

*UNITED NATIONS INTELLECTUAL HISTORY PROJECT*  
*The Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York*  
*365 Fifth Avenue*  
*New York, NY 10016*

**TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF**

**JAMES JONAH**

**BY**

**THOMAS G. WEISS**

**New York, 30 August 2001**

THOMAS G. WEISS: This is the beginning of tape number one, 30 August 2001, James Jonah being interviewed by Tom Weiss in the offices of The CUNY Graduate Center in New York.<sup>1</sup> James, I wonder whether we could actually start at the beginning, and whether you might tell us a bit about your early years of schooling and upbringing, and whether this eventually contributed to your own views about international affairs, international cooperation, the necessity for the United Nations.

JAMES JONAH: Well, frankly, my early years and objective as a young man had nothing to do with the UN or politics. Primarily, I wanted to go into the ministry to be a priest. Of course, my father was trying to get me to go into medicine. But I wanted to be a priest. So I went into classics. My first degree was in the classics, and I enormously enjoyed it. I think I got a tinge of interest in state politics or city politics, through the Latin scholars like Livy, and Cicero, particularly Livy for some reason. Reading Livy's *History of Rome* in Latin, and all of these wars, the Battle of Canai, for example. I read about wars and politics but it didn't make an impact on me. I still wanted to go into the ministry.

I think the important year for me was 1956. That was when things turned around, during the Suez Crisis, which came to me like a bolt from the blue. My father was always interested in international politics. He would always be discussing with his friends. They would come to the house for exchange of views on global developments. We had what was then a radio system in Sierra Leone; not everybody could have it in the house. It is not like today's radio but was piped in from a central place. So only a few people could have it, but we did. By means of that, you had all the BBC programs throughout the world.

My father was an avid listener and reader. So I listened to most of the developments regarding Suez. But what struck me most about the Suez Crisis was that as I was listening, I heard Anthony Eden use a phrase which I will never forget: “An act of plunder will never be allowed to succeed.” Mainly because of my religious leaning, I thought, “What does he mean—a head of state, [Gamal Abdel] Nasser? What could he have stolen?” I wanted to ask more questions. This led to the issue of the 1888 Convention of the Suez Canal. I became really, really interested in following it.

I can say, frankly, from that day, I have never stopped my daily obsession with international politics. For me it was a very interesting time. This was a major world crisis since the end of the Second World War. Then some things happened that were not supposed to happen. First of all, the divergence of views between the Americans and the British—I became aware of a man called John Foster Dulles and then President [Dwight] Eisenhower. Then, of course, I was taken aback by the political disputes and division in the British Parliament. Why were many parliamentarians attacking Anthony Eden? Wasn't that the time when they should have been united in the House of Commons? Why all this abuse? I couldn't understand, so I began to learn more parliamentary politics. Yes, in Parliament, people can have a difference of views. Yes, amongst allies they can have a difference of views.

Then, as the deadlock continued, Dag Hammarskjöld came on the wireless during a visit to Cairo. I was not that much aware of the UN, although there was at least a little general knowledge. And here you had all of the diplomats and statesmen, among them, the Australian prime minister. He came back from Egypt, having not succeeded. Dag Hammarskjöld also went there as Secretary-General. He returned to New York to respond to the Security Council. It was then that I began to pay attention.

---

1 Tatiana Carayannis was present throughout the interview.

So from that moment, I liked listening to Dag Hammarskjöld. I liked what he was doing. I wanted to learn more about him. Luckily for me, there was the British Council. The British Council is a library system that the British government used to have in all of their colonies. So I started going there to find things, developments in Europe. Right there, in the library, the English lady who was the chief librarian came to me and observed that I was a frequent visitor. I told her of my interests. She brought me a book of [Anthony] Trollope. Of course, I was coming to the library mainly for newspapers and books on politics. But I got the book of Trollope, and I just loved his writing. I was twenty-two years old. I was so enthused by it that I asked her about more, and she gave me the political novels of Trollope. This also brought me more and more to the world of domestic politics. So gradually, I said, “Okay, let me see. Politics is where I want to be.” So I had to change my focus from the ministry. Then a friend of mine, Dr. Edward Blyden, suggested, “If you want to change, then you will eventually have to study political science.” It was he who then recommended for me to come to the United States. Then my goal was set.

TGW: I wonder whether you could just dwell a bit on your parents and siblings, and the situation in Sierra Leone, and the extent to which you were aware of big world events. The Depression—did this make a difference?

JJ: No, not at all.

TGW: And the Second World War?

JJ: The Second World War, yes. And I remember, I think, in 1945, I was eleven. One thing stuck in my head. It is very hard to explain why. But there was a parade made by the British troops in Freetown. There were lots of sailors, a lot, because Freetown was a major port and all the major vessels of the Allies were in Freetown because it was a transit point. Even the

American cargo flights were coming from Brazil because we were the shortest point across the Atlantic, from Brazil to Freetown. So there was a hive of activity—prisoners of war from Burma. They were all stationed in Sierra Leone. So there was a bit of activity.

But I remember this distinctly at the end of the war: at this parade, there were British papers which said, “[Adolph] Hitler is dead. Victory is ours.” That was one of the statements. I was just eleven, a little boy. “Hitler is dead. Victory is ours.” And this was the day after Hitler died. So yes, I was conscious. But I was not aware of the disputes that went on between the Allies and the Axis powers. But I knew we had a lot of people in Freetown, Sierra Leone. We had a lot of prisoners of war, and we used to go and look at them in the camps. I was not really aware of what led to it.

TGW: I am curious whether, maybe not at age eleven in 1945, but sometime in high school, towards the end of the late 1940s, whether the curriculum in Sierra Leone, at the school where you were, touched upon the United Nations, the League of Nations failure, the founding of Bretton Woods, the experiment with the Marshall Plan?

JJ: No.

TGW: None of these things?

JJ: None of that all. I was also teaching history. What they used to do was they used to take older students to teach. I taught. But we focused mostly on British colonial history, actually. I focused primarily on the Tudor and Stuart periods. The UN did not really enter the radar screen, except in 1956.

TGW: What was your father’s profession? Was he in business?

JJ: No. He was like an engineer, specifically a boilermaker. He was also president of the railways workers union.

TGW: So, instead of saving lives and saving souls, you are now going to save international relations?

JJ: And the bishop actually recommended that to me. It was really funny. He said, “You will be more useful in this area.” He was aware that I was speaking to people about international politics, and people would come to ask me to explain situations to them. So I became active in that area.

TGW: And how did you end up at Lincoln University?

JJ: You know, in the early 1950s, for Africans, the only university worth going to was Lincoln.

TGW: I wasn’t aware of this. Tatiana mentioned this to me.

JJ: It’s incredible. All of our African leaders went to Lincoln, nothing else. They didn’t want to hear about Harvard, or—I heard of Harvard only through this friend of mine, Blyden, and then George Padmore. They wanted me to study under Rupert Emerson of Harvard. But there was no question. [Nnamdi] Azikwe, [Kwame] Nkrumah, all of our earlier leaders went to Lincoln, and it’s a very good school. It’s a liberal arts college in Oxford, Pennsylvania, with a very good academic record. So for us, Lincoln was the school to go to.

TGW: As you are finishing up there, you mentioned Nkrumah, but how did the independence of Ghana and the beginning rumblings of decolonization seem from the vantage point of Lincoln? Were you or other students interested in what was going on? And then, subsequently, the first meeting in Bandung (Asian-African Conference)—how did this appear?

JJ: There was also something which happened to me just at the time. The year after I was absorbed in the Suez, a man came to Sierra Leone who had lived in the U.S. for a long time, called Edward Blyden III. He had finished his generals at Harvard and finished his thesis, so he

came home. He was a very, very good speaker. Since I was young, I had always been good in public speaking, even as a little boy. So we would heckle him in his meeting. He was very smart, in a sense, because he picked me out of the crowd and said, “You need to be up here with me, not there.”

He was very much aware of world politics. He knew a good deal of what went on with the war. So we discussed, and he was surprised that I knew so much about the Suez. I was very much anti-Nasser. He could not understand when I talked so much about the sanctity of the 1888 agreement. He was implying to me that that agreement was the exploitation of Egypt. So he began to tell me a lot about imperialism, about colonialism. He put me in touch with both Nkrumah and George Padmore. It was very interesting, you know.

As a young man, I was cautious. In politics I was more aware of what was going on in the world than many people of my age. So Nkrumah came to Sierra Leone, and George Padmore came, and they spoke to me. They said, “You must go to the United States, and go to Lincoln.” You know George Padmore?

TGW: Yes.

JJ: George Padmore was West Indian, but he was the leading theoretician of Pan-Africanism. He had been in Bandung with all of these leaders—[Kenneth] Kaunda, Azikwe, all of them. But he was the leading theoretician of Pan-Africanism. So he came, and said, because I was really a Tudor and Stuart historian, they began to tell me about the Bandung conference, what happened in Bandung, why we should fight against colonialism.

Then we found what was called SLIM (Sierra Leone Independence Movement). I became one of the founding members. I was the secretary-general of the movement and the youth leader. We used to give many lectures on what imperialism was all about. Of course, we

took mostly the Leninist point of view—“Imperialism is the highest form of capitalism.” That was the way until I came to the United States.

TGW: And when you got here, how did Bandung appear? I think in retrospect, people look at Bandung as a momentous event. There seems to be quite a difference in our interviewees between those who say that at the time everyone was seized with it, and those who said no one even knew where it was. What do you recall?

JJ: Yes. I came across this whole issue during the Suez Crisis, because when one probed while Dulles took his position, it was when Dulles was arguing that neutralism was immoral, and felt that they should not support Nasser, because he had joined [Jawaharlal] Nehru, and [Josip] Tito, and all of them. This is immoral. You have to take sides. So of Bandung he said, “You cannot be neutral.” So I got to know about that.

But when Nkrumah came to Freetown—and I also met Zik. I was very lucky. Zik also came to Freetown and we had a long talk. They wanted me to meet with him, and so I went to the ship to meet him. He met me alone, as a young boy, and said, “Africans can depend on people like yourself.” So they all talked about Bandung because of anticolonial trade. That part was the main point of Bandung.

TGW: And upon arrival in the United States, what struck you as most strange or most different from West Africa? Was this your first trip abroad?

JJ: Yes. The first day was very funny. As I said, I was said to be a very good historian. So an English professor called Professor Kup—because when I took my university exams, I came first in both part one and part two. As I said, it was highly unusual. Then he said that I should go to Balliol College at Oxford. So they got me a scholarship to go to Balliol. The British wanted me to, but Blyden and Nkrumah said, “No, don’t go there.” So there was a split.



My parents wanted me to go to Oxford because for them English education was the only thing that matters.

But the other lesson they gave was that there was so much discrimination in the United States. I came from a family called the Kreolos. We never experienced that. We were the elites in the country. They said, "You are not used to this. You will not be able to take it." That was one of my parents' concerns.

But when I arrived, it really was my big shock. I arrived in Baltimore. I was supposed to go to New York; that was my destination. But I was so seasick, at the first port-of-call I said, "I'm getting out." And the captain said, "OK, you can get out. You can take a train to New York." So I got out and took all of my bags. I stood in the corner trying to see how I could get to the bus station or railway station, and when I was waiting there, a white lady came up. She knew that I was not from there. I explained to her that I wanted to go the subway. She asked where I was going. I said, "Well, I have a friend, a student who is in New York. I want to go there." She said, "But you are carrying a heavy load." I said, "I just want to get to the train. I just came from Africa." She stood there for a while and she said, "Can you wait here for a while? I'll come back." She went and came back with her husband. They said, "Why don't you stay with us?"

We had this idea of America being cowboys. It was not supposed to happen in America. That was a big shock to me. I stayed with these people for two months in Baltimore, this white couple. They became like my parents. They were my first experience, in a sense, in America. So that was my big shock. I gathered that that was not what it was supposed to be. It was supposed to be rejection and all of this other thing.

Of course, I was very amazed with the development and everything. And I was also very struck, later on, when I went to Lincoln, about the low motivation of the black students. I couldn't understand. It was very difficult, because coming from an elite family where education was such a high priority, and you know you are going to make it, you are highly-motivated. And these boys were sitting down playing cards. I used to go and talk to them. I couldn't understand their lack of motivation. And they would tell me, "It doesn't matter if we study hard and obtain academic degrees." That was a big shock to me, that they were not motivated to achieve. And they were giving me reasons why I shouldn't.

TGW: I recall, in the interview that I did with Bernard Chidzero, his saying some of the same things about "American Negroes." He went through McGill and came through Detroit, and to New York, in the other direction, working for whatever the predecessor of Amtrak was. You began then studying contemporary politics—no longer Tudor history—at Lincoln. Then from there, you went to Boston University?

JJ: Yes. I did that. As I said, all I was told to do was to study under Rupert Emerson. But because of the role I was playing in Sierra Leone, I became more political. Because of the youth movement I led in the earlier days, people permitted me to go back into politics. I quickly found that because of my previous liberal arts studies, they said, "You need only to do three semesters." So I only did three semesters there.

Then, another professor—he was also a white professor, and he came from Princeton. He wanted me to go to Princeton. But I said to him, "No, I cannot go because I have to study under Rupert Emerson." It was so funny the school was not as important to me as the professor. So I applied, and I applied only to Harvard. But I applied for a Master's program because what I found was that Harvard had an M.A. in international relations. They said, "Look, we can accept

you, but we have no M.A.” That M.A. program had been cancelled at Harvard, the M.A. in international relations. I was devastated. I said, “Well, what do I do?” They said, “You will go into the Ph.D. program.” I said, “No, it takes too long.”

So I went to see what Professor Emerson, who was aware of my difficulties, thought. “Look, there is a way out. If your concern is basically to study under me, with the strength of your record at Harvard here, your reputation, I can go to Mr. Brown (who was then heading the African Institute at Boston University), and I can arrange for you to enroll there. And you can take your courses at Harvard.” That is what happened. So, in fact, I did more courses at Harvard under Professors Emerson and McCloskey that one year when I got my Master’s than from Boston University.

TGW: What things that you read at the time stand out in retrospect?

JJ: OK, I did all the courses that Emerson gave, which were on colonialism, imperialism—all the “isms.” That was his strength. I took everything he gave and everything McCloskey gave on constitutional law. He was very helpful to me, Rupert Emerson. Then he encouraged me to go for a Ph.D. By that time, my mind was changing about Africa, because my first lecture under Rupert Emerson was a course he gave on imperialism. He was such a genius that at the beginning of the class he would go through the entire reading list, the entire course you were going to take.

So, as I said, I had only studied imperialism from the Leninist point of view. And here he was talking about [Joseph] Schumpeter’s theory of imperialism. I was so angry with him. I said, “What the hell do they want me to talk to this man about?” I really challenged him because he gave the various theories of imperialism—manifest destiny, all of that. I was so angry because I thought that the only definition is that of [Vladimir] Lenin. And there was a professor—I think

he was called Hobson, in England—who was also known in that literature. I was so upset, but somehow, I said, “This man, he must know something, I may not be aware of.”

I was treated as a Harvard student, and I had the privilege to use the Weidner Library. I went to the stacks and I spent almost six hours going through the reading list, and I realized that I had a narrow approach to the subject matter. That was a big change in my life. So I began to question a lot of things which Africans would say. By the time I was getting my Master’s, I was questioning a lot about the nationalist philosophy.

TGW: And even though you started out not wanting to do a Ph.D., you then decided to do one.

JJ: What happened was Emerson was always keen that I should do it. Just about that time, this German foundation came to Harvard through Carl Friedrich and others. They wanted somebody to go to Germany as a Friedrich Ebert fellow. They said, “You can do it, and we are going to send your name.” Emerson said, “This will be good for you as a transition.”

They recommended me for the foundation, the Stiftung, which I never knew what it was about. I got the fellowship. So I went to Germany. The idea was that I would come, after that, to Harvard to finish my Ph.D. But while I was there, in Germany, this was the Congo period. It was intense—the Congo, Europe was in turmoil with all of these Belgians coming back. And I, at times, was sitting there, the only black man. People were frightened that I had come to chop off their heads.

I went to Geneva. Before going to Germany, I had gone to the Middle East on a study tour to look about what the young Arabs think about Arab-Israeli relations for the long term. So I spent about five weeks, I think, in the Middle East. So I came to Geneva, and I met a group of

scholars. I said, “Look, there is something I don’t understand about political scientists. How do you capture change?”

I kept in touch with these professors. So I returned to Germany, and after four months one of them wrote to me and said, “We have an answer for you. MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is going to start a program.” I was living on Massachusetts Avenue all of these years before that, and I said, “Come on, MIT is just a science university. They are not able to do this.” They told me there is a professor there, that if I want to, I can write to Karl Deutsch. So they gave me the name of Karl Deutsch, and I wrote to Karl Deutsch from Germany on this problem, “How do you cope with change?” He then asked me to get hold of a book which he had written, which is called *Nationalism and Social Communications*. So I managed to get the book. Of course, it was all statistical analysis.

So we started corresponding. I said, “I had this professor at Harvard who had been my mentor, Rupert Emerson.” He said, “Oh! He was my teacher.” So he went to talk to Emerson. I wrote to Emerson that I wanted to go to MIT. He said, “No, don’t do that because you will spend more years getting your Ph.D. You can come and do it here in two years. If you go to MIT, it is going to take more years.” But as I thought more and more, if people were saying, “This is the wave of the future,” I thought, “Why not?” So I told Emerson, “Look, I have talked to Karl Deutsch. He said that even if I enter the MIT program, I can also study at Harvard.” That is what I did.

TGW: Existentially absurd, but very useful.

JJ: But you can see that with a university, it always has to do with individuals. This, in fact, is the German approach, which I found out later on. Germans only study with professors. Students would move from Heidelberg to Freiberg to Berlin. If the professors moved, they

moved with them. That is the tradition. I didn't even know. The school is not important; it is the professor. They want to get disciples, somehow. It is really funny that when I was in Sierra Leone, I was told, "You must study with Rupert Emerson." So that's how I got there.

TGW: And in the process—before we slip into the Congo—Sierra Leone becomes independent in 1961.

JJ: I was out of the country.

TGW: You were out of the country, but basically all of Africa becomes independent within a couple of years. Did this seem surprising, or not?

JJ: Yes, because Sierra Leone was the only country where there was no demand for independence. It was very clear why this was the case. This SLIM, of which I was the youth leader, we were preaching the need for independence in the tradition of Nkrumah and others. But frankly, it was an intellectual thing. The people were not impressed. The intellectuals were a very small group. The large mass were what we used to call "natives," "provincials." They didn't care.

The British played a game. The Kreoles, before I left, opposed adult suffrage for the provincials. They fought against it more bitterly than [Orval] Faubus did in Little Rock. That's why I never was disturbed when I came here. I knew that this was what I left behind, that the Kreoles were opposed to adult suffrage. They said, "They are not educated, they do not have British culture." The same argument! Then when the British insisted on adult suffrage, they became the allies of the provincials, who were in the majority. So the majority of the people never saw why they should ask the British to leave. They were their protectors. That is why there was no agitation for independence in Sierra Leone. About 80 percent of the people felt that the British helped them against these Kreoles, who would have denied their God-given rights.

So the British actually gave independence to Sierra Leone. There was no nationalist movement, no struggle in Sierra Leone.

TGW: You mentioned earlier how influential Hammarskjöld had been in your own development, and as a result of the Suez. How did he look in the Congo?

JJ: OK. Yes. I have had a problem which I have had throughout my professional life. The African students were meeting in Geneva and I went there. I made the only defense of Hammarskjöld after the death of [Patrice] Lumumba. I didn't have much information, but just my feeling about Dag Hammarskjöld since 1956. But I did not know then some of the information which I now know as related in books, like in the *Congo Cables*. But I felt that Hammarskjöld had nothing to do with the death of Lumumba, that there was no conspiracy, which was the argument which was made against him by most Africans.

So I felt it was a difficult situation, but that the UN should not be blamed. I was totally a minority among all the African students, and in fact they used to attack me. They called me all kinds of names. But I was not critical of Dag Hammarskjöld, and I am glad to say that historical evidence has come out, like in the *Congo Cables*, by Madeleine Kalb, confirming what I intuitively felt about him.

TGW: What do you think, with forty years of hindsight, Hammarskjöld's legacy has actually been?

JJ: I think he has been misunderstood by some people. But we have to bear in mind that Hammarskjöld was not a popular Secretary-General within the UN Secretariat. I was very surprised when I arrived there. As I said, I did not apply to the UN; I was a product of a search. I was brought in by Mr. William Jordan, an Englishman who was a professor at LSE (London School of Economics) before the war and a good scholar.

This man called [Chakravarthi V.] Narasimhan was the *chef de cabinet*. I'll never forget that. So he called me and said, "Look, I think you should come and work for us." I said, "No, I can't do that. I was brought in by Mr. Jordan." He said, "There is better prospect for you here on the 38<sup>th</sup> floor." I said, "I have always had this respect for Dag Hammarskjöld." He said, "What Dag Hammarskjöld?" I was surprised by the reaction. He said, "That man almost wrecked the UN." As a young man, I had only been five months at the UN, and I was so shocked. He was lambasting Dag Hammarskjöld.

So I came out so worried. I went to see Jordan, and I said, "What is this?" He said, "Well, you know, he was very controversial within the Secretariat." I said, "But why?" For the same reason that [Boutros] Boutros-Ghali became—he didn't tow the line. He didn't want any wishy-washy things, and he was a sort of reclusive person.

But I still believe that he is unsurpassed. I am convinced about that for three reasons. One, I think Hammarskjöld was a true intellectual of the highest and finest sorts. He was not a wishy-washy man. He had a good conceptual view of the UN. Secondly, he was a man of absolute integrity. Not a single—you will not find any blemishes. He was brought up very well. His father was prime minister of Sweden. He was well-educated. Thirdly, he had the quality of tremendous courage. The only person who really, to me, has come close to having this type of courage is Boutros-Ghali. Therefore, I believe, he remains, to me, exemplary as a Secretary-General. Of course, there has been so much revisionism. But again, I am convinced that we will never have another Secretary-General like Hammarskjöld. There is a determination among the veto powers that that will never happen.



TGW: Is it possible to generalize from that? What is the role of ideas, or intellectual capacities, conceptual capabilities throughout the secretariat, whether it's the Secretary-General, or a P-2 or P-3?

JJ: Today there is none. There is none. They resent it. In my generation, we were very lucky because the people who were there at the time were intellectuals and academics. They were people of ideas. They were the first generation. But even that generation—I remember when I came in, and of course, coming from MIT, which was a new frontier of research on development at MIT. The first thing that the director of the Political Affairs Division said was to hold luncheon seminars for the staff of the Political Affairs Division about research methods. They resented it so much I couldn't believe it. I couldn't believe it. They all resented it.

The only person, fortunately, was [Vladimir] Petrovsky, who would come back and ask me for more books to go and read. I used that book by [James] Rosenau, *The Theory of International Relations*. The rest did not want to hear about it. And this was that generation. They think, "You don't belong here. You belong in university." I think even now it is worse. This is not only the UN. I think it is across the board in governments and everything. People of ideas are not welcome. They are seen as being impractical. Now it is PR (public relations) people that dominate.

TGW: Let's just digress a minute here. Why is it that the middle ground—which to me seems fairly obvious, between abstraction and theorizing, and finding hooks on which to put all of these anecdotes is valuable. And obviously exposure to problems and problem-solving is also important. While there are people who go in the extremes, it seems to me that there is a lot of room in between. Why does this territory seem so hostile, both for practitioners and for scholars?

JJ: Listen to this. I once mentioned to [Kurt] Waldheim, who is a very close friend—we used to talk informally—because his argument, when he came, was, “Look, the best way is to have contacts with the missions and the governments, and talk to them. You can do more than doing in-depth research.” I said, “You may be right. But from my experience, unless you, yourself, have good resources internalized, you can be fooled by these individuals. If you have the ideas, if you know the subject, then when you talk to a first secretary, or counselor, and he is giving you something cockeyed, you can know it because you have the knowledge.” I said, “But if you don’t have the knowledge, he will point you and other people only where he wants you to go.” That remains my strong conviction. I still believe it today that you need both. It is not either/or, you need both. But you cannot just say, “I want to use the telephone.” You’ll get all kinds of rubbish, and you are making policy on rubbish.

But it takes time. It does take time, and people don’t want to do that. One of the reasons why I spoke about Brian Urquhart is that he has the resources. He has more practical experience than anybody I know, but he has a good mind. And he reads a lot. People don’t want to read. I remember that when I went to the Middle East, and I would talk to foreign ministers, I’d know more about what was going on in Israel than many others.

TGW: But it does take time. I am throwing my own two cents worth here. Secretariat officials need to subscribe to journals and take sabbaticals and do things; and academics need to get out of the stacks and the classrooms. But if you are in a rut and it’s much easier to proceed—laziness may be unkind, but it does take an extra effort to move toward the middle and be familiar with two sets of ideas and two sets of literature, rather than a single one.

JJ: Well, we tried it with ORCI (Office of Research and Collection of Information) when ORCI was founded. This is James Sutterlin’s credit there. The promise was there, that if you

found ORCI, that would be an intellectual, academic arm. But there was so much resentment. They said, “You are not realistic.” They just don’t accept it. So you have to have the head. Where Boutros-Ghali was full of ideas, that’s all he wanted from you. He judged a product on the ideas, and this was such an alien idea to some of these people. They didn’t accept it. You could not go to Boutros-Ghali and say, “We cannot do it because the African group is going to oppose.” He said, “Don’t tell me about the African group. Why are they against it? Do they have a rational reason? What matters to me is what they’re saying, is it tenable in terms of the Charter and our mandate?” That’s what Hammarskjöld used to ask. But these people don’t ask because it’s too troublesome.

But what is happening now? They are doing that now the secretariat, which is very interesting. I just found out in the last three or four months. Most of the reports of the Secretary-General are produced outside, in academic institutions. If you look at it, most of it comes from the academic world.

TGW: It’s Bill Durch at the Stimson Center.

JJ: Yes. It’s incredible. Every major study he has done has come from—this is the way, because this guy who is there now is at Harvard. What is his name?

TGW: Andy Mack or John Ruggie?

JJ: Ruggie. Many of the donors have accepted, reluctantly, that the UN cannot do it. So they farm out now to academic institutions. So this is the way it is now going—

TGW: Or you could argue that this is an openness to academic perspectives?

JJ: Yes, but it shows you that the secretariat is not there, whereas if you look at the World Bank, they have people in there who are very, very good. I have been very much

impressed by the quality of the staff of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank.

TGW: I have a two-part question. We are going to move back here in a minute, but as long as we're on this topic, why did Boutros-Ghali dismantle ORCI if he was the person who was most interested in ideas? It was one of the first things he did, as I recall, in 1992. But this was supposed to be a place for ideas. And the second thing is—and you've moved toward the Bank and the Fund—how does one explain this difference in secretariats, a difference in intellectual capacities, which seems to be a generalization that lots of people make about the quality in Washington, versus the quality in New York?

JJ: First of all, you see, you have to go back. By the time Boutros-Ghali came to the UN, ORCI was nothing. ORCI was dead because James Sutterlin built it around me. That is how ORCI was founded. [Javier] Pérez de Cuéllar said to me, "I have to see you as an under-secretary-general (USG) before I leave." I said, "No, I would rather stay at ORCI. If you want to do that, then elevate the position of ORCI to USG." But you know, the secretariat had posts which were African and others posts belonged to other regions or nationalities. I was supposed to only occupy the African post. It is stupid, you know. And I fought against it. He begged me to accept the African USG. He said, "Look, please take this post." Then I recommended that Jean-Claude Aimé should succeed me. I said, "At least he will continue the tradition as it is."

Pérez de Cuéllar agreed. When the announcement was made, [Alvaro] de Soto was named as my successor, not Mr. Aimé. De Soto really is more of a technician. And he came to ORCI. So by the time Boutros-Ghali was coming, ORCI was nothing anymore. What he said to me was, "Build units of ORCI into your divisions." But ORCI was really gone. I was surprised when I read the Brahimi report (*Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations*), and they

wanted to create ORCI. They forgot there was an ORCI. They said, “Do it.” But with ORCI, this was done, and it failed.

Now, the other question. It is because the secretariat had become too political. Years ago I used to argue, in the secretariat, that it all depends who is the head of the department and who are the directors. These are two key elements. I used to say, “Look, when I joined the UN, I was exposed to people like William Jordan. Ralph Bunche used to speak to me at least once a week for at least an hour.” Could you imagine? A P-2, and all he wanted to do was to convey to me his experience. I was exposed to Brian Urquhart. So they were thinking ahead. These people were such well-established people, they were not afraid of a young P-2 coming and taking their jobs. They were solid.

Now, once you began a policy in the secretariat of bringing people from outside and making them D-2s, they are afraid. They don’t have the knowledge. So anybody with ideas, they pushed aside, and they began to surround themselves with mediocrity. It took a long time for us to get to this position where they do not have the best and brightest. No, they are afraid, because the directors and heads of departments themselves are not qualified. So they don’t want them.

Whereas if you go to the Bank, it has not been freely politicized yet. There, your professional standing is the key. The directors—you do not have this kind of, it does not exist. And I think that is what accounts for it. And I think that is more meaningful for them. It is job-satisfying, because typically in the World Bank, they go to a country. They have substance. It is the way UNDP (UN Development Programme) in the early years used to be, when the first man, what’s his name, used to be there.

TGW: Paul Hoffman?

JJ: Paul Hoffman, when a UNDP man in a country is like a governor-general. That is now gone. But if you don't have the head of the departments and the directors of quality, you are wasting your time. The young people are all going away. If you look at the UN today, most of the young people who are there today, people who are brought in, who are still there—young people come in two years and they leave.

TGW: I wanted to just go back a minute, before you get to the UN and ask about your student days. One of the things that you wrote was that while you were in Germany, you were converted—different from a religious conversion here—from an African nationalist to more of an internationalist. What caused this?

JJ: First, the intellectual part as I mentioned before was upon my first lecture of Emerson. But when I went to Germany, Germany was a godsend for me because I was not planning it. It was Rupert Emerson and Carl Friedrich who got me interested. Germans were supposed to be highly nationalistic, very, very nationalistic. I was very lucky that I came in contact with some of the theoreticians of the socialist party in Germany. I lived with them in Bad Godesberg and a place called Bergnewstadt. I observed that they were aiming to transcend German nationalism. People like Willy Brandt and others were saying, "Look, our history is because of our super-nationalism. We must look wider."

So there was a big debate when I was in Germany in 1960 about the common market. In 1959, the Social-Democratic Party of Germany in Bad Godesberg changed their whole Marxist approach and began to search out. So they became very close to the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats of [Konrad] Adenauer, they had seen a linkage between all of the Christian parties in Europe. I was living with the people and I saw them struggling. They used to have

weekly conferences and seminars, and I took part in all of those. And I was very much impressed—you had Frenchmen, Danish men, all of them coming in.

So I got caught up in this. And I said, “Well, if these people have come to realize that nationalism is not the end of everything, why are we Africans talking about nationalism? Where will it take us? Are we going to repeat the European history of wars?” They said that nationalism is what caused all of their problems. Also at the same time, I was becoming concerned with the African leaders. Corruption was beginning to surface. Dictatorship was beginning to surface. So all of my heroes, except one—[Julius] Nyerere—were becoming terrible people. So I just felt the only way to do it was to be an internationalist.

TGW: The other event—it happened before you got to Germany, but it was while you were doing your undergraduate or graduate degree. But I presume that, when you arrived in Germany, it was quite topical. It was the Treaty of Rome, and Europe’s effort to go beyond the borders of the nation-state. What do you recall of those early debates in Europe, and how did students, either in the United States or elsewhere, look upon this? Did this seem like a model for other parts of the world?

JJ: I did research on it when I went for Stiftung. Again, I was lucky because of one of the good things attached to the Stiftung, which is a major German foundation, they arranged all of my trips. Therefore, they arranged some of my interviews. I got to know [Walter] Hallstein very, very much. He was the first commissioner of the Common Market. At that time, they didn’t believe it would go far, because the coal and steel community was supposed to be a gradual step; it might evolve. You had a big division. The Social Democrats were opposed to the Common Market, because they said this was a Catholic gathering, because all the leaders at the time when I was there were Catholics—[Charles] de Gaulle in France, [Konrad] Adenauer,

the head in Austria. They all were Catholics. So it was perceived as a sort of Catholic cabal. Then the other parties looked on it with suspicion. I remember talking a lot with Hallstein about this. He said, “Well, it will take time.”

The Schumann Plan, yes, was OK. But then if you recall, there were two or three poles that were taken. The EDC (European Defense Community) debate was before I got there, but I knew what was discussed. The majority of French people opposed to being in with the Germans. There was strong opposition to bringing the Germans into some kind of community at the time. So it was not seen as going to work, because the British were out of it with EFTA (European Free Trade Association). People have forgotten about this. You had the seven out, with Sweden and Britain, and the British were saying it was not going to work. So, there was no really firm conviction at the time that this was something which was going to last. It was not seen as a model because the players were divided themselves.

TGW: When you were recruited in the secretariat, you hadn't finished your dissertation. How did you manage to write and hold down a job? And actually, what was the topic of your dissertation? This is a question directed at other people in the room.

JJ: It is so funny, you know, because actually what I wanted to do, on the explanation of Karl Deutsch, was to look at Tanzania, at national cohesion, using the model of Karl Deutsch in his book. As I said, I didn't apply to the UN. I was not planning to go to the UN at the time, but when it came, two of the people who recommended me was Professor Louis B. John of the Harvard Law School—I was also at the Harvard Law school studying there—and Rupert Emerson. They all said, “Look, this is a good job. You can do it.” So I then went to talk to the chairman of the department, because at MIT you were required not to stay on campus when you were doing your research. It was required. You present your project to a committee; after it is



agreed and accepted, then you leave the campus. That was the procedure at the time. Then you go for about one or two years, and then you can come back and finish writing. That was the standard.

Professor Pool, who was a good friend of mine, said, “Look, you are going to a good laboratory, but I suggest you change the subject. Go there. It will be good for you. You will interact with delegates. So we will discuss it with Professor Padelford and Emerson.” They said, “Why don’t you look at this whole debate which went on for so long, how best we can deal with security. Is it by the regional system or by the global system? This is a big debate, and nobody has reviewed it—a big debate between the Americans and the British. And write about the peacekeeping.” There was a big debate that peacekeeping was dead in the Cold War after the Congo. It would not happen anymore, that it was not going to work. The Russians were not participating.

So that is what I did. Then I came back and presented to them on regional peacekeeping and peacemaking. They accepted it. Then, of course, I became so absorbed with the Middle East problem and Vietnam. So one day, there was a change of chairmanship at MIT, and they wrote me a letter. It was the end of 1965. They said, “Two years now have passed. We haven’t heard about you. You have only a few months to tell us what you are doing.” As God is my witness—you will not believe it—I sat down at home and wrote roughly about seventy-five pages that day. I was thinking about it all the time. I was researching it. I knew what I was going to say. So I sat down. Believe me, I still have that paper. I wrote it, had it typed, and sent it to MIT. They said, “Fine, then develop them.” I gave them chapter by chapter. So that is what happened.

But then I ran into great difficulties with Professor Padelford—not with Professor Bloomfield so much. We disagreed. He was one of the architects of the Charter. Do you know Professor Padelford?

TGW: No, I don't.

JJ: He was one of the architects of the Charter. He was American, and he could not accept my shift towards regionalism. Then we had lots of fights. I had a lot of headaches with him. Bloomfield was more sympathetic. But he could not really understand, because this was a debate that was finished. Churchill made a big debate over this thing. I said, "But the Charter does call for it. You never developed it." So that is what I did. It was a big struggle. About a year after I did that, I finished it.

TGW: I am trying to think—who was on your committee? Was Lincoln Bloomfield a member?

JJ: He was there. Professor Padelford was there. And I think Professor Pool and somebody else. I cannot remember. But the one I had the biggest headache with was the chairman. But the others understood my position. I was writing more for direct—I was talking to delegates and everything, interviewing people. It was more concrete. But Professor Padelford was sort of old-fashioned. Professor Padelford was not in the tradition of MIT at all. Professor Padelford is a Harvard graduate-type, more of the Harvard type. He was just one of the people who was brought to MIT before this MIT program started, just to give the students some background.

TGW: Actually, you mentioned something that very few people have mentioned in interviews, which is obviously fairly important to me—the Vietnam War. How did this conflict

permeate the secretariat? What was its influence on the politics, and particularly on openness to ideas?

JJ: As I said, I was brought in because of the German problem, which was very acute in the 1960s—the Berlin Wall had been established. I remember that the very first thing they asked me to write was “Kennedy’s Speech,” at American University on 10 June 1963. They said, “Look, explain this speech to us along with that of Mr. [Andrei] Gromyko before the General Assembly on 19 September 1963.”

So I said, “OK, the only way you can understand what is going on is that you must look at two levels of analysis. You must look in terms of Soviet-American relations, and broader East-West relations. It is difficult, but you must do it in order to understand what is going on, because the Russians were keen on having good Soviet-American relations, but not keen on having wider ones.” I put this down and explained to them that in Russian history, from Peter the Great, they always wanted to be seen as among the great powers. And for the Russians, no matter who the Americans were, they wanted to be seen as their coequal. So they would do anything.

So this paper impressed the secretariat. I was very surprised. This was my first paper I wrote. It started a major—and I still have that paper. It was debated. They were all saying, “Who is this guy?” Of course, Jordan was very proud because he found me. I went to speak at Columbia on this thing and he was so pleased. That is how I got to meet many people on the 38<sup>th</sup> floor. So that made a huge impact. Then they said, “OK, can you help us to look at other broad things?” So then I began to prepare notes, these monthly notes, which I did for about three years. And I have a collection of all of them. In fact, this lady who died wanted me to publish

them. She was one of these people who had ideas on the UN. She was incredible. Oh, Mrs. Winslow.

TGW: Oh, Ann Winslow. Yes?

JJ: She tried to really develop ideas. She would read every month my papers. They had a first-rate library for the service of the secretariat, and Ann Winslow was in charge. So then I began to write about Vietnam as part of my monthly notes on East-West relations.

TGW: Richard Swift, *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*?

JJ: This employs high thinking. Nobody else—this was when I joined the UN.

TGW: But look at the contributors to this volume. This is interesting: William Jordan, Hans Singer, Julia Henderson, Brian Urquhart, Oscar Schachter. Very interesting. Actually, I'm interviewing Oscar next week.

JJ: You see, you had people who were producing ideas. And these people—I remember when I used to go there, and you would hear interesting discussions, superb discussions. So for a young P-2 of only a year or two, I was drawn in immediately into this group. And Ann Winslow was there.

TGW: I am just curious. What was the Dag Hammarskjöld Library like in those early years? These days, it seems to be barely keeping up with newspapers.

JJ: I spent almost half of my time in the library. At the time, I was about P-3. I spent half of my time because that's all I was doing. I had no other outside function except to prepare these notes and other ad hoc notes. So I would be just reading books and magazines. They had a good collection at the time. It helped me enormously. I almost had a desk there by myself. I spent all my time there.

TGW: And what happened by the end of your career? It seems there has been a deterioration in the services. Is this reflective of the priorities?

JJ: Yes, yes. It's all manufactured. For example, this old wonderful library which Ann Winslow used to have, they stopped it, because after the "Zionism is racism" issue, the UN became a bad word in America. These things all stopped. These were the underpinnings. The only thing which came close to it was Ralph Bunche. They were doing similar things, but not at the same level as these people. This came out every year.

TGW: I am reminded, by looking at the table of contents, that the people who are still alive are part of our oral history. But while you were a young official—in fact, as you were arriving, and shortly after—the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is held. How was this perceived in New York, in the sense that New York is supposed to be political and security? In retrospect anyway, this seems like a major development on the economic and social side, a major coming together of developing countries, most of whom are now independent by that time. And certainly the formation of the Group of 77 (G-77) subsequently was a major factor in world politics. What did it seem like in 1963 or 1964 in New York?

JJ: The impact was not that great. These intellectual ideas came from Latin America. That is where it came from—ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America). ECLA was the driving force of all these ideas. The way they were really discussed in the debates—not intellectually, but in the debates—was, and this is very interesting, which I am developing in my book in fact, that these UN organs were really not in favor of the Third World. That was basically the argument. Therefore, unless you can reform the UN, they will get nothing out of it.

First of all, people forget that there was a big debate as to whether they should even have a major economic program of the UN. The U.S. opposed it. They didn't accept that the Charter authorizes the UN to do so—the Danes and the Scandinavians were more supportive of it. So the way I remember it being discussed was that we had to create these institutions outside of the framework, where we will have a voice. That is the way UNCTAD was debated. And that is why the Americans never accepted UNCTAD and others, because they think that, in contrast to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, you don't have a weighted voting. They feel that when you are dealing with these resources, the people who are paying most—it's not like in the General Assembly—don't accept it. Whereas the Third World was saying, "Yes, we need equal voting."

That's when all these things began. You had things like UNCTAD coming up with major programs that would cost so much, and were developed by people who did not have much to pay. We could not go on doing that. This is how it all started. But this was more or less a shift in the power structure of the UN. But actually, the idea, as it stands theoretically, came from ECLA. It was purely an ECLA thing. And they sold it to the Africans. They bought it. They went to them to listen to what they had to say.

TGW: Did it seem at that stage—because this was supposed to be a one-time conference when it was prepared in the beginning of 1962, but by 1964 it becomes a permanent conference—that there would be an organization? Were people within the secretariat, or did your monthly notes reflect that there may have been a sea change in international relations going on in this balance between North—well, it was not called "North"—and "South" at the time, between developed and developing countries?

JJ: No, there was a more bureaucratic thing which one has to look at, because when you have a conference like that, the operators in the secretariat are looking for posts. So there were people who wanted to create a permanent institution. The established posts were in the secretariat, and people wanted to move.

Normally what you have is, the Secretary-General would present his budgets to the General Assembly. But then you could create more posts when you report to the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council), and you would say, "To implement this program, we need two D-2s." It was somewhat of a bureaucratic thing. I know many people whose careers came through—people like [Diego] Cordovez, people like the Iraqi. What's his name?

TGW: [Ismat] Kittani?

JJ: They all came out of the—even Ken Dadzie. They came outside of the regular system. It was a bureaucratic thing; it was not seen as—it was only afterwards, when the Americans began to query, when UNCTAD began to go into this question of protective prices, subsidies. Then they began to fight openly, and said, "No, no. We cannot accept it." Even though this was nothing different from the farm policy of the United States, where you give to the farmers. They fought against it because they saw they had no control over it.

TGW: In a general way, what is the weight, if any, of economic and social issues within the front office of the United Nations? In reading through this series of biographies and autobiographies of Secretaries-General, there frequently appears a sort of lip service. But if you weighed the pages, you'd have to say that ninety-five pages out of 100 are devoted to issues of high politics and not UNCTAD. Is that the case?

JJ: Yes. It was always felt. Unfortunately, the economic aspect was never given that much consideration. This has also worried a lot of those who were involved in things like

UNCTAD and UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization), who said, “You are giving us a bad name. We are doing such good works, but nobody knows what we are doing because you people are messing up the world.” Some people made jokes about that. It has always been that way.

TGW: Of course the economic, at some point, penetrates what is going on. I was wondering, during the 1970s, when you move into the office of the Secretary-General, you were preoccupied with the Yom Kippur War. But on the economic and social side, you have OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), which is thriving on the politics of this conflict. But it has this gigantic impact on the world economy. And the spin that that is given in international discussions takes the form of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). So you had these two worlds. But I presume that the politics of the G-77, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), within the conferences in 1973 and 1974, after the Yom Kippur War, also have an impact on what is possible in the political realm and on the 38<sup>th</sup> floor.

JJ: The way I remember, it was in things that I was doing in the Middle East at that time very, very actively. First of all with Nyerere, and then by myself. It came to the Algerians. The argument that the Algerians made was, “Look, they are just very unfair. What we were importing from the industrialized powers was so expensive. What we sell under deteriorating prices—it’s not fair. It’s not an equitable system.” That was the way the Algerians made the argument. So they said, “Look, let us use our resources also to bargain with them.”

Of course it came in the context of the Middle East, which is already an explosive thing. So this is why the Algerians joined this oil cartel, which was to raise the price of this commodity which keeps falling—oil, which is so essential for an industrial economy. Of course it caught the



industrialized world by surprise. It never occurred to them that this cartel would form and be successful.

It was the time of [Henry] Kissinger. And I remember that because of the fact that it was in a context of Middle East war. Immediately Kissinger saw it in a geopolitical sense. He saw it clearly, that this could be more damaging to the industrialized world if they don't respond. What I think he did—this is my own analysis—he decided that America must improve its relations with the Arab countries. At that time, America had no relations with the Arab countries. They all broke relations after the Six-Day War. They broke with the United States, and the United States was not present in the Arab world between 1967 and the Yom Kippur War. That's a big gap in terms of diplomatic relations.

So he decided that first we were going to play a role. He won favors with Egypt and others. Then his next thing was to create dependency. That is my view—he created a dependency relationship with Saudi Arabia and others, and Kuwait, by supplying American technology, American military hardware, and getting American technicians. That is how it began, gradually. So with this dependent relationship, they were hooked. They were encouraged to invest their petrol dollars in the United States and Europe. They have an interest in a stabilized economy.

So for the Americans a role in solving Middle East problems, creating a dependency relationship in the key oil-producing countries by making them know that, "If you hurt us, you will be hurt, because your money is also here. But also, we will pull our military trainees." So it was after he had done that that he was able to get the Saudis—Jarring and others—to begin to play the role of fighting the Algerians. That, to me, was the real orchestration of Kissinger. And that one, I was very much involved in because it was in the context of the Middle East years.

TGW: How does, in retrospect, this New International Economic Order look, with a quarter of a century perspective?

JJ: It was never accepted by the Americans. It was never accepted, because it was again the Third World countries trying to find a niche for themselves. One thing which I am surprised is that people forget that there was a big element in this—global negotiations. People forgot about it, but that was watchword of the Third World. And what were they saying? They were saying, basically, “You have things stacked against us. All the economic decisions in the world are made at the IMF and the World Bank. You have more voting there, and we have little say. We are helpless, and we are going to stay where we are unless you create a new economic order. But even if you have to use that, we must have global negotiations where everyone will be in one place, and we set the parameters that the IMF and the World Bank all implement.”

That is why [Ronald] Reagan and others fought it to death. They just refused, when it comes to money. People hardly talk today about the big argument about global negotiations. The whole thing came to Cancun, and that is where it finally was killed by Reagan. But these things were big decisions—the whole idea of global negotiations. Then the Americans came with the idea, and said, “You Third World countries go to the market economy.” And the Africans came out in that special session—economic matters became important in the context of global negotiation. But the West understood that what they were trying to do was to change the voting pattern, and they, the Third World countries, were not prepared to do it. But I know that is what they were doing.

TGW: We need to pause here. This is the end of tape number one.

TGW: This is the beginning of tape number two, the 30<sup>th</sup> of August, Tom Weiss interviewing James Jonah. We were at the New International Economic Order. Johan Kaufman,

in an interview he did for the project, emphasized not Henry Kissinger's geopolitics, but the semantics, the bitterness that characterized debates within the mid-1970s. This is the era of "Zionism is racism" and the New International Economic Order. What, in your view, is the importance of rhetoric and atmosphere within such sessions in contributing to an ability for states to hold discussions sensibly and come to a meeting of the minds? Was it possible within that climate?

JJ: Well, this is all part of the changing fortunes in the UN. What I mean is this. Strictly speaking, the way the Charter was crafted, only the Security Council was the executive organ, basically. I personally have also stressed that the Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General, can play a very important role. So during the Cold War years, and the failure of the concert concept, the power of the General Assembly grew tremendously, way beyond what was conceived by the drafters. And it created a distorted picture in the minds of the developing countries that they have the power. In fact, the major powers competed for the favors of the developing countries in the 1960s. And success or failure depends on who is the dominant dog in the great power rivalry. So I think there is the illusion that led the Third World countries to believe they could do whatever they like with their votes: "We don't care what you say, this is our turn. We control the General Assembly." Until the Americans put a stop to it and said, "We will not pay. You can let everyone vote, but we are not going to pay for it."

So this rhetoric came with this illusion of power by the Third World countries. But how do you counter this? The American response was, "Look, we will not pay for these expensive programs. We will not pay for these big conferences. We will not pay for them." So this is how the financial crisis started in the middle 1970. This was contrary to the whole American approach which was, "You don't have to like what is passed; you have to pay for what is

passed,” which was the whole peacekeeping dispute that went to the ICJ (International Court of Justice)—financial obligations.

I remember when the Americans lost in 1965 during the Article 19 dispute. People forget about what [Arthur]Goldberg, who was then the ambassador who had left the Supreme Court, said, “If we cannot obtain a consensus on this issue of the obligation of member states to pay, whether they like it or not, it will come to haunt all of us. Because we, the USA, will decide what we can and cannot pay.” This was in 1965. I remember that speech; it struck me as a warning. So that is what the Americans did. They just said, “We are not going to pay for this program or conference, which is the forum that would be used to denounce us.” And they didn’t pay for it. Of course, things are more favorable today. So they paid for all these things that they said they would not pay for.

The USA even succeeded in getting a decision in the General Assembly, even got the idea, the financial, that the ACABQ (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) can take decision only by consensus, which brings a veto into it immediately. So you don’t have the USA being outvoted in the General Assembly with the budget. They said, “We can only pay if we have consensus.” It was very painful for the Third World countries to accept, but they had no choice. In fact, the Americans got it, and then they reneged on the payment of their debts. This has been the pattern. They always say, “We will pay if you do this.”

But that changed the entire picture. So if you don’t have an agreeable situation where you reach consensus, if you go and build these large-scale programs any longer, say for UNCTAD, they don’t pay. If you don’t have consensus, you don’t have a budget.

TGW: During this period of the 1970s, when you are in the office of the Secretary General, one of the vehicles for ideas that is prominent in many of our interviews happens to be

the role of the conferences you just mentioned—these big, expensive, visible conferences. The 1970s began this trend with Stockholm (UN Conference on the Human Environment), and Bucharest (UN World Population Conference), and Rome (World Food Conference), et cetera. What, in your view, in terms of launching new ideas—the environment, food security, population—what is the importance of these major international gatherings in putting ideas on the radar screen of decision-makers or academics or journalists?

JJ: Well, the general view was that they are good in terms of raising consciousness. That is one major goal which I would accept. But frankly, realistically, and honestly, it was also as a bureaucratic device by the secretariat to create institutions. If you look, many of these things came out of the conferences. Someone in the secretariat would be planning, “How many posts am I going to get?” It’s a fact. No question about that, it’s a fact. Most of it is conceived by people who want to advance their careers. At one point, the Americans, and those who pay the budgets, began to resist that these conferences create new institutions. It was always stipulated, “You don’t like it, but there should be no new institution created.” Quite often this was a vehicle by bureaucrats to create—but basically, and I think Boutros-Ghali did a lot to make the argument that creating global communication is so important, that you can continue these global conferences, minimizing the creation of new institutions. So I remember many times, he would say, “Look, don’t bother to think about creating any new institutions at all.”

But I see many of them as bureaucratic. The environment, yes. And here you might bring in the role of the NGOs (nongovernmental organizations). The NGOs did more over the years to advance the conclusions of these conferences. They are the foot-soldiers. The other beneficiaries were secretariat officials. You should look at some of these peoples’ careers. You would see how their careers advanced through these conferences.

TGW: So there were actually, as you mentioned, these two big rushes of conferences, one in the 1970s and one in the 1990s. But you would see the ones of the 1990s being different from the 1970s in that a conscious decision was made not to create institutions?

JJ: Yes, he would always say, “Go ahead, but don’t create any new institutions.”

TGW: This is interesting because, for people who look at ideas, one of the concrete manifestations of the importance of an idea, or the importance of a norm, or the importance of a principle is, in fact, once it becomes institutionalized, once you can point your finger at a place where an issue is discussed. So the environment, before the creation of an environmental ministry, is just sort of floating around. And the environment, before the creation of UNEP (UN Environment Programme), before an environmental arm in the World Bank, et cetera, is merely interesting as an idea. But once it is crystallized in an institution, it actually is important. Would you agree?

JJ: Yes. But you see, the way it was done—for example, with UNEP, there were a lot of criticisms of the head, that he was more bureaucratic. I was the head of personnel at the time, and we had to deal with the Kenyan government. They almost ran him out of town. It became an obstacle in many ways. In fact, there was an idea to move UNEP out of Kenya, saying it had become too politicized. So it created lots of problems.

It is true that, as I said, for me the NGOs are more important. The NGOs take the statements—Brandt or whatever—and argue in their various countries to give it flesh and blood. They did a lot.

TGW: But that argues that it is an essential or useful tool to push an idea.

JJ: Well, like UNCTAD. At the beginning, UNCTAD did that. But you had, at the time, the more intellectual people out there. [Raúl] Prebisch himself was there. But if you create it

with a big bureaucrat who has no ideas, he will just manage to maneuver. And if you take the whole question of creating this economic czar, it is a very interesting. The complaint was being made that these things were too dispersed around the place, and the Secretary-General formed a task force to look into this. They did, and they came up with the idea of an economic czar. The whole thing became more bureaucratic. Of course, Ken Dadzie finally cut it, but the bureaucrats in the secretariat undermined everything. So it became finally useless. You create an institution which was to put together all of the economic and social things in the whole system. That was the point.

TGW: This was the position of the director-general.

JJ: Yes. But by the time it got there—and I was really involved in this—people like Rafi Ahmed and all those economists undermined everything. Ken Dadzie was there just like a figurehead. He had no power. A similar idea was discussed with respect to humanitarian coordination in the system. In fact, Boutros-Ghali talked to me about it. They wanted me to take the new position. They said, “You combine the humanitarian concerns and give the office the political clout.” They wanted to give the humanitarian czar political clout, bringing him to New York. This was the debate. In fact, since I was already coordinating humanitarian assistance in the horn of Africa, they were thinking that I should be the person to do it.

TGW: This was the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)?

JJ: Yes. And I said, “No, it would be a useless department.”

TGW: As long as you mentioned NGOs, what do you see as the future of NGOs in terms of intergovernmental decision-making? Is there a role for them as a more integral part of the United Nations machinery, or will they remain on the periphery?

JJ: You see the UN has taken a very ambivalent view toward NGOs. In the early years, up to the mid-1980s, or when Boutros-Ghali got in, the secretariat viewed NGOs as useful instruments in the area of disarmament, apartheid, and Palestinian issues. They were useful instruments. In fact, they did a lot on apartheid, the NGOs. But once the NGOs found strength—and they found strength because most of the NGO people became heavyweights in their countries—the European NGOs in particular. They were NGOs, and then they became very powerful political figures. Now maybe for some people they have become too powerful. The reason is that the NGOs had a way of overestimating their strength, based on their success in disarmament and Palestine, and they are branching out and often challenging governments. That's where you have problems, where governments are beginning to raise questions: "Who are these unelected people? Why should you give them a voice in the General Assembly? Who elected them?" Many governments are not prepared to give them a prominent voice in intergovernmental organizations.

I also believe from my observation, because I work with them a great deal in the horn of Africa—I had to coordinate the NGO activities there—they have to look at their staffing situation. Not all of them are solid. Some of them are outright "crooks," sorry to say, engaged in smuggling commodities and diamonds. In Africa in particular, some of these NGOs have links with rebel movements. I think that raises questions. Thirdly, governments are raising questions—and I know we did in Sierra Leone—about the accountability of NGOs in terms of how they run their show. Because they are politically powerful in many countries like the United States, and in Europe, these governments channel their assistance through NGOs. But who measures how the NGOs dispense these funds? You hear from the Americans that they



have given to Sierra Leone \$15 million. But it is given to NGOs. We don't know what amount they spent in our country and how much is overhead. There has to be proper monitoring.

TGW: There is one question I had meant to ask earlier because it came up in your writing. When did you get married? Did you have time for this?

JJ: Yes, in 1964.

TGW: In 1964. I see, so you worked on it before the dissertation.

JJ: In fact it had something to do with that, because I came to the UN because my mother-in-law convinced me to come. They offered me a job at the UN. I first said no, when I received the offer. I was in Sweden that summer. I said, "No, I am not ready yet." And she convinced me to take it, and said if you were going to get money, you have to accept the job.

TGW: Well, that's one argument. But given that they were close to Hammarskjöld, or they knew Hammarskjöld, what was their link?

JJ: They knew him, but not fully. But a man called Bo Beskow, who was very close to my wife's parents, was the closest friend of Dag Hammarskjöld. He was the painter, Bo Beskow. He made that sculpture in the room, the prayer room. He was the closest friend of Dag Hammarskjöld. He also became my friend. This friend also convinced me, more or less.

TGW: What intrigued you about moving to the Office of Personnel after working in the Middle East and political affairs—your move in 1979?

JJ: There are many ways you can interpret it. One is that I was already interested in international civil service. I was a member of the Staff Council. I was a member of the Appointment and Promotion Committee and then the board. I was seen as a friend of staff generally, and I got much support from them. I was one of the closest people to Waldheim, and whenever he had problems with the staff he asked me to help. So we got to a point, by 1978,

when the assembly took it on their own to take on reforms. There were a number of Young Turks in the Fifth Committee. And George Davidson—head of administration—fought with these people, fought with these Young Turks, resisting reforms. And when he would bring a paper to the Secretary-General, he would call me. And I would say, “No, don’t do what he wanted you to do. Don’t pick up a fight with the staff.”

So it may well be that by 1979, he felt that he needed somebody that the staff will trust. That was the one benign, explanation: people in the political field were not happy. You will not believe that the Israelis objected that I was being moved from the Middle East desk. But this was the time of Camp David, and we calculated that the role of the UN would diminish.

Another way some people have looked at it is this. For some reason—we don’t know how it started—*Africa Confidential 1978* published a major article saying that I was going to oust Waldheim and take over the Secretary-Generalship. You will not believe this. We could not figure it out. I think it was done by Israeli intelligence, because what had happened was Waldheim had shown much confidence in me. Waldheim panicked and said, “This man may be a threat. Let me get him out of the way.” That is another way of looking at it. But I think the first one has merit, because I know he used to consult me. And it seemed globally that he was correct, because this was the first sign that Waldheim was serious about building a proper international civil service.

TGW: You in fact are spending your time this year at The Graduate Center writing a book on the international civil service. I think you have either written or said that the future of the UN may depend on the viability of the concept. Is this true? And where does this leave us?

JJ: I think it’s true. I still believe that the question which was posed by Hammarskjöld in his Oxford speech (May 1961) still stands. And I think people intuitively agree, but they feel it

has gone so far that you can never change it. This is the consensus, that it is a good idea but that it is not going to work. And that you have to accept that fact. But I am saying, “Well, it may be practical politics, but the consequences down the road are very serious.” And I go back to what happened under the League system. I have looked at this book *The Enemy Within*, where it was posited—

TGW: Who wrote it?

JJ: I forgot the name of this guy. The book argued that the second secretary-general of the League, a Frenchman, killed the League from within. It is a very good book, an excellent book. Therefore, I still believe that if you kill this concept, what is going to happen? You can see it now happening. In the past, if you wanted to send an envoy, you took him from the secretariat. Now it is hardly done.

You are hearing a good deal about peacekeeping and the way it is done by people who have no clue of the organization. And I think in the long run, it will make the UN become what it was not supposed to be—an intergovernmental secretariat. But they fought against—this was a Soviet concept—they fought against that, the Americans, the British. We are moving towards that, and I think it is not going to be very good for the credibility, as a corporate body of the UN.

TGW: How do you explain this deterioration over time?

JJ: It’s deliberate. I think it’s deliberate. The Russians never bought the idea at all. At least they were clear about that. They didn’t buy it. The Americans, the British, they were sold on the idea. They really had complete faith in it, but they came to the position that the secretariat was detrimental to their interests. All these big conferences, they all originated from the secretariat. They cooked it up and sold it to delegates.

I don't know what else I have told you about Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Here was a woman who thought that she was an intellectual. She said, "What have Americans done? How dumb could the Americans be? Look at the British. They are smarter. They are putting Brian Urquhart there to make all this policy." Americans said, "What have we done? We have nobody of stature." And I said, "What does that have to do with the British? They were not responsible for Brian's recruitment into the secretariat." But for her, it was all a British plan. Brian said they would do the same thing.

It is true. A government can conceal its action in the secretariat. It can get the secretariat to take initiatives that it does not want to take credit for. You can always defend what the secretariat has proposed. I think once the Americans changed their views, and said, "Yes, it is all and well to talk about career service." Once they changed, then there was no way to protect the international civil service anymore.

TGW: It seems to me, actually, that politicization, or making an intergovernmental secretariat like the European Union, is one problem. I think that Brian, in his autobiography, writes about another, which is the erosion in standards.

JJ: In the secretariat?

TGW: Yes, exactly.

JJ: That goes together.

TGW: I see.

JJ: For me, I agree. For example, the Americans did something. The man they brought in knew there was a post which, in fact, was in the political department, which when I went there the head was William Jordan, the head of the political affairs division. And that man was a man of ideas. When they brought in an American—he was a man of ideas stationed there, a professor

and everything. They kept that tradition. But Kirkpatrick brought in a political operative. You see, already it changed, because all he was there to do was to implement American interests. That was the person that Kirkpatrick promoted to that position. So you can begin to see that once he's there, the staff are not going to be motivated to work for that person. And this is going on around the secretariat now. It has gone too far.

TGW: In your view, should there be more career officials, more seconded officials or more fixed-term contracts? Is there any fix to this? Or do you have to go back to the drawing boards?

JJ: I think you need to build up a career service. You really have to do that. Experience counts a lot. Take this racism conference. I am amazed that people ignored what happened in the second world conference in Geneva in 1982. When I was secretary-general of that conference, I was able to prevent Zionism from being included in the documents. The people now, they don't even have any clue of that conference. But if you had a career service, that is what a career service does—a body of knowledge, institutional memory. You are losing that now because you are not strengthening the career service. And they are going to stop careers in the secretariat.

TGW: Stop them?

JJ: The Secretary-General last year proposed to stop permanent contracts.

TGW: Well, I have always thought that career service is a little like tenure in universities. It is really is a double-edged sword. It can be an excuse to keep people around forever who shouldn't have been there in the first place, or it can be a guarantee to have the right people around.

JJ: No, but the *Staff Rules and Regulations* provide for periodic reviews every five years, a peer review. People just don't know what happened ten years ago. Then how do you make policy? Governments have people who are there with institutional memory. So that is what happened. And I think it is a mistake. You cannot run the UN like a business. You cannot do it. It will be a disaster. In the long run, you will find it will be a disaster. I am absolutely convinced about that.

TGW: Would it be fair to ask your judgment about the quality of people working in the secretariat, the intellectual quality of people? Earlier you mentioned intellectual quality, integrity, and some risk taking. It seems to me that those are important aspects of anyone in a bureaucracy. How would you compare the secretariat when you first arrived, or in the middle years, and now, with comparable kinds of units, whether these are national civil services or university faculties, if those are fair comparisons, or the Bretton Woods institutions? Earlier you said they were unfavorable with the Bretton Woods institutions. What about good national civil services or a good university? How does the secretariat match up?

JJ: The problem is the same problem when a national civil service has been politicized. And the more you get politics involved, these people are already used to that. Somebody who has catapulted to become an under-secretary-general of the UN, maybe in his own country all he knows is that you appoint political people. For a while, that is what was happening in the secretariat. I once tried to map it out.

You have somebody who was brought in by politics. He lobbies. This was a problem that was quite common in the late 1970s. You had people who were collecting government endorsements in the secretariat to be appointed. Most of the time, when there was an endorsement, they said, "Look, when I get there, I will give you a post." This is how the game is

played. So they become head of a department. They pay these debts. They want to bring people in. Now they discover there are people there with permanent contracts. So what do they do? Before the Americans stopped the whole thing, they would go to the assembly, under the financial implications of a resolution, and say, "Look, there is no post right now. I promised you, but this guy is there. So we need to get about ten posts. Why don't you draw up this resolution to get it passed? You will say there are financial implications to this resolution, and then you will have this post." They take the post, and now he is in the post. But he has a group of people who are there who are sidelined. They are pushed to the corner.

And that is why you begin to have this—over the years, an ineffective secretariat. They cannot remove them because they have permanent contracts. Not that they are not good—some of them become deadwood in the end. Functionally they made them deadwood. But then they bring in new people who are not committed to the UN but use it as a matter of a job. This happens in the UN. This is a fact of life. That's why I always tell people that there is no way that people who open their eyes wide to appoint me Secretary-General would do it, because half the secretariat would be out within twenty-four hours.

In the Bretton Woods institutions I thought it would be the same, frankly, until I was minister of finance and I had to interact with them. Then I found that these guys were solid people, and the reason being was that their bosses were all solid. You take the IMF—you have Mr. [Stanley] Fischer. He is one of the best—he came from MIT. These are all people with ideas. You cannot fool around. And even the governments were not lacking. These are people who donate billions—they would not allow it. So that is the reason why these people have not gotten to the stage where it is so politicized as the secretariat.

For many governments, the consequences of the secretariat mean nothing to them. In the IMF, it is a huge problem. So they see that it is in their interest to make sure that the standards are kept high. And the interaction between staff and governments—I have been very much surprised.

TGW: Is there a better way than geographical representation, or quotas, or whatever euphemism you want to use for it, to measure the kind of diversity one would like in the secretariat? Is there any alternative to this?

JJ: You see the Charter doesn't say that you have to have quotas. Whenever you have a quota, people interpret it. You have a range, but you have to have a representative secretariat. In fact, it was never true. I once challenged a group of ambassadors from the Western European countries. I said, "You are wrong. Some of the brightest people in the secretariat are from the Third World, for the simple reason that an Indian scholar, who studied in the best universities in the U.S. or Europe, cannot get a good job in India. He looks to the secretariat. He has good ideas." But because it was abused before—you see, take the French. The French abused it. They used to bring Africans to the secretariat who were really not up to it. But the French did it deliberately. They were the only power that really subverted the secretariat by forcing Africans at the senior level—if you look most of the key first senior officials were French-speaking. And what they used to do was to lobby very hard with the Secretary-General to appoint a Francophone African.

TGW: I met him. Some argue that actually gender parity is the most recent manifestation of this. But others argue that special measures are necessary to redress what are obviously gender imbalances at the UN. What's your opinion on this?



JJ: I raised the level of gender representation more than anybody else when I was head of personnel. And there was resistance. And I was very surprised, because some of my colleagues in the secretariat said they did not want women in their department. They made it plain to me. And this was cultural. They just couldn't accept it.

But I think it can be overblown too. Because I don't think, at least when I was in the UN, where you have two or three candidates and the woman is the best candidate, the woman is not taken. I cannot recall one occasion. None. I just couldn't. At times it was more difficult. For example, we tried to include Russian women. You could not under the Soviet system. This was impossible. Or any of the Eastern European countries. So what are you going to do?

It's different now. But this was a problem. I went on missions to China, to Russia to recruit women. "No way," they would say, "We are married. We are not going to leave our husbands. Our husbands will not allow us to leave." So this was all part of the problem. You can have bright people, you know. I have brought very bright women that I met in universities who still work in the secretariat. But they were on their own.

TGW: You mentioned cultural difference, and there are some obvious ones related to women. How do you juggle these kinds of understandings, or misunderstandings, within the personnel service?

JJ: You have to fight it, because we had the target of 25 percent. That's what I was concerned with. So I told the department, "You have to make sure you have 25 percent. I don't care what your feeling is." Then I began to do something which I didn't like to do. All the vacancies, I reserved 25 percent of the vacancies for women. There would be competition, but these posts would only be filled by women, my directive to every department. For me to meet the target—and I wanted to meet the target—these 25 percent were going to be filled by women.

I didn't care. You can go and get the best women you can find, but these posts are for women. You had to do that. You have no other choice.

TGW: The first conference on women was in 1975 (UN World Conference of the International Women's Year). When did the topic of women's representation or gender equality—

JJ: I think in 1978, with the Young Turks.

TGW: But when do you think it entered the secretariat as a concern? As a result of the conference or discussion?

JJ: The first resolution on that was in 1978, because I was there in 1979 and I had to implement that resolution.

TGW: And how had it manifested itself in the secretariat earlier? Is this one of the occasions when an idea from outside comes into the UN?

JJ: No. I think there was a general consciousness that was developing—the women's conference, employing women. This Finnish woman—what was her name?

TGW: It was in the email from Leticia Shahani the other day. It's an unpronounceable name.

JJ: Yes. In fact, Shahani came after her. And Shahani had a tough time. I had to go to bat for her a great deal because this woman was a skillful person. So she was the first senior official to occupy that post. Then they moved it, of course, farther to Vienna. You know, when you are in Vienna—

TGW: Yes, Margaret Anstee had a lot to say about that. In fact, I think it is true. I was going to ask you that earlier, but we got off the topic. The location of UNEP in Nairobi or the location of women in Vienna. On one hand, you can argue that it is useful to move sites around.

On the other hand, it really does move away from the idea of a sort of integrated, coherent, centralized presence and discussion of these issues. On balance, which is better?

JJ: For example, you can make a case that some of these functional institutions, which will be in the constitutional field, should be out. But some things like if you want to make it to the top of the agenda, you must be in New York. You won't get any attention if it's outside. That's the way things are.

TGW: During this time, you had actually had the chance to work with four Secretaries-General. You said you had been quite influenced by Dag Hammarskjöld's actions. How would you rank them in terms of leadership, in particular intellectual leadership, or openness to ideas, and an ability to try to move outside of the box, intellectually speaking?

JJ: That's very difficult. Very difficult, because one thing that U Thant did very well, he got out of the way. He allowed Bunche and others to run the show. That was very good, because you stretched the philosophy and temperament of others longer. So that was very good. He didn't manage to do anything; he just allowed the same intellectual things to continue. Waldheim had a good intellectual grasp of world politics. But he was too much of a politician and excessively pragmatic without principles. So when you say the word "leadership," that's why I said it was difficult, because I didn't think he was able to convey leadership. He was very good in his job, but I don't think he conveyed leadership at all. He was, in a sense, also very patrician in his dealings. So I don't believe the leadership was there. It was not there, but he was good.

Pérez de Cuéllar, to me, was almost a disaster. It was not of his own making; he was a weak person. He is a man, I believe, who never wanted the job. I think he was a man who was pushed into a job by ambitious people like Emilio—the Peruvian fellow. Emilio was a disaster

for the UN. He did a lot of harm in the secretariat. Pérez de Cuéllar was so distant. He didn't want to get involved. He didn't want to get involved with dirty things. In fact, there was no leadership from Pérez de Cuéllar. He left the political side to [Giandomenico] Picco and others. But he was basically, in my view, a decent man. He was no fool, but he was not a very energetic person. He allowed a drift to take place.

And I always said that you cannot understand Boutros-Ghali unless you know that there was a vacuum for ten years. Boutros-Ghali came in, saw this malaise, and wanted to shake things up. After ten years, people don't accept it. I just found a quotation which I don't think they knew the man. It was very interesting. Kirkpatrick complained that the secretariat was adrift. People were doing whatever they like. This was just before Boutros-Ghali was elected, and that's true. And the point of Boutros-Ghali was that he was trying to reign in a secretariat that had developed its own way of doing things. And he was not able to give leadership because he was baffled by the secretariat. He could not understand why people could be so incompetent. He just could not understand that people could not write anything decent. It bothered him that there were people who could not write. But if you have gone for ten years where nobody questions you, this is true. Nobody questions you.

So I don't think they gave leadership as such. It's very hard for a Secretary-General to give leadership. The only way he can do it is by his appointments. But it is very, very difficult. They have lost control. Even Boutros-Ghali, a strong man, had problems. He tried to change the makeup of the secretariat. He was told he could not do it, period. Even the British told him he could not do it, period. So they have lost control. Sometimes they have to consider this veto power, and they want to get reelected. They listen. Whereas Hammarskjöld said, "I am not going to take anybody you give to me. I determine who should be my senior advisers." And he

said to the Soviet Union, “You give me two or three names. I will select whom I want.” That kind of thing is gone.

You have a situation now where you take a Frenchman in the Department of Peacekeeping who never heard about peacekeeping. This is incredible! It was a part of a deal to be elected. But [Bernard] Miyet never heard about peacekeeping before he became USG.

TGW: Is it possible to make better use of special envoys, or is this part of the problem of going outside of the secretariat? I, frankly, myself have not thought of insider versus outsider in such negative terms, in the sense that Cyrus Vance or Lord Owen in the Balkans—maybe this is a way to get to the parties that you would not have, being part of the secretariat. But what is your feeling about the role of special representatives or envoys?

JJ: Well, you can have people—not everybody who is outside of the secretariat is inappropriate. Some of them could be very good. But some people take the idea of a prestigious male. It doesn’t work that way. I know. I can tell you. When Vance was proposed to go to South Africa, [Nelson] Mandela opposed it. Mandela came to me and totally opposed it initially.

In some cases—well, you have Mr. Baker in Western Sahara. You see, someone would say, “If you have an American, it comes with clout.” This is debatable. I don’t know. But I still believe that you have to have somebody who understands the problem thoroughly—that for me is the key. If the person knows the problem thoroughly—I don’t care where he comes from—he is a professional. He is not somebody who is just looking for a job, somebody who has helped the Secretary-General get elected.

That, to me, is very bad. And we did it even under Boutros-Ghali in two cases. And I told him it was wrong. He told me that this man helped him in his campaign. But I said, “But you don’t appoint him.” We finally did appoint that man and that man was a mistake. There are

two cases where it happened, where he told me frankly, “Yes, I understand your case, but I have promised them some jobs and I want to give them a job

TGW: Exactly, there is a ripple effect. Would it be impossible to change this? You said it was just not on; the Brits refused; the Americans refused. Is this a house of cards? Could a Secretary-General basically say no? It would become a practice, and a different type of tradition would be respected, that states cannot force either incompetent or unknowledgeable people down your throat. Would that be possible?

JJ: Yes, but you have to have someone who is not that ambitious. You see, Hammarskjöld was not ambitious to be Secretary-General. So he was not bothered. You should read this book by Ms. Madeline Kalb. That man was fighting the big powers over appointments. He would fight them to the death. He didn’t care. But the moment your election becomes, or you made a commitment—I know this, because as a candidate for the OAU (Organization of African Unity) I knew what countries were asking me to commit to. I said, “No way. I cannot do it.”

TGW: This was in 1991?

JJ: Yes. I was one of the five candidates. What I said to them is, “I would disgust myself, because there are people who know me, who I am. And if I am to be held by my commitment to you, I would be useless.” I was adamant to them. I said, “No, I will not do it.” They said, “OK, we will withhold our vote.” But to the credit of some governments, I was getting six votes consistently, without making any commitment to anybody. So there were governments, really, who believed you could have an independent Secretary-General.

TGW: Either that or they were voting against someone else.

JJ: They had to make up their mind. Or you can do it by disguise. Boutros-Ghali fooled them. That is precisely why he got into trouble. The first thing he did, he fired a Frenchman. People don't remember that.

TGW: That's right. He eliminated several under-secretaries-general.

JJ: And the number two man, he fired him. That takes a lot of guts. What was his name? He came after—what was his name? But the French—the first thing he did was to eliminate that post. He said, "I don't care." And then you wonder why in the end did the French betray him. So there are consequences.

TGW: Do you have any second thoughts about that candidacy in 1991?

JJ: I didn't want to do it. If you remember that that was the year that the Ford Foundation came out with its leadership study.

TGW: That was the year that Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers did their leadership study.

JJ: Yes. And I remember the American ambassador—what was his name, he was one of the best that they had. Now we have got to go for someone who really knows this house, who understands. This is a new ballgame. I will never forget—what is his name now? He just resigned as number two in the state department.

TGW: [Thomas] Pickering.

JJ: Pickering. All of them said, "Look, this is a different game." Of course they were sincere. So I was faced with whether or not to oppose, because my name was put in without my agreement—I did not apply. But what they realized was that once the voting started, it was totally out of their hands and it went to the capitals. And they have different criteria. They were not lying. They were sincere. But once it started, and the lobbying started, the capitals got

involved. And they had a different idea. [George H.W.] Bush wanted to have the Canadian prime minister. Invariably it is political. Boutros-Ghali was lucky, because they thought they were getting a weak person. And then he changed, and they said, "OK, this guy cannot last for more than one term. He cannot serve two terms. Forget it."

TGW: But while we are on that, before we go to lunch, the reporting on that is that it was only the United States. There were 188 or 187 countries that were for him, and one country that was against him. That seemed to be a little simplistic.

JJ: It is true. You know why? Because there is also a tendency in the Security Council not to change. So they had a tendency not to change the Secretary-General.

TGW: So inertia would have overcome the reticence about a Secretary-General with independence and personality?

JJ: They always want to do it. If you remember, they were going to elect U Thant for a third term. I had to take U Thant's letter to the Security Council to say, "He will not serve." He actually did, he said, "I am a sick man." Don't forget, they were going to elect Waldheim for a third term. Only one vote changed that. People don't know, and they tend to forget. The tradition is to resist change. This is the pattern of the UN. The Security Council, when they have someone there, they don't care to change him." This has been consistent.

Only one member said, "I cannot accept." Russia, in terms of Trygve Lie; the Chinese as far as Waldheim was concerned; and the Americans as far as Boutros-Ghali is concerned. That's it. But the votes were always fourteen to one. There is the same pattern. They don't want to change.

TGW: With that I think it is time to go to lunch. This is the end of tape number two on 30 August.



TGW: This is the beginning of tape number three, 30 August, Tom Weiss interviewing James Jonah. Actually, before we move ahead, there was one more question about the secretariat. Is it true that the financial crisis was used to destroy the essence of the international civil service? I am in particular thinking about seconded personnel in peacekeeping and elsewhere that caused so much furor. But what role did the financial crisis—which is still not over—have to do with the destruction of the civil service?

JJ: This is one of my theories. You see, there are a lot of contradictions that have occurred. I say the financial crisis, in a sense, was manufactured. We talked about the fact that the Americans resented the fact that they paid the highest amount. Yet, in the General Assembly and these large conferences, where the Americans were always attacked and criticized—so they were paying for people to criticize them. So this is what led to the Kassebaum amendment. OK, [Nancy] Kassebaum herself—because I think she is very pro-UN—I think she was trying to rescue the UN by coming out with this amendment. But others saw it as a way to get the UN in the image of the United States, or the West.

I have come to the conclusion that the contradictions are so many. First they say that the UN is overpaid. That is one of the arguments. It is true that a large part of the UN budget is for salaries and paychecks. Staff cost was a very large share—over 68 or so percent. So that was one of the arguments which they used to make to the secretariat, to cut back, cut back. But the one contradiction is that it was the same countries who came with supplementary payments of staff members on the secretariats, which was an indication that they were not well-paid. So therefore to bring them in and say, “I will give you a supplement,” was contrary to an independent civil service. That is one contradiction.

The second contradiction was that they said that we don't pay, we don't provide money. Then they turn around and say, "Yes, by the way, we know that we have given you so many tasks to perform. You don't have the resources to perform. But they can give you "loan staff" for free. X number of staff, take them free. That is, to me, undermining the secretariat. So it is not money. They had the money. But this is part of the way they tried to.

Third is a way that people may not know about. They created trust funds. These countries came out with trust funds for the UN. But the trust fund is controlled by the donor. And the first thing they will say is, "OK, we have this \$5 million trust fund. The manager there should be our national." Again it is subverting the whole thing. These are the reasons I feel that this whole thing was used. And of course, the most blatant was in the peacekeeping UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

The Secretary-General of the UN did not have the resources himself, but came in the American Pentagon and said, "We will build you a control center with all of the gadgets. We will pay for it." And they did it for the secretariat; they paid for it. They say, "You need some technicians, some logisticians. You need this and this, but you don't have money to add. We will give it to you." So these people then are brought in. They are given the *laissez passer*. They are mere agents of their government. So this again is another—I can give about four cases where, because of this financial crisis, these developments which were unthinkable have all become now common practice.

That is why, in fact, when I raised this issue, the assembly agreed with me and stopped this practice in DPKO. Not the others, but they stopped that.

TGW: We mentioned earlier ORCI, the Office of Research and Collection of Information. But I wanted to go back to that. This seems like such an obvious idea. Why did it take so long to get off the ground?

JJ: First of all, one of the conclusions I reached after ORCI is that even within governments, there is always a reluctance to have any kind of early warning, intellectual exercises. They just don't like it. Senior government officials always like to react to cables coming from the field. They must reply to the cables. And they don't want to spend time on projections for one year—they just don't like it. So there is a resistance to it. And with the UN anti-intellectual posture, which has been there for some time, it was even worse. They don't want to hear that. They want to deal with the most immediate thing.

So that was it. I give a lot of credit to Sutterlin, who really pushed this idea. And the staff really were enthusiastic about it. But what is the point of your preparing a paper which the *chef de cabinet* keeps from the Secretary-General? For example, one of the things which the Secretary-General wanted me to do was to give him daily briefings. I did it for one week, and they complained that too much of his time was taken up by that. So they changed it to two times a week. Then finally it faded out, because these people have no real love for it. But I found that in other governments, this has been the same case. They just don't look at people who look ahead. They just like to deal with the most immediate thing.

TGW: In your estimation, did some original thoughts, ideas, come out of that service and get their way into public policy discourse?

JJ: Well, yes, and of course they got into trouble. Take Yugoslavia, the very early projection about the man, [Slobodan] Milo\_evi\_. Milosevic raised the issue of Kosovo to really get publicity. Kosovo is such a sensitive thing in Yugoslavian sentiment that it was clear to me

that this man would cause a lot of trouble in the Balkans. We wrote the paper, and someone leaked it out to the Yugoslav ambassador and he raised strong objections. We had to stop this type of thing.

The Baltic states is another one, looking ahead. The Soviet Union opposed strongly that we should not be interfering in the internal affairs of member states. So those in the secretariat who don't want this thing would leak to the governments. But we did things of that sort. We did also, on the Iran-Iraq negotiations, we did a lot of overall analysis as to what direction they can go. I must say that there were people in the executive office who really believed that ORCI could contribute.

TGW: You have described a lot of constraints. I am led to ask just how possible is it to do high quality, independent, hard-hitting, honest research within the secretariat?

JJ: The Secretary-General must want it. If you know he wants it, it will be delivered. If he makes it a requirement, it will be delivered. It has to come strictly from him.

TGW: So you wouldn't see a comparative advantage in outside institutes taking on research if the Secretary-General wanted it?

JJ: That is what is being done now, but I am saying this is not an answer to the secretariat. And regrettably, it is biased, because it is mostly western institutions, which is why most of the things the Secretary-General does are not embraced by the Third World countries.

TGW: So in your view, there is not necessarily more credibility from outside independent research. There would be more credibility, if it were possible, to have independent inside research?

JJ: Yes. In fact, this was an issue—this was Bunche's opposition on UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research). This was one critique he had, because UNITAR was

created precisely for this purpose, on the grounds that you cannot have robust intellectual output in the secretariat. Therefore you have to create it. Bunche's argument was, "Look, they will be so far out of the loop that they cannot understand the intricacies that went on to make anything meaningful to us." That was his basic argument.

TGW: Unfortunately, of course, then UNITAR began to operate in UN mode by getting people who retired or should find jobs.

JJ: Yes. First, because first of all they have no money. They did not have much support.

TGW: In your view, what kind of academic makes a difference, in terms of the conduct of international secretariats? Are there some people who come in and are more effective? Some who are less? Is there any role for what is called theoretical literature in the academy? Does any of this make a difference within secretariats?

JJ: Yes, it could be done. It could be done if you have the people like William Jordan who wanted these kinds of things. I was asked to produce these kinds of things. When I come in next week, I will show you some of these things. And if I delayed a few days, they asked me, "What happened with the paper?" So there was a yearning for it to be done. But you have to write it in a way which is meaningful. Because one of the troubles with intellectual writings is that quite often they are so off-base that the practitioner throws it out and says, "This man or woman is unrealistic and doesn't know what he or she is talking about." So you have to be aware of the constraints of policymaking when bringing the intellectual resources of history and all of those things to bear. And then it is relevant to them.

TGW: I am wondering whether there is a difference between political, on the one hand, and economic and social analysis on the other. One of the quotes that was in Pérez de Cuéllar's memoirs was really quite interesting. He says that he was heavily dependent on his senior

economic advisors and, with rare exceptions, they have not recognized intellectual authority needed to provide leadership within the UN system, or among states. So frequently, within the economic and social arena, one establishes expert groups that put together august bodies of people to come in and provide advice or to write reports. Do you think there is a difference?

JJ: You see, take the early years of [Philippe] de Seynes. And there was a South African. These were intellectuals. This was the first generation. Ideas were coming in there, and these were all renowned economists themselves. There was a South African—I forgot his name. They were all known. But that generation has gone. But Philippe de Seynes was one of the brightest of economists that you had in the world.

TGW: People usually point, obviously to Prebisch, but also to Arthur Lewis. There was a series of people—Hans Singer, for example, who wandered through the secretariat in the early years.

JJ: Yes. So there were people with ideas, creative ideas. But, as I said, you can bring in people. ORCI was based on exchange of ideas. That was one of the requirements of ORCI. It was useful to do that. And some of the scholars are very good. Some of the scholars tried to know precisely what was going on in the UN before they got there. Or some of them were ex-staff members who went into academia and therefore write from that perspective.

TGW: We mentioned earlier global ad hoc conferences as a vehicle for ideas. One of the other vectors, or vehicles, that has come forth are reports from linked, but independent, commissions of eminent persons, beginning with Pearson (*Partners in Development*), Brandt (*North-South: A Programme for Survival*), Palme (*Common Security: A Programme for Survival*), Brundtland (*Our Common Future*), and so on. What, in your view, is the impact on

the intellectual climate of such reports? Are they taken seriously? Are they discussed seriously? Does the secretariat take a look at them? What is the role of these reports?

JJ: Well, it is the members—finally it depends on them. For example, you had the situation, even Hammarskjöld, Trygve Lie, when they began their reforms, they would form outside groups drawn from member states, academics, to assist them. It came from them. And then, of course, there was a change in the pattern where the governments in the mid-1980s were doing it themselves, without consulting the Secretary-General. And you have cases where, in foreign ministries, somebody in the foreign ministry will have studied the problem and say, “Look, we have to study these kinds of problems.”

So I think it is mixed. You can bring a mixture of that. But it has to be relevant, like Brundtland. You see, these big studies like the Brundtland report—she was prime minister of Norway with a high political profile, therefore the media seizes it, and it gets in. But in the long run, it is the member states who have to decide whether they are going to implement it or not. It, like the Brahimi report—they had difficulty getting the member states as a group to come to grips with it, because the Third World countries didn’t like it. Therefore, they would discuss it and discuss it. The Palme report, and even Nyerere on the North-South dialogue. So all the ideas are there, but they don’t get through.

TGW: But is it the quality of the ideas of the report? Is it the timing of the report? What makes some of these more useful than others?

JJ: Well, it is the way you have a consensus among the member states, whether they say, “We will go down this road.” I don’t think it is intellectual quality. I don’t think governments go that way. It is just what is ripe. When the appropriate ripeness is there, then they will approve it. It is good, in a sense, because if you get the media to accept it, then the local

population can put pressure on their governments one way or the other to go along with it. But in the long run, all these studies must go through the legislative bodies. And there they might be amended. You will not see the end product from the beginning.

TGW: You mentioned the Nyerere commission (South Commission) and the Nyerere report (*The Challenge to the South*). One of the ideas that came out of that was the notion that the Third World countries needed a think tank or a secretariat to push particularly economic and social ideas. This somewhat got off the ground—but it was never very seriously financed. Was this a sensible proposal?

JJ: What he said was this, that he went to the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) to have a discussion. And he was very much impressed that they had experts, with their files. They were sort of handicapped, these Third World countries talking with the OECD countries, because these guys were all there with all their documentation. And he said, “Why can’t we do the same thing? Why can’t we do like the OECD, have professional people with in depth knowledge?” But there was always the reluctance, this fear that it would become a big bureaucracy which would produce nothing. That was the problem. So you had some people with token staff. It was a good idea, but he was trying to pattern it according to the OECD.

TGW: You think OECD for developing countries would be a sensible idea?

JJ: The question is who pays for it? Who pays? They are strapped for cash themselves, and nobody wanted to foot the bill to do that. I heard him talk about it, but he would always say how impressed he was with the OECD, how they did their business.



TGW: I think that's actually correct. They do have a high priority on research. And of course the political differences are not so great among them. Occasionally there's a report that makes a big wave in the secretariat, but not that frequently.

JJ: Hammarskjöld came from the OECD. That's where he learned to be a good administrator.

TGW: After ORCI you moved to special political questions, and finally with a focus on Africa. Much of your career has been starting out with Germany and the Middle East. What did it feel like finally, basically concentrating on Africa?

JJ: I have never really forgotten them. The Africans disliked me for that. They somehow thought it was deliberate, whereas I didn't want to be pigeon-holed. Even as a student I didn't want to do that. I didn't see why it was that an African should always be an African specialist—I guess they didn't buy it. They didn't understand it. They felt, "Why don't you get involved?" As I said, I was not really keen to take an independent civil service post, the designated African USG, because I felt that it was contrary to the concept of the secretariat, that you reserve certain posts for certain nationalities. I just didn't like the idea. Of course, one of the things that I had to do was not only Africa—the primary focus was that—but also regional coordination with the Arab League, with the OAS (Organization of American States). So it had other countries, but formally it's an African thing.

TGW: One of the things that happened, either during ORCI or at the beginning of the special political affairs, was the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Almost no one predicted this. Was this surprising to you?

JJ: No, no. In fact, I wrote a letter about that. Petrovsky and I were very close friends, and he liked to get me to talk to his colleagues. So I got to know many of them there. And what

happened, if you notice the people who brought about *perestroika* were either Soviet officials who had been in Washington, New York, or Ottawa. It is very interesting. They were the ones who generated this. And basically, I think, from what I gathered from just talking to them, they said, “Look, we are so advanced in science and technology. Why are we so backwards in other areas?” They were ashamed. They were literally ashamed that Russia was so backward economically. They believed they had the talent.

So they found somebody like [Mikhail] Gorbachev. But the mistake that they made was that you cannot have openness and then maintain the Communist Party. It was a contradiction in terms. And if you read Karl Popper, you can see that. And this they did not realize. You see, that was their problem. So you could almost say that they are going to have a problem down the road. There was just no way that you could have this kind of openness and free debates and everything. The Chinese had it in the 1950s—let the hundred flowers bloom. And then they stopped it, because once you get free ideas you cannot control them in the Communist Party structure where it is only the few who decide.

So it was very plain. And the war in Afghanistan was a big, terrible thing for them. Whoever made that mistake—one will not know why it was done. It was a disaster for them. And in my meetings with these guys I could see this trouble in Afghanistan, and the way it had an impact.

Some may say nobody ever thought it would happen, this attempted coup. It was not inevitable that communism could crumble in 1989 as it did. No, it was because of this coup. Because if you know that [Boris] Yeltsin, as the mayor of Moscow, was very popular. He was a bumbling man, but very popular. But these guys who thought that Gorbachev had gone too far, in a sense they came to realize that *perestroika* and *glasnost* were going to end. And they

wanted to stop it. It was when Yeltsin took over. He was the one who pushed the whole thing. If there had been no coup, I don't think it would have happened so soon. It would have been more of a gradual process.

But this was such a shocking thing to people. And it was a failed coup. And it was so clumsily done that when he got into power, he just completely—because he was not chosen by the Communist Party, and yet he was fighting with them all along. So he just stopped the whole thing. Yeltsin was the one who split up the whole thing.

TGW: What do you think the main consequences were? I am thinking here, we usually point to the fact obviously the Security Council could begin doing certain things. But what were the consequences for the intellectual atmosphere, if that's the right word, that certain thoughts, ideas, approaches that had been politically incorrect within the secretariat suddenly become feasible?

JJ: Gorbachev published, in 1989—I forgot what it was called. But I prepared for Pérez de Cuéllar a response. I don't think they understood what I wrote, but it was not sent. Gorbachev had written a memorandum, or something, which was talking about their view of world politics, fundamental changes in the Soviet attitude toward the UN, and the role of the Secretary-General. So I said, "This is a big change." And Petrovsky was very much involved in drafting this, because we used to keep in touch.

So I prepared for Pérez de Cuéllar a response which, from what I found in my papers, I don't think it was sent. This was the first time when, after so many years, the Soviet Union said, "We accept the political role of the Secretary-General." It was the first time. There was a fundamental problem that they had. They never accepted that the Secretary-General had a political role. It was only an administrative role.

On peacekeeping they changed their position. These were fundamental changes. And they accepted the idea that the United Nations is an active instrument, that it can adapt. These were fundamental changes. As I say, I have to look more. I just found this paper which I had prepared, which I sent up. But definitely there was a big change. It was not a memorandum—I cannot remember how it was titled. But basically it touched on all of these things.

TGW: If we had certain kinds of closed minds during the bipolar era, are there any particular problems that arise at this unipolar moment for the UN as it tries to formulate new ideas or new approaches?

JJ: Yes, huge ones. If you remember, there was, years ago, in 1993 or 1994, in the UN we were on the same panel. What was that one?

TGW: That was an ACUNS (Academic Council on the UN System) meeting in the Dag Hammarskjöld auditorium.

JJ: Yes. So I mentioned the danger for the United States. And I used the question of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. I don't know if you remember that.

TGW: I don't remember the Peloponnesian War. I'm not that old.

JJ: I was saying that the danger for the United States is becoming the sole super power and becoming like Athens—unsurpassed. But if you are not careful, it is this superiority which is going to create problems if it is not well-managed. This is what is happening now. What is happening now is that the Republicans, and the Bush-type Republicans, felt that the Democrats have not exploited quote unquote “the superpower role” of the United States.

I gave a lecture recently in Sweden. I am very worried about the whole area of unilateralism. That is the great danger. They feel, “We can do what we want. We cannot be challenged.” This is why, in all of the policy plans that they are making, they say, “Fine, but we

can do what we want to do.” You cannot run the world that way; and therefore they have isolated all of their allies. And the only thing that they have to do, they have to readapt. They have no choice. But it’s a learning process.

TGW: How do you view the tensions within the UN system? It is usually described as rivalry over turf, or preoccupation with organizational mandates.

JJ: You mean in the Secretariat itself?

TGW: Not so much within the Secretariat, but the Secretariat vis-à-vis specialized agencies, and the Secretariat vis-à-vis Washington, in particular. In your view, is this tension creative, or is it not so useful as a sort of feudal approach to international relations? Is this counterproductive in terms of, in particular, producing new ideas or new approaches?

JJ: You see, Kofi [Annan] temperamentally is not in for this. You don’t have that driving personality who wants to dominate, like the Waldheims and the Boutros-Ghalis. He is not the kind. So there are people who are more relaxed.

And again, you had the tough guys of the past, of UNESCO—[Amadou-Mahtar] M’bow—or FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). These guys are gone. “Strong little princes,” we used to call them, you know, who really would not allow you to—they didn’t allow it. Their personalities are different. So it is much more relaxed now, much more relaxed. You don’t have that tension in ACC meetings. But where are these people like M’bow or Saliman? You get them in a room and my God! Each one, he or she is a king: “You don’t mess with me!” And when you have a Secretary-General who wants to assert his coordinating role, it is bound to cause tension. But it is not now. Kofi, temperamentally, is a different person. He doesn’t go in for—he is more subtle.

TGW: But are these tensions sometimes worse sometimes better? But in terms of the competition for ideas, or the production of ideas, is this kind of competition useful? UNCTAD races to get out its report, or UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) wants to be in the forefront by putting its best foot forward. The Bank wants to compete with the UN in terms of global statistics. Is this, at least in terms of the production of ideas, a useful system, or would it be better to have something more centralized?

JJ: Well first of all, there was never much relationship, really, between the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN. People are trying to do that now. So they go about doing what they want to do. And if you remember, in the early years the Bretton Woods institutions would never get involved in political things. You just had to drag them to do that. They just kept saying, "That is not part of our mandate." They are now doing it. They are jumping to it right now because the border between economics and politics is very blurred now.

But the other areas where you have problems with the agencies is because it's a tough fight. And it's very strange that the Charter, on its surface, gives to the General Assembly as a kind of a coordinating role; but because these agencies have their own independent budgetary systems, they go their own way. And we are always making fun that they tell us to coordinate, but they don't coordinate themselves. Ministers do not coordinate. You have the secretary of agriculture going one way, the secretary of finance another. They don't even talk to each other. And the secretary of agriculture goes to FAO with a different policy. I don't think it is as pronounced as it was before, because there were some Secretaries-General that I know—Waldheim, Boutros-Ghali—who wanted to put their stamp. The only way to do it was the in ACC (Administrative Committee on Coordination), and there you begin to have some resistance.

TGW: Actually, it is surprising that in the course of our interview, there is a term that has not come up, which is “human rights.” Some people see it as the most revolutionary idea that has come up through, or been massaged by, the UN system through the years. Would you agree with that, that it’s potentially the most important idea?

JJ: It is not so clear-cut in the context of apartheid. You see, apartheid was the rallying point. Human rights, as “human rights,” quote unquote, wouldn’t have made that great an impact without apartheid, without Mandela. You see, that is why Mandela is so symbolic. Formally speaking, Mandela was symbolic being in prison. He set no mark before going to prison. But he became a global phenomenon because of apartheid.

Then it became a Cold War instrument, something which you used to beat up your opponents. The U.S. government has its human rights reports. But basically, it has not achieved much, because sanctions against a recalcitrant government is very weak. So it is good to have the Declaration, as in the human rights Declaration, that sets out these principles, that governments are forced to adhere. But this is only because you have NGOs and people within governments who say, “Look, you must take these principles of the Declaration.” But people are still violating human rights.

TGW: One of the things that has happened with the end of the Cold War is that the bifurcation between political and civil, and economic and social—which was certainly a football kicked back and forth by the East and West during the Cold War—there is more of a chance of these two things coming together. It seems to me that the package of human rights is somewhat less controversial now than it was for all those years during the Cold War. Is that true?

JJ: Yes, because it is used as leverage. This is why I think the legislative organs of governments are very important. Sudan asked for aid in the World Bank or from the IMF. They

say, “Well, let us see your human rights records. You won’t get it unless you improve it.” And governments are forced to do it. It is used as a leverage, because even the legislative bodies might say, “You don’t give assistance to A and B unless—.” China is a good case in point. They said, “Your entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) will depend on your human rights record.” So it has a regimented level. And this is what many lenders are doing now.

But it doesn’t affect those who don’t need anything from the USA, IMF, or the World Bank. [Muammar] Quaddafi doesn’t need any loan from anybody. He can violate anything. It is only with those who need something that it has an impact. Who cares how Quaddafi treats the people of Libya? Quaddafi doesn’t need anything from the IMF, nor from the World Bank, nor from the United States.

TGW: But Kofi Annan is probably the first Secretary-General who has really taken a visible stance on human rights. And I suppose it has been more possible, given the context of the post-Cold War era. Is this the only explanation for previous Secretaries-General being sort of reluctant to touch this issue?

JJ: No, others have also tried. Boutros-Ghali in 1994 complained about genocide in Rwanda. They shouted him down—they said that he misspoke. Mrs. [Mary] Robinson has even been more outspoken. The planet has changed. Kofi Annan has a favorable atmosphere. So he can do a lot of things which, if some of the others had done it, the Americans would have criticized them.

Some of them never had the credibility. Waldheim wanted to do it, but he had no credibility. There is something about the sincerity of Kofi Annan that makes what he speaks—it has more relevance and more credibility than if somebody else had done it. I mean, Hammarskjöld fought against the treatment of the Algerians, one of the things that earned him



the hatred of de Gaulle. So many of them—they have spoken in the past, but the environment was not conducive to it.

TGW: During this long period of time, how has the understanding of international peace and security changed from the original Charter conception to what the UN is now doing? The phrase that is on everyone's mind is "human security." What does this mean, actually? Is this new?

JJ: Well actually, where they were really concerned—the Charter was written up in the early postwar years. They could not allow any government to mobilize and cross borders and attack another one. That was their main concern—what Germany did in Poland and all these places. They said, "We are going to stop that." That was their concern. They didn't think much about internal, or indirect, incursions.

But now people are saying, "Look, this is not the only case." Security involves development. But these are people trying to reinterpret things in their own way. The original members, the major powers, they saw security defined as the major objective of the organization. In the 1960s, these Third World countries came in and said, "Wait a minute, anti-apartheid, anticolonialism, development, these are for us, the trinity—decolonization, development, and the end of apartheid." That is what brought the tension between the western powers and the Third World.

TGW: How useful is this broadening of the notion of security as an organizing principle, or an organizing idea for the UN system?

JJ: It is useful, but only so long as the major powers accept it. They have to accept. And frankly, they have not accepted it. Today, they tell you, point blank, "You go to the World Bank." That's why the World Bank has been strengthened. Most of the social development

policy in the Third World is done in the World Bank, because they have leverage. They say, “OK, we will give you a loan. But you have to do this in education, in health. If you don’t undertake these reforms in education, in health, in agriculture, you will not get a loan.” And they all scurry around to do what they say.

The UN doesn’t have that leverage. That’s why shifted things away from the UN. They ought to be doing all these things, right now, frankly speaking.

TGW: Are there any weaknesses in this idea?

JJ: No. I like it. As a minister of finance, I was very pleased because I could argue in the cabinet that this is where we had to put our resources. Because if we don’t, we will not get the good mark of the IMF, and if we don’t get it no one will touch us. So it is very good. I don’t see anything wrong, frankly, that any government should not put their resources in these areas. I think they should. In education, in health, in agriculture—that’s where you should put your money. But governments didn’t like to do that. They want to go do something else. But if we have a minister of finance who can argue, “Look, I agree with you. But for us to survive—.” So I like it. That’s why I never accepted the criticism of conditionalities. I think that at times they are very useful.

TGW: You just mentioned the role of powerful intellects at the outset of the UN. One of the propositions we are playing with in the project is that within the secretariat people use ideas—as you mentioned, when you were minister of finance. What are, in your view, the most critical new ideas that have revolved around the UN system in the last half-century? And what are the worst ideas that have been kicked around within the UN system? The best and the worst in your view.

JJ: This is difficult. For me, the best ideas which should be developed, what got me excited was—maybe this was wrong to use the words—what was called the “New World Order.” What they were saying really, is, that this New World Order was in a sense a return to the original concept of the Wilsonian view of the UN, where you can harmonize your policy within the UN to deal with a case like Saddam Hussein. I thought this was a very, very good portent. Maybe the word “new” created a lot of problems. People said it was a joke because you had also the New International Economic Order, the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). So it becomes that, where it suits you, you say you have a New World Order. But where it doesn’t suit you, you say you fight against it. But this thing was very, very good.

The worst idea, to me, is the notion that the secretariat should realize that it has paymasters and must obey the paymasters. That, to me, is the worst idea, which Ms. [Madeleine] Albright propounded. And I think it was a shame, because this was also an attempt to undermine the career service of the UN. Most people did not know that [Yasushi] Akashi—when the Americans fought to get Akashi out—as a long-standing member of the secretariat, stood to the principles of the international civil service and was run out of town. It was then that she said, “Akashi does not know who pays his bill.” That, to me, is certainly wrong.

TGW: But we are moving toward what was a traumatic event for the United Nations—Somalia. With a little retrospect now, what could have been done differently in Somalia?

JJ: Very little. You see, because there is a lot of propaganda which has gone around. I did explain what went on in Somalia in a paper which I did at ACUNS. Basically, I had the first mission in Somalia in 1991. What was the mission? The mission was first we had a coup

against [Mohamed] Siad Barre. And the people who made a coup against him began to fight against each other. OK, it was purely internal affairs. They made a coup against him, and these people fought against each other. The consequence of that is that chaos came down on Mogadishu. All the embassies left except one—the Egyptians. All the agencies and international organization staff left. The OAU didn't take a lead. In fact, the OAU was meeting at the summit when the civil war broke out. They did not take a lead. As you know, for many years, if the OAU leaders don't act, the UN doesn't act. The signal must come from them.

So when I was there it was to first of all find out, how do we bring material assistance to the people of Mogadishu? And there was intense fighting on a large scale. So I went there, and one of the results was to get them to have a ceasefire. That was essential to begin. Some people took exception to that—in fact, one NGO, Africa Watch. And it was done for a selfish reason, because the lady who was there was a Somali, who did not want to see peace restored to the capital. Her family supported the break away of Somalia land.

TGW: Rakia Omaar.

JJ: Who comes from northern Somalia, whose strategy was that there should be no peace in the south. People didn't realize this. So she criticized, and asked, "Why do you engage the warlords?" And that caused a lot of confusion. But people later understood that this was a false accusation.

Then there emerged the "technical." We had a ceasefire, but the ceasefire had to have two components—delivery of humanitarian assistance and their protection. Therefore, you need observers—not military force, just purely observers. These were all approved by [Hussein] Aideed, by everybody.

Now the way it was executed, in my judgement—and I am going to try to criticize [Mohamed] Sahnoun. Sahnoun misunderstood the whole purpose of the enterprise. I was the one who proposed Sahnoun, and the Secretary-General (SG) totally in the first instance objected to him. I didn't know the SG knew him more than I do. Sahnoun was to go there, and I proposed in the plan that he should work with the Arab League and the OAU. And it must be done in Mogadishu. Sahnoun did not want to stay in Mogadishu; he wanted to stay in New York. He misunderstood the role I played as envoy. My duties were in my capacity as under-secretary-general, but from time to time I was sent out as envoy. He didn't understand that. He thought he could stay in New York, with an office in New York, and—I said, “That is not the purpose why you have been appointed the representative of the SG. He never got Aideed to accept UN observers. He failed miserably on that. And because he failed, he began to make propaganda and criticized so-called obstructionists from New York.

But the main problem was that unarmed observers could not do the job, we realized. And Bush, in the campaign, proposed that America would assist. What could you do? And some of my colleagues in the Secretariat said, “No.” I said, “Look, we have to be realistic. Only the Americans can do it.” OK, I managed to convince some in the Security Council—the Africans and the Third World. They agreed. I remember they said, “OK, the Americans can come in, but we are never going to accept the Korean model.” “No Korean model. No Kuwaiti model,” they chanted.

You have to remember what this means. The Korean model gave *carte blanche* to the Americans to organize their military operations with a UN flag. And they are still there. They said, “That is out. We will not do it again. We will not have the Kuwaiti model, where the Security Council authorized ‘Friends of Kuwait.’” They said that one was out because during the

war there was nobody that could restrain the excessive use of force. So they said that is out; we must have a new model.

I remember talking to the ambassador of Zimbabwe. I said, “Look, the way you will do it, the political control will be in the hands of the Secretary-General. And the military will be under the Americans.” That is what we did. The Americans were very uncomfortable with that. They were afraid that the Secretary-General would tell them what to do. In fact, he did. He said, “You must disarm.” They said, “No, we cannot do that.” He said, “That is what you are here for.” You see, these are the things which have never come out. People don’t know. This was one of the first disputes we had with Colin Powell. He said, “We are not going to take on the task of disarming them.” We said, “But why are you going there?”

TGW: A very good story. Since that point—I don’t know if this is not the Korean or not the Kuwaiti—the new model seems to be, whether to call it or not “coalitions of the willing and able.”

JJ: That was the Kuwaiti model.

TGW: You think that’s the Kuwaiti model.

JJ: Yes.

TGW: But that’s not the only the thing that’s happening now.

JJ: No. Now is different because they will go with the UN flag. In Kuwait, there was no UN flag.

TGW: I see what you mean. There is now the UN flag.

JJ: With the UN flag it is a little different. But you see, in going with a third model, we came with this hodgepodge which, in the end, caused a lot of difficulties—that’s why I opposed the way they wanted to do it in Sierra Leone. I said, “No, this was the problem we had in

Somalia. I was part of the negotiations that brought it about. We are going to have either the UN or ECOMOG. We are not going to have a contradiction.” And I must say [Marrack] Goulding was always consistent in that. He never wanted the Americans to be there. That is what led him to be removed from the DPKO.

TGW: He actually told me the same thing. He is finishing his book for this summer, which will make a good read, I hope. Is there a danger in the subcontracting toward regional institutions or coalitions of the willing that the large community of states, the international community of states, sort of washes its hands and puts back to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or ECOMOG in West Africa, that outsiders in general wash their hands of responsibility for conflicts in other parts of the world?

JJ: It is difficult for them. They won't have to do that. And this is one of my last arguments with Warren Christopher. My last week in the UN, they came out with this new policy on peacekeeping. It was 1994. Boutros-Ghali begged me to please come to this meeting. He said, “I know you are busy packing, but you have to come.” I said, “Look, this policy does not work.” He said, “We are no longer going to get involved peacekeeping at all.” I said, “You have no choice.” He then said to me, “Do you think you are going to be governed by CNN?” I remember that. No, they cannot. The genocide in Rwanda shows the shortsightedness of the overreaction to Somalia.

So no government wants to be caught anymore with a situation that will produce another Rwanda. That's why it is very difficult for them to wash their hands, even if you are a big power. It is very, very difficult.

TGW: Do you see Rwanda as being a direct result of Somalia?

JJ: Yes, no question about that. And also the Secretariat losing backbone. I resisted the withdrawal of our forces when I was there.

TGW: You mean from Kigali?

JJ: Yes. I fought against that. If you look at the date, I left at the end of February. The disaster happened in April.

TGW: And your argument about not withdrawing forces was related to what exactly?

JJ: Mrs. Albright was worried about the cost that Congress will not pay. I said, "We are not going to be guided by that." And frankly speaking, Kofi was more accommodating to her. No question about that. It is too clear. That was a real disaster, and the figures coming out now are clearly showing that in fact they had all the information about an impending disaster.

TGW: That was obvious all along. We now have the smoking guns. How did you feel when you left the UN? It was thirty years of your life.

JJ: I felt OK, because I'll tell you what I wanted to do. And there were multiple reasons why. First of all, there was this request by these young boys who had made the coup, who called on me to come and help them. And I felt that I had been giving so much time to the UN, I have to help my country. I had been away for too long. That was one. Secondly, I had, on my own, made up my mind that I don't want to stay beyond the age of sixty years in the secretariat. Why? Because there was a big debate in the secretariat in 1978 on reforms, where the General Assembly said that everyone must retire at sixty. Waldheim was against this. George Davidson was against this. They wanted to scuttle the entire resolution. They fought hard. I said, "No, we have to respect the views of the General Assembly." Waldheim said, "Look, all I want to know is, I don't want people to be driven out when they are sixty."



So I went to the Fifth Committee. I said, “You have to make a difference between people in the ASG and the USG categories because they are different from the rest of international civil servants. They serve at the pleasure of the Secretary-General. It’s a big difference. They should resign when you change.” That’s why I was the only one who resigned when Pérez de Cuéllar came, the only one. At that, Pérez de Cuéllar laughed. He said, “I told my wife, Jonah will be the only one to resign.” I was the only who resigned. But I made this argument, and then I assured them, “I will be pleased if you exempt these people. I will not be a beneficiary of that.”

TGW: So you were exactly sixty?

JJ: Yes.

TGW: I don’t know if this is possible to answer, but what ideas about development did you take with you to your job as finance minister?

JJ: Well, really not much. As I said, my basic frame of reference in the UN was not—the humanitarian side, yes. The humanitarian side, I took a lot. Not development economics, but the humanitarian side because of my work at home, as the coordinator for most of the things that we do in Sierra Leone today. I worked together with the World Bank people to develop it. All the humanitarian assistance—precisely all that I worked on for three years. Basically what we were all doing with the projects and everything. So the underlying philosophy came from my work in the UN. But not development, as such.

TGW: But I mean the kinds of big ideas that have moved through the system, whether it was dependency this, or export promotion that, or democracy before development, or development before democracy. Did you bring any of this baggage with you?

JJ: No, no, no. Basically, it was already set. I had no problem with the IMF and the World Bank. These are standard policies now of the IMF. It is just that I said that we should

agree with them. It is no problem, because this is what we should be doing even if we have no IMF or World Bank. So one of the things where, people like Michel Camdessus, it was easy for them because they found first a minister who was not resisting this. It was always priority—people want to do something different, but for me it was so simple. We had no choice but to go down that road. It was no problem.

TGW: How did the reports that you used to read in New York appear in Freetown? That is, when you used to get a report from the World Bank, the *World Development Report*, or the UNCTAD *Trade and Development Report*, or UNICEF on *The State of the World's Children*, or what have you—did you read these in a different way when you were at your desk in Freetown?

JJ: No, no. In fact, they make fun of what I said. They said, “These are the UN people requesting these. They all agree with these people. They speak UN-ese. They just bring the same language.” And it is true. There is a commonality. No problem. The president and I had no problem, because he was a former UNDP resrep (Resident Representative).

TGW: I’m trying to remember where [Ahmad Tejan] Kabbah was resrep.

JJ: Kabbah was in Tanzania. He was in Lesotho. So we have no problems.

TGW: How did you observe what we described earlier as tensions, or rivalries, among the economic agencies from your desk in Freetown? Did the UN differ from UNCTAD, from ECA (Economic Commission for Africa), from OAU, from the G-77 (Group of 77), from the World Bank? Did you receive them in different ways? Did they make their pitches in different ways?

JJ: The problem was that the UN was strapped for cash. So they were not relevant. They were not as big donors as they used to be, the dominant donors. They are becoming

irrelevant. The World Bank, the IMF, the EU (European Union) were the major donors. They have the money. UNDP had nothing.

TGW: You had this interim period as secretary-general of SLIM, and then an absence of thirty years. Then you are back in Sierra Leone. Then earlier this year, you left. What caused you to leave the service of the government?

JJ: I told them that I would serve for only two years and then I planned to write a book. When I wanted to come back in 1996, they begged me not to come back. I made a compromise by being head of the permanent mission. So I said, "OK, I will just spend two years and I will leave." We agreed. Then the coup occurred. When President Kabbah was restored by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), I was strongly urged to go to Freetown and support him. I agreed on condition that I would serve only to the end of his term of office, February 2001. I was then appointed the minister of finance.

When I stated that I would leave at the end of February to write my memoirs, there were many appeals for me to stay. I rejected all of them. That was the whole reason. It had nothing to do with policy. I was reading yesterday an old issue of *Africa Confidential* that made me laugh. They said I and the president had a fallout because I was opposed to the extension of his mandate, and I walked out of the cabinet and left the country. It never happened that way. It had nothing to do with that.

TGW: How do you have time to read old magazines? I don't even have time to read new ones.

JJ: I like to. So that was the only reason why I left.

TGW: How did you react to the proposed birth of the African Union? Not to put it to kindly, the OAU has hardly been a rip-roaring success.

JJ: I don't think that is significant.

TGW: Will it get off the ground?

JJ: You see, what has happened today, globally, is that the PR people have taken over. Everything is PR. It was Quaddafi's ideas, and [Olusegun] Obasanjo, in fact said, "Let us encourage Quaddafi. Maybe he can become a good boy." It is a silly idea, but I will go along with him. It will not change much.

TGW: What do you think, over the next five to fifteen years, are the main intellectual challenges that should be addressed by the UN system as a collective? Where would you place your energies and resources? Which of the issues that are out there seem most pressing?

JJ: I don't know. It's a tough thing to do, but I think one of the most serious issues in the world is how you deal with power in international relations. There is so much that is so unfair in this world. [John F.] Kennedy said that life is unfair, but how can any rational mind accept this whole idea that you can go to the Middle East and say to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, "You cannot make nuclear weapons," when Israel has nuclear weapons and you don't stop it. What rationality? I don't understand. We must say, "Do not make it. We will destroy it if you have it." What kind of a world is this? It's so wrong. It is not fair.

I think the UN has to come to grips with that basic issue of unequal treatment. Certain powers have to do certain things, otherwise you cannot do it. It is not right. And that is creating a lot of resentment. The Americans don't want you do something: "We will do it, but you don't do it." That will become an issue because, as people themselves get more power—and they will get more power—you are going to have a messy world. You are going to have a messy, messy world. If you say, "We can get out of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty when we want to at any one time," others will say, "Why can't we do that?" And what kind of a world community

are you going to be in? But no one is addressing this issue. I have been bothered by this thing pretty well all my life. Why don't you say, "None of you should have it."

TGW: Is there a question that I should have asked you, that you wished I had asked you? We could continue this for days, I'm sure.

JJ: We have covered a lot of territory.

TGW: Yes, we have covered a lot of territory. I am delighted to have spent this time with you, and I know future historians will be as well. So thank you very much.

JJ: OK. Thank you.

## INDEX

- Academic Council for UN Studies (ACUNS), 67, 74  
 Adenauer, Konrad, 21  
 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), 35  
 Afghanistan, 65  
 Africa, 8, 13, 22, 29, 33, 38-39, 64  
   leadership in, 22  
*Africa Confidential*, 41, 82  
 Africa Watch, 75  
 African Institute (Brown University), 10  
 Ahmed, Rafi, 38  
 Aimé, Jean-Claude, 19  
 Albright, Madeleine, 74, 79  
 Algeria, 31-32, 71  
 Allied Forces, 3-4  
 Annan, Kofi, 68, 71, 79  
*Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*, 27  
 apartheid, 39, 70  
 Arab-Israeli conflict, 71  
 Arab League, 64, 76  
 Asian-African Conference (Bandung), 5-7  
 Athens, Greece, 67  
 Austria, 22  
 Axis Forces, 4  
 Azikwe, Namde, 5  
 Bad Bodesberg, Germany, 21  
 Balkans, 52, 59  
 Balliol College, Oxford, 7  
 Baltimore, Maryland, 8  
 Bandung, Indonesia, 5; *see also* Asian-African Conference  
 Barre, Mohamed Siad, 74  
 Belgium, 11  
 Berlin, Germany, 12  
 Berlin Wall, 26  
 Beskow, Bo, 40  
 Boston University, 9  
 Bloomfield, Lincoln, 25  
 Blyden, Edward, 3, 5, 7  
 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 15, 18-19, 36, 38-39, 51-52, 54-55, 68-69, 71, 78  
 Brahimi report, *see Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations*  
 Brandt report; *see North-South: A Programme for Survival*  
 Brandt, Willy, 21, 37  
 Brazil, 4  
 Bretton Woods institutions, 4, 45-46, 69; *see also* International Monetary Fund *and* World Bank  
 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 1  
 British Council, 3  
 Brown University, 10  
 Brundtland report; *see Our Common Future*  
 Bucharest, Romania, 36; *see also* World Population Conference  
 Bunche, Ralph, 20, 28, 50, 59-60  
 Burma, 4  
 Bush, George H.W., 55, 76  
 Cable News Network (CNN), 78  
 Cairo, Egypt, 2  
 Camdessus, Michel, 80  
 Cancun, Mexico, 33  
 Carayannis, Tatiana, 2, 5  
*Challenge to the South, The* (Nyerere report), 63  
 Chidzero, Bernard, 9  
 Childers, Erskine, 54  
 China, 48, 65, 71  
 Christian Democratic Party (Germany), 21  
 Christopher, Warren, 78  
 Cold War, 24, 26, 34, 70-71  
   *and* human rights, 71  
 Colombia University, 26  
*Common Security: A Programme for Survival* (Palme report), 61  
 Communist Party (Soviet Union), 65  
 Congo, 11, 13-14, 24  
*Congo Cables*, 14  
 Dadzie, Ken, 30, 38  
 Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 27  
 Davidson, George, 41, 79  
 decolonization, 5  
 Democratic Party (U.S.), 67  
 Denmark, 29  
 development, 80  
 Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), 38  
 Detroit, Michigan, 9  
 Deutsch, Karl, 12, 23  
 disarmament, 39  
 developing countries, 28-29, 34  
 Dulles, John Foster, 2, 7  
 Durch, Bill, 18  
 East-West relations, 26-27  
 Eastern Europe, 48, 64  
 Ebert, Friedrich, 11  
 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 81  
 Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 28-29  
   as producer of ideas, 28  
 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 82  
 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 30  
 Eden, Anthony, 1-2  
 Egypt, 6, 32, 75  
 Eisenhower, Dwight, 2  
 Emerson, Rupert, 5, 9-13, 21, 23-24  
*Enemy Within, The*, 42

- environment; *see* sustainable development  
 Europe, 3, 11, 21, 22, 32, 39, 47, 48, 64  
 European Defense Community (EDC), 23  
 European Free Trade Association (ETPA), 23  
 European Union (EU), 43, 81  
 Faubus, Orval, 13  
 Feinberg, Germany, 12  
 food security, 36  
 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 68-69  
 Ford Foundation, 54  
 France, 22, 47, 54  
 Freetown, Sierra Leone, 81-82  
 Friedrich, Carl, 11-12  
 Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3-4, 7  
 Gaulle, Charles de, 22, 72  
 gender, 47-49  
     *and* UN staffing considerations, 48  
 Geneva, Switzerland, 11, 14, 44  
 Germany, 11, 22, 26, 64, 72  
 Ghana, 5  
     independence of, 5  
*glasnost*, 65  
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 65  
 Graduate Center (CUNY), 1, 41  
 Great Depression, 3  
 Gromyko, Andrei, 26  
 Group of 77 (G-77), 28, 31, 81  
 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 2-3, 14-15, 18, 40-41, 50-51, 53, 62, 64, 67, 71  
 Harvard Law School, 23  
 Harvard University, 5, 9-12, 18, 25  
 Heidelberg, Germany, 12  
 Henderson, Julia, 27  
*History of Rome*, 1  
 Hitler, Adolph, 4  
 Hoffman, Paul, 20-21  
 human rights, 70-71  
     *as* aid leverage, 71  
 human security, 72  
 Hussein, Saddam, 74, 83  
 ideas, 2, 16-20, 27-28, 35-37, 43, 49-50, 58, 60-62, 67-69, 73, 80, 83  
     *and* academics, 18, 60  
     *and* the Bretton Woods institutions, 19  
     *and* gender, 49  
     *and* global conferences, 35-37, 61  
     *and* institutional rivalry, 68-69  
     *and* policy discourse, 56  
     *and* post-Cold War environment, 67  
     *and* UN commission reports, 61-62  
     *and* UN leadership, 50  
     *and* the UN regional commissions, 28  
     *and* the UN secretariat, 16, 18  
     *and* UN staffing considerations, 40-44  
 biographical influences on, 1-2, 4  
 impact of the Suez Crisis on, 1-2  
 institutionalization of, 37  
 one-sidedness of, 17  
 production of, 27  
 India, 47  
 international civil service, 40-41, 44-46, 56, 74, 79  
 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 35  
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 19, 29, 33, 46, 70-71, 73, 80-81  
 Iran, 59  
 Iraq, 59  
 Israel, 17, 41, 83  
 John, Louis B., 23  
 Jordan, William, 14-15, 20, 26-27, 43, 60  
 Kalb, Madeleine, 14, 53  
 Kassebaum, Nancy, 56  
 Kaufmann, Johan, 33  
 Kaunda, Kenneth, 6  
 Kennedy, John F., 83  
 Kenya, 37  
 Kigali, Rwanda, 78  
 Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, 43-44, 51  
 Kissinger, Henry, 32, 34  
 Korea, 76-77  
 Kosovo, 58  
 Kuwait, 32, 76-77  
 Latin America, 28  
 League of Nations, 4, 42  
 Lenin, Vladimir, 10  
 Leninism, 7, 10  
 Lesotho, 81  
 Lewis, Arthur, 61  
 Libya, 71  
 Lie, Trygve, 55, 62  
 Lincoln University, 5-6, 9  
 Little Rock, Arkansas, 13  
 London School of Economics (LSE), 14  
 Lumumba, Patrice, 14  
 Mack, Andy, 18  
 Mandela, Nelson, 52, 70  
 Marshall Plan, 4  
 Marxism, 21  
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 12, 16, 23-25, 46  
 McGill University, 9  
 Middle East, 11, 24, 31-32, 40-41, 64, 83  
 Mogadishu, Somalia, 75-76  
 Moscow, Russia, 65  
 Nairobi, Kenya, 49  
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 2, 6-7  
 nationalism, 11, 14, 21, 22  
*Nationalism and Social Communications*, 12  
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 7  
 New International Economic Order (NEIO), 31, 33  
     U.S. approach to, 33, 34  
 New York, New York, 1-2, 8-9, 19, 28, 38, 50, 65,  
 New World Information and Communication Order

- (NWICO), 74, 76, 81  
 Nkrumah, Kwame, 5-7, 13  
 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 31  
 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 36, 39-40  
 relationship to governments, 39-40  
*North-South: A Programme for Survival* (Brandt report), 61  
 North-South relations, 29, 62  
 Norway, 62  
 nuclear weapons, 83  
 Nyerere, Julius, 22, 31, 62  
 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 83  
 Office of Research and Collection of Information (ORCI), 17-20  
 Omaar, Rakia, 75  
 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 53, 75-76, 81-82  
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 31  
 Ottawa, Canada, 65  
*Our Common Future* (Brundtland report), 61  
 Oxford, Pennsylvania, 5  
 Oxford University, 7-8, 41  
 Padmore, George, 5-6  
 Palestine, 39  
 Palme report; *see Common Security: A Programme for Survival*  
 Pan-Africanism, 6  
 peacekeeping, 24, 35, 42, 52, 56-57, 66, 78  
 Pentagon (U.S.), 57  
*perestroika*, 65  
 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 19, 50-51, 60, 66, 79-80  
 Petrovsky, Vladimir, 16  
 Poland, 72  
 population, 36  
 Powell, Colin, 77  
 Prebisch, Raúl, 37, 61  
 Princeton University, 9  
 Quaddafi, Muammar, 71, 83  
 Reagan, Ronald, 33  
*Report on the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Brahimi report), 19, 62  
 Republic Party (U.S.), 67  
 Robinson, Mary, 71  
 Rome, Italy, 36; *see also* World Food Conference  
 Rosenau, James, 16  
 Ruggie, John, 18  
 Russia, 24, 42, 48, 55, 65  
 Rwanda, 71, 78  
 Saudi Arabia, 32  
 Scandinavia, 29  
 Schachter, Oscar, 27  
 Schumpeter, Joseph, 10  
 security, 24-25  
 global versus regional, 24-25  
 Seynes, Philippe de, 61  
 Shahani, Leticia, 49  
 Sierra Leone, 1, 3-6, 9, 13-14, 39-40, 77, 80, 82  
*and* U.S. aid, 40  
 independence of, 13  
 Sierra Leone Independence Movement (SLIM), 6, 13, 81  
 Singer, Hans, 61  
 Six-Day War, 32  
 Social Democracy Party (Germany), 18, 22  
 Somalia, 74, 76-77  
 South Africa, 52  
 South Commission, 63  
 Soviet Union, 26, 42, 52, 59, 64, 66; *see also* Russia *and* UN, 66-67  
*State of the World's Children*, 81  
 Stiftung Foundation, 11, 22  
 Stimson Center, 18  
 Stockholm, Sweden, 36; *see also* UN Conference on the Human Environment  
 Sudan, 70  
 Suez Crisis, 1-2, 5-7, 14  
 sustainable development, 36-37  
 Sutterlin, James, 17, 58  
 Sweden, 15, 23, 40, 67  
 Swift, Richard, 27  
 Tanzania, 23, 81  
 Thant, U, 50, 55  
*Theory of International Relations, The*, 16  
 Third World, 28-29, 33, 34-35, 37, 59, 62-63, 72-73  
*and* the UN, 59  
*and* the World Bank, 73  
 Tito, Josip, 7  
*Trade and Development Report*, 81  
 Treaty of Rome, 22  
 Trollope, Anthony, 3  
 UN Charter, 18, 25, 29, 34, 47, 69, 72  
 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 81  
 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 28-31, 35, 37, 69, 81  
 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 57  
 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 20-21, 81  
 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 68  
 UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 37, 49  
 UN General Assembly, 26, 29-30, 34-35, 39-40, 46, 56-57, 69  
 Fifth Committee of, 41, 45-47  
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 69  
 UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 31  
 UN secretariat, 15-16, 18-20, 23, 26, 30, 34, 36, 48-49, 51-52, 56, 59-62  
*and* gender, 49  
 UN Security Council, 2, 34, 36, 55, 66  
 UN staffing, 19, 48



*and* gender, 48  
UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR),  
59-60  
UN World Conference on the International Women's  
Year (Mexico City), 49  
UN World Population Conference (Bucharest), 36  
United Kingdom (UK), 2, 11, 13-14, 42-43, 51, 53  
presence in Sierra Leone, 14  
United States (U.S.), 2-3, 5-8, 22, 24, 29-30, 32-33,  
34-36, 39-40, 42-43, 46-47, 53, 55-56, 67, 70-71,  
76  
*and* the UN, 28, 43, 46  
relations with Arab world, 31-32  
response to New International Economic Order,  
33-34  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 70  
Urquhart, Brian, 17, 20, 27, 43, 54  
Vance, Cyrus, 52  
Vienna, Austria, 49  
Vietnam, 24, 27  
Vietnam War, 25-26  
effect on ideas, 26  
Waldheim, Kurt, 17, 40-41, 50, 55, 68-69, 71, 79  
Washington, D.C., 19, 65, 68  
Weidner Library (Harvard), 11  
West Africa, 7  
Western Sahara, 52  
Wilson, Woodrow, 74  
Winslow, Ann, 27-28  
women, 48  
*and* UN recruitment, 48  
World Bank, 18-20, 29, 33, 37, 69-72, 80-81  
*World Development Report*, 81  
World Food Conference (Rome), 36  
World Trade Organization, 71  
World War II, 2-3  
Yelstin, Boris, 65, 66  
Yom Kippur War, 31-32  
Yugoslavia, 58  
Zimbabwe, 77  
Zionism, 28, 34, 44