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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF

VIRGINIA HOUSHOLDER

BY

RICHARD JOLLY

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Transcribed by Julie Anderson

RICHARD JOLLY: Right, this is Richard Jolly. I am now interviewing Virginia Housholder in Venice, Florida, on June 21, 2001*. Virginia, thank you very much for joining this interview. Perhaps you'd begin by telling me a bit about your own early life, where you were born, your early experiences, and how they might have affected your perspective on the UN throughout your many years in the State Department concerned with the United Nations but not being a staff member of it.

VIRGINIA HOUSHOLDER: I was born in Salem, Missouri, which is where the sinkholes in Missouri are. I may have been born in a sinkhole. We moved to Illinois when I was very young and settled in Peoria when I was five. I went through the public schools there and grew up in a family of three brothers and no sisters. I had two older brothers and one younger. My oldest brother was five years older than I. I was born on his fifth birthday and his story is that he would rather have had a puppy.

I went through the public schools and when I graduated from high school, I had a scholarship to MacMurray College, which was a women's college in Jacksonville, Illinois. I went there for one year and then returned to Peoria and did the rest of my college work at Bradley University. It was then called Bradley Polytechnic Institute. I majored in history, primarily English history, and I graduated from college in 1940, just as the war was getting well under way. I went to work for my father, who was a public accountant. I had taken some accounting in college, but I decided after I'd worked in accounting for a little while that I didn't like it well enough to make a career of it. Pearl Harbor happened on December 7, 1941, and I decided if I was going to get out of the accounting business, I'd better go before all the men got drafted because that would just leave me.

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* Julia Henderson was present during the interview.

So, I went to the University of Wyoming, of all places, to do a Master's degree in political science. While I was there, I was interviewed by the National Institute of Public Affairs. I became an intern with the National Institute in July of 1942. Julia Henderson was an intern about three years before I was. We still have some dispute as to when we first met. But, in any case, we were both interns. I interned in three different places in the federal government and finally wound up at the end of the internship with a job as a junior budget examiner at the Bureau of the Budget. There were two of us interns who went to work for the budget bureau—both female. The bureau maintained that it had no prejudice against women, but they'd had one woman budget examiner several years before and I think they lost her under a desk or something. But, anyway, Jane Dunlap Highsaw and I were the two interns that went to work for the budget bureau.

In early 1945, I got a call from the National Institute wanting to know was I happy in my work and I said "yes," and they said, "Well, how would you like to go to Germany to work for UNRRA?," which is the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. I said, "Who wants to go to Germany? There's a war going on." And they said, "Yes, but the war's about to end." So I had had no previous particular interest in international organizations, but at the end of about six weeks, I was on a boat headed for first London and then France and then finally Germany. We had two weeks training at College Park, Maryland, and they sent us then to Reading, in England, where we got the same two weeks of training, and then subsequently they sent us to Granville, France, where we got the same two weeks of training. We all got worried whether the displaced persons (DPs) would all be gone by the time we got to Germany. Unfortunately or fortunately, they weren't. They still had them. There are still DPs around from other wars and catastrophes in other parts of the world.

I went to work first for UNRRA in the central headquarters that was located at Hoechst, which is a suburb of Frankfurt. Then we moved the headquarters up to Arolsen, which was a little town out in the middle of nowhere near Kassel. It was in the American zone and UNRRA literally took over the town. I began to get restless to get out into the field, and so I became a deputy director of a team that was located at Korbach, which was not far from Arolsen. Subsequently, I became the director of a team at Hess-Lichtenau. I was a good, ripe twenty-seven and I had not had any dealings with people of other nationalities. But we wound up with this team of fifteen people and ten nationalities and no common language. We used English and German and French. I had had German in college, but it was several years back. The first time I had to make a speech to any of the DPs, I used an interpreter and I wasn't very happy with it because I had no sense of communication with the people. So the next time I had to make a speech, I apologized for my bad German and went ahead and talked in German. Well at that time, we had Poles, and they spoke the same kind of ungrammatical German that I did. So we got along very well.

So I left UNRRA in January of 1947, got married in Heidelberg to a man who had been my English professor in Bradley, and we took off on what was to be a six months honeymoon around the continent. Two weeks after we were married, he broke his leg skiing in Switzerland, and so we spent ten weeks with him in the canton hospital in Lucerne. I've been opposed to honeymoons ever since. We came back to the States finally in the summer of 1947, on our way through Paris, Tip (Tipton Westfall) had been interviewed by some old friends of ours who were working for UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) recruiting people. So we got back to the States and I had an attack of appendicitis. We put me in the hospital and took my appendix out. In the meantime, Tip got a cable from UNESCO offering him a job. So

as soon as I was out of danger, he took off for Paris and I stayed in Illinois. Subsequently, I was job-hunting for something to do in Paris, and Walter Laves was the deputy director of UNESCO and he was an old friend of mine. I wrote him and sent him a c.v. and next thing I knew, I had a job offer from UNESCO that said instead of coming immediately to Paris, I should go to Mexico City, where they were having their annual conference. So, I joined the UNESCO staff in Mexico City and then went to Paris from there.

I was in the budget office of UNESCO and Celia Nevis, who had been with Julia Henderson and the Advisory Committee when they were setting up the UN, was the budget officer. Her deputy was Charles Weitz, who was an old friend of mine and an ex-intern. I stayed with UNESCO—we both stayed with UNESCO until 1949—and Tip came back to the States to find a teaching job and I stayed on to do one more budget. I came back to the States late in 1949 and in 1950 went to work for the State Department. In the meantime, Tip had a teaching job out in South Dakota, a place called Vermillion, which had a population of 4,184 plus the university, and its prime activities were the university and an alfalfa plant. Neither of these seemed to suit my particular talents, so I wound up with a temporary job at the State Department, which finally lasted for sixteen years. I was in the Office of International Administration, which dealt with budgets and administrative problems of international organizations. One of our chores was to go up to the Hill (Capitol Hill) and justify the contributions that we wanted to make to international organizations. I started out as one of the Indians and wound up as the director of the office.

RJ: That's very helpful and I want to go back over the story, but perhaps you could finish the biography right until Venice. So you were in the State Department as chief in 1966-1967?

VH: I wound up in 1966 and went on loan to the public health service for two years. Then I retired from State in 1968 and went to work for the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). There we called me a management analyst, which was a title that we made up. Nobody was ever quite sure what I was supposed to do except to find problems and solve them. And I had an interesting time doing that! Among other things, I did a tour of all the offices that PAHO had in South America. I spent a month doing that and that was very interesting.

RJ: And you remained in PAHO until when?

VH: Until 1970. I was there for just two years.

RJ: And then in 1970?

VH: My husband had retired from the Pentagon. I should say this was my second husband. My first husband and I survived each other for ten years and we sand-papered each other to death, so we gave it up. So, six or seven years later, I married Tate Housholder, who had two sons. They were twelve and fifteen and so I became an instant mother of two teenagers, which was an interesting experience. And I survived! Yes, and we're all good friends!

RJ: That's wonderful!

VH: So I have four grandchildren, none of which I had any responsibility for.

RJ: But just to finish the story, you leave PAHO—

VH: And we retired to Florida.

RJ: You retired to where in Florida? To Venice?

VH: No, we retired to Oamond Beach, which is on the east coast and is just north of Daytona Beach. We built our dream house there. If we'd lived there longer, it would have been a better dream house because it would have looked like Florida instead of northern Virginia. But Tate died in 1975. At the time I was working with an accounting firm there in Daytona Beach. I

became what they called the firm administrator, and we were never quite sure whether "firm" was a noun or an adjective. But the firm was a lively up and coming group of young CPAs (certified public accountants), and so I stayed with them until 1977 as I continued to work with them after Tate died. In 1977, the State Department called me and wanted to haul me out of retirement to be the U.S. member on the UNACABQ, which was the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. I told them that I'd been out of the international organization business for ten years and I wouldn't know any people or any of the problems and they said, "Don't worry, they're the same problems that you had before you left. And a lot of the same people are still there." And sure enough it was—

RJ: And the same chairman?

VH: And the same chairman. Well, no he wasn't. C.S.M. M'selle became the chairman—

RJ: Later.

VH: Well, he was chairman when I went onto the committee. But the problems were the same and the people were the same. The only difference was that the budget was now in billions instead of millions, and if you add a couple of zeros to your arithmetic, well, you're all right.

RJ: So, you remained on the ACABQ until 1985?

VH: No, I filled out a term of a fellow who had tried to tell Andy Young how to run the mission. And Andy decided he'd rather do it himself. So, he fired Dave Stottlemeyer and that's why they needed a substitute to fill out the year and a half. In 1978, I had moved from Florida to California. And so I retired happily to California. Two years later, George Saddler, who had succeeded me in the Advisory Committee, called and said that he had been asked to go to UNESCO as an assistant-director-general. So how would I like to go back on the Advisory

Committee? So I said I would. I finished out George's term, and then I was elected for three years on my own and elected for another term. I served at that point from 1981 through 1985. By that time, the mission had gotten a professional staff member who was qualified to serve on the Advisory Committee. So I resigned and went back to California.

RJ: When you were on this committee, this was two or three months a year, or even more at that point?

VH: It was nearer six months a year. It was three months on and three months off, which for a retired person was ideal. I finally ended up with an unfurnished apartment in New York, which I furnished. So, I had two of everything, one in California and one in New York. I was never sure which was where.

RJ: And then after 1985?

VH: After 1985, I went back to California and helped establish a library in this little town of Canyon Lake where I was living. And then I decided in 1988 that I really should move closer to family. My youngest stepson and his family lived in St. Petersburg, but they were going to move to Plant City. So I came out and looked around and found a house under construction and bought it and then went back to California and sold my house there and moved to Florida. And that was 1988. Not long after I got settled in Plant City, I got involved with Meals on Wheels, which was a program that was just being started at the church where I went. So I wound up as the treasurer of Meals on Wheels, and I stayed with that until the year before I moved down here.

RJ: And you moved down here when?

VH: I moved down here in March of 2000. So, I've been here a little over a year.

RJ: Very good. Well, let me go right back to the beginning and ask you some questions about early influences before we come to your different experiences in and around the UN. You went for a year to a women's college, where you had a fellowship, then you left. Did the fellowship run out or did you decide that a women's college was not what you wanted?

VH: Well, the reason I went to the women's college in the first place was that I was tired of living in the shadow of my brothers. I was Tom Coker's younger sister. One of the problems that I had was that none of my brothers appreciated any of the young men I brought home. They all had three heads or something was wrong with them, and the only person I could date was a friend of one of my brothers. So I decided that I really would like to try at least a year away from home. After spending the year, I discovered that I could operate on my own as an individual, and so I had no problems and went back to Peoria. Bradley was a good school, and the advantage of going there was I could live at home and, therefore, it was not expensive. Of course, in those days tuition was I think either $125 or $250 a semester so it wasn't—

RJ: And the recession then still running was somewhat petering out. Petering out isn't probably quite the word—

VH: It was still running, but one problem we had was that there were three of us that were eligible for college all at the same time. So the way we handled that was that one of us would stay out of school for a year and work and then go back to school, and so I did that when I was a sophomore in college. I stayed out of school and worked the typewriter in my father's accounting office and learned how the other half lived. But it was a very satisfactory college experience all the way around. I had some good professors. I didn't have anybody that laid any particular emphasis on international affairs as I grew up. When I got out of college, I was pretty much concentrated on local affairs. My father was an auditor, and we audited something like

half of the counties in Illinois. He would deliver an audit report to the county board of supervisors. If he got too fancy in his letter of transmittal, or if I didn't understand it, I'd tell him we'd have to change that because, I said, "I've got as much of an IQ as all those farmers on the board, and if I can't understand it, you know they can't understand it either." So, I was more interested in local government than I was in national or international affairs. When I went to the internship, I was really interested in federal government. And I didn't really get interested in international organizations until I was recruited for UNRRA. As I say, it was really my first experience in dealing with nationals of another country.

RJ: I'm fascinated with the point about a year in the women's college showed you, gave you, if I am understanding it, a certain confidence and clarity about yourself vis-à-vis your brothers. Has that given you a sympathy for all women's colleges?

VH: Yes, I really am very much in favor of a women's college. The only difficulty that I could see was that the importance of men was greatly exaggerated by it. That's all that women thought about was when were they going to get to see their boyfriends. But I was able to develop a lot of confidence in myself at that point. I don't know if I had a daughter if I would send her to a women's college or not. I think I probably would, just because it's a good experience.

RJ: Now, there's a certain continuity between your focus, your father's focus in accountancy, your working for this year with the father's firm, and then indeed your whole career in administration and focus on the audit, the budget side, particularly. Is that a meaningful continuity in terms of your experience?

VH: Oh, yes. One of the reasons that I was hired in the budget bureau was the fact that I knew some accounting and I could add two and two and get four consistently.

RJ: And you had vast experience of the practicalities of budgeting as well as the theory and the professional training of it. That combination for someone at the beginning of their career must have been a rather powerful mixture.

VH: Yes it was, and I've always found accounting and, just handling figures and costs and such, has always stood me in good stead. I think sometimes people think I'm too numbers conscious. So my emphasis really career-wise has been administration and budgets rather than any particular subject matter.

RJ: Then you joined the budget bureau and they sent you to UNRRA?

VH: No. When I left the budget bureau to go to UNRRA, I severed my connection with the U.S. government. And UNRRA was a completely different operation. They were recruiting, trying to recruit young Americans that had some interest in administration. So I say I had no particular interest in the international organization aspect of it at that point. When I got to UNRRA and lived with it for two years, I became a confirmed internationalist. When I had this UNRRA team of fifteen people and ten nationalities, I discovered they could work together. And we did a beautiful job of working together.

We would get together as a team to prepare for something that was coming. For instance, we knew we had a convoy of a thousand people coming in. Well, I'd never had anything to do with a thousand people coming by train. I grew up out in the middle of Illinois. And so we assigned jobs for various people. We had a doctor and a nurse and a supply man and this, that, and the other thing. And so after the first major convoy that we had, we got together to do a post-mortem. And it was the unanimous opinion of the staff that I should not be assigned any job in receiving a convoy because I had been assigned to squirt people with DDT when they were coming off. And what happened was, every time somebody else had a problem, they'd

holler at me and so I would stop the DDT-ing and go solve their problem. So we decided that the best thing to do would just to leave me out of the operation except I could be the receptionist and then go around and solve problems as they came up. And it worked out very well.

RJ: May I ask the gender question? A woman, a woman accountant, were there many women accountants, women with professional skills in administration?

VH: No.

RJ: And how did that strike you at that stage and later? Or how did it strike the men, should I say?

VH: At one point, I was the youngest team director in the American zone, and I was the only female director in the American zone. It was interesting, we started out with Polish and Baltic DPs, and then there was an influx of Jews. There were pogroms in Poland and the Jews started heading for Palestine. And they hooked onto the UNRRA camps as their way stations. So when I knew we were going to become Jewish, I offered to resign. My field supervisor said, “no,” that they just didn’t have enough Jews to serve as directors and so they wanted to try me. And so I said, well, that was fine as far as I was concerned because I didn’t have any prejudice against the Jews. They had tried up to that point to have Jewish directors of Jewish camps, but they wound up with too many Jewish refugees, and so I became the director of four Jewish camps with 3,580 refugees. And it worked out well. The men didn’t seem to mind too much because I shouldered my end of the load as much as they did. And they didn’t seem to mind having a woman tell them what to do because somebody had to, and I was there, and I was it.

RJ: And it’s often said that women have to perform five times better or at least twice as better as a man if they aim to be accepted. But from the way you describe this, that wasn’t your experience.

VH: You just had to be good at what you were doing. If you weren't, then you'd get tossed out of the job, easily as not.

RJ: Whereas the man would be treated as, well, those are human frailties, and every regular guy is a bit different. And sometimes, it works out. Let's come to UNESCO, if we may. You worked in Paris, working with Walter Laves?

VH: I'd known him in the budget bureau. He was in the Budget Bureau about the same time I was. And then he went from there to UNESCO. And I went from there to UNRRA.

RJ: And now my impression, to share my prejudice, is that UNESCO over the years has been anything but well-managed from a budgetary point-of-view. Does that relate to your own experiences?

VH: Well, in the beginning, when I went to UNESCO, it had a budget of six million dollars, which is not a great sum, particularly when you have a charter as broad as UNESCO's was, to cover education, science, and culture. I remember one time I was dealing with the auditors for UNESCO, and they wanted to know if I could certify, or could somebody certify, that the funds that had been spent were spent in furtherance of the resolutions of the general conference.

RJ: And the mandate, yes.

VH: Yes. I said, "Well, if you can tell me what that mandate means, I'd be glad to certify how we spent our money."

RJ: Which was not just a joke. It was with such a broad mandate.

VH: Oh, it was, it was.

RJ: Presumably UNESCO always has had a real challenge to know what to focus on.

VH: Yes, because the conference always came up with these very broad resolutions. Maybe by now they've gotten down to more specific things, but in the early days—

RJ: At the beginning, Julian Huxley was the director-general?

VH: Yes.

RJ: Did you have any first-hand interactions with him?

VH: Yes, quite a bit.

RJ: And, tell us what you remember.

VH: Well, he was a delightful man. He had an almost insatiable curiosity about anything and everything. My favorite experience with him was in the general conference in Beirut in 1948, and there was a move by some of the Arab countries to get Arabic established as a working language of UNESCO. So, we, the budget group, did an estimate of how much it would cost, and so I was to backstop Huxley up at the podium when he defended our estimates. Just before the meeting began, he read the paper that we'd given him. And he turned around and said, "My, isn't this awfully high?" I said, "Well, yes, it is high but that's what it's going to cost. So we simply can't afford to take on Arabic as a language now." Well, he reluctantly opposed it, the Arabic as a working language. I'm sure they've got it now because everybody else has it too. But he was a delightful man. He was easy to work with. He was—I would guess spontaneous is the word I would use to describe him.

RJ: He was not a great manager—

VH: He was not a manager, which is why he had Walter Laves there as his deputy. And Walter was good. He had a good vision of what you could do with the organization, and he was good with staff. But those early days were wild and woolly.

RJ: On that particular decision about whether UNESCO should have Arabic as one of its languages or not—looking back, does it seem to you only a technical calculation that you were required to make, or do you feel that, in practice, technical calculations tend to be pushed slightly higher if someone wants to argue against and push?

VH: I see that kind of movement in the bureaucracy too.

RJ: It depends what you want to argue, what sort of figures are produced, and how you count things. But looking back on that decision, do you think that you were motivated or pushed by Laves when you announced that it was too costly to have Arabic—to pile everything in and make the calculation a little on the high side?

VH: I don't really know that anybody really pushed to do that. But we did throw everything in that you could count as a cost. Because although that was something that was going to come eventually, we just didn't feel that at that particular point it would be wise to add that to the budget.

RJ: Do you think that you would now take a more forward-looking view on the need to extend the official languages within the UN system?

VH: Well, I think that one of the things that really influenced us was a question of time. That there were so many things that UNESCO had to do at that point that we felt that adding one more working language was simply overburdening the system. I think, generally, it's been true that all the organizations have added up to, I guess its six languages that they have now.

RJ: I make a distinction between the official languages—French, Spanish, and English—and other working languages. Interpretation and UN documents must always be prepared in the three core working languages. But I think there is some slight margin of discretion for the other three.

VH: In meetings, I think generally, they use the six. And the key to experience is the business of having to translate and reproduce documents in all six languages.

RJ: Now, let me ask you to say a little about your experiences in State, which were the main chunk of your early to mid-stage career in the Office of International Administration. And that must have been fascinating because, in the early days, the U.S. was a strong supporter of the UN. But later it shifted. Is that right?

VH: It shifted after I left. Not that I had anything to do with it, but until I left the State Department—

RJ: In 1966?

VH: Well, actually, I was still on their payroll, but I actually retired in 1968. I was on loan to the Public Health Service from 1966 to 1968.

RJ: But tell me a little bit, because it is such a critical and fascinating point. The U.S. in 1950 was a strong supporter indeed.

VH: Right.

RJ: Many of the great things of the UN emerged because of direct American leadership, strong American support, American creativity, American vision—some very visionary, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which never would have been there without Eleanor Roosevelt's personal leadership. You must know better than I do the many other areas where a positive attitude from the United States was very important.

VH: Well, this is very true. We had an exceptional group of men who were assistant-secretaries for international organization affairs. Francis Wilcox was the assistant-secretary when I first went to work for the State Department, and we had one or two others in the 1950s. But then we got Harlan Cleveland. He came in with Kennedy in 1960. The whole thrust of the

State Department, as far as the UN and other international organizations were concerned, was very positive. We were supportive; we contributed as much money as we could, and we did our best to try to get good Americans to go to work for the international organizations. And so the whole attitude was a very positive one.

And then we went through a period when they were assigning foreign service officers to the various offices in IO (Bureau of International Organization Affairs), and some of them had no interest at all in international organizations. And the attitude of support gradually began to erode. Now, one of the people that was particularly influential in all this was Walter Kotschnig, who was the head of the Office of Economic and Social Affairs in the IO bureau. He was an Austrian by birth. He had a good staff and he was very supportive of the UN. He was the deputy U.S. representative on ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council), and so he had a lot to do with the work of ECOSOC, particularly in the early days.

I think you would have to say that one of the reasons that the U.S. had the positive attitude that it had toward the UN was the fact that a lot of the staff was civil service and had been around for several years. The foreign service officers get transferred every two or three years, and we had some people in IO who had been there from the beginning. And so they were very strong supporters. But when they began to dilute the staff with foreign service officers, some of them were very good, but some of them couldn't have cared less.

RJ: Do you think that's because the civil servant members of IO actually built up a lot of experience over time both to see good things the UN had been doing, to realize the pressures on the UN from so many different governments, that may make a rather sort of simple more forthright approach to problems more difficult than people might first imagine, and that the foreign office people coming into it fresh didn't appreciate many of these things?

VH: Yes, I think that's very true. An institutional memory as it's expressed in the people that are working really makes a lot of difference because when you have people that come in for two years and then go on, they barely have the ability to grasp a current problem without knowing anything at all about the history of it.

RJ: And do you think foreign office people become, in a sense, schooled in defending the national position—in this case, the national United States position in the different field assignments, whereas secretariat people get accustomed to seeing a more negotiating position?

VH: No, I think that's true. One part of it was the mix of foreign service and civil service, and the other part of it was the caliber of the people who were appointed as assistant-secretaries. We went through, in the period that I was there, I went through maybe five assistant-secretaries. Since then, they've gotten in political appointees that will stay for two years and then go on to someplace else. And it really has been so, particularly the last few years when I was on the ACABQ. For instance, I would get briefly acquainted with whomever the assistant-secretary for IO was. Well, they might be very bright people, but they had only superficial knowledge of international organizations. But they were presumably making policy all of this time.

As I think I mentioned last night, back in the olden days when I was there, an assessed contribution was a treaty obligation, and I don't think any time while I was with the State Department did we ever withhold any money from our assessed contribution. Well, then when I went to the Advisory Committee in 1977, I discovered that the U.S. was withholding odd little bits of money for things we disapproved of.

RJ: For leverage.

VH: And that's no way to run a railroad, because once you decide that your assessment is not a treaty obligation, then you can do anything with it that you want to.

RJ: Do you know when that change came in?

VH: I can only say that it was some time between 1968 and 1977, which was the time I wasn't around.

RJ: Let me take you back to some of these assistant-secretaries of state. I think you mentioned Fran Wilcox, Harlan Cleveland, Walter Kotschnig.

VH: Well, Walter Kotschnig was not an assistant-secretary. He was on the same level I was. He was an office director.

RJ: Tell me just a little about Fran Wilcox and Harlan Cleveland.

VH: They were both great fellows. Wilcox was very bright. He had been up on the Hill, I think as a staff man for one of the Senate committees, and he was solid and very good policy-wise. He was a good administrator too. Cleveland became one of my favorite people. He was an ex-intern, by the way, with the National Institute of Public Affairs. He was bright. He was good as an administrator. He was good at testifying on the Hill and he ran a good operation.

RJ: Surely he is and was an irrepressible visionary.

VH: I don't know. You might very well call it that. But he knew what he was doing, and he knew where he wanted to go with something. I used to be amused at him that we would be writing a speech for a congressional presentation and I took some text up to him and he would say, "Well, now, we shouldn't say this this way; let's say it another way." And I say, "Well, I will redo that." But he would turn around to his typewriter and punch out with two fingers what he wanted to say. So I'd take that and we'd put it in the speech and go from there. But he was a

great fellow to work with. He was very patient. I don't think I ever saw him lose his temper. He became the ambassador to NATO when he left the State Department.

RJ: Now let me ask you about the other side of the 1950s. You give this positive view of the U.S. over this period, but first there was [Joseph] McCarthy for three years doing untold damage in the UN and indeed in the high levels of U.S. politics and so forth. And then there was John Foster Dulles, who surely wasn't exactly a friend of the UN.

VH: Yes.

RJ: So, how does that square with Fran Wilcox who was there during Foster Dulles's period?

VH: Let's see, when did Dulles come in? He came in with [Dwight] Eisenhower.

RJ: Yes, 1952. Would that be 1952 to 1960?

VH: Yes. Well, Wilcox was there before Dulles, and then we had the Dulles period, and then we had the Kennedy period, and—

RJ: Chalk and cheese.

VH: Yes.

RJ: Light and dark, or dark and light.

VH: Dark and light, yes. With McCarthy, there was an executive order that [Harry] Truman issued, saying that U.S. candidates for international organization jobs had to go through a vetting process. Unfortunately, my office was the one that had to administer this, and we saw some of the FBI reports that they made on candidates for the UN. Some of it was the biggest bunch of garbage you have ever seen. We had to enforce the executive order and send whatever information we had to send to the UN, but it was something that we did with a great deal of distaste. McCarthy did an enormous amount of damage both to the international organizations,

to the State Department, and to the U.S. government in general. And it was too bad that nobody had the guts to take him on until it was almost too late. Dulles was an interesting case. When I went to work for the State Department in 1950—the secretary of state before Dulles was Dean Acheson. He did his farewell outside, out in front of the State Department. He was presented with the chair that he had had, and the staff loved him. And about two or three weeks later, we had Dulles's introduction to the State Department at the same place. And so he gave a speech that indicated that he had been born to the job of secretary of state. It was foreordained.

RJ: By God himself.

VH: Or either by God or one of his deputies. And so Dulles made this long speech about how great he was and what a good job he was going to do with the State Department and the staff. Instead of this bright, sunny reception that they had given Acheson, the staff was all standing there looking very glum and very dim. And it was not a happy time. He was bright, I guess, at least he said he was bright, but as I say he had all this preordained—

RJ: There was a very much a religious sense of him being right, isn't that correct?

VH: Yes.

RJ: He was insufferably convinced of his correctness.

VH: That puts it very well.

RJ: I suppose then for professionals in the State Department, many must have realized this was not only excessive, but made it very difficult for negotiation and good interchange.

VH: Yes. I remember one occasion when—I've forgotten what the issue was. It was the amount or the percentage that we were contributing to one of the international organization programs, and Dulles had come down with an edict that we were not to contribute more than whatever X was. And so I had written a paper to try to persuade him otherwise. My boss at the

time was home sick, and so I took the paper out to him because we had to get it out in a hurry. So he went over it and we got it all sorted out, and I said, "Well, what happens if we can't convince him?" He said, "Well, you can suit yourself—either accept the decision or resign." And I said, "Yes, but I don't want to resign." He said, "Well, you know, if it's a matter of principle with you, why you decide what you want to do." But, fortunately, we were able to persuade him to go ahead and do what we wanted done. That was one good thing about it. If you could write the right kind of paper, you could convince him to go ahead and do what you wanted.

RJ: Talking about resigning on principle, over your career in State, did you see many people resigning on principle?

VH: No, there were a few, not very many while I was there. I've seen them since. They've been given a lot more publicity in the foreign service journal, but people do resign over principle.

RJ: Which examples stick in mind?

VH: It's particular with young foreign service officers who get all caught up in a particular policy that the government is following but they object to it, or a policy that the government doesn't follow that they object to. So I don't have any specifics because I didn't know the people but I read the cases.

RJ: But during the McCarthy period, of course some U.S. people were forced out of the UN, and if I am remembering correctly, there was at least one suicide. Is that right?

VH: I wouldn't be surprised.

RJ: In the forwarding of these FBI files to the UN, as you indicated, a number of people in State must have felt very unhappy about having to do that. Was there any way that people managed to lose the odd file?

VH: No, because you had the candidate hanging, waiting to be approved, and it was just one of those things.

RJ: My understanding is that one of the consequences, although this may have been a parallel move, was that the Russians then said, "Well if the Americans are going to pass on all of their people, we will do the same." At least that's how it was when I joined the UN in 1982. Persons from the Soviet Union were all people who were seconded from their own governments with controls and particular arrangements that made for a total lack of independence. But whenever issues were raised about this, it was always said: "Well, look, the U.S. set this up by insisting on clearing their own nationals and the Russians argue this is just their way of doing the same." Do you have any comment on that?

VH: No, I think it was undoubtedly true. The one problem with the U.S. position on almost anything was that you should look at what we do, as opposed to what we say. You take the abortion issue, for instance. We've got all kinds of moral arguments built up about that which are just a lot of nonsense—that is, that a woman should be able to decide what she is going to do with either a planned or an unplanned pregnancy. So we set ourselves up as moral giants on all sorts of things when we've got no more right to than my dog, Susie.

RJ: But the political pressures that led to the politics of abortion in the U.S. are surely wildly different from the politics vis-à-vis the UN. Or do you see actually rather a close link between them?

VH: It's all a matter of attitude. Nationally, we've got all kinds of screwy attitudes on all sorts of problems. And so I say we've done the same thing with the UN.

RJ: Well, let me then come to the budget issues. It is very interesting that the United States issued annual reports on all their contributions to different parts of the UN and other parts of the international system. Was it your idea to develop that report?

VH: No. What happened was there was a staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that was interested in U.S. contributions, and it was our office that he always called to get information. And we spent, it seems, half our lives setting up information for him. And he would publish all this stuff that we gave him, and then beat us over the head with it. And it was a losing game and so, finally, in order to get ahead of what he was doing, somebody asked Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to put in a rider in some bill to require the State Department to report annually on its contributions to international organizations. So we seized on that. That is, the report was done at State Department's initiative. So we took that and made it our first report, in 1952. And I was the author of the first report. I had a good staff man, fortunately, so I didn't have to do all the numbers. But we debated long and seriously about the information that we should include, and we decided to put in more rather than less. So we started with that first, skinny little report, and we sent it to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and they published it as a House document. And it's been going ever since.

RJ: How many other countries in the world consolidate all their international contributions in this way?

VH: As far as I know, nobody does. Some of the Scandinavians might, but I've never seen their reports. We found the report a very useful document and, when it came out, we always sent a batch of copies up to the U.S. mission, and they transmitted them to some of the

other missions around. We gave them to the ACABQ and, far as I know, it's the only report that has all this material in it. And we made it as accurate as humanly possible. And remember, this was done in the days before computers. We got these enormous spreadsheets. We did them by hand every year and typed them up every year. So it was really an operation.

RJ: Let me come to the UN more generally. You've seen the UN's administration close up through participation as a representative of the most powerful and influential government within the United Nations. How inefficient, how efficient do you think the UN is administratively?

VH: Compared to what?

RJ: Well, that's my next question. Compared to the United States government or, indeed, to other governments or to many private sector firms or big multinational corporations.

VH: Well, actually, I've always thought the UN was pretty efficient. I realize that's not the government point-of-view, considering all the calls that the U.S. government has made over the years for reform and reorganization. The U.S. government doesn't know what it wants the UN to do in terms of organization and operation. I sometimes think this call for reform is because nobody can think of anything else to do. But the UN really operates, at least the way I've known it, it operates with a good bit of efficiency, and a thing goes from here to here to here, and it gets there. And sometimes, one of the problems that the UN has had is that, just like in UNESCO, the General Assembly will pass great, big, broad resolutions, then give them $10.32 to carry them out. And that's very difficult to do.

RJ: When the UN was asked to reform, as it was a number of times, was it governments or was it the secretariat that often went slow and limited action?

VH: Well, I think that the secretariat was always a little slow to respond but that was because the directions that they were given by governments were usually so fuzzy that they couldn't figure out what they were supposed to do. And you can ask for all the reform in the world, but until you give somebody a specific notion of what you want reformed, you can't just take the secretariat like a bunch of dough and throw it up in the air and it will come down in the formation that you want it. It just doesn't work that way.

RJ: Which, in your experience, have been the more efficient and effective parts of the UN?

VH: I've always thought that peacekeeping was pretty well done. They got themselves into some political problems there once in a while that they didn't necessarily need to. But back in the early days when they had a peacekeeping operation, you had a pretty well-defined problem that you were trying to do something with. And, at least back in the days when I was dealing with it, I say I felt that the peacekeeping operations were really pretty good. We had a number of hearings on them when I was in the ACABQ. I think the UN has shortchanged itself in terms of not having the kind of permanent staff built up that you could use to launch into a peacekeeping operation quickly and well-organized.

RJ: A standing peacekeeping force. Would there have been the same government objections to bailing out the standing peacekeeping force as there has been to building up a standing army, should we say?

VH: No. The thing that I think that they haven't done that they might have done was to have built a very small cadre of people in the Secretariat that knew how to do a peacekeeping operation. So they've had to reinvent the wheel from scratch every once in a while.

RJ: When you returned to the ACABQ in the 1980s, did you notice much difference in the UN from your experiences, particularly in the 1950s, in terms of efficiency and UN morale?

VH: The prime thing that was noticeable was that everything was so much bigger, that back in my first encounter it had about sixty members. It had done really a remarkable job at absorbing all this—over a hundred members since the beginning. But I always felt that the UN was a pretty efficient operation. We got into one interesting scrape in the Advisory Committee when we had a witness who was speaking in Spanish and the interpretation that came out was very halting and not very coherent, and so after a little bit, the chairman stopped the meeting to see what the problem was. The problem was that the man who was interpreting into English was interpreting from Russian. The Spanish speaker had been interpreted into Russian and then from Russian into English, and the results were not very good.

RJ: But what is the significance of that particular story?

VH: Well, the significance of the story is that every once in a while the UN can get itself royally screwed up. The language services were generally very good. But in the Advisory Committee, we had about the same bunch of interpreters most of the time. And they were good, and they read the documents, and they knew what the terminology was.

RJ: In the ACABQ, is your experience that often the North-South divide was operating in the committee? Or was that much more subtle and different alliances arose depending on the issue?

VH: I would say the latter not the former. By and large, the people I served with were pretty good, though there were some of them that didn’t do any work. But most of them did, and the chairman definitely dominated the group. But he was able to because he was so reasonable. And he and I got to be great friends before—

RJ: This wasn't the Tanzanian?

VH: Yes, M'selle. He's been there twenty-five years now. And before that, the first one had been Agnides, who was a Greek, and then there were two or three others in between. And finally, with M'selle, he was able to get quite a decent salary and arrangements for the chairman.

RJ: That's the part I know about, and I was always suspicious whether the chief watchdog committee loses his influence to set up his own salary.

VH: Well, I'm sure he did.

RJ: Well above, I think, normal UN rates. Some of us weren't too impressed.

VH: Well, he wound up I think at the ASG (assistant-secretary-general) level, or something similar. I should say in his defense he was a good chairman, and he only misled us once as far as I recall.

RJ: Which was that?

VH: That was the issue of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). We went there and we concluded that they really shouldn't do what they were planning to do, and then he went ahead and swung the thing his way. But I would say he was a good chairman. He really worked hard. He kept up with all the documents and knew all the issues, and he knew the history of it since he'd been there as long as he had.

RJ: In your period in ACABQ, at least the latter part, was the U.S. representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick?

VH: Yes.

RJ: So that again was a period of the U.S., indeed, following the New International Economic Order (NIEO) set of issues in the 1970s, where the North-South polarization had

become very tough. Did you feel this was putting a lot of pressures on you in representing the U.S. positions in ACABQ?

VH: Well, one of the nice things about being a member of the ACABQ is that you don't take any instructions from anybody.

RJ: Is that true of all representatives or just the U.S. one?

VH: Basically, it's true of most of them. There's some of them that toe their government line. I remember one of my favorite experiences with the ACABQ was that the Secretariat had proposed an increase in the working capital fund, which they really needed. But the U.S. position was against it. A lot of people in the U.S. had the position that the only good budget is the one that's less than last year's. And so in this particular issue in the Advisory Committee, I supported it, supported the increase, and when it got to Fifth Committee, I said I wanted to talk on it, I wanted to be the U.S. representative. So I wrote a very mild speech opposing it, and of course the thing was passed overwhelmingly. And I felt very good about it because the thing had come out the right way.

RJ: Were you reprimanded in any way for that?

VH: No, no. No, I maintained my independence and everybody respected it.

RJ: Did Jeanne Kirkpatrick ever try to lean on you?

VH: No, she tried to hire me at one point.

RJ: Really?

VH: Yes, she wanted me to go to work for the mission, and I turned it down. A couple of months later, at a Christmas party, I was going through the line and she held my hand and said, "I've sent you messages for the last six months that I want you to go to work here." And I said, "Well, I have a one-track mind, and I can only do one thing at a time, and I can either do

the Advisory Committee or the mission, but I can't do both." She said, "I doubt that." So, we shook hands and parted as friends. But, no, if I'd gone to work for her, we would have killed each other by the end of six months.

RJ: That might have been better for the UN if you did succeed. Thinking of the various permanent representatives of the United States to the UN, who are the great ones in your view?

VH: Andy Young was one of the great ones in my mind.

RJ: Now is that just because you vote democratic?

VH: No. It's because as a person, he's a great guy. His successor, Don McHenry was quite good too. I was there when Henry Cabot Lodge was the U.S. representative, and I never got to know him well because he never recognized anybody that he knew. I'd see him half a dozen times, and he wouldn't nod or speak or anything. Adlai Stevenson was a great one, as far as I'm concerned.

RJ: Greater than Andy?

VH: Yes, he was broader than Andy.

RJ: More the statesman, perhaps.

VH: Yes.

RJ: I happened to know Andy a bit and he is just wonderful. Charismatic, visionary, and someone who cares, is really humanly committed.

VH: Yes, yes, he is all of those.

RJ: Now, was Adlai Stevenson humanly committed? One gets the feeling he was not only quite patrician, but an intellect of higher power.

VH: He was an intellect and he was an aristocrat, but he was just as warm and human as anybody you could ever meet. It was interesting. One day—I didn't know him well at all at the

time—I was in New York and I went to Stevenson's office to catch Harlan Cleveland. And Cleveland and Stevenson and half a dozen others were rushing out to a meeting. Stevenson saw me in his ante room, stopped, came over, shook hands, and said how nice it was to see me. Well, that may have been the politician in him, but he's really a very warm human being. I knew him both in New York, and he was there in Geneva a number of times when I was there.

RJ: What about Paul Hoffman?

VH: He was a very nice guy and he did a good job with UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). I got to know him fairly well. For several years, I sat as the U.S. representative on the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), which was the committee of governments that governed the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA).

RJ: How many governments were on that committee, roughly?

VH: Originally, I think about the same number as was on ECOSOC—I think about eighteen. And I think it expanded like everything else expanded around the UN. But it was a good committee. Philippe de Seynes was sitting on it for the French at that point, and I knew all the people from the agencies pretty well, and it got so I knew the government people as well. So TAC was never a great committee, but it was pretty useful in terms of keeping tabs on what the UN was doing in technical assistance.

RJ: What about Maurice Pate and Harry Labouisse?

VH: I didn't really know them. I knew who they were and saw them in meetings, but I never got personally acquainted with them.

RJ: And Ralph Bunche?

VH: He wasn't in my particular circle. I had a great deal of respect and admiration for him from a distance, because he was quite a good guy.

RJ: Tell me a wee bit more about Paul Hoffman, in looking at him as a manager, looking at him as a leader, a builder indeed of UNDP.

VH: Well, taking over UNDP was a difficult job for anybody to take on because you had all of the parochial interests of the specialized agencies, who had each built up its own little kingdom in technical assistance. And then, I think, I've forgotten when it was that the UN started sending out resident representatives.

RJ: About that time, I think—1966, 1967. I may be wrong, but I think it was about then.

VH: Well, the UN was tackling a problem that should have been tackled years earlier—to have field representatives that had some coordinating responsibility over the specialized agencies. The basic problem in the system was the fact that everybody had its own constitution and its own governing body and its own resolutions and all that kind of thing. So each of the agencies felt that they were king in their own field and they weren't about to bow down to some bureaucrat from the UN. I guess part of the problem is that the whole thing just kind of grew. And it wasn't as if somebody set up a program and planned it this way, but it just grew. And when the UN finally tried to take hold of it through these representatives, they were really bucking a very strong tide.

RJ: You make a point there which I hear far, far too little. Namely, that each of the individual UN agencies has their own governing body and their own mandate and, indeed, their own current policies.

VH: And their own budget.

RJ: You sound to me, if I may say, like a wise, experienced administrator or analyst of administration. In contrast, the lack of UN coordination is time and time again attributed to the ambitions of the individual agencies rather than to their mandates, their budgets, their

structures—which, after all, the governments of the governing bodies of each of these agencies could change if the governments really had the will and the understanding to do so. And I deduce that most governments are divided within. On the one hand, their foreign office people, state department people say that there should be more coordination. But, meanwhile, their agricultural department is going off to Rome and their ministers or whoever are going off to Paris, or their representatives on the UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) board see it differently. And no one ever says, look, we can't have it both ways.

VH: You're so right. And it's up to the governments, and the governments do a very poor job of coordinating themselves. We had that problem all the time in the State Department, even though, in some ways, we were fortunate because we had pulled into the State Department appropriation the contributions of a great many of the international organizations we belonged to.

RJ: As covered by this report, for example.

VH: Yes. And our office, the Office of International Administration, either wrote the position papers on budgets, or we would always get input from the relevant agency. We would work with the agriculture department on FAO, and with the Public Health Service on WHO, and so forth. But we tried to keep a consistent policy among the agencies. The real problem was that a lot of people have the idea that the only good budget is the one that's less than last year's. And you can't carry out an expanding program if that's what you're doing.

RJ: I hadn't pressed you quite hard enough in explaining how it works in the United States with State, or indeed other departments pressing for one policy as part of the administration, and then Congress sniping at this in its Foreign Affairs Committee or otherwise. Is that a perpetual problem over this whole period or has that been more a problem of the last ten years?

VH: I'd say it's probably been more of a problem in the last ten years. We had a problem of coordinating the U.S. position in different international organizations. But because the State Department names delegations and funds sending them off, we had a certain amount of control over the delegations themselves and the positions always had to be State Department positions. Now we had wrestled sometimes with some of the agencies as to what we supported and what we didn't support, and it was always a problem when we were trying to cut budgets and the substantive agencies didn't want it to be cut, and so sometimes we had to come to a compromise. But until at least the last ten years, the support on the Hill for everything but the UN was really pretty good.

RJ: Really? Even during the [Ronald] Reagan period?

VH: Well, I wasn't really around then.

RJ: Perhaps the early Reagan period? Because, after all, David Stockman argued that he was cutting the budget and trying to produce a balanced budget. Admittedly, he then broke with Reagan and said that it was all—

VH: It was all a game.

RJ: It was all like smoke and mirrors. And we now can see that. The biggest budget deficit was run up under Reagan. This would suggest that, in fact, whatever was said, there wasn't that much financial budget cutting pressure on everything at the UN.

VH: Well, of course, the individual pieces that were cut really didn't have any great impact on the total U.S. budget.

RJ: The U.S. contribution to the UN, though large, is still very small in relation to everything else?

VH: It still has fallen in relation to the whole thing.

RJ: This brings me to what you were saying last night about the origins of this proposal that Russia should lose its vote if it did not fully pay its treaty-obligated contributions.

VH: Well, though, our suggestion was that we take those speeches out of the drawer and give them to the Russians so that they could beat us over the head the same way we used to beat them over the head.

RJ: How at the time was this speech received by the Russians?

VH: The U.S. drive to apply Article 19 to the Soviets was in my book one of the stupidest things we ever did. But the amount of time and energy and cable costs that the U.S. ran up trying to take the Soviet vote away was done without any relation to common sense. It was during Harlan Cleveland's time, and Dick Gardner was the deputy-assistant-secretary of state and he was a lawyer. The lawyers got hold of this and they really went to town without any reference as to what would happen if the shoe were on the other foot.

RJ: And no one ever imagined it would be at that time.

VH: No, no, no, nobody ever imagined it would be. But, of course, the other thing was it was so silly for us to want to take the Soviet vote away from them just as a matter of principle. I don't know that anybody ever thought beyond what would happen the day that they lost their vote.

RJ: And why and when did the U.S. attitude to treaty-obligated contributions change?

VH: That I don't know. It certainly was after I left the State Department, because through the time I was there, they were treaty obligations and we handled them as such. But then, just as I mentioned earlier, at some point we started withholding little bits and pieces from our contribution for things we didn't approve of. I don't know if Law of the Sea was one of them, but there were half a dozen little things that we withheld contributions from.

RJ: Which must have been between 1966, 1968, and 1980, or something like that.

VH: Yes, say 1977.

RJ: And is there any legal justification for the change? Having been so close when the legal justification was formulated, that treaty obligations must be paid, were you aware of any loopholes that could legitimately be used?

VH: Not that I know of. I've argued that question with some of the people in IO, but they say that that's what we're doing. If we don't approve of something, we're not going to pay for it. And that just is not a way to run a railroad.

RJ: We're almost to the end, but I have two or three questions that I'd like to ask you. One, of course, is looking forward. Given your long experience of the U.S.-UN relations, both from outside the UN looking in from the U.S. position and sometimes as a UN staff member, what would be your hope for U.S.-UN relations in the next twenty-five years?

VH: Well, I would hope the U.S. would go back to the position of paying its bills. The U.S. has got to recognize that it really can't live without the UN, and the UN really can't live without the U.S. We went through this exercise of withdrawing from UNESCO. And, apparently, we're now about to reenter. And the amount of wasted time and energy on that was just phenomenal.

RJ: What changes would you like to see in terms of structure at the UN, thinking of your perceptions and your experience gained in the ACABQ, if you could wave a magic wand?

VH: That's a bigger question than I can answer now. It's one you'd really need to do some studying on.

RJ: Do you have a feeling where administration ought to be going in general?

VH: Well, one of the problems that the UN has, I think, is that with all the governments that you've got and all their conflicting interests and desires, you wind up with resolutions that get bigger and bigger and they still give you $10.32 to carry them out. I think that the UN probably needs a different structure than it's got now in terms of relationships between governments, on the one hand, and secretariat on the other. But I don't know that anybody yet tackled this whole question of how you get governments to operate together, other than through this enormous agenda that they have every fall. And so they go through all the machinery of passing resolutions and laying out programs. And I think there's probably a better way, but I don't know what it is.

RJ: And I didn't ask you particularly about the funding agencies, the UN, which you must have looked at in ACABQ, the UNDP, UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), World Food Program (WFP). Did you have any view of their relative focus, their relative efficiency?

VH: I've always thought that UNICEF was pretty well administered. I've always felt that the voluntary programs are much better focused than the regular budgets. And everybody gets his two cents worth on the regular budget. But you get a program like UNICEF or like UNDP and they're focused on particular kinds of activities. And they try not to stray too far from that.

RJ: I have another question or two. You mentioned early on that you'd always lived your professional life as a sort of numbers person who has seen the budgetary dimension of administration and management and like that. Robert McNamara, who was at least within the popular mind, the quantitative manager supremo, whether he was managing Ford or body counts in the State, in the Department of Defense, or in the World Bank. He was quantified. When you

think of his management style, do you sort of want to say, "Oh, that's what management should be about?"

VH: No.

RJ: Did you take that somewhat negative view, even when he was in the World Bank?

VH: Well, when I went to the Public Health Service—on loan—that was about the time that Lyndon Johnson had said—

RJ: Great Society.

VH: Let there be light. No, McNamara had sold Johnson on the idea of program planning and budgeting (PPB). And Johnson said, "This is great, let's do it throughout the U.S. government." And so one of the reasons I went to the Public Health Service was to try to help them install PPB in the Public Health Service. And it was a fascinating exercise. We didn't get very far with it. It didn't succeed. But McNamara, at least as I saw him, was a great theorist, and he took a theory and he tried to apply it all over the place, and theories don't necessarily work that way.

RJ: But here was a man not only praised by government but praised by the private sector, the whiz kid that was the paragon of private sector management in the United States in one of the most important companies of the United States. So how does one say he was a great theorist, but it doesn't work very well?

VH: Well, he forgot the human element, I think. I think that was his basic problem. So he interpreted Vietnam as body counts and not people. And I think, in all due modesty, I've never done that. No, my experience in UNRRA, as I said, was where I learned about international cooperation. And it was a people experience, because we had some people that had been in death camps, and we had Poles, Polish Jews that were moving from Poland hopefully to

the Promised Land. And I had all kinds of requests that I had to turn down because it just wasn't practical. But I learned a lot about people at that point and I don't think I've ever forgotten it.

RJ: Virginia, thank you very much. It's been a fascinating and wide-ranging account and a very interesting perspective.

VH: Well, I hope it's useful in the whole study that you're doing.

RJ: Thank you. Well, I'm sure it will be. Thank you.

VH: Well, you're welcome.

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