I carried out a very interesting assignment at the invitation of the president of the Canadian International Development Research Centre, which funds research in developing countries. This involved a number of visits to countries—in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—to discuss and report on the role of research, the problems encountered in conducting research, and in implementing results in various development areas. There have been quite a number of other matters which have taken me out of Jamaica. I was a member of the Board of Trustees of the UN Institute of Training and Research, the Council of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, the Governing Council of the Society for International Development, and the Steering Committee of the North-South Roundtable. Later, I was a member of the

Independent World Commission on the Oceans, and now the chairman of the Commonwealth Foundation for a four year term.

On top of all that, I have had the occasional speaking engagement and participated in a number of seminars and conferences. Some of these were somewhat outside of the broad areas in which I have been mainly involved. There was the symposium on the use of confidence-building measures in Bonn, which had been promised by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament; former prime minister of Sweden Olaf Palme's Conference on Common Security; and Prime Minister [Pierre] Trudeau's conference on Strategies for Peace in a Nuclear Age.

And there was more. So it's been quite a busy time. I have enjoyed it. But I find myself once again trying hard to repossess my time so that I can go on to other things which I have neglected.

TGW: One of the things that you have really spent a lot of time on these last couple of decades and, I presume getting yourself up to speed on intellectually and substantively, is the environment. How do you explain this interest of yours? Is this due to Jamaican geography, or are you persuaded that this is *the* issue for the twenty-first century?

DM: Certainly the environment has become one of the most critical issues of the age. What is more, it will occupy an even larger place in human concerns in the twenty-first century. Just two issues point to that—global warming, with climate change and sea level rise, and the threat to the earth's biodiversity. Well, as far as my own personal interest and involvement are concerned, I do think they started with Jamaica itself as you suggest. A small island, with great diversity in its topography, vegetation, soils, crops, and very mountainous. Really very beautiful, and I have always been very conscious of that. Then, working in the field of

development planning and being aware of the critical role that our natural resources play, with our significant agricultural sector, the problems of conserving the forests and the valuable watersheds, and the loss of soil; the mining industry and the problems of pollution and disposal of waste. In addition, we have had for years the problem of the pollution of coastal waters and of the magnificent Kingston Harbor, the seventh largest natural harbor in the world. In fact all our major economic sectors rest upon our natural resources, not least the tourist industry in which our coastal waters and beaches play a critical role. So there was some consciousness of environmental issues. But it was the Stockholm UN conference in 1972 (UN Conference on the Human Environment) which virtually initiated the global environment movement with the establishment of government agencies and other activities. That for me was the major impetus.

For me personally, it was at the UN that my full recognition of the nature and the magnitude of the issue developed, as well as my commitment. It was just a few months after I went to New York as ambassador that the very first meeting of the Governing Council of the new UN Environment Programme took place in Geneva. That was June 1973. It was for me a major experience, not only because I was new to the UN, not only because of the special importance of the occasion, but because in addition to all that I found that I was designated the chairman of the Group of 77 for that meeting. It was by no means an easy task, as the draft proposals put before the council proved to be very controversial—especially the question of priorities. And we had long, drawn out negotiations with the industrialized countries on one side and the developing countries on the other. And note that this was June 1973, before the start of the full-scale North-South dialogue and negotiations! Jamaica remained a member of the Governing Council for some years. So I was plunged into matters concerning the environment as soon as I went to the UN and have remained involved both at home and abroad. As I told you,

I have been chairman of the government environment authority and special advisor on international environmental matters.

TGW: I would like to, if you don't mind, use the environment as a kind of case study to think about the role of ideas and their impact, and in particular how they penetrate mindsets, penetrate institutions. Because, as I think back over our last several hours of conversation, the environment has come up time and again. And you are working on it. In our work, and in other interviews that I have done, it seems to me that as we're looking at the United Nations system, that the sources of ideas and their impact could be broken into four categories. So, I would like to see if you think this makes any sense and to trace these through. The first is academia, and in particular individuals. They don't have to be from academia, but who have big ideas. I suppose if we were looking at the environment, you would think of Rachel Carson outside of the system. And then you would think about Maurice Strong within the system. But anyway, big ideas and big people. The second kind of vector would be reports of eminent commissions. Basically, Stockholm started it, and I would say the Club of Rome was certainly important.

DM: Yes, I just made a note on the Club of Rome as one that had influence. The organization came on the scene just about the time that I started my career in the UN system at the IMF and the UN in the early 1970s. Their first book, *Limits to Growth*, made a major impression and helped to generate the debate on global development.

TGW: And somewhere in midstream, you would have the Brundtland report (*Our Common Future*). But anyway, reports of eminent groups of people. So, are these important, and to what extent? The third would be—some people would pejoratively characterize them as jamborees—global ad hoc conferences. Stockholm, Rio, you've mentioned both. Finally, and we've also mentioned this, is the importance of parallel efforts to the UN, usually accomplished

by NGOs. In fact, even in relationship to conferences we have these parallel forums. But, let's just for a few moments go through those one by one. In your view, what importance and how, for the environment or any other issue, have these played out within the UN system? Let's start with individuals and academia.

DM: I think your schema, if I may call it that, is a useful one. But I suppose that we should keep in mind the way that some ideas grow and change by way of interaction, cross-fertilization, transference, and the fact that some are actually born in different places, and in some cases at different times. But it is a good idea to use a relatively simple system for the examination. Where individuals, some of them academics, are concerned, Rachel Carson clearly is a very special case. She is, in the view of many people, the mother of the environment movement. There are, of course, a number of persons who have made considerable contributions to that cause—people like Maurice Strong and Mustafa Tolba come readily to mind—as well as others who, especially in the early stages of the modern movement, have dedicated themselves to that cause. But I think it is important to bear in mind some other considerations. The truth is that recognition of the need for effective environmental management is by no means a recent development. Evidence of the practice of such techniques in time long past exists.

I suppose it is the extraordinarily rapid growth in the ability of humans to plunder and to destroy the gifts of nature that has brought about the crisis of the environment. But the debt we all owe to those who have so vigorously taken up the cause of the environment is great. And today the means of spreading ideas over the globe have multiplied enormously. And the UN forms an important element in this.

The environment has clearly attracted the interest of persons in all walks of life—as concerned individuals, as members of NGOs—in government, business, the professions, in

education, and in academic life. For example, there are so many aspects of the environment that call for research, and inevitably the issue has stimulated a considerable amount of work in that field. For example, the oceans—critical to the environment, largely unexplored, but with major developments in research, related in some instances to the issue of global warming, climate change, and sea level rise. Biodiversity has become a critical matter with scientific, social, legal, economic, and political ramifications.

On soil, one example is the research project being conducted at the International Centre for Environment and Nuclear Sciences at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica, which involves the application of geochemistry, in respect of the environment and sustainable development, with special focus on soils, agriculture, and health. I'm sure there must be a large and increasing body of research relating to the environment. The legal profession has been drawn heavily into the environment issue—with the increasing number of international and regional conventions, the development and operation of national legal systems in that area—the litigation resulting.

So I believe that the environmental issue—the focus on this over the past thirty years especially—has had a profound effect in many areas of life: the role and structure of governments, the operations of enterprises, the developments in technology, the attitudes and behavior of people—as individual citizens, as consumers, as producers, the young, educational systems, international relations, disciplines such as the sciences—social and natural—professions such as engineering, architecture, medicine, and health. Truth is, there's hardly an area of life or work that has not been significantly affected. I want to stress the role of civil society in the development of interest and commitment in respect of the environment, the large numbers of persons in different parts of the world. It would be interesting to look at what

happened at Stockholm in 1972, in particular the extent of the influence from civil society and NGOs, especially, on that encounter. And the media, a critical role—there are some individuals and some media organizations which are really committed. I think of someone like Geoffrey Lean in England, a journalist, and David Attenborough with his travels and films on the environment. And there is our own John Maxwell in Jamaica. Finally, there has been increased interest shown by a number of religious organizations and individuals. I have participated in two symposiums, each taking place on a ship, with two to three hundred persons from religious organizations, along with scientists, economists, environmentalists, and journalists, discussing the interrelationship between science, religion, and the environment—with a particular focus on the oceans.

TGW: Right. Let's move to these commissions because there have been a whole series of them. You were, initially, you said, skeptical about Brandt (*North-South: A Programme for Survival*) or worried that it would displace the UN discussion.

DM: Well, let me explain. In the mid-1970s, we had begun the negotiations in the UN on the New International Economic Order—the North-South issue. We had the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly and the seventh on the issue. And then, as I said earlier, the French government initiated the idea of a conference in Paris between the industrialized countries and the OPEC countries. The OPEC action on oil, the big increase in the oil price, et cetera, made energy the critical issue for the West. OPEC said no to such a conference, but they would agree to one which included other G-77 countries and with an agenda covering issues in the NIEO.

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation went on for about eighteen months. We—that is, Jamaica—were there. The results were disappointing after some real hard

work. But many were upset at what seemed an attempt to take the NIEO issue out of the UN. So when Willy Brandt took on the task of the Brandt Commission, some of us expressed our concern about what might be, in effect, another attempt to remove the North-South issues from the UN. Willy Brandt heard of this and arranged to meet with a small group, perhaps five of us G-77 ambassadors, at the UN. He convinced us, in a really good discussion, that that was not the case and that the report would be submitted to the UN.

TGW: These commissions—beginning with Pearson, earlier—Brandt, Palme, Brundtland, South Commission—when are they important, or how can they be made more important? Is it the timing? Is that the issue?

DM: Timing is the first thing.

TGW: Because Brandt came out when you had Reagan and Thatcher on the scene.

DM: Yes, it was unfortunate that the commission's report came in the Thatcher/Reagan era. I think the report, in broad terms, echoed many of the concerns of the developing countries.

The Pearson Commission was the first of the series. It was established in the late 1960s, interestingly, before the NIEO emerged. It was proposed by the president of the World Bank, George Woods, and chaired by Lester Pearson, the former prime minister of Canada. My feeling is that it was a response to disappointment over the limited impact of aid programs and other international development initiatives, and the widening income gap between North and South. It was like the Brandt Commission, ten years later.

There was another commission, a very important one. This was the group of eminent persons, which looked at the nature and operations of transnational corporations, whose economic power and influence had become a major factor in world affairs. I mentioned this before. We had really good discussion on that report in ECOSOC and in the General Assembly,

and the result was the setting up of the UN Commission on TNCs and the Centre for TNCs, which did a lot of good work. But later I got the impression that some major interests were unhappy about that. I think of that in this era of globalization. It seems to me there is an important relationship here. The South Commission, which was headed by former president Nyerere, left behind a secretariat which it was hoped would serve the South. Its survival depends, of course, on the availability of resources.

As far as the impact of these commissions is concerned, I suppose this is difficult to assess. First, of course, there is the effect on the members of each commission. I heard, at the time, that it was surprising to see the effect of the discussions in the Brandt Commission on some members who had not had occasion to focus on some of the issues before. That probably was true for all of the commissions. And hopefully the members would spread the word.

Some used special methods of extending the discussions beyond the membership. The Brandt Commission did that—invited a number of persons to meet with them. I was invited when they came to upstate New York, and they had consultations with a number of persons. The Palme Commission on Common Security was the subject of a conference in Stockholm chaired by Olaf Palme, and I attended that. In the case of the Commission on Global Governance, Sonny Ramphal, the co-chairman, arranged a number of seminars on the issues. We had one of these in Jamaica.

For the Commission on Oceans, we had a number of study groups on the issues, each with some invited persons. Moreover, we paid a lot of attention to the matter of public awareness and the means to enhance this. The Brundtland Commission dealt with the environment and development—a set of issues with a growing constituency—and I feel its

impact was significant. And the report came out in 1987, five years before the Rio UN Conference on Environment and Development.

How do we measure the impact, the importance of these commissions and other encounters? One important factor is that they bring together, in each case, persons from different countries and backgrounds, with different interests, in a dialogue on a subject of international importance which requires them to study issues in which some have never been involved, in a situation which requires some open-mindedness and the hope of an element of consensus.

So, ideas come. The NGO community—one would have to make a distinction, I suppose, between the local NGO community and the international NGOs. They have to be credited with persistence. If you take, for instance, the famous NGO—if one calls them an NGO—which deals with things like the passage of plutonium across the sea. Now, this is a form of influence. What do they call themselves?

TGW: Greenpeace.

DM: Yes. Now, Greenpeace is seen by some as a damn nuisance. For us, here, it is Greenpeace who really helped to alert Jamaica and the Caribbean countries about the continuing movement of ships because the Japanese—and the Europeans, the British and the French—they have this problem of recycling plutonium. These ships, loaded with the stuff, pass through—and they claim that the Caribbean is the most convenient route. We have protested—I have been very much involved in that through the government. And it is Greenpeace who keeps telling us, because we don't have our own means of knowing when a trip is planned, when the ship has left, and where it is at different times. And Greenpeace has been here and talked to us about that. So, you have that type of activity. And I suppose there are others.

TGW: But I presume that in some of your debates, for example the technical research information that has come up, or the extent of pollution, the extent of temperature rise, the extent of one thing or another, is data that helps foster the negotiating position of environmentalists.

DM: Definitely. For example, the climate change issue has been so controversial. I was one of the members of the World Commission on the Oceans who insisted that in spite of the differences in view between scientists, we should give adequate space to this in our work and our report. Because I am told that there are scientists who just don't believe that the claims made about sea level rise and temperature rise are valid. But there are others who do, and the UN has a very respectable committee, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, working on it. And what is more, the fact is that, in spite of the very strong lobby of the oil industry, especially in North America, which has been struggling against the establishment of fixed targets and timetables on the reduction of emissions—the efforts continue. Well, some of the industrialized countries have come aboard. And, fortunately, there are scientists who are absolutely convinced, and what is more, there are private interests—like insurance interests—who, I understand, are taking account of the danger of global warming and sea level rise, certainly in Britain and in other places. And you can see that issue is bringing a lot of interest. The island countries have come together forming this Alliance of Small Island States in an attempt to press the case of the hazards which face them.

TGW: What about global ad hoc conferences? During the 1970s, there happened to be a spate of them, and then again in the 1990s. How do these conferences mobilize intergovernmental institutions as well as government institutions and NGOs?

DM: Well, there is a quarrel I had with those people who are so absolutely, unreservedly critical of Rio. They saw Rio as an event in which a lot of government leaders went and had a

drink and a chat and then left. The fact is that the process was enormous. It lasted over two years. All over the world, governments, on the local and national levels, NGOs, all sorts of interests, were involved. Just one of the exercises that I remember well is that Chip Lindner, head of the Center for Our Common Future, organizers of the Global Forum in Rio, established a series of encounters in preparation for the Rio conference. I was invited to two or three of them. What did they do? They invited a lot of NGOs and a number of other people, people like myself, people from the UN. And what they did when you got to these meetings, you are at a table sitting there like birds on a wire. And you are not making speeches—oh, no. The room is full of NGOs and *they* are the ones who are speaking, and you are reacting. I thought that was beautiful. That technique should be used more often.

I attended the ones in Amsterdam and Prague. You're talking about 1991. This was after the shake-out in Eastern Europe. And it was fascinating. They brought all sorts of people together from that region. So there was an enormous amount of activity all over the world. And the media were very much involved. So whilst there would be disappointment to some extent, at some of the things that didn't happen in Rio or after Rio, the fact is that a great deal took place actually before the conference, so that those people who felt it was only on the basis of what happened in Rio that you could claim any success or develop some momentum and maintain the momentum made a great mistake. And the considerable follow up on Agenda 21—the UN, governments, and others. Other world conferences also go through similar preparatory processes at the national level also.

TGW: Without putting words in your mouth, these conferences then are a kind of useful gimmick or pretext for governments and NGOs and others to do what they probably should do, but might not do if there were not a deadline. Secondly, does the context provide the possibility

for what political scientists would call learning? That is, other NGOs find out what is going on in another country, other governments find out what is working or not.

DM: Definitely. The amount of learning that takes place—consider someone, for example, from a small country perhaps, with some involvement in international affairs, but certainly not any major involvement. You have to learn—learn not only the substantive matters, but also the processes—and make contacts. To work in a community like that, oh it's tremendous! This is where the G-77, for instance, has been very helpful. Delegates, whether senior persons or junior persons, come in and are in a sort of learning situation as they try to make their own contribution. But, when I think of occasions like the UN population conference. In Jamaica—as in many countries—what you have are people in the government agencies concerned and in the NGO system beginning to work to prepare well before the conference. The government has to prepare its own positions, statements, et cetera. And then the NGOs become involved. We have developed the habit of putting NGOs on the government delegations. And the conferences hear the reports by each country and establish performance targets, and it is the responsibility of the countries, both the governments and the NGOs, to pick up the momentum at home. So whilst I suppose there is an element of waste in such conferences, as in all things related to the UN system, there are some positive gains.

TGW: Or to human beings.

DM: Yes, there are positives. And people don't know enough about the UN. Here you have this wide range of activities impinging and impacting closely on not only international, but local affairs, in all directions. And you just don't have enough public understanding. People don't even understand sufficiently how their governments work. So this is a real gap now. In

government and governance, at the local, national, and regional levels, you have all these layers, and there is an insufficient basis of public understanding.

You don't have to go to a university to learn what it's about. So with UN matters, you have to be informed. You have to be active. You have to be a participant—not a politician, but a participant, on a continuing basis. So with all of these things, starting with government and then moving to NGOs, and business interests, schools, and others, how many people are aware of the massive amount of interesting and important information there is in the UN? Information that you can pick out of the air, on the internet. The situation becomes more critical because the information is now more readily available. How do you get people involved in the whole thing? So many people regard the UN as something to which the government delegates go, and a few NGOs, and they don't think much happens. So there is a gap there.

TGW: This is the end of tape number four.

TGW: This is the beginning of tape number five, a continuation of the 1 March discussion between Don Mills and Tom Weiss. Just to look at this final part of our institutional template, during UN conferences there frequently have been these parallel sideshows. In your experience, what has been the type of interaction and the exact role played by NGOs organized in this way next to an intergovernmental gathering?

DM: Well, let me say this. NGOs have different ways of having a presence. One of them is getting on a national delegation. Now that is a dual position. It means that an NGO is in a delicate situation because you are a member of the delegation, although you cannot be totally inhibited in terms of being an NGO. But you cannot at the same time embarrass your delegation—one hopes, and it has worked well with Jamaica. So that's one way. The other way is to be accredited to the conference itself, separately. And the third one is to have the NGO

forum on the side. The very presence of a body of NGOs at a UN meeting must have some value, without trying to put any quantity on it.

The forum that I found particularly spectacular was in Copenhagen (World Summit on Social Development), because my wife and my daughter attended. I did not go to the conference, but I had a meeting at the North-South Roundtable in London. I drove up to Copenhagen. I did not attend the UN conference, but I went to the forum. It was vital. It was alive. It was a coming together of people from civil society, both in respect to this subject and others. And they had cultural events and things like that. It tends to be much more lively, much more vital, much more real, without knocking the UN conferences. Occasionally, somebody would say, I have the floor. I have recorded my name to speak, but instead of my statement, I am going to treat you to fifteen minutes of music, something from my own culture.

But you see, it is very difficult to bring that dimension into the UN. It is a pity, perhaps. Every now and then a meeting comes alive in the UN, very much so, but you cannot always count on it. And you can see delegates brightening when something happens like that. And NGOs do not just get up and say, "I am going to Copenhagen," or whatever. They prepare for it. It makes sense out of the whole activity, because they are a constituency. They have a variety of views and their special ways. So I think it tends to legitimize the UN meetings. I go back to this business about constituencies. Too much of the UN's work has no listening constituency, no aware interested group. The Charter begins "We the Peoples of the United Nations—."

So I would say that these UN conferences, along with the NGO forums, are a mixed blessing. But imagine the world without them. So, if all these conferences would take place, and only bureaucrats, diplomats, and civil servants would go, it would not be enough. You see, everybody has a duty to go back home and, so to speak, carry the message. So I am all for them.

I don't know where they will go, with all these developments in communications. The next thing, you can stay at home and do the whole thing. Have a mass meeting on the net!

TGW: May I have that small book of yours? Because I wanted to revert in time to a subject that you have thought a lot about since you have repossessed your time, which you have published in the series by the Grace Kennedy Foundation, entitled, *The New Europe, the New World Order, Jamaica and the Caribbean*. You mentioned, in another article, and in an earlier discussion, that the most significant change in the twentieth century—maybe of all time, along with the end of slavery—was decolonization, the independence struggles, and the emergence of the Third World. Elsewhere, I think you put the implosion of the socialist bloc and the emergence of the United States as the lone, or lonely, superpower, as a close second, if I am reading right. Why was this so important, and how is this playing itself out in particular within UN debates, within UN ideas?

DM: You mean specifically the U.S.?

TGW: Well, the two-part business. The end of the socialist model, if that's what it was, as a seemingly realistic possibility, the compunction to move in the direction of economic liberalization and political democratization, and then the emergence of the United States as the world power.

DM: Let me deal first with decolonization. Consider the history of the past 500 years and the development of European power and influence—the attempt to take over a very large portion of the world; the empires, by Britain, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and later Italy, Germany, and the USA; the dominance of European military might and culture and economic power; the subjection of peoples, continuing virtually up to the mid-twentieth century. Consider, in some areas, the imposition of a system of slavery, lasting for something like 250

years—that's at least ten generations—and the slave trade. And then the termination of the colonial system and the liberation of the countries and people of those territories. It is a monumental change, and the consequences will flow and grow in the future beyond our imaginings. I referred earlier to the process of "colonisation in reverse." There are many signs of that already—the movement of people, the cultural influence of the South on the North, and the growth in the economic and technological power of some of the countries of the South.

At the establishment of the UN in 1945, apart from the twenty Latin American countries, including Haiti, there were few developing countries in the group of fifty-one members. In all of Africa, only Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, and South Africa were "free"; in Asia, India, Iran, and the Philippines; and in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Today, there are some 130 developing countries in the UN. That gives you an idea of the enormity of the change. And if you look at the population factor, the overwhelming proportion in the South, the relatively high growth rates in that area, and the fact that many industrialized countries are not recording growth rates which will maintain population levels—the implications are even more clear.

I would not really put this implosion of the Soviet communist system at quite the same level of significance as decolonization and its consequences. But the emergence of the system and its implosion, both have had the most far-reaching effects on the world. The collapse was sudden. It was peaceful and for the most part unexpected. That in itself was extraordinary and had particular effects. The extent to which people at all levels, in countries of Europe and across the world, were influenced by the ideology, the growth of the communist political parties in Western Europe—for example, in Italy and France, especially—these were of enormous historical and social significance.

Perhaps we should not speak as if the system has disappeared entirely from the world. First, there are China and Cuba, and there are significant elements of the old system in the hearts and minds of many in the Russian Federation and elsewhere. Yet one has the feeling that it is very unlikely that there will be a resurgence of great significance of that system in anything like the previous mode. But elements of it linger.

TGW: What have been the benefits and disadvantages of this new situation for the United Nations, and for discussions in the United Nations, and for the emergence of new or old ideas within the UN framework?

DM: Of course, in spite of the major change in relations between East and West, serious problems and tensions remain, notably in respect of the issue of nuclear capability, and the danger of nuclear confrontation and conflict has not totally disappeared. But it is a very different world from that of the Cold War years. We are left with a single superpower, in military and economic terms, and with increasing influence in the cultural sphere. This is a country which, in spite of its global reach, seems sometimes somewhat uncomfortable in the face of those capabilities and responsibilities. Perhaps an element of ambivalence? This comes out in its relations with the UN and in that organization. And, as always, there is no single view in that country on such issues, but rather a wide range of opinions and attitudes.

The important question is how do others influence the U.S.? Consider, for example, the situation of small countries, and especially developing countries, in their relations with the U.S., in the world at large and in the UN. My own country is close to the American mainland and has had a very long relationship with the U.S., by and large a very good one, but some of it very difficult. In this, as in so many things, size does matter. The fact is that in relation to some issues, a country like Jamaica will have views and interests which are not only different from

those of a major power like the U.S., but opposite to them. There has then to be some level of understanding and of tolerance on both sides—understanding of the necessities of small countries, and on the other hand, recognition of the problems of the major power. And one recognizes that serious differences exist between major powers, even between countries which refer to each other as "allies."

Through the 1970s, a feeling developed in the U.S. that there is excessive criticism of the U.S. in some circles—in say, the Non-Aligned Movement, and in Third World countries, but elsewhere as well. And there was quite a bit of sensitivity there. Some U.S. diplomats, I found, were better able to handle such sensitive situations than others—in a way, a human face. If you're dealing with a diplomat from any country, you are dealing with a country, but you are also dealing with a personality. So it seems to me that in more recent times, the U.S.'s position has become harder in terms of putting restrictions on the UN, on reform, restructuring, and the rest. And it has resorted to the rather extreme device of withholding funds. It has resorted to the extreme device of withdrawing from at least two major UN bodies. A lot of Americans do not share those views. But then I do not know to what extent a country as large as the U.S., with all its responsibilities, is influenced by those opinions within its own borders.

TGW: Could you say more about the pluses and minuses of the collapse of the bipolar system for the world body, and for the emergence of new or old ideas within the United Nations framework?

DM: Clearly, I feel the present international situation has some very dynamic elements, and the development of regional groups is one in particular which has interesting implications in so far as the relations in the world are concerned. The European Union is seen by some as moving toward the status of a superpower. To arrive, they would have to develop the requisite

military power. But whether they do or not, it is clear that the configuration of power and influence in the world is changing and that that group will assume an increasingly influential position.

In all this, we have the UN, searching for answers as to its role in this emerging world. I see as its central responsibility the task of trying to maintain a balance between the interests of various parties on a basis of equity, taking account of the vast and accumulating power and influence a few major states and business enterprises are likely to develop. There is the particular factor related to the increasing globalization, with the accumulation of economic power and influence in the North and the widening gap between North and South. We are in for interesting times at the UN, and that organization's relationship with the U.S. will surely be a critical factor.

TGW: Part of the fallout from the disappearance of the Soviet Union is the enchantment—infatuation, if you will—with the private sector. There is the view that the private sector can do anything better than the public sector. But, more recently, at least I would argue that there has been somewhat of a swing back in the pendulum.

DM: That is my impression.

TGW: How do you explain this? When do you think this began? Some people say that the World Bank report in 1997, and the arrival of Joseph Stiglitz indicated that this had definitely arrived. Did it actually begin a little earlier in the 1990s?

DM: Let me venture some thoughts on this. Perhaps Britain is a good example of the movement over the years in that matter. Immediately after World War II, you had the Labour Party in power, democratic socialism, and the introduction of the welfare state, and the government playing an active role in the economy—nationalization, the state in the coal mining

industry and the utilities, for example. The change came later, and was given momentum in the Thatcher/Reagan era of the 1980s, the age of what someone called "the magic of the market." And in their dealings with developing countries, institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, as well as governments in the business of dispensing bilateral assistance, introduced deregulation, privatization, and the opening of markets as conditions for receiving such resources. Then of course, we had the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO and the free trade movement. But gradually it seems the realization has grown that the market is not particularly concerned with equity, nor for that matter with welfare, and that social factors have traditionally been excluded from economic accounting, with the resulting distortion of the picture of economic activity, the contributions to it, and the distribution of the benefits. What I find particularly interesting is the role that the World Bank and the UNDP are playing toward emphasizing the critical importance and relevance of the social elements in development and economic activity.

There is also this business about the smaller the government, the better. It seems to me there has been not a retreat, but a turning away from these hard positions. Going back to the environment issue, one of the things that impressed me greatly was that during the 1970s, the notion of management became increasingly explicit. The idea of establishing machinery at the international level, in the UN system, to manage things like the commodity issue, and the exploitation of the seabed resources, in the case of the International Seabed Authority. And some of the ideas of the developing countries in the New Economic Order were seen as representing a desire for *dirigisme*, machinery that would control and manage. This was one of the major objections from the point of view of countries like the U.S. and Germany at the time, and some others to the NIEO.

I think there is, in places like Jamaica, some realization now that you cannot put all the critical focus on the state system. And I heard some people say, within the last forty-eight hours in Jamaica, that the state has never, ever, anywhere, done anything—never been successful in doing something which cannot be done better by the private sector. Of course, that is not a helpful position. There are certainly problems with state actions, especially if politicians and political interests interfere in order to gain personal advantage for themselves or others. But still, I myself have felt there is need for a balance in this matter. The private sector is by no means without its faults and limitations. And I am happy to see that it looks as if there is some turning away from the extreme position. Now the question is whether the UN would be allowed to move along that line in any of its particular areas of interest, especially since it has to depend on the agreement of the member countries.

TGW: Throughout our discussion, you've mentioned the names of several prominent individuals who have served in the UN system. What actually is the scope, in your view, for independent action and leadership by the head of one of the agencies or the UN itself? And to what extent are they prisoners of their times or of politics?

DM: Well, there was a study of leadership in the UN carried out by Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers around 1990 and funded by the Dag Hammarskjöld and the Ford Foundations. I had a particular interest in it as I was a member of the steering group of four persons associated with the study. The views of quite a number of persons on the issues covered were obtained. The report focuses on appointments to the posts of secretary-general, heads of specialized agencies and other bodies, as well as senior positions in the UN system. But of course it covers other related issues—for example, the structure of the system and the way it operates. These are major factors affecting the role and performance of leaders.

They really took a close look at the way that these leaders at different levels are appointed, or for that matter elected, and they have some very critical views on the subject, as well as on the improvements that seem to be necessary. One of their main criticisms is the lack of a sufficiently systematic, consistent, and uniform approach in this matter. It seems there have been wide variations through the system in this. Clearly it has important implications for the quality of leadership, the performance of those appointed to these posts, and their scope for independent action. Of course, there have been areas where the procedures have been quite satisfactory.

You get the overall impression from the study that while a great many very good choices have been made for different UN leadership positions, there has been too much room for unsatisfactory appointments. I have the feeling that there has not been sufficient attention paid to this aspect of the UN's operation by most member governments, and that such interest as many may have shown may have been too much centered on what I would call the "political" aspect, as well as the obtaining of particular advantage or influence. I really believe that the report deserves close attention on the part of governments and others seriously interested in the operation of the UN system.

Clearly there would be for new appointees significant constraints, starting with their own agency. If a new person comes in who was not in that agency before, or in the UN, they are going to have to make their headway; they are going to have to develop some influence and credibility. I suppose there are a number of factors which account for their scope for independent action—their familiarity with the issues in which their agency is involved. Their actual working experiences in the area, their general involvement in international affairs before coming to the UN.

Of course, the bottom line is that the UN is an intergovernmental body and although staff have a critical role, policy decisions are in principle made by the representatives of member countries in the various committees. There are some people who are going to come in, people like McNamara, and take bold action. While I was at the Fund, McNamara arranged a reorganization of the World Bank by a management firm. And it seemed to me that there was a lot of agony. But I don't know how successful it was or how acceptable eventually. But McNamara was the sort of person who would go ahead in that way. But there would obviously be limitations. The success of a new head of an agency would depend on the influence that person had or developed outside of the agency, with the rest of the system, and with the Secretary-General.

But this, of course, brings up the question of how they got the post. Some people get there through influence of some sort, which helped put them there. In some cases, it was the powers of persuasion of the particular government, if I could call it that. But it would be good to know Erskine Childers's views, if he were still with us. Erskine was such a mine of ideas and information. I don't know if any further work has been done on the full Dag Harmmarskjöld-Ford Foundation study of UN leadership. That is a critical matter.

TGW: In what sense?

DM: Let me start by saying that there are a number of persistent myths concerning the UN and these are cherished even by persons who should know better. One of these relates to the size of the staff, the belief that it is enormous, a bloated bureaucracy, et cetera. Clearly the UN system in this is not unlike some other public bodies, with some of the same weaknesses. But in the matter of size, it has been pointed out repeatedly that the staff in the system at all levels is smaller than the public service establishment of many relatively small cities. For example,

Stockholm, as the leadership study has pointed out, with a population of under one million, has a larger body of public service workers than the UN system's 50,000, or thereabouts. This highly exaggerated view tends to nurture negative attitudes concerning the general quality and performance of the UN staff. I have no doubt that the UN has its share of misfits, of persons engaged in dull and uninspiring tasks, and that there is an element of waste in this area. But I am equally sure that there are a significant number of bright, dedicated, and hard-working persons on the staff of the organization

Clearly there are some posts which are virtually reserved for particular countries—the managing director of the IMF and the president of the World Bank. It would be interesting to know how the U.S. community deals with the question of the replacement of the head of the World Bank. It is not a question of advise and consent. But does it go through any process? Through the president or Congress? What if there was somebody who was seen as undesirable by the Congress, would that person have a chance?

TGW: Actually the Congress, and various constituencies, do make their views known. It is a presidential appointment, or nomination, but you may know that the president's actual first choice for UNICEF was actually a technician who was at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, who obviously was preeminently qualified for the position, and then some combination of the traditional bias against senior women in the UN—saying we needed a woman—and women's groups within the United States, which said you've committed yourself to diversity, why not a woman? So, these views actually were made known. My recollection of the Hammarkjöld-Ford report is that the emphasis was more not on diversity but on competence.

DM: That's right.

TGW: For eight years you were in New York. What is your impression about the quality of the international civil service? We mentioned the names of a couple of sterling figures: Brian Urquhart, Erskine Childers. But how would you compare the run-of-the-mill international civil servant with the run-of-the-mill administrator in Jamaica or professor in the United States? How do they stack up?

DM: There were quite a number of officials of high quality and dedication at the UN in my time—persons, that is, that I knew well. Some names come to mind: Pierre Saul Schweitzer, the managing director of the IMF when I was there; Jim Grant at UNICEF; Richard Jolly; Ken Dadzie, the first director-general of development and international economic cooperation; Arthur Brown, from Jamaica, co-administrator with Brad Morse at UNDP; Mahbub ul Haq at the World Bank and then UNDP, setting up the Human Development Reports; Idris Jazairy at the International Fund for Agricultural Development; Gamina Corea at UNCTAD; and Angela King, from Jamaica—still in NY. These are just some of them.

But I tell you, one of the things about my stay at the UN is that I did not find myself having as much to do with the staff as I would have expected. Top staff, yes. The Secretary-General heads, of agencies, senior officials, and others, yes, depending on what we were doing. Earlier, I mentioned Raúl Prebisch, who was at one time secretary-general of UNCTAD. He was invited by the staff, to address them. I was asked if I would chair this meeting, in which Prebisch was invited to speak. So I went over there, and in introducing Prebisch, I made the point that it was the first I had found myself in a room full of UN staff and that I welcomed the opportunity.

Yes, I got to know individuals on the staff, some of them quite well. But I wondered about the extent of the interaction between, say, young diplomats and staff members. I didn't go to the UN in my younger days, so I don't really know. I got the impression from seeing my own

delegation, and the other delegations, that there was some interaction. The IMF was much smaller. I got to know the other executive-directors and senior members of the staff. Certainly, my relationship with some junior diplomats, in the UN in the Group of 77, was very good. Because they were in there in the Group of 77, many of them were involved and we became a family. In the years since I left the UN, occasionally I go to some country and I meet some young man or woman who introduces himself or herself, and says that he or she was a junior diplomat in New York when was I was there and in the G-77. And they all light up in recollection.

TGW: In the recent literature on the impact of ideas on foreign policy, several ways of looking at the world have come up. Nothing has been done, as far as I know, on the impact of ideas on international organizations other than a small literature on the importance of technicians. So, this is one of the things that we hope to make a difference on. We have found four ways, we think, in which ideas have had an impact on international negotiations, international institutions, and international relations. Let me see the extent to which we have it right. The first thing we believe is that new ideas have changed the discourse, the way international public policy is imaged, is framed, the options that are on the table. And more particularly, it has also, we believe, permitted states to redefine the way they interpret their own national interests. Does that make sense?

DM: I suppose there was a time when foreign policy was the prerogative of a relatively small number of actors and there were few international organizations. It would be interesting to consider the impact of ideas on foreign policy in that situation—as a way of dramatizing the enormous changes which we are seeing—with the vast increase in the number of nation-states,

organizations of all sorts, intergovernmental and others, and the expansion of concepts, contacts, think tanks, universities and research institutes—et cetera.

Surely, the emergence of these organizations and activities must be having a major impact on international relations, negotiations, and action in that sphere. I'm thinking of the UN system, the various regional intergovernmental bodies—the Group of 7, or is it 8; the EU; the OECD, the western states; the Group of 25 developing countries; the Group of 77; the Non-Aligned Movement; the OAS; the OAU; the NGOs, like the Society for International Development; and lots of others. All of them seek to influence international concepts, ideas, and action in some way. Inevitably, they directly or indirectly impact on the UN. Many or most of these came into existence in the post-World War II period. And all of these reach the world public. Radio and TV transmissions and the press must be having an increasing influence, especially through news reporting and analysis and commentaries. And now there is the internet, as well as the cellular telephone, linking individuals and organizations all over the world.

TGW: For example, the human rights idea has penetrated every level and changed policy. And I believe that states are not acting only because they have seen a vision, but I think they have also changed their minds because they have determined that their own national interests are better served by having certain kinds of codes of conduct. So, I was wondering about the economic arena, and I presume the environment, and you mentioned debt earlier—that instead of being a problem, it was seen as only on the other side. It is a problem with larger implications?

TGW: We also think that ideas provide a guide, or a roadmap, when norms or values conflict, or when there is a dispute over priorities. After all, you have to emphasize one thing versus another. I would say, here again, the issue of sovereignty in relationship to human rights

abuse, versus respect of sovereignty, you have to come down on one side or the other, and in terms of the environment, sovereignty, or some kind of consideration of sustainability for future generations. So the second way we think that ideas have made a difference is that they provide a way for decision-makers, policy-makers, to make decisions.

DM: Yes, sovereignty. What has happened to sovereignty in Jamaica—we, having gone through a colonial period, the idea of sovereignty, of independence, was a critical idea. We came in to independence after the development of the multilateral, intergovernmental systems. But the regional system in the Caribbean came after independence. We very quickly found that we had to contemplate getting into a larger community, apart from our own domestic community. And the moment you do that, there is a consideration of sacrificing, or giving up some elements, some degrees of freedom. Specifically, if you go into agreements, for instance, like the common market; we are going into a situation in which we will have to conform on the matter of tariffs and of our economic policies. And there are other things which are requiring us to limit our formal concept of sovereignty. And this is happening in the world. I mentioned the British and the European Union—the differences of view within the UK.

So in the interests of the wider humanity, how far does one go? Now, U.S. Senator Jesse Helms' speech in the UN Security Council—it seemed to be an overstatement of the question of how much freedom a country can demand, no matter how big you are. But, of course, one has to detect somehow the greater good that is being derived from whatever diminishing of the sovereign rights. This also applied in the behavior of the individual. When you think you have become a man or a woman, you recognize very quickly that everything is not going your way.

TGW: The third proposition that we are trying to evaluate is that ideas, as they've entered the UN system, have oftentimes altered the prospects for forming new coalitions of

political or institutional forces. This could be UN officials and certain governments, or other governments and NGOs; it could be military-civilian; it could be NGOs and corporations. But the idea is that an idea which emerges and becomes part of public policy discourse at the international level provides new ways for parties who used to see themselves as indifferent, or even hostile, to come together in new way. Does this make sense?

DM: I believe it does. The Law of the Sea is a case in point. For example, the forty landlocked countries, no matter their basic relationships, have found it expedient to form a negotiating group to press their case for some element of access or rights in respect to the oceans. Another example—in the attempts to establish fixed targets and timetables for the reductions, especially by the industrialized countries, of emissions of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming, in the Berlin meeting on the climate change convention in 1994, OPEC countries and the U.S. and others stood against the proposals by the Alliance of Small Island States and the rest of the G-77.

The case of the NGOs and the multilateral system is an interesting one. The UN Charter provides for NGO interaction with the organization. But the Bretton Woods system was, in that and other senses, different. Gradually, the World Bank—which has often been severely criticized by NGOs—established relationships with NGOs. The IMF, always more conservative than the Bank, has recently established some contact with NGOs and should benefit in spite of continuing criticisms by some of those interests.

TGW: Our notion here is that once an idea—sustainability or mutual interests—becomes part of the common vocabulary of governments and institutions, intergovernmental and nongovernmental, that different parts of these, and different parts of the private and public sectors find partners in framing issues. For example, for me the way this came about in

relationship to the International Landmines Treaty was quite extraordinary—this constellation of northern and southern countries, NGOs from various parts of the world, et cetera. So, this provides a new way to congeal some of these forces.

DM: Excellent. That is an excellent example. Of course, aided by Princess Diana who took a special interest there. And I am sure there are other very good examples. What about, in the area of health, I just wonder if there is any very good example of that in the health field, especially now that the world is affected with AIDS, which is such a terrible scourge. One of the things is the extent to which people leave home and go to assist others. When you look on the newsreels and you look at the films and you see people who travel across the world to help others in the face of disasters, AIDS is just one example. There was a time when these people would be called missionaries of a sort. So that this idea persists and people from the North, for instance, I am impressed by the fact that so many people from the North are involved in these programs—programs which take you back to what you heard or recall about the missionary movement where people are motivated, very largely in those days by religious-humanitarian ideas. But now I think this has a wider foundation, a foundation coming out of the solidarity which has built up around the UN. And there are a number people, young people, who have been touched by the broad concept of a global community, a concept fostered in particular by the UN system.

TGW: Actually, this will be perhaps a large parenthesis. I was struck yesterday when we were discussing your period after you were at LSE, and I was struck in interviewing Gamani Corea and others, that one of the variables that we ought to look at eventually is graduate education, or just university education in another country, as a way of not only providing ideas but providing a new set of lenses through which you look at your past experience and you look at

your future experience. It seems to me that this is a variable that has been very little studied. One of the propositions that I would have is that, indeed, American politicians, who are reputed for being parochial, and many of them are, have not had the opportunity to have their eyes opened in various ways.

DM: Yes. Some time ago, I developed the idea that in the face of some of the social problems that you have say, in the United States, especially in the inner cities, we could well enter into an arrangement of sending some Peace Corps-type persons, coming from a country like Jamaica, with its own circumstances and people who have developed considerable experience, both in the inner city and in dealing with, if you like, conditions of minorities as well as others. What would happen? The American Peace Corps is an idea which has had quite an impact. And others—I don't know which one started it, but the British have their volunteer group, the Canadians have, the Germans have, the Japanese have. Where did it begin? Did it begin with the United States? Was that the first? That is my impression. And when I was at planning, the planning unit coordinated this along with all technical cooperation and related programs, including the volunteer programs. So that idea has had an enormous impact. The UN has volunteers. So that idea has had some of that effect that you are talking about, although not at the level of post-graduate work. Yet it has a significant element of post-graduation learning and experience. There are people who have learned a great deal and hopefully many of them have gone back and had some influence, even modest influence, by reason of this experience. There is also the UN Programme of Internships and Fellowships that can provide some of these benefits!

There is a program—Jamaica and a number of countries are involved—in which young people, teenagers and perhaps a little beyond that, come out to Jamaica and visit, spend quite a

while living in homes, and at the same time Jamaicans go abroad to other countries and live in private homes. This program, from the little I have seen of it, is excellent. And I have met once or twice some of the young people, and you hear that this is an experience where the value is immeasurable. So postgraduate work is a very good idea. Imagine sitting in a postgraduate group which is mixed in that sense. This adds dimensions to the process of learning and understanding. In fact, our University of the West Indies has had links with a few universities, in Canada and in England, involving postgraduate training.

TGW: My fourth proposition is perhaps the most obvious, but it has not been explored nearly enough in my view. That is that ideas, once they catch on and states redefine their interests, the discourse changes, there are new partners, et cetera—institutions consume, digest, this new idea. And ideas become embedded in an institution where they can take on lives of their own. Whether you are looking at something like the environment—there are now environmental ministries where there did not used to be. Or something like the *Human Development Report*, which requires or suggests that countries come up with their own reports, means that there is an idea that has a life of its own. Does that make sense?

DM: Yes, very much so. Your list of the various ways that ideas may impact on international life is very interesting and useful. I hope you will pursue the search and that the UN Intellectual History will provide the results. I certainly accept the broad thesis on the possible impact of ideas in this sphere. Let me give some of my thoughts on the subject.

I can think of a number of issues, or ideas, which I believe have had significant impact in this area. You mentioned the environment, which we have already discussed, and human rights, and the impact of that issue on the concept of sovereignty. And we touched briefly on debt. I would add such issues as aid, poverty, the idea of the coming together of the newly independent

developing countries in coalitions such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, and parallel to this, South-South cooperation. There is also the concept of the commons, which existed to some degree in different societies ages ago, and continues in many societies—for example, in respect to the preservation of land as natural parks, sections of the sea as marine parks in order to provide recreational facilities or to preserve important collections of biodiversity. This concept is now enshrined, for example, in the International Convention on the Law of the Sea as the common heritage of mankind, and also, I believe, in respect to outer space. I have the impression that the concept of the common heritage of mankind has also been applied to the original species of certain plants which have been traditional sources of food for some societies. This idea and its place in a number of areas of activity has already had major effects on important areas of international relations, including the formation of public policy, negotiations, and the relations between states.

Another idea which has had enormous impact is the notion of the intergovernmental organization. There has been a considerable growth in the number of such organizations in the past sixty years at the global, regional, and sub-regional levels. This development has deeply affected such matters as the concept of sovereignty, the practice of diplomacy, the definition of national interest, the development of public policy, and much more. It is introducing new notions in the formal educational system, and reshaping elements of public administration and governance, including those concerned with the role of the citizen and the relationship between the state and civil society. It has greatly affected the relation between states. The emergence of intergovernmental bodies is now taken for granted, but it has been a major step in human and international affairs.

The environment issue has generated a great learning process across the world, at the level of the individual, through the formal educational system at all levels, and for the society as a whole. It has demanded and commanded increasing attention, and it is playing an increasingly critical role in international relations. It has promoted the creation of a global constituency in which national as well as sectional interests are slowly but surely yielding to the broader interests of society and of future generations. It affects policy considerations and policymaking in a variety of ways; for example, in the matter of foreign investment, especially in industries which have the potential of producing negative environmental effects, in external trade, and in tourism, which are increasingly subject to scrutiny on environmental grounds.

I add South-South cooperation—collective self-reliance—as one of the important areas which has had major implications for international relations, as has the idea of the coming together of the developing countries on the North-South issue. These ideas emerged as a virtually inevitable follow-up of the decolonization process. In the colonial period, trade, particularly in manufactured goods, investment, military control, administrative authority, laws, institutional concepts, cultural influence, all flowed from North to South, from the seat of empire to the colonies. And that went for all of them—British, French, and the rest. Primary products flowed from South to North. So that even after decolonization, the links remained in such matters as communications and transportation. Travel between developing countries usually meant going north to Europe and then south. Much of that still remains. And this was further complicated by the fact of different metropolitan countries, each with its own connections with former colonies. Developing countries have therefore sought through programs of cooperation to fill in these gaps in the global infrastructure, and in the flow of contacts, trade, et cetera. The UN system is committed to assist in these efforts. Clearly, this is a matter of historical

significance and it has implications for many elements of international relations and for international public policy.

Let me now say something about poverty. Poverty is by no means a new or recent condition, of course, and we must be careful not to speak or act as if it is. Poverty is as old as history. What appears to be new is the degree of concern about the persistence of poverty, this in a world in which the levels of affluence are extraordinary, and the fact that it is increasing. This concern exists not only in the developing countries particularly affected, but in the affluent countries as well, and especially in the bilateral donor agencies and international institutions such as the UN and the World Bank. Poverty has become the number one priority. This is a major change and seems to reflect a realization that development prescriptions have not had the promised effects as far as that condition is concerned. This requires a revision of the previous thinking about poverty, and perhaps what is seen as a more direct approach. One gets the impression that this reflects a combination of humanitarian feeling and enlightened self-interest. Increasing poverty is a threat to all interests and one expression of this is the continuing effort on the part of people from poorer areas to move to the North—or in some cases to the West.

TGW: You have written that the UN's agenda and its officials and national diplomats are being affected by three factors. I just wanted you to expand a little on this. The first is the diminished role of radical ideologies. The second is economic liberalization, the free market system. The third is political democratization. How do you view these three factors over the next ten years?

DM: I'm just thinking aloud now. There is a danger in this comfortable feeling that some people have, and young people especially, that radicalism is a thing of the past. Look at the state of all those masses of people in the world who live in deplorable conditions and are not

even within miles of getting any material improvements. Will they and their children remain satisfied with the conventional political processes? Well, how would you define radicalism? It won't be the Russian Revolution again, but surely there is more than enough basis for ideas for leadership, for agitation about making radical changes that are supposed to reach people. Poverty—people talk about poverty in mild, analytical terms. Oh, they are very sympathetic. But many don't realize they are dealing with an extremely powerful and explosive circumstance which is not waiting there for the government of Jamaica, or of other countries or the NGOs or the UN or anybody to come and say, "We're going to help you."

The fact is that you cannot separate poverty from the rest of the system and the activities in a society. You have to deal with the society as a whole. You don't only deal with poverty and the poor. There is a structural factor, so I believe that it is somewhat risky to have a generation growing, believing the era of radical political ideology or action is over. That it won't happen again. Is the frequently repeated promise of "the eradication of poverty" gradually taking the place of ideology?

TGW: So you think this is a temporary respite from radical ideology?

DM: You see, I use the term "radical" in a very special sense. You say radical, and some people see a red flag. But let's face it, there are other radical things which are taking place. The continued widening of the gap between rich and poor—within and between countries, and regions—probably provides, and will continue to provide if this condition persists, fertile ground. Let's recognize also that there is the matter of radical right wing ideology and action, fascism, which has also been a major feature of the twentieth century, much of it associated with critical social and economic conditions in Europe and in Latin America, for example. And

where do we put the repeated demonstrations on each occasion of a meeting of western readers and certain international organizations?

So I don't know what form it might take, but I just believe that we should leave our minds open for what may be much more than a possibility—that the world isn't going to wait patiently—the have-nots of the world—because the movement to deal with this condition is a very slow process. And how will civil society activism, now emerging nationally and internationally, develop? More and more people demonstrate on the streets over perceived grievances and neglect. And what would happen if there was a prolonged recession or depression in the western industrialized countries? I wonder.

Your other issue was markets. Again, that is already being eroded. The idea that the market will do everything is already somewhat eroded—without putting too much on Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher, and others. As a small country we have had that preached at us—the market is the thing. Fortunately, there have been other voices, as we agreed earlier. Now, where will we go in terms of qualifying this, because the market has a very important role to play. But it is a denial of the imperatives of equity, because there are a lot of people who are not going to benefit, not now, not for a long time, if everything is just left to the market. How will that be qualified, both at the national level—in terms of developing policies and programs—and at the international level? How will the instruments of the international community, like the World Bank and the IMF, behave? The World Bank has sometimes been listening to the world, and now they are making interesting statements on this issue. How do you influence the UN system, as such? And I regret that there is not much opportunity for open debates on such fundamental issues, outside of having to deal with a decision or a resolution, in the UN system. This is where I had hoped that something like the UN University would play a special role.

And then there is political democratization. The democratic wave is here. It's remarkable if you look at Africa and Latin America. I have quoted Sol Linowitz elsewhere, who was U.S. ambassador to the OAS and chairman of the Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations. He made a remark some time ago about the impact of the democratic wave on Latin America, but also pointed out that many of the democracies were being challenged by violence, deep social and economic inequalities, and erosion of public confidence. I am sure some other new democracies are having similar problems. And this is inevitable because even some of the "great" democracies—and you have to be careful how you use the phrase—have been experiencing a loss of public faith in elements of the system.

There is again a conceit, a belief that there are certain forms of democracies, which are the legitimate ones. It is true there are some variety in the western world, in that sphere. But this is one of the areas in which the experience, the traditions, the forms, and the practices of other cultures do not seem to have had a great influence. Where are the modifications or the improvements then going to come from? Surely, the democratic system is not complete, final in form. So, I would expect that there will be changes—for instance, the demand from civil society for effective participation in governance. This is an extremely far-reaching proposition, whether involving them in the UN system or at home. How is one going to deal with that movement, which is now getting stronger and stronger, to introduce a broader democracy in terms of governance? All these require a considerable amount of thought, and I hope that the innovations will come not from one part of the world only. Some of the older communities, societies, and cultures really have a responsibility to influence the development of democratic forms. The UN could expand its work on the promotion of democracy to include such exploitation.

And then the environmental issue has brought the question of community rights and the commons—common property—into prominence. So you have this infiltration of these notions which are cutting across the rigorous concept of property and individualism. The environment, more than almost anything else, has told people, "You don't own it. You have it for a while." So how far will this go?

TGW: I was struck early yesterday by your comments regarding South Korea and Mexico in OECD. And you wrote about this phenomenon that it was extremely significant in crossing North-South lines. As we go to the next ten years, do you see more crossing of North-South lines, or would you see that the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77, the Third World, the Global South, however one wants to package those, as being more or less relevant as we move into the future?

DM: This situation is not going to remain static, definitely. Latin America is really the area where some have felt—and I hope I am not doing them an injustice—themselves somewhat different. They have been independent, most of them, from the early nineteenth century. But, the speeches made at UNCTAD I—I was very impressed when I looked at that report and read one or two speeches made by Latin American diplomats or ministers. The developing countries had been entering the UN in large numbers, but Latin America was there from the start. This was 1964—Jamaica had been in for just two years. But the creation of UNCTAD brought the countries of the South together. They had to delineate bargaining groups. You had Africa and Asia (Group A), western countries (Group B), Latin America (Group C), and Eastern Europe (Group D). And there were seventy-seven developing countries in Groups A and C. So the name Group of 77 was coined and is still used.

But the speech that was made there, at the closing ceremony, by a Latin American minister, I thought was fantastic. It was a heartfelt statement of solidarity among the developing countries. But there is some ambivalence. So in terms of which countries might cross to the North in the future, Latin America might be the region from which one would expect more of that, although some in Asia might also move.

So there will always be a tendency for some countries to feel a little bit out of place in the Group of 77 for whatever reason. The challenge to the group, which will not remain the same, is to accommodate the variety of countries and interests as far as possible, as long as you have strong common interests, as I said earlier.

But there is another side to the matter. There is a cultural relationship that has existed. The European family—it started out as a family in the broad sense. I will not use any other word but cultural. And with migrations to the West, to America, and to Australia, there has been extension of the family. But in the case of the European Union, as it spreads to the East, they are now going to contemplate taking in Turkey. This is a totally different culture. It is Islamic, basically. And there are others. But then you come to the point where you get to the Caspian Sea. Now, you are approaching the heart of Islam. You have a number of Islamic countries right there, and then Pakistan and Iran. So I am curious about what relationships will exist in that area. I believe there is already some sort of grouping of some of those Islamic countries.

So what does all this mean in terms of association between western states and countries such as Mexico, South Korea, and possibly India, Brazil, Singapore, and others? Japan is a member, not of the "family," but of the group. That is the OECD. It is a different culture.

As to the question of the future of Third World groupings like the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, it is hard to tell. Will they whither away as the member

countries reach certain levels of development? Certainly not in a mass movement. There will no doubt be some movement away from the group. The fact is, however, that there are major cultural and other differences between what we call very broadly the North and South. These differences and the tensions and problems which have been associated with them are in part related to historical factors and are unlikely to disappear as the material gap decreases, unless a major effort is made to create a sound basis for life in a multicultural world. These differences have been a significant underlying factor in the North-South relationships, although this was not a part of the North-South dialogue which focused on economic issues.

Some countries of the North, which have received significant numbers of immigrants from the South, are making some effort in the direction of dealing with the fact of multiple cultures within their borders. And, of course, the changing balance of numbers, of population between the two areas, would underline the need for such an approach.

TGW: I am struck, in our conversations, at how much you rely upon history and historical developments, in looking toward the future. What do you think we will gain from this project in looking at the UN's intellectual past for the future? When we put the term "future-oriented" in the title, we hope that is sensible, but what would you expect us to learn?

DM: I take first the aims of the project. These I understand are to trace the ideas and concepts which have emerged in the UN's work in the sphere of economic and social affairs, to trace them in a systematic way, for the record, and as a means of preparing to meet the challenges coming in the future. As a general point, let me say that I feel that it is an excellent idea. What if the UN had initiated such a process from the start! I hope that the means will be found to provide some continuity in this undertaking, following the example of the IMF and

others. I believe the IMF once had a historian. It would be interesting to get some idea of what came of that.

The project results should help towards bringing greater coherence in the work of the UN system, much needed in an organization with such a large number and great variety of agencies, committees, and programs dealing with a large variety of issues, and as an intergovernmental body based on the sovereignty and the will and the whim of its members. And the benefit of the work will go beyond the UN since the issues and ideas are of universal interest. Governments, and especially their agencies which are concerned with international matters, should derive significant benefit, and especially the large number of developing countries, most particularly the smaller ones, many of which are without adequate resources for monitoring and analysis of ideas, issues, et cetera, as they move through the system, and for determining previous developments in particular matters.

A related point—there are ideas, concerns, and proposals which emerge from time to time and are half digested, sidelined, or abandoned. I suppose some deserve that fate. But there are those which represent deep concerns of some members or signal serious dissatisfaction. They then may not disappear or be abandoned, and may in some cases resurface in the future and present serious problems if not dealt with. I could argue that the debt problem is a case in point.

The UN history project, especially if it stimulates the establishment of a permanent process in the UN in this matter of the course of ideas and concepts—and I for one hope it will—could lead to a review of the roles and the work of those agencies in the system which are concerned with research, training, and related matters. I think of UNITAR, which started with great promise and far-reaching terms of reference, and then was gradually deprived of resources

and its role diminished. Then there are the Committee on Development Planning, the UN University, and others.

I would hope that the need which I expressed to you earlier, the lack of sufficient opportunity for open debate on major issues, outside of formal committees which are seeking conclusions, resolutions and the like, could be met. Could one contemplate, for example, such a discussion involving UN staff, diplomats, and Bretton Woods personnel? Perhaps the movement towards subject-oriented and high-level discussions in ECOSOC points in that direction.

Finally, would there be a role in all this for the UN information services? They have tried hard over the years, but have a very difficult task. And one has to think of the education systems in member countries. Twice when I was in New York, the UN had a group of curriculum specialists from schools discussing how best to introduce UN matters into education. On each occasion I was asked to address the group. What about universities, faculties dealing with the social sciences, environment, international relations, government and public administration especially? I hope the UN intellectual history will reach them in some form. And there are the interested NGO's—a very important element in this matter.

TGW: Yesterday, you quoted a poem by Louise Bennett called, "Colonisation in Reverse." And we returned to that subject at lunch today. What do you see as the importance, or possible influence, of the movement of fairly large numbers of people, North and South, East and West, in virtually every direction? How do you see this in the future and what is the importance for the world of ideas and the world of policy?

DM: We are seeing today a great movement across the world, and more and more contacts between people through travel and migration. The flow of emigrants and refugees—including boat people, tourism, sport, business travel, consultants, aid workers,

conferences, and meetings of all sorts, official and otherwise—all this constitutes an escalation of movements which are not at all new. But the scale, the pace, both are greater, and considerably enhanced by radio, TV, and the internet.

Migration—we have seen the era of movement from Europe, in the process of fleeing from poverty, capturing territories and creating settlements, colonies, empires in the Americas, in Africa, in Australia, New Zealand, et cetera. There, and in other colonial territories, was the implanting of languages, administrative, and other machinery and legal systems. In short, a North to South movement. All of these have greatly influenced ideas and policy, social structures, cultural systems, trade investment. In fact, today the world is still facing the fall-out from that. Think of decolonization and its consequences. But at the same time, we face the current movements. A lot of them are in the opposite direction, South to North, much of it to the former metropolitan centers—"Colonisation in Reverse," or to borrow a phrase, "The Empire Strikes Back." But a lot of the movement also is to other affluent countries—North America and Europe from the South.

We spoke earlier about the Jamaican migration to Britain, starting in the 1950s. These movements—to Europe, to North America—are bringing changes to those societies and to their relations with the parts of the world from which the people came. And in some cases, lobbies and pressure groups are exercising some influence on ideas and policy in the receiving countries. And there is the significant flow of remittances, going back to the home countries of the migrants.

The cultural impact of those movements must be quite great. The penetrating influence of the music and its messages, the increasing sporting contacts, the demographic changes—these all impact on ideas and policies in the countries sending, as well as those receiving people, as

migrants and settlers, or through other movements. I believe that these developments will continue, including illegal immigration, but not without friction. Note the racial incidents in a number of countries of the North in the face of immigration from the South and the East. There are movements in other parts of the world also which arise from or result in racial or ethnic problems. Policies have been changing in such matters, including those affecting discrimination in employment. Britain has declared officially that it is a multicultural society, a major step in a country in which there are people lamenting the disappearance of "Englishness." The truth is, I think, that that is another situation which more and more countries will have to face, and clearly one with significant international implications. It will impact more and more on the UN system.

Schools, the education systems, feel the impact of more and more of these developments—the implications for content in the teaching programs about the world and its peoples. There is in all this a massive transfer of manpower and a lot of it involving considerable skill acquisition by the receiving countries. Simplistic ideas and prejudices based on limited knowledge and deep-rooted cultural perceptions will hopefully give way gradually in the face of all this. I suggest the current reappraisal of the nature and causes of poverty taking place, for example, in the World Bank and elsewhere is, in part at least, a result of a more realistic outlook, influenced by these increasing contacts. Poverty is not a new phenomenon. It is not a Third World phenomenon. And its eradication is not merely a matter of better policies and greater honesty in administration. What are seen as the more developed countries instinctively judge others by the standards they, themselves, have now reached in economic and social development, in values—such matters as human rights—in political development, et cetera.

Hopefully, the rapid development of contacts of all sorts across the world will bring a better understanding and a better balance in relations between peoples. Who knows? Perhaps they represent, in some respects, a journey into the past for some, a reminder of their own societies past, and for others a journey to a possible future. But whatever the future holds, I think the UN, which is already concerned with these matters, will become more involved.

TGW: One of the questions that I have had in mind as we have been proceeding—and you have written about this somewhat, saying that as a result of various kinds of technological developments, in particular communications, but also as a result of human rights and humanitarian problems in the 1990s, that sovereignty in certain ways, or at least sovereignty in Article 27, Westphalian version, certainly has eroded. After Latin American countries and Caribbean countries had asked the U.S. to intervene in Haiti, after the UN has monitored domestic elections in several countries, where exactly are we headed?

DM: In terms of intervention?

TGW: You just mentioned the OAS, and throughout our conversation we have mentioned various groupings, North and South, and you have actually written repeatedly about the importance of regional organizations. What, in your view, is a sensible division of labor, to use an old Marxist concept, between the UN system, or universal institutions, and regional institutions? Put another way, what is the comparative advantage of a universal institution versus a regional institution?

DM: Today you have a multiple-tiered system in governance. At the top, the global level, there is the UN system, universal in membership, coming into existence when in the main the only other organizations were national ones—central governments and local government authorities of some kind. Some countries have had federal systems or regional bodies within the

state. Into that gap between the two spheres over the past fifty years have been placed a number of regional and sub-regional organizations virtually all over the world. Parallel to this, there have come into existence all sorts of regional, sub-regional, and international organizations of civil society, some of them interacting with UN agencies in some ways. It's a very different world in that respect. The UN had had to adapt to this.

As an organization with universal membership, the UN is uniquely placed to deal with a range of matters. Moreover, it brings all interests to the table. It is therefore essential, I think, that the organization retains its authority and its resources so that it can continue to operate in respect especially of those matters and be in a position to meet new situations as they arise. Failure to do so would damage its position seriously, and it would inevitably be challenged by other organizations in the field.

Regional and sub-regional intergovernmental bodies are here to stay, and their existence has very positive aspects. They provide a smaller forum, are perhaps more actively concerned with matters which more or less are of special interest to members, and give opportunity to participate as the numbers are limited. This probably is of advantage to smaller members. But I believe that care has to be taken to keep in balance the relationship between the UN and these organizations, and to manage the collaboration between them, which is likely to increase over time as those bodies widen the range of their activities.

I see the emergence of a number of regional intergovernmental organizations, therefore, as a major development which will inevitably affect the UN. But it need not be an entirely negative effect. Already, there is positive interaction in some cases—for example, between the EU and the UN. And, like others, the EU has observer status in the UN. The OAS has been involved in efforts at mediation, to settle disputes between states, and from the outset the relative

roles of that organization and the UN Security Council in such matters were defined. Like the European countries, the OAS also has its own human rights convention, and many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Jamaica, have ratified this convention. The OAU has been very much involved in respect of African liberation struggles and conflict between states, and has in recent years entered into cooperative arrangements with the EU in such matters as well as in development programs. In fact, I seem to remember that the UN Charter anticipated such interaction between regional organizations and the UN Security Council, but this matter requires continuing attention to prevent confusion.

TGW: For those of us who are studying global governance, we have a future.

DM: Yes, indeed. Most definitely.

TGW: Is there something I should have asked you that you wish that I had? I have reached the end of my questions. Is there anything else you would like to say?

DM: Well, I said there were a couple of things that I wanted to mention. I have spoken about migrations, and of course there are migrations coming out of the genocides. But one of the things that I wanted to say something about is the business of addressing past actions and past wrongs. Well, let me just show you this. This came out in the newspaper on the 25th of February.

TGW: "Charles Returns 200 Year Old Chalice."

DM: Yes. That's Prince Charles of England. Well, this is something which was "borrowed" permanently from one community of peoples. I have become interested in the issue of the purposeful re-examination of the past, retelling particular events. Reparations—the broad issue, not the narrow issue—the restoration of stolen cultural property and other such matters. I have developed the feeling that this whole issue constitutes a new wave, a new direction, the idea

of restoration—reconciliation toward the establishment of a more just world and a more peaceful one. Let me give some particulars. Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton have publicly admitted serious errors in personal life and political actions. Robert McNamara's confession of the terrible wrong involved in his government's decision in respect of Vietnam. The demand for reparations and material compensation in respect to African slavery, the stealing of the property of Jews caught in the Nazi trap, compensation for the Europeans forced to work virtually as slaves in factories during World War II. Pleas for forgiveness for great wrongs done in past times, such as those by Pope John Paul II on behalf of the Catholic Church in respect of the Inquisition, the treatment of people of the colonies, and of the Jews, and the silencing of Galileo for saying that the earth revolved around the sun. The large amounts being paid by the tobacco companies in respect of damage suffered through smoking. Mass apologies in Australia over the abduction of 300,000 Aborigine children in order to assimilate them. The apology by the Japanese government to those who suffered by reason of that country's actions in World War II, and that country's apology to the Republic of Korea for thirty-five years of brutal colonial rule. The request for forgiveness by the major Hutu political party in Rwanda for its role in the genocide in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and others were killed. And there are other instances. Of course there is the special case of Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa following the overthrow of the apartheid regime. There is the matter of stolen or appropriated property, artifacts, et cetera, and the demand for their return to the original peoples. This involves lands in countries including Australia, New Zealand, Africa, Canada, and Latin America. Then there are the artifacts and other articles taken away—for example, the demand for the return by Britain of the Elgin Marbles to Greece; the demand by Ethiopia for hundreds of precious artifacts, including objects said to have been taken away by

British troops from the mountain capital of the emperor; pre-Colombian artifacts in the case of Ecuador, and many more.

Where does the UN stand in all of this? Is it likely to be drawn increasingly into some involvement especially in the face of the increasing pressure being mounted on these matters? Of course, the organization has already been deeply concerned about some of these issues, and I would suggest actually involved to a limited extent. Is this one of the issues, along with the concepts involved, which might face the organization in the future—the sort of development you suggest in the statement of the purposes of this project that the UN Intellectual History might help to prepare it to face? In the case of artifacts taken away, UNESCO has a strong interest. It monitors cases and the trade in stolen items, assists countries with information, and with advice on legislation, and there are international conventions on the matter, and a committee on the return of such objects. In respect of other issues, there is the recently established International Criminal Court, the UN Compensation Commission for dealing with claims and losses resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. And of course you have the International Court of Justice, the concept of crimes against humanity, the acceptance of the sanctioning by the Security Council of intervention in the face of gross cruelty within a state, on the basis of what has been characterized as "a new sense of human responsibility." And you have, outside of the UN system, the effort to punish leaders seen as guilty of sanctioning acts of great cruelty, like Augusto Pinochet, the former president of Chile, and there were the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders after World War II.

Let me give you the words of Pope Paul on all this. He was speaking of the Inquisition, but I think his words could apply to the matters I have outlined here. He said, "At the threshold of the new millennium, it is legitimate to hope that political leaders—above all, those involved in

dramatic conflicts fed by hate and the memory of old wounds—let themselves be guided by the spirit of pardon and reconciliation."

TGW: Well, thank you. Let me just record my own gratitude for your gracious time and wisdom over the last two days. It has been a real pleasure.

DM: It has been a great pleasure.

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