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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF

BERNARD T. G. CHIDZERO

BY

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Transcribed by Ron Nerio

THOMAS G. WEISS: This is Tom Weiss on 11 May 2000 in downtown Harare interviewing Dr. Bernard Chidzero in his offices. Good morning, Bernard. It's a pleasure to be here. I thought we might start this morning by going way back and thinking about your own background. Could you tell me a bit about your early life, your family, your background, how you spent your youth?

BERNARD CHIDZERO: It's rather a longish background. It covers a number of countries from the date of my birth, 1 July 1927; born here in the neighborhood of Harare, at Arlington Estate. Then we moved with my parents, when I was about seven, to another estate, called Edinburgh Estate, across the Nyatsime River. Now, if you know the geography of this place, the Nyatsime River divides two geographical areas. Facing south, to the right would be what was white land, so to speak, which really means areas declared reserved for white settlement, for commercial farms. To the left were what we called native reserves, communal areas. And Edinburgh Estate was on the right side of the Nyatsime River; to the left was the school where I went, Jonas School. I used to travel on foot from Edinburgh Estate, about three or four kilometers, across the Nyatsime River to Jonas School, where I did my primary education.

What might interest you here is that I did not start going to school until I was twelve years old. The first few years I worked at Edinburgh Estate in the fields, planting tobacco, weeding the grass and grading tobacco leaf after curing it. As a young man, I worked with Mr. Chirimuta who took me away from farming to become a tailoring assistant at the same farm. Mr. Davies was the owner of Edinburgh Estate and had a shop as well, where he sold goods to people coming from across the Nyatsime River. And Mr. Chirimuta used to provide the tailoring for the

clothes which people bought and I became an assistant. So you may wish to know that I know a bit of tailoring! I can cut men's trousers. I can sew them, which is a bit of fun.

From there, that is from Edinburgh Estate, and after my first years of primary school, I went to Kutama where I met others who later played an important role in Zimbabwe, like the president of Zimbabwe, [Robert] Mugabe. I first met him there. He was teaching when I was doing my primary school. I don't know whether I should give you more detail about this.

TGW: Were your parents then also working on the estates?

BTGC: My father was, yes. My mother was not working but she was cultivating the old fields of the estate, to grow our own maize, our own groundnuts. Which is interesting because at present, there are some white-owned farms, even black-owned farms, where workers are not allowed to grow their own food. They are supposed to buy from the estate production, which makes their lives more expensive. We had to sell and make money and were never made to go to school.

TGW: And you did not start until age twelve. Now, until age twelve, were you able to get any form of instruction?

BTGC: No. My first instruction was at the age of twelve when Chirimuta started a school across the river, the Nyatsime, and we were writing on sand. We would shape the figure "A," for example, and we were asked to pronounce "A," not as in English, but "open" as "A" in Shona. Write a figure like "B," and we would pronounce it "B." Combine "B" and "A" twice and you would get the word "Baba," which means father. We all enjoyed that. It opened our eyes. Then we would have a break after which we would go to the garden to do some gardening. Each of us had a small bed of vegetables, onions, cabbage, et cetera. In a sense, it was a form of education with production at that early level.

But we soon, of course, got more formal education. We got slates, we got books and teachers, et cetera, at Jonas school, before I went to Kutama. So it is correct that before I was twelve, I had no education whatsoever.

TGW: What kind of teacher was Robert Mugabe?

BTGC: Well, he did not teach me. He was a teacher in primary schools. I was much farther behind him in learning. I was in what we called at that time Standard One, Standard Two. I think he had qualified already as a teacher for primary education.

TGW: But this was a public school.

BTGC: No, this was a missionary school.

TGW: Run by which order?

BTGC: It was a Catholic school run by Jesuit fathers. An old Irish priest, Father O'Hea, who was succeeded by another Jesuit, called Father Markalls, who later became the archbishop of Zimbabwe. The actual teaching, however, was done by Marist brothers, who were also Catholic. And these were Canadian—English and French speaking.

TGW: And this is where your mother's beer-brewing money came in handy? This was, of course, a difficult period for the planet. Do you recall the outbreak of the Second World War, and how the war had an influence on day-to-day life in what was then Southern Rhodesia?

BTGC: I wouldn't say I knew of the outbreak of the war in an informed manner, such as who were the players or the antagonists, and why it started, what sort of war. But we used to sing songs which, even now, remind me that we had some good knowledge that there was a war. In what I'm writing about myself, what I call my own poetic biography, I recall that we used to sing a song which, translated into English, went like this, "We shall suffer, we shall suffer. German women can handle guns, and move and direct their guns in a manner which was

surprising to people." Now, if I sang it in Shona it would not make any sense to you. In Shona we sang with feeling: "German women shoot like men and they dance like doves, and so on."

We knew about it. We heard about people being recruited to go overseas. There was war. We heard that this war was not like the one which preceded the great influenza. Like my mother used to say, she knew the great influenza when she was a young girl, which was in 1918. There was no comparison to this war. We used to come to town, to Harare, then Salisbury, from the villages before that, from Edinburgh Estate. We would see quite a lot of mobilization of soldiers to be sent overseas. But we did not know exactly why the war was being fought and where exactly. I was very young then. I was born in 1927.

TGW: But by the end of the war—

BTGC: Well, by the end of the war, in 1945-1946, I was knowledgeable about it. I was at Kutama. I had done my Standard Six, and as students we used to talk about war among ourselves. And in 1946, I went to Saint Francis College in Natal, South Africa; German nuns were teaching there. And strangely enough, I got interested in learning their language. So, I had a small textbook for French, a small textbook for German, apart from English.

In 1946 I was about nineteen. I refused to go to the secondary schools in Rhodesia because they were racially segregated. I went to South Africa, instead. Although those in South Africa were also racially segregated, at least they had a liberal history in the sense that some of my own people, like Lawrence Vambe, had been to Saint Francis College, where the teachers were German nuns. It was a famous school. The secondary schools in what was then Southern Rhodesia were segregated. In fact, for blacks, secondary schools had just begun, namely Gormonzi School near Harare, and Fletcher in the Midlands, while Saint Francis, the one at Kutama, was just beginning to offer education above what was called Standard Six. It was

possible then to move from junior certificate to matriculation. But I left deliberately to go to South Africa because I admired those who had been there and had returned home. And I also wanted to see what South Africa was like. We had heard stories about these German women who were teaching there, in contrast to the German women who were carrying guns, you see.

And I do recall one of the nuns who became quite friendly with the students saying with a welcoming smile, "Why do you come here, when the whole world hates us because our brothers were fighting the war?" I do have a good memory of that one. She was either Sister Lucia or, more likely, Sister Adelgisa.

TGW: How were you able to pay for the transport and the fees?

BTGC: My father was working for Mr. Davies at Edinburgh Estate. He was what they called a storekeeper. Not that it was his own shop, but he was the one who was the front man selling and handling the goods for Mr. Davies and earning a fairly good income.

TGW: And your parents were supportive of the idea of going such a long distance away?

BTGC: Partly supportive because they had heard how they trained and disciplined the boys there, who otherwise played truant at home. So, finance was partly from my father and partly from my mother's brewing beer and selling it on weekends. I did get a scholarship, eventually, from the Catholic priests.

TGW: You mentioned being politically aware at the end of the war. Just to fast-forward a little bit, do you recall any discussions amongst fellow students or faculty about the founding of the United Nations or the Bretton Woods agreements? Or was this just too far away?

BTGC: No, that was just too far away. I went to Mariannhill in 1946, at about the time the UN had been or was being founded. We did not talk about that. We did talk about the end of the war and what it meant. There would be peace. People would come back home. It was only

when I had completed my matriculation—which means after four years of secondary school, and in my matriculation classes we did some history, and some advanced language classes, Latin, English—that we began to know about the outside world more clearly.

I left Mariannhill in 1949 to go to what was Basutoland then, now Lesotho. There I did my first university degree, BA, at Pious XII University College. I moved very fast, some people say, from 1939 when I started writing in the sand, to 1949, when I went to University College in Basutholand, that is in Lesotho. I should point out that Pious XII University College was actually part of the University of South Africa. It later became the National University of Lesotho. In fact, therefore, my BA certificate was from the University of South Africa. The subjects or courses which we took there opened a complete world. I took history, English and Latin. I also took psychology and what was called native administration, which included how blacks were ruled and how whites were ruled, and why the difference. I met there with people from various parts of the world. There were students from Kenya, from Uganda, from Zambia, and from South Africa. And the teachers came from Canada, Ireland, the UK, and South Africa.

Whereas at Mariannhill it was mainly German nuns teaching us and some local black Africans, at the University College where I did my first degree, we had for instance three Irish priests teaching us. One taught Latin, Father Hickey. He is dead now. I mention him because he taught Latin in a dramatic manner, comparing the plebeians and the patricians. The plebeians were "like you people here," and the patricians were the rulers, "like the British." He was very humorous, I tell you. And he taught us history. We had another Irish priest, Father Touhy, who taught English. And Father Ferguson. We had an Englishman, Professor Fuller, who taught psychology and mathematics; Professor Jowett, native administration; and Professor Stewart, who seemed so much at home in English literature and what went by the name of principles of

classical literature, like Greek works and others in English translation. In other words, we were exposed to an international environment. There were French-Canadian priests heading the college. I barely knew where Canada was at that time, such was my knowledge of geography! So we got to know history and geography first through the subjects we were taking, and through the individuals who were teaching them.

We had a debating group where we debated subjects about different issues and peoples of the world. Why there was segregation in South Africa. Why in 1948 there were elections in South Africa in which Jan Smuts lost. Jan Smuts was an Afrikaner, but a liberal Afrikaner. And the Boers won. I think it was [Hendrik] Verwoerd who led the winning party and introduced racial separation and apartheid policies. And that began to make us very politically conscious. Where did these people come from? Where did the Boers come from? Jan van Riebeeck came to the Cape in 1652. Looking back, history and other subjects, as well as discussions among students who fell under the influence of teachers who came from different parts of the world, opened our eyes to an entirely different world.

TGW: So this was the beginning of your internationalism?

BTGC: It was in a way. My international experience, or interest to be more correct, was the result mainly of being exposed to people who came from various parts of the world: the Irish, the Canadians, the English, and fellow Africans from Kenya, Uganda, and so on. Partly from the subjects I took: history and, of all things, Latin. I spent five years studying Latin. It was for me a great stimulation of the imagination. Can you imagine Caesar declaring: "V*eni, vidi, vici.*" ("I came, I saw, I conquered.") We repeated the words and acted like Romans. Or when Caesar was fighting Hannibal across the Alps. Hannibal had come with all his elephants and baggage and snow fell on them all. Caesar was waiting for them in warmer weather. And when winter

comes, disaster befalls Hannibal and his animals and men are all torpid with snow. Caesar, invincible soldier and strategist, descends on the valley where he sees frozen man and beast. I remember a poem in Latin which I can still quote. In laconic and poetic language, Caesar, seeing the disaster which had fallen on Hannibal, wrote, I believe in *De Bello Gallico*:

> *Tecta informia imposita repibus.*
> *Homines intonsi et inculti*
> *Animalia torpida frigore*
> *Omnia inanes*.

It is something I learned with emotion and poetic sense and will never forget. Loosely rendered the passage could read as follows:

> Tiles perched shapelessly on roofs,
> Men unshaven and savage-looking.
> Animals frozen with cold
> Everything lifeless.

For young people in Africa, to study Roman history and the wars between the Carthagenians and the Romans called for imagination and when Scipio says, "*Delenda est Carthage*"—Carthage must be destroyed—you want to know where is Carthage. Why?

TGW: Your memory is much better than mine. I memorized those same passages, but I had forgotten them many times over.

BTGC: And then as the Romans are debating in the Senate and Brutus betrays Caesar, who cries, "*Et tu Brute*?" And you wonder about lasting camaraderie. You know, at the time I did not appreciate why they were teaching us Latin. But all this excited our imaginations and enhanced our knowledge of history. And we went beyond to study things like Homer and the Greeks and *The Odyssey* and *The Iliad*. The Aegean Sea—where was the Aegean Sea? Geography became exciting.

TGW: I can understand this vast opening up of the mind. Now, you settled on psychology.

BTGC: Yes.

TGW: Why?

BTGC: I cannot understand why even at the moment. But I got a distinction in psychology, in my B.A. You know, when I was introduced to psychology and the teacher explained it as the science of understanding human beings, what motivates them. Then you have expressions like stimulus and response. It's like electricity. Then, we began to relate psychology to the society in which we lived. Why was there racial discrimination? Did people understand each other or not understand each other? Why do people get angry? Is there bile in them? But basically I got interested in psychology as the study of the behavior of individuals, vis-à-vis other individuals. And, of course, moving on to social-psychology, class-psychology and so on. And, as you will see, when you come to visit my little study, I have a certificate there from the University of South Africa, with "Distinction in Psychology" inscribed on it.

This created some difficulties for the University of South Africa to issue the certificate because I was in a black college. They did not expect it and delayed issuing the certificate. Finally, they did. I had, in addition, a peculiar combination of subjects: psychology, English, and Latin, as well as principles of classical culture, history, and native administration.

TGW: And from there, you ended up in Canada. Was this a result of the encounter with the Canadian priests who provided the scholarship?

BTGC: It was an encounter with the Canadian priests, yes, but I became very active in the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and it was in acting as the president of the Student Representative Council at the college and representing our college in the National

Union of South African Students, traveling to Cape Town University, the Witwatersrand University, Pietermaritzburg, and other institutions, meeting people, different people, white and black, including new arrivals just joining our communities in South Africa and relating to us in a much more understanding way than the average student. You had Jewish students there, relating to us more than some of the English students who, although friendly, did not have the same sort of human touch. I got, for instance, Philip Tobias, who was the president of the NUSAS. He became professor of anthropology, at Witwatersrand University, as I recall. He related to us very closely. We were breaking apartheid laws left and right as students.

Even though I wanted to escape apartheid in South Africa, I could not escape it at home on holidays in the then Rhodesia. There I found the same thing: separation between whites and blacks without the official policy of apartheid. There were native reserves, native urban areas like Highfield. And you couldn't walk on the *stoep*, the paveway. It was something which was quite contrary to what we were being taught by the Canadians, or by the Irish priests at the University College, or learning from the students we met who were challenging the South African system. And some among those immigrants from overseas, from other parts of the world, who became students at the University of the Witwatersrand in particular, often attended open meetings of NUSAS. My desire to go abroad grew. Partly it was the imagination. What was the Aegean Sea? What were the Alps? What exactly was Canada? Why did the Canadians and others come here to teach us? And the Irish?

So I got excited about wanting to go overseas and one of the priests, Father Guilbeault, from Ottowa and Mattawa—Mattawa was where he was born, Ottawa was where he went to university and where the mother house of the priests was—and a colleague of his, Father Quirion, asked one day whether I would like to go to study in Canada. I said, "Study in Canada?

Why not?" So they arranged it. In fact, Father Guilbeault arranged with his own mother to sort of adopt me. I was received at the airport outside Montreal by his sister and brother-in-law who took me by car to Mattawa where the old lady lived. And I was there as an adopted son in Mattawa. I don't know if you know that part of Canada.

TGW: Yes. I grew up in Detroit.

BTGC: Not far from the Great Lakes. So, I grew up in that surrounding. I think we were only two black people at that time there. There was a medical doctor who was Haitian, married to a Russian. I was living in Mattawa with the Raiavilles and Ribouts, both families related to Father Guilbeault when I joined the University of Ottawa.

TGW: You mentioned one of two black faces. Did this make you uncomfortable in any way?

BTGC: Strangely enough, it didn't make me uncomfortable. And this is very strange, because coming from South Africa, or Lesotho, with all my background, suddenly I am exposed to an entirely new situation and I felt at home as it were. I believe this was due to my experience in the National Union of South African Students, black and white, where we met as students, we often joked and even danced together—that's what I meant by challenging the apartheid laws.

Now, I'll tell you something I'll never forget. I traveled from Cape Town by boat, *The Edinburgh Castle*, from Cape Town to Southampton. I had to spend a night in Cape Town. There was nowhere I could spend the night, but fellow students—one of them is a judge here now—took me to what was a Catholic guest house, mainly for white students. And I spent the night there—curtains closed and so on. Anyhow, we defied apartheid! I traveled by boat, and on the boat we were only two colored people—a young Asian who was very active, and played tennis, therefore mixed with many. I did not play anything, but I shared a cabin with him. I had

the lower berth, and he had the upper berth. On deck, there was just one black visible, me of course. I had my own little table, in the corner of the dining room by the main entrance.

People were not hostile. They were friendly. But there was a girl who was the deputy president of NUSAS. I remember her name very well—Patricia Arnette, who worked under Philip Tobias, the president of NUSAS. We used to work together because I was representing my own university whenever NUSAS met. We had been friendly, but on the boat this girl avoided me like the plague. We would meet and she would just look elsewhere, disappear. But as we came nearer to England, in fact one day before we got to Southampton, she came and talked to me. Well, when we neared Southampton, she sort of got "liberated." The environment, I suppose, had changed. And we talked like friends about NUSAS and so on. In other words, I began to appreciate my study of psychology—that human beings can be influenced by their environments to the point that they behave against their own convictions, or in response to circumstances. That prepared me, in a sense, to accept people as they are.

When I was in Canada, in Mattawa, I played with white children. And they would teasingly say, "Let us see. Can we remove that paint from your face?"

TGW: My impression is that Canada is very different now from when you were there, with the vast influx of immigrants that came later than that in the United States. But it is a very different society now. Were you aware, in the mid-1950s to late-1950s, of the growing civil rights movement in the United States, across the border? Was this reported in Canada?

BTGC: Yes, I was aware. Because when I joined the University of Ottawa, I worked one summer on the railways, and also one summer in a brewery. At the brewery, I used to meet French-Canadians and English-speaking Canadians. But some of them were not natives, they had come from Europe. They seemed very different from the others. But more importantly, in

the summer I worked on the railways as a sleeping car porter and, given my study of psychology in South Africa, I had an appreciation of individual behavior and class behavior. I worked as a sleeping car porter, riding Canadian Pacific Railways from Montreal to Detroit and from Montreal to New York, making passenger beds, and so on.

And I remember three types of behavior. First, that of ordinary travelers—Canadians and Americans—who would say, "You are not American. You are not Negro." I would raise my head and ask, "Why?" They would say, "Well, you don't speak like one." And I would say, "Well, I'm African." They would retort, surprised, "Oh, African." But they were more generous in tips. They would give me more money when they realized I was a student. The other kind or second type of traveler was reserved. At the end of the journey they would search their pockets and give you a quarter or even only ten cents. And we got to realize that these were new immigrants. They did not know much or just had no money. There was also a class of people, also new immigrants, who were highly trained. They were doctors, they were scientists. They have, I believe, enriched Canadian society.

But I also felt there was a conflict of classes or races, between the French-speaking and the English-speaking Canadians. At Ottawa University, this conflict was suppressed because the university was French controlled and the student enrollment was not as mixed. McGill University was a mixture of students of different backgrounds. To mention but a few, there were English-speaking Canadian students, Egyptians, Ethiopians, and Israeli students, West Indians and also French-Canadians.

We would debate and debate, and have endless discussions about all sorts of issues, local and international. Why Montreal, for instance, was in fact a metropolitan city but if you went to the west, that is Montreal West, it was predominantly English-speaking and if you went to the

east of the same city it was French-speaking. And the behavior of the two communities was different, or so we felt. Between McGill University (English speaking) and the University of Montreal (French), there was a cemetery, a graveyard, and we used to joke about this. We used to say, "Between McGill University and the University of Montreal there is a graveyard!"

On the other hand, we were told that the French-speaking university had attracted some of the bright scientists from eastern countries and had developed very up-to-date science departments, including medical facilities, competing with the medical center at McGill. What I learned was the importance of cross-fertilization of ideas, the mixing of people, more-or-less freely. This enriched rather than impoverished relations.

I go back to the days I spent in Mattawa playing with the small children in the snow, making snowmen. They would say, "snowmen are white, but we can't make a black snowman." We used to have real fun. Acceptance of difference even at that age. Yes, recognizing that we are human.

In Ottawa, I worked during my second summer in a brewery, at Brading's Brewery—which is now Molson's Brewery—where I spent the summer of 1954 operating the bottling machine. The bottles would come fast on their belt and I had to be quite sure that I got the corks plugged right on time. And if you missed, you smash all the bottles of beer. Instead of people saying, "You Negro! What have you done?," the French Canadians would say, "*Voilá!"* And we would all laugh, and continue laughing at lunch over a glass of beer. I had no doubt if I were working in Rhodesia and I was accidentally caught in such a mess, I would have been given quite a *shambok*.

TGW: You mention this was a hotbed of discussions because of so many kinds of students and faculty members. What were the subjects that were most controversial? I guess I

am wondering, most importantly, whether decolonization, the first Bandung conference, whether these subjects were already on your agenda or the students' agenda, or whether this was only in retrospect?

BTGC: They were on our agenda. In South Africa, to start there, at the university we studied what was called native administration. So, we studied a system of government for the whites and a system of government for the blacks. We understood clearly what that meant. And we contrasted this with what we were learning in history about what administration meant in other governments. But, more importantly, when I went to Canada, I took up what they called PPE, in my MA degree, which is philosophy, politics, and economics. And in that course, we included what they called comparative government and international relations, including imperialism and colonialism. That is, the foreign government or policies of European countries.

We were studying fascism and authoritarian rule. We studied the different types of fascism: Hitler, Mussolini, Franco in Spain, and Hirohito in Japan. We were exposed to these systems in the study of what had happened before the war and the cause of causes, or what was happening as a result of the war. And in discussing these things, I remember very well that this did not mean much to us as such, until we understood what had happened after the First World War, the settlements after the First World War and how unjust these were for some. Or how the victors had taken over properties which belonged to the conquered. And hence, the position taken by countries like Germany and Italy, to repossess or to revenge. And therefore, for these countries, the need for national unity and the rise of authoritarianism and repossession of colonial territories. We had earlier studied the partitioning of Africa between the colonial powers: the British, the Belgians, the French, and others.

In addition to the study of comparative governments, in other words, the ways the different countries run their governments—democratic, authoritarian, fascist, communist, we began to understand all this—I drifted more and more toward understanding what was happening to the conquered countries in Africa after the First World War and what their fate was during the Second World War. In other words, by studying different types of governments—how Hitler was running Germany, how Mussolini was running Italy and how Emperor Hirohito was running Japan, Franco in Spain, uniting their countries, industrializing, and yet overreaching themselves—I was constantly thinking of the fact that these countries had been conquered during the First World War, which we studied very carefully in my PPE. I was also looking at the first partitioning of African countries before the existence of any international organizations which could intervene. At the 1884 Berlin Conference, the Belgians, the British, the French, the Italians, the Americans sanctioned the partitioning of Africa. Why was there no reaction? Or was the reaction so suppressed, so that there was no problem for the international community? I was much in the dark until my study of international relations, which was part of the PPE program.

TGW: This is the Canadian approach, which is akin to the British approach.

BTGC: I suppose. In the international relations part of it, we had to study the League of Nations. And in studying the League of Nations, we had to go through the various treaties. And I got more and more interested in how the conquered native countries were treated in these international organizations. Hence, the question of the Mandates System came up. Various countries were allocated to important countries to be protected in their own interests, or to be preserved for the interests of the conquerors, by administrative authority. That is an entirely new

subject because, as you may know, I drifted fairly soon to concentrating on the Mandates System of the League of Nations which compares with the Trusteeship System of the UN.

I concentrated my work on East Africa. Now, you can ask, "Why East Africa?" I took Tanzania, or what was Tanganyika, and a number of factors led me to that. First, I had German teachers back in Natal. And I knew this had been a German territory. Second, it was British and I wanted to find out the link between the British and the Germans, or the League of Nations itself as an international instrument, and the imperial colonial policies of the British. It was also because reading material was available on Tanganyika at McGill library and elsewhere. So, I drifted in that direction. But that is a story on its own because I could easily have taken another ex-German territory, such as German West Africa, now Namibia.

But I took Tanganyika because of the growing influence of African leadership: Julius Nyerere. And, at the same time, the contrast with Kenya, where the leadership was embodied in Kenyatta, and the Mau-Mau movement. But more important, really, this was due to the fact that you did not have racial discrimination or segregation in Tanganyika in the same way as you had in South Africa, where I had been, or even Kenya. This is a very subtle point to elaborate on. I can only elaborate on it when I come to my work in the UN, in ECA (Economic Commission for Africa), when I went back to study these countries. I went back to these countries when I had finished my Ph.D. at McGill and then two years of research at Nuffield College, Oxford. I was assigned to ECA, my first UN job. At ECA, I undertook a study, *The Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discrimination*, which covered several countries, including what is now Tanzania, as well as Kenya, and the Rhodesian Federation countries. But that is later.

At the time of my study at McGill University, I did not have this thrust of racial discrimination, double facilities expenditures on white schools and black schools. This was not

the issue. I was more interested in the historical partitioning of Africa between the major powers and how the partitioned countries were treated. Were they being absorbed, as Portugal tried to do, or were they just being treated as imperial possessions, as the UK was doing? Or, were they so poor that it didn't matter? And Tanganyika was one of those where it didn't matter, except for its sisal and a little bit of diamond.

It's a very difficult process to go through, why I chose Tanganyika; but as a student of philosophy, politics and economics, I tried theoretically to isolate two or three trends to see how they interacted. Because in philosophy we were studying the theory of dialectics: the positive cannot always be the positive; it generates the negative. But the two cannot coexist forever, that is the positive with the negative; they compose! Theoretically, I was trying to identify a process which opposes another process, and how these two compose. And I looked at imperialism and British colonialism. Then I looked at nationalism, as a process. Could they coexist? For me, political theory, at that time, from Marx, back to Plato, and so on, was simply an academic exercise. Now it seemed to me that Tanganyika was interesting in throwing up three forces. You had British colonialism or imperialism with its protectionism, its exploitation, on the one hand. Then you had the Mandates System of the League of Nations, which tried to protect the natives and yet to keep the doors open to everybody or other colonial powers. The doors were open to outsiders to protect the territories. But it was a passive arrangement. Where was the dynamic element? In other words, I was looking at British imperialism and the new dimension which was the Mandates System—two things or forces now coexisting. What would bring them together in the dialectical process? Could they coexist permanently? No, for nationalism came in. And I looked around to see where nationalism had emerged in Africa, where nationalism would interact with the Mandates System—internationalism if you want—and the British system, colonialism,

imperialism. Nationalism was the third force which would bring the other two together. In other words, make them interact. Tanganyika seemed to be ideal for this because nationalism was being pronounced there, by Nyerere and others. And nationalism could not coexist with colonialism, and was not identical to internationalism either. So, what was it? Imperialism, or enlarged colonialism, and internationalism interacted and nationalism emerged victorious in the process.

I went for research at the New York Public Library. Eventually, I went to the Library of Congress in Washington to get more material. Then, as it were by chance, when I went to New York, to the UN Library, I ran into a New Zealander—Robin Miller—who was attached to the Trusteeship System department. And he introduced me to the library material on the Mandates System. More than that, to the Mozambican nationalist, the late Eduardo Mondlane, who had joined the UN secretariat. I learned a lot from these two.

The second element which made me concentrate on Tanzania was a Canadian professor whom I met at McGill and who had lived in East Africa, Professor Cranford Pratt. That was my progress. Robin Miller knew more, being in the UN system, about the history of the Mandates System and the Trusteeship System, and Mondlane more about the UN and nationalism. Now I could access documents, which were classified otherwise, on the Mandates System, particularly instructions from London, the governor's communications, and things like that. And Crawford Pratt had visited Africa, so he could talk about Tanganyika in a matter that was informed. I had not been to Tanganyika myself and in fact I finished my thesis on Tanganyika before I visited the country!

TGW: The one thing that we skipped over—and I am particularly interested in this myself—was your thoughts about American civil rights movements as viewed from Canada. In

my way of thinking, it is linked to various kinds of liberation struggles. It was an internal struggle, in an important country, that was occurring at the same time as decolonization. And I was wondering if you made any links and how this looked from north of the border or how it looked when you arrived at the New York Public Library.

BTGC: It began earlier. When I got to Montreal in 1953, and I lived in Mattawa with this white family—I told you there was one other black chap, a doctor from Haiti, married to a Russian girl. This chap talked about the political system and how the people of Haiti dispersed in various countries. That simply made me wonder how he became a doctor if he came from such a poor country. When I went to university in Ottawa, people talked about the Underground Railroad. How Canadians were bringing people from the south to the north, that is from the United States to Canada. I met up with some of them whose elder relatives had come to Canada in that way.

When I worked on the railways, Canadian Pacific, I told you I used to go to Detroit and to New York. I would walk in the streets, waiting between trains, and I would watch. It was frightening for me in Harlem, for instance, to see people sitting idly by outside these buildings; it was frightening for me. And when I went to 42nd Street, restless people everywhere, it seemed. It just struck me: why? No work, or whatever it was. Then one day, I went to St. John's, New Brunswick, as a sleeping car porter. I spent the night there waiting for my next train. And there were Negroes there who did not come from the United States. They had come via the north from England, through the north of Canada. They did not come from the south. They were very different. They were very proud people, proud of their origin. For me, it did not seem that the subversiveness I had seen in Harlem—people were just idling about—was not something related to an identifiable color. Because the people I had met in St. John, New Brunswick were proud

people, accepted by fellow citizens, fellow Canadians. They could talk vaguely about how they came from Sierra Leone, or Freetown, and so on. I still have very mixed feelings about this situation, how people behave, given different historical and social circumstances.

TGW: I guess the direction I had wanted to try to take this is, as you look back on this period, did it seem that Nyerere's message would get through quickly or slowly? The reason I ask this is that, at the time that the Charter was signed, and that the Trusteeship System went into effect, most people thought that it was going to take 75 to 100 years for the system to devolve. It actually moved much more quickly. So, I'm trying to figure out whether you, at a university in the 1950s, thought—

BTGC: I thought it would move quickly. I thought it would move quickly when I was at McGill trying to finalize my thesis. First, the country had no real resources to attract whites to stay there apart from sisal, which was mainly Asian controlled. It was not attractive enough for foreigners to stay there long. Second, the colonial system, which obtained in Tanganyika, did not allow for land-alienation. There was no ownership of land by foreigners. Therefore, the people were free to move. But there was an additional factor: freedom of speech. Nyerere could speak freely. He was encouraged to speak. He was not locked up in prison, like the leaders and their followers were being in other colonies.

In other words the internationalism coming from the Mandates System was not only protective of native interests, but also promotive of their interests. Education was more advanced in Tanganyika at that time than in Kenya. It was also not segregated, as such. I thought, at that time, that the British would sooner get rid of Tanganyika because it was a burden for them. They weren't getting much from it, whereas they were getting a lot from Kenya. There were British settlers in Kenya. I compared the three countries: Tanganyika, Kenya, and

Uganda. Uganda was a protectorate, with the Kabaka ruling there. The British could not do much about Uganda. And Ugandans were a proud people. Education was far advanced in Uganda, as I realized later. And again, there was nothing much for the British to take from Uganda, apart from coffee and maybe fish from the lakes and some timber. But nothing very much, really.

To come back to Tanganyika, the main element that made me feel that nationalism was moving faster there was that there was a very small white population. And that white population was mostly administrative; a few British companies, not settlers. Second, there was a leadership which was free and educated. Nyerere was a teacher, after all. He read and wrote. He did not change from a ritualistic point of view as it were. He had a humanistic approach to it, which broke down the theory or practice that the British wanted to perpetuate, namely group interests. In other words, the British wanted a legislative or law-making body in Tanganyika which represented the white minority; the second-largest group, Asians; and the black majority. Triple representation. Nyerere rejected the concept of representation by racial interests. He espoused human interests, and I felt that the majority would move quickly; the minority were accepted in the sense that their interests would be reflected in the behavior of the majority.

My thesis was published by Oxford University Press, and you can see there more clearly what I am trying to reflect from memory rather than from the actual text.

TGW: I have already looked at it. Indeed, Tanganyika became independent at the same time as Kenya and Uganda. There really was no difference. Rhodesia was behind schedule. Did you think that by the early 1960s, or 1962 or 1963, that virtually all of Africa would be independent. Did this seem conceivable?

BTGC: No. I did not think so at that time. Partly because I was, not fully but considerably, influenced by the thinking at Nuffield College, reflected in the work of Marjorie Perham (later Lady Perham). The Perham sisters had lived in Kenya; they were spinsters and they wrote a lot about Africa. Talking about Marjorie Perham, I have just come across a letter she wrote to me in 1962, when I had joined ECA: "Independence in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will take anything up to 15 years or more, because of the investment made by the whites in that part of the world." Unlike in West Africa, where there was no such investment. Well, true enough, when she was writing, Ghana had become independent in 1957, Nigeria in 1961, and she was writing to me in 1962. I had written and was thinking about Tanganyika; I was then writing about the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and she was trying to show me that it was going to take longer for nationalism to succeed in that part of the world. Well, as it is, the Federation broke up in 1963, followed by independence in Malawi and Zambia.

I had been preparing myself in Canada, and at Oxford, to go back home, as a nationalist. I wasn't going to get married. I wasn't going to be distracted by anything else. I was going back home to join the nationalist movement. Colleagues had been writing to me—Chitepo, Chikerema, Shamuyarira, Mushonga—"Come now, come now," they pressed on me. I said, "No, I am preparing myself for a different phase of the struggle." And Marjorie was saying that if I was waiting for that, I would be waiting for a long time. "If you want to come when colonialism is collapsing and you want to come in the reconstruction phase (which is really what I was looking at), it will take some time."

I had been prepared when I was in Canada through the contacts we had made with the Ford Foundation and the Canada Council, to go to Oxford, spend two years there, recast my Ph.D. into a book, which I did, and concentrate my study on what was happening in the

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. A new chair in government was going to be established at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. I would be the first to hold that chair. Therefore, I was going to join in the struggle at a level where I could make a contribution in the realm of ideas. As it is, fate decided otherwise. Less than six months before I left McGill to go to Oxford, I fell in love, really in love.

TGW: Inconveniently?

BTGC: I had been in love with others, but this one just held, so to speak. The force was greater than anything I had experienced before. Although I left Canada, we decided to get married. So, when I got to Oxford, three or four months later, I asked my girlfriend to come join me. We got married soon after.

TGW: So, you initially were married in 1958?

BTGC: Yes, I got married in December 1958. It was something of a saga, and my God, the thing blew up in Rhodesia.

TGW: So, from your late start at age 12, you had made remarkable progress. You published your Ph.D. at Oxford University Press, and you actually were oriented firmly toward an academic career.

BTGC: Yes. Politics and government. That's what I was going to teach. I had studied PPE at Ottawa University, and government and international relations at McGill, and had done my thesis on the history of international institutions and mandated territories. And I had been writing, too, about partnership, racial partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. So, a post was established at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was going to be funded by the Ford Foundation. And I spent two years preparing myself at Nuffield College.

All that collapsed. And I got correspondence from the college's head, Sir Walter Adams, regretting the cancellation of the post for three reasons. It was difficult enough, Sir Walter stated, to establish a chair on a subject which we cannot really quantify (government and political science). And the first occupant would be black in a country that was still not liberated. And, thirdly, "we would lose our financial support." The university would lose local white support to finance not only the chair but the university as a whole. The university depended very much on contributions from local companies and from individuals. And, of course, "we don't know where you would live with your wife," he added to good measure.

TGW: This letter came from the chancellor, the provost?

BTGC: The principal. Walter Adams.

TGW: Do you think that the main problem was that you were going to be a black academic or because you were a black academic married to a white woman and they would have trouble finding a house?

BTGC: I think different people had different ideas. They had difficulty incorporating a new course of studies on government and politics in a politically awkward situation, with that post being filled by an African. But they had been convinced by the people at Oxford, by the donors, that the chap had a fairly broadminded view of that. In my poetic autobiography, I go more deeply into this sad and tragic patch in my life.

TGW: So, this was in 1958, the same year as you were married. Did you think about continuing an academic career elsewhere?

BTGC: I tried to see if I could go to Nigeria. My wife said she could not take the climate there. And, in any case, I lost that job to another competitor, a Britisher. I applied for a post in Khartoum, at the university. And I could not sell this to my wife—she knew something

about the climate in those countries. Then I was attracted by a letter I got from Roosevelt University in the States. They were interested in my going to North America, as was Professor Mallory at McGill University. They could have accommodated me there. Other universities were interested. Loyola College in Montreal would have taken me; University College of Swansea in Wales was interested. I did also think of staying on at Nuffield. They would have made arrangements for me to stay on—after all, there was at that time only one black chap at Oxford as a whole, a Ghanaian who had become a fellow at All Souls. To be more specific here, there were lots of blacks at Oxford, but only one fellow!

But I was always thinking of going back home, at least back in Africa. I applied for a job at the UN. It took ages for them to react.

TGW: It hasn't improved!

BTGC: Yes. Or is it no? And there were people pushing for decision by the UN, like George Catlin, who was a professor at McGill, but had by then gone back to Whitehall, London. Even the British government itself was pushing that I get a job in the UN. What happened eventually was that the executive-secretary of ECA at that time, Mekki Abbas, a Sudanese, married to a Scottish medical doctor—she's still alive, we correspond with her, Elma—visited Oxford; he had been a student at Nuffield College. Marjorie Perham, who was my mentor and my tutor at Nuffield, pressed Mekki. "He has applied for a job at the UN. Why can't you take him at ECA where you are?"

And that's how the decision was taken, and I went to Ethiopia. I joined at P-2 level, as a social affairs officer. That's how my UN career began—because I had failed to join the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and did not want to go to other academic

institutions. Fate led me to Ethiopia, as it were; and it all turned out that all the work I had been doing until then became very relevant, very relevant.

TGW: Indeed. Actually, that's a very good place to end this first tape. Thank you.

TGW: This is the beginning of tape two. One last question before we move to the Economic Commission for Africa. I was curious about your recollections about the Cold War. Obviously, when you were in secondary school it probably did not loom large. But in the late 1950s, when you were doing your M.A. and Ph.D. work, particularly after the Hungarian invasion by the Soviet Union, this much have been front and center. Was it?

BTGC: Well, my recollections of the Cold War were subsumed or covered in my thoughts on the theoretical and historical aspects of capitalism, on the one hand, and communism on the other. The struggle, and the relevance of the struggle to the fate, or to the lives of Third World countries. We had experienced, as developing countries, the impact of colonial rule, which was basically capitalist in its approach to economics, and which treated people, human beings, as tools, particularly workers. And that goes back to my own childhood, working on the farm. We were tools, instruments to be used. We were not human beings, really. Therefore, the question of participation in decision-making was not there. We just took orders. And after reading about the Bolshevik Revolution, (which I did in university) from 1905 to 1917, then to the war, the Second World War in particular, and the concept of a classless society in which the people sort of control the economy, the concept and role of the state intrigued me. Yet, in fact, this was not so when you read what happened in the USSR—Stalin, in particular. Many thousands of people died. So, ideologically, this became a problem for me.

Similarly, the Cold War itself was a world situation full of both ideological considerations and the struggle for power between two blocs, the East and the West. And the

question was, are we, the people, victims in this? Was there a way we could rid ourselves of the whole problem? The Third World, or the people of the world generally, could not avoid the struggle that raged between the East and the West, countries led by the Soviet Union at the time and, of course, the United States and its allies on the other. And I must confess that at that time, because I was preoccupied with the problem of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the racial partnership system, when I was preparing to come to Zimbabwe in 1958, the East-West struggle did not take uppermost position in my mind.

I was more concerned about how we would make the peoples of central Africa, in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, work together. Similarly, my preoccupation was with what had been my subject of study—Tanganyika and international trusteeship. Things were developing more or less in the direction we had foreseen. Tanganyika was going to become an independent country, and then its other two neighbors, Kenya and Uganda. In fact, that happened. And race relations in Tanzania were good, but it was a poor country. In other words, the East-West struggle did not have any immediate impact on my thinking or on my preoccupations. It was much more something to study, something to be understood.

TGW: Do you recall the meeting at Bandung? Africa was basically absent. But, as time went on, in 1961 in any case, Africa was present. Did this seem like a sensible grouping of developing countries or did you see it as diversionary?

BTGC: We are talking of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). No, I had not earlier been occupied with these subjects. I had heard of them. What I was thinking of was Jawaharlal Nehru in India. And Nehru was concerned about the independence of India and how he could get the support of neighboring countries to cooperate to protect India's independence, but also to enjoy regional cooperation as well as South-South cooperation. That much I

remember. And, of course, Nehru was preceded by the great mystic, Mahatma Gandhi, and the role he had played in South Africa in passive resistance. We looked to India for leadership. Therefore, I was impressed by Nehru's ideas, which really were adumbrated in this concept of nonalignment at Bandung, the Bandung conference in 1955—or was it earlier—although my memory suggests that there was also a conference about the same time or soon after, in Belgrade.

TGW: Yes, 1961.

BTGC: Nonalignment, yes. But, I thought of this more in economic terms rather than in political terms, cooperation in the areas of trade and investment. At that time I was still in Canada. In 1960 I was at Oxford, and in that year, I joined the ECA. And when I went to ECA at Addis Ababa, cooperation among developing countries began to assume greater importance in my thinking. Therefore, Bandung was interesting in retrospect.

TGW: How soon after you met the executive-secretary, Mekki Abbas, in Oxford, did you assume your duties in Addis? And what were they, actually?

BTGC: It was surprisingly very soon. I think within a month or two of the decision being taken by the UN, which was in 1960—June or July—we were on the plane. My wife and our son, our firstborn. And she was expecting our second child. I remember this because we arrived in Addis Ababa when there was a conference going on—I think it had to do with cooperation—and the hotels were full. We were put in one little room, the three of us plus the expected. And there were common toilet facilities. For a Canadian girl, the introduction to Africa was not romantic, to say the least. But she said "together we can make it!" She was very courageous and encouraging.

The next day we moved to a hotel where we were given a suite, but there was hardly any water. That lasted only two days. Then a Swedish member of the secretariat of UNCTAD (UN

Conference on Trade and Development), Stein Rossen, who was going on home leave, came to see me at the hotel and asked us to take care of his house while he and his wife, Aasse, went away. We moved into the house; it had three bedrooms, bathrooms, a kitchen, and a domestic worker! It was a new world altogether.

TGW: Stein was at ECA?

BTGC: Yes. He was Norwegian and a very senior official. There were many others, of course. I remember, in particular, Surendra Patel. I was put under Surendra. Strangely enough, they thought that since I had done work on Tanzania and that while I was at Oxford I had also done work on race relations in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the first assignment for me was to make a study of the economic and social consequences of racial discrimination. My God! I said to Surendra, who was my immediate supervisor, and to Stein, who was in charge of general studies, for someone who had just come from the university, it would be very difficult. But I had sufficient knowledge, having studied what became Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. I had also visited Zimbabwe in 1959. You see, in 1958 I got married and lost the job at university, as I have already said. I had already been doing research, funded by the Ford Foundation, on labor movements or migrations in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. So, I had come here in 1959; that's when I stayed at the university—the same university that denied me a job. But, as a guest of Terrance Ranger, who was warden of Carr-Saunders Hall; that's where I stayed, sharing a room with a student of his from Northern Rhodesia, Dominique Mlaisho. I was myself already a post-graduate chap, but I shared a room with this young man.

I could tell you stories about my short visit to Rhodesia and my stay at Carr-Saunders. But I want to come to how all this predisposed me to accepting the assignment on economic and social consequences of racial discrimination. The experience narrowed my area to certain

concrete things. I did an outline. What does the study mean? How do you study discrimination legislation? The different colonial powers or countries how do they discriminate? Why? On the economic side, I asked how the economic services were provided: separate services, were sufficient allocations made, double expenditures. I studied the political impact of separating people, and the policing, the management of the whole service structure.

So, I did that study. It entailed traveling to the different countries. In Southern Rhodesia, checking in Salisbury, the statistical information in Milton Building, now called Munhumutapa, in the basement of which were kept statistical records and other material. I encountered one H.J. Gann, an Oxford chap who was the supervisor. I worked there in the basement and I remember that one point in time I wanted to go to the gents room. So, I asked Gann, who came from Oxford, "Where is the gents place?" He looked at me, and he seemed puzzled and said, "My God, they never thought that there would be black researchers when they built this place." There was no gents place for blacks. He said, "Well, I'll give you the key. You go use that one." That was reserved for whites. There was none for blacks!

I did the study. It covered the three countries of the Federation. But I can tell you now a story, an interesting one. When I got to Blantyre, in Nyasaland, the secretary for African affairs (I remember his name very well: John Ingham), having been told of the purpose of my visit, said: "Be our guest." So, I stayed with him as his house guest, which was quite contrary to what had happened Salisbury. And I had access to whatever information I wanted.

When I went to Northern Rhodesia, I was lucky. I stayed with Dr. Raymond Apthorpe at the Livingstone Institute, who gave me the material I wanted and arranged for me to travel back to Salisbury by courtesy of the Indian High Commission in Lusaka. So, I completed my survey

on economic and social consequences, which was published as a UN document. It caused considerable debate in the UN Commission for Africa.

TGW: Why was that?

BTGC: Well, a new study. A new revelation. What are we talking about? Human rights. We are talking about equality. If you read the study it is startling in many ways. And resolutions were adopted on that basis. But the point I should make is that this was linked to work I had been doing, to surveys, Tanganyika and trusteeship, Southern Rhodesia and racial partnership. At the ECA, they took an economic approach.

TGW: That's what I was going to ask. Having been trained as a philosopher, historian, and political scientist, you are now asked to move into the economic arena, which is in fact where you spent much of the rest of your life. Did you feel comfortable with this at the outset?

BTGC: Yes, I was quite comfortable. At the university, when I did my PPE, we studied philosophy, politics, *and* economics. So, I had elements of economics. I could talk about supply and demand. I could talk about costing, budgets. We learned the main elements of economics. The PPE program provided you with a good understanding of political institutions, the role of political parties, the formation of governments, authoritarian, democratic. It also dealt with economics: public sector, private sector, multinationals. We were exposed to all that, particularly budgeting. So I knew something when I joined ECA.

TGW: What other people were wandering in the corridors? Didn't Dudley Seers do the first economic survey of Africa?

BTGC: Yes. Dudley Seers, I remember him very well. But my main contacts in ECA were Surendra Patel, who was Indian and an economist, and his wife Ahuja. We became very good friends. Stein Rossen, not only because he gave us his house, so to speak. We became

personal friends. And he was head of the research studies department, or something like that. And Arthur Ewing, an Englishman, who was head of—international trade, I can't recall. There was also a Nigerian, Godfrey Lardner. I think he was more on the human resources and development side; Shadrack Okova, from Kenya; Fred Arkhurst, from Ghana, and others. I was in good company at ECA.

TGW: Perhaps this is a little unfair as a characterization, but it certainly is a fairly dominant one, namely that the Commission for Latin American and the Commission for Europe are highly specialized and well-staffed parts of the UN, but ECA has always been characterized as being a little feeble. Do you think that is a fair characterization? If so, why? If not, why not?

BTGC: Actually, when I was there, before I got deeply involved in the study I referred to on economic and social consequences of racial discrimination, I was twiddling my fingers as a student who had been very active. I did a short informal paper—I may still have it—on the Africanization of the staff of ECA. There was a melange of people; people came from various parts of the world. You had the executive-secretary at the top, Mekki Abbas, a Sudanese. Then you had Robert Gardiner, a Ghanaian. Then you had the different departments. Stein Rossen was in research; and there was the Nigerian, Godfrey Lardner, in human resources and training. Then there was Rados Stamenkovic—I think he came from Yugoslavia.

In my view, there was not what I call "ethos," or central objectives clearly defined, apart from understanding how the economies of Africa were structured, how they worked. Whereas in ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), they had evolved a distinct perception of the workings of the world. Raúl Prebisch, for instance, on the question of dependency of developing countries on the North, on the question of commodities, price declines or fluctuations on non-industrialization, et cetera. I think ECA was still evolving and developing an intellectual body, a

way of thinking and objectives, in search of Africa. After all, ECA had come into existence only in 1958. They were searching.

TGW: You mention Robert Gardiner, who then became the second executive-secretary. What do you recall of him? I think he is recalled by most people in New York as having been somewhat of a giant in the system.

BTGC: Well, he was a very well-built man. A grand chap! He spoke English with distinction. He did not despise anybody, but he was authoritarian. He gave instructions. In many ways, he was more of a noble Englishman who was intellectual and very clear-minded. But we never got to be friends as such. He was deputy, after all, of the organization and I was only a P-2 chap.

TGW: What do you recall about how the Congo crisis was viewed? Subsequently, I think, the Congo crisis has been interpreted in one of two ways. That is either that the UN was siding with the West in the internal struggle, or that the UN was simply incompetent, the Connor Cruise O'Brien interpretation. Do you recall how the UN's first big adventure in Africa was viewed?

BTGC: Not really. I do recall that one session of the ECA took place in Leopoldville. I can't remember which session. And I believe that the study I referred to was discussed there, at that ECA session. But we are talking about the period of Lumumba, Kasavubu, and Moise Tshombé, and the role which the Belgians played. People talked about how Lumumba had addressed the prince of Belgium and was very outright about the need for Congo-Leopoldville to be independent. Lumumba was arrested and eventually killed. Preference was given to Moise Tshombé. Kasavubu was a chap who could be manipulated. And that, I remember, there was general chaos in the area. And the UN came to try to restore order. I was not very involved in

thought or discussions in the goings on there. I only got more clearly involved in 1960 or 1961 when Dag Hammarskjöld's plane crashed.

Most of my memory about the Congo situation would come back much later, when I was on the board of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. How Dag Hammarskjöld was killed and what that meant for Africa. But when events were evolving in the Congo, early when I was in ECA, and subsequently when I went to Nairobi to open a UN office, although these were matters of concern, I never really got so deeply involved.

TGW: So, you would not have predicted then that the UN would have such a black eye that no peacekeeping operation was mounted until 1989? That's a very long time.

BTGC: I would not label it a black eye, except the impression which was given to us that the powers that be—the Belgians, the Americans, the British—did not want effective intervention. Hence, the shooting down of the plane. Who shot the plane, I don't know. But I don't think there was real support for UN intervention during the Cold War. I do not know the full reasons. This may explain why people are reluctant to be involved even now. It's a huge country, very wealthy. And there were many players in the game at that time. But to be frank with you, I was more concerned with things I could put my teeth into when I was in ECA, like the survey. And subsequently, when I became resident representative of the UNDP (UN Development Programme) in Kenya, I was interested in Kenyan problems. How we could formulate projects, how we could cooperate with specialized agencies of the UN, how we could work with the bilaterals. There was competition, you see.

TGW: Much of this project, as you know, is about ideas. What of the big ideas circulating that were a direct concern to Africa were debated in the early 1960s? You mentioned

the process of localization, capacity-building, national planning, commodity stabilization. How were these ideas being researched and discussed at the time?

BTGC: I think within the ECA—I was only three years there—there was a consciousness of the scarcity of human resources to deal with African problems. Hence, the department that was concerned with these matters was given, as I recall, to a Nigerian who was very articulate—Godfrey Lardner. So, utilization of human resources, posting Africans to other countries—for example, Yao Adu, a Ghanaian, became secretary-general of the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) in 1962, and then regional representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in East Africa two years later.

The other was general cooperation, regional cooperation. I remember traveling on missions from ECA in the company of a Frenchman called Jacques Royer, who was a distinguished statistician. We were trying to cooperate on the collection of facts and comparability of facts about the African situation. The British had a different approach from the French. And how could we make the different African countries cooperate unless they knew clearly what the facts are, what they were dealing with? And we were concerned with this in the Department of Statistics.

Trade was not really given that much attention, as I recall. It was more about understanding one another and strengthening independence by some form of inter and intra-regional cooperation within Africa itself. But, as I said earlier, I do not myself recall that there was distinctly the same sort of thrust or union of purpose that the Latins evolved. And I might say, even ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), in Asia—they were more on the trade side. We had a human resources problem in ECA. And in understanding the real facts of African countries—don't forget that many were still colonies at that time. They were not

independent. Kenya became independent in 1963. The Rhodesias and Nyasaland were still a federation, from 1953 to 1963. Then Malawi was independent in 1964, and Zambia following. So, you were not dealing with independent countries—in the South at any rate—which were very much involved in ECA. South Africa was a completely different animal. The domination of the ECA personnel came from the North. Yes, the Egyptians were there, and also the Asians—from outside. But mainly human input was from the North. And, as I say, there were Europeans like Stein Rossen and so on, who had the interests of Africa at heart. ECA was trying to build an organization with different inputs.

TGW: You mentioned going to Kenya in 1963. Were you still a P-2?

BTGC: No, I was P-4 probationary, then.

TGW: Wow. A meteoric rise.

BTGC: And when I got to Kenya, I was P-4 substantively, but acting at the P-5 level.

TGW: I just wanted to straighten one thing out. You got to Kenya in 1963, but UNDP was actually not established until 1965.

BTGC: I went to Kenya in two capacities, which were merged. The UNDP did not exist as such; what existed was the UN Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB), which was headed in New York by David Owen (a different David Owen). And I was representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board in Kenya. At the same time, there was the economic development arm of the UN, which was the Special Fund, headed by Paul Hoffman, in New York. And I came as director of the Special Fund in Kenya. So, my full title was representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board and director of the Special Fund in Kenya. These functions were merged a year or so after, and formed UNDP. I became at that time representative of UNDP in Kenya.

TGW: I'm just curious. How many black African resident representatives were there in UNDP at its founding in 1965?

BTGC: I was the first black African in that.

TGW: In the field. That's what I meant. Not in New York, but in the field.

BTGC: I was the first black in the field, called representative of the UNDP.

TGW: That's what I assumed.

BTGC: At the time I went to Kenya, there was a Trinidadian—Ken Robinson—in Uganda. But, as an African, I was the first African to be head of a development or technical assistance agency in Africa, perhaps with the exception of Yao Adu at the regional level.

TGW: What was that organization like at the outset? You mentioned that ECA was a mixture of nationalities, and Africans were in short supply. I presume that at the beginning, the Special Fund and the Technical Assistance Board were even more so.

BTGC: Well, there were Africans in these organizations elsewhere, you see. I cannot remember exactly, but you had in New York people like Michael Doo Kingue—you remember. In any case, you had in New York people with real appreciation of African problems, like David Owen. In East Africa itself, as spokesmen of the UN, there were two other people, non-Africans, but deeply in love with Africa. One was Robin Miller, a New Zealander who helped me access documents in New York, as indicated earlier. The other was George Ivan-Smith, regional representative of the UN Secretary-General in East Africa, and was based in Dar es Salaam and was Australian. There was the Commonwealth-supported chap, Yao Adu, a Ghanaian, who became head of the East African Common Services Organization, as I said earlier. In other words, you had in East Africa several top people; two of them were not African: Robin Miller and Ivan-Smith. These and Yao Adu helped me to give an African thrust to the program in

Kenya. There is no doubt about that. I did think Kenyan. I can assure you of that. I used to be invited by cabinet ministers—like Tom Mboya, Mwai Kibaki (who is in the opposition now) and Charles Njonjo, who was attorney-general. I had also access to the president of Kenya.

The thrust on development was very real. Most bilateral missions promoted technical assistance, picking up specific projects, like building schools, hospitals, clinics, and promoting agriculture. And, I might say, we were more advanced in Kenya on "Africanization." ECA (if I may revert to it) was a melange of various people from different parts of the world, still evolving what one might call an "ethos." There was no real uniting theme in ECA because of the newness of independence or the lack of it. People were sending representatives to meetings of ECA from countries which were not yet independent or were only recently independent. The universities had not yet brought up thinkers, like Raúl Prebisch or Iglesias in Latin America. Nevertheless, ECA brought different people together, uniting them so to speak. In Kenya, there was real national unity, vision, and drive. And the UNDP office and leading experts helped in this.

TGW: So, the UN had a positive profile in 1963?

BTGC: Very positive, despite my strictures. It contributed in galvanizing the issues, in searching for unity. But much depended on the heads of departments.

TGW: It was fortuitous that you had a cup of tea with Abbas in Oxford. How did you end up in the UNDP, or what was to become the UNDP from Addis Ababa? How did that transition occur?

BTGC: The transition from Addis Ababa to Kenya. I was given a farewell party, my wife and myself, by the secretariat. Abbas had left then, I think. So, I think Ewing was acting executive-secretary, or was it Robert Gardiner? It was a normal farewell. They wished me well. "How lucky you are. You'll be given a job in which you'll be the top man in an interesting

country, Kenya." Everyone wondered about Kenya, Mount Kenya, Mombassa, all that. So people were somewhat jealous. We went by plane and we stayed at the Norfolk Hotel. We felt at home. The Kenyans were quite friendly to the whole family.

TGW: Now, that's David, Ann-Marie, and…

BTGC: And Michael, because Michael was born in London in 1962. Bernard was born in Kenya in 1964. But, for briefing purposes, we were sent to Arusha, and also to Dar es Salaam first, because the resident representative in Nairobi was to take over responsibilities not only for Kenyan projects, but also for some regional projects. Although the railways and major regional projects remained for a while the responsibility of Yao Adu. Local representatives in Uganda and Tanzania looked after their own country problems. The regional projects were centralized in Nairobi, like the railways and agricultural research.

I was well-received and had easy access to Governor-General Malcolm McDonald. I have a picture with McDonald, very interesting. And I discussed projects with ambassadors and ministers. I suddenly felt, "What a difference. Maybe it is well that I did not go to become some unwelcome professor at University College in Rhodesia and Nyasaland." I became quite well-known somehow and was invited to conferences to present African views.

In fact, it was at one of these conferences, which was in Beirut in 1968, when I was sent as an African to attend a meeting on cooperation. Raúl Prebisch was there. He had written a letter to me, asking me if I could leave my job in Kenya to become director of the Commodities Division in Geneva. Now, the mistake I made was in taking my wife with me to Beirut! When we got there, Raúl Prebisch said to me: "Have you got my letter?" I said, "What letter?" Prebisch said, "The letter I wrote to you asking you to come to Geneva." I asked, "To do what?"

He said, "To be director of the Commodities Division." I said, "I don't know anything about commodities." He said, "Okay, I shall see."

I talked to my wife about this. "I have been asked to go to Geneva." I said, "What do you think?" She replied, "Geneva? It's a dour place." Well, we didn't give much thought to it.

Then the next day, we went to dinner and ran into Raúl Prebisch. He said, "Mr. Chidzero, has it worked?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Ah, you will know." Then, I sat down to dinner with my wife. After a while, she said, "I had tea with Dr. Prebisch and he told me about Geneva. I think it would be a good thing if we went there, and the children would learn French." So, that's what happened. Prebisch was an old man in his late sixties or early seventies. But foxy, I tell you!

TGW: And he had remained charming?

BTGC: Oh, yes. Charming man.

TGW: Before we get to Geneva, I want to go back a little bit. When you were at ECA—and you have just explained that Prebisch approached you while you were in UNDP—did someone in the technical assistance board approach you while you were in ECA or did you apply for that job in Kenya?

BTGC: I did not apply for it. I was approached by David Owen, to whom I referred earlier and whom I had met when I was doing research work in New York. George Ivan-Smith, the Australian—I also referred to him earlier, he was the personal representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in East Africa—approached me, I think through Robin Miller, the New Zealander, asking me if I could go to Kenya. And also, there was someone in the British Commonwealth office; I don't remember if it was George Catlin or someone else, who thought it would be a very good, challenging job there, particularly in light of the work I had done on

Tanzania, as well as the survey on economic and social consequences of racial discrimination, which included Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. And, of course, my marriage.

TGW: You have encountered a number of famous people. You mentioned one earlier, Kenyatta. When did you first meet him, and what was your impression? He was a little larger than life, actually.

BTGC: I first met him in person in 1963 when I went to Kenya. I had seen him from a distance when I was doing my research work on economic and social consequences. But I first met him when I was introduced to the prime minister of Kenya, as representative of TAB and director of the Special Fund in Kenya.

TGW: During this period, before you left Kenya, UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) is declared in Southern Rhodesia. How did you react to that? How did you feel about it?

BTGC: I felt bad. You see, as I told you, when I was in Canada, I was preparing myself to go back home to join the liberation movement, to be in the struggle, at an intellectual level. When UDI was declared in 1967, I was already in Kenya. Although the decision by the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1958 had made earlier return impossible, I still followed with fellow nationalists, the course of all the struggles. Chitepo, in particular, but also Nyandoro, Chikerema, Mushonga and others would be witness to that. They were urging me to come home. In the course of things, the main parties urged me to be chairman of the Geneva Conference with the British in 1976. As an international civil servant, I declined; I could not. I was preparing myself for the struggle at a different level.

UDI took place against a mixed background. The whites had got used to Rhodesia having self-government since 1923, when they had voted to be a responsible government—not to be a colony. Well, it was a little bit frightening because we knew that Northern Rhodesia, after Nyasaland had become Malawi in 1964, would get independence from colonial rule—there was only a small minority white population then. Mining was important, et cetera, but it had some form of protectorate status and the British had ruled directly as it were from London. Malawi was a pure protectorate before federation and was going to get its independence. That was clear. Zimbabwe, or Southern Rhodesia, had fallen under the Commonwealth Office and was under preparation already for independence and the Africans played absolutely no political role here. It was the most radically discriminating of the three countries.

The nationalist war of independence was raging in Rhodesia. The Federation had broken up in 1963. So, UDI took place at the time when Malawi and Zambia were independent—it foretold what was going to happen, that this place was going to be very difficult. UDI yielded to the liberation. As may be remembered, there had been no question of one man, one vote in Southern Rhodesia. Cecil Rhodes said, "Equal rights for equally civilized people." Now, how can you have people equally civilized if you don't have equal rights? And Ian Smith said, "not in a thousand years." It was terrifying. We knew very well that this was the center of development. One of the central factors which made for federation was foreign currency from copper (which was plentiful in Northern Rhodesia), labor (which was plentiful in Nyasaland, coming to Zimbabwe), and food, manufacturing, and finance here (Zimbabwe). Rhodesia was the hub, with a strong white population, and political organization rather weak among the Africans. So it was frightening when UDI happened.

During federation, I had visited home two times, i.e., I had been here in 1959, when I stayed at the University College in Carr-Saunders Hall. I came again in 1961 with my family. On that occasion we did one memorable thing. We went to the first multiracial cocktail in Highfield, organized by Mr. and Mrs. Chitepo. It was attended by many people, some of whom are still here. John Deary was there; Judge Nic McNally was there; Chris Milton and others as well as their spouses. More significantly, my old mother was there. I remember that very well and Mrs. Chidzero could tell you more. That was long before, for we had come on a special visit, before UDI. I remember taking my wife to visit Highfield, visiting African houses there and our son David responding and dancing to African music. He was just over a year old. The situation was freer. And I remember that on the same occasion, Walter Adams made amends and asked us to be guests at the university and we were at Fletcher apartments for about three days. He also invited us to drinks at his house. So, we made amends.

I went again in 1966. That is for sure. I was already in Kenya that time, when my mother died. And I brought my daughter with me, Anne-Marie. We stayed at the Jameson Hotel. No one bothered us; I just came to bury my mother. And we went back via Lusaka on this visit. During Federation days, I used to call on two prime ministers. I'm trying to remember the Rhodesian prime minister. Oh, yes, Sir Edgar Whitehead. The federal prime minister was Sir Roy Welensky.

TGW: I just wondered how you reacted to the UDI intervention.

BTGC: I reacted violently to UDI.

TGW: Did you think sanctions were a good idea?

BTGC: I did not think that sanctions were good, or only bad. They were ineffective and therefore ruinous. That's what I thought. And we thought that the British were connivers. I did

not really think in terms of the sanctions working, but I thought in terms of the nationalist movement being thwarted. We went through a difficult period. I had joined NDP (National Democratic Party) in 1963, at the end of the Federation. ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) was formed, and Mugabe eventually was coming. And the Patriotic Front was formed. I thought that it was not possible for the minority in Zimbabwe—the white minority—to maintain power indefinitely because of the growing pressure inside, and also the pressure from the independent neighbors and from abroad.

It was the failure of the policy of racial partnership which was of more concern, in the sense that the Federation was on the basis of that partnership. Rhodesia and the UDI were very racialist phenomena. But the armed struggle was already in the making. My general impression about UDI was that we were going the South African way, apartheid. Yet, on the other hand, whereas apartheid was dogmatic, because of the stance taken by the Afrikaners, in Rhodesia race relations were pragmatic, rather than dogmatic. The fact that the University College was already mixed, which they inherited from the Federation, was a good example despite my own personal experience. I believe that the hotels were non-racial under UDI. Nonetheless, international pressure was growing, that much I know. It is a pity that I have not studied fully the UDI period, because when it took place I was at the height of my UN responsibilities and duties in Kenya. I was king there. Internationally, I was beginning to be known and people were visiting me from the region, coming to my house in Nairobi and Geneva later. Whether it was ZANU or ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union); they used to come. And I would introduce them to the president or foreign minister in Kenya, and so on. That was the time when the pressure was mounting for me to come back and I would say, "Not yet."

I then got the shock of my life, when rather than continuing on the path that I thought was clearly evolving—Canada, England, Ethiopia, Kenya—in 1968 I was shot back to Europe, as it were. I was called to a higher UN job in Geneva. That was something that I could not easily reconcile myself to. But the nationalists were now saying, "That's alright, you are a top civil servant. It helps us."

TGW: Before we actually get to Geneva, I want to probe a little bit into this book you wrote on the imperative of international cooperation that was published in Nairobi, I presume—East African Printers—in 1966. You have focused on this theme that has come up numerous times already: regional cooperation.

BTGC: It was not a book. It was a paper—"African Nationalism in East and Central Africa," published in the *Journal of International Affairs*. Or it could be the later work—"Linking the South: The Race to Economic Cooperation."

TGW: And indeed, the experience in East Africa, the East Africans inherited probably the best infrastructure around. You mentioned communications, railways, et cetera. And you were quite optimistic in this piece about the nature. Just a quote from you here: "Regional cooperation should render possible rational optimum use of scarce human and natural resources and avoid duplications of efforts in capital." And it seemed very logical.

BTGC: That was a theme which also emerged from my study, *Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discrimination*, in particular with regard to duplication of facilities and resources.

TGW: Yes, that builds naturally on your previous work. How did you feel when the East African community came apart? Did you feel that somehow all of your university

theorizing took secondary place to politics, or did you see this as a temporary aberration, a sort of initial nationalistic euphoria after independence?

BTGC: I thought of it as a temporary setback—a pause to allow for necessary adjustments in the East African Common Services Organization, which had been inherited from the British or the colonial regime, a cooperation which would be negotiation among equal sovereign parties was required. EACSO tended to favor Kenya for one reason or another. The railway headquarters were in Nairobi and the harbor was in Mombassa. Regional services were based in Nairobi and more industrial development was taking place in Kenya. There was little taking place in Tanzania. Uganda was more or less self-sufficient in its own development, although land-locked.

I felt that, given the new political dispensation, and also given the pressures that had been operating—particularly in Uganda, where you had agitations and some instability, but Uganda had more trained people—there was now the possibility of negotiating a new dispensation by authentic leaders. This is what I had gathered while I was in Kenya mixing with ministers; they needed something they could call their own, which was not merely inherited. And you got the same feeling in Tanzania in particular, to change the structure. While in Kenya, I went to Tanzania more often than when I was in ECA. I did also go to other parts of the world.

It was a disappointment in a sense that EACSO broke up, but then a strengthened one was in the making, under the leadership of the Ghanaian, A.L. Adu. The arrangement right now is more multi-sectoral, moving in the direction of an East African Common Market, where governments take the decisions themselves, not imposed from outside. I was not, at the time, very optimistic as to what would happen. But now, I believe that East Africans are coming back together even more purposefully.

TGW: There have been rumblings that [Yoweri] Museveni and others are trying to revive this fellowship. So you would remain sanguine?

BTGC: They may not be exactly the three countries. There are now two organizations, which act as umbrellas: COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is broader, and includes Ethiopia and other Eastern and Southern African countries; and SADC (Southern African Development Community), which is basically Southern African. South Africa now is in SADC. So, you have these two overlapping organizations—SADC, which is basically southern, the two ex-Rhodesias, Malawi, Mozambique, and Namibia, with actual operating arrangements where they are negotiating tariffs and so on. You have COMESA, which is a larger common market for Southern and Eastern African countries, and Kenya is in it, whereas Kenya is not in SADC. I am not sure how all this is going to operate, whether COMESA will become as operational as SADC, or whether the two will be merged.

But, at the moment, to be quite honest with you, I am not as much concerned with these matters of regional cooperation as with reviewing the evolution of policies in Zimbabwe—from the socialist thrust in the first ten years, with the emphasis on education, on housing, on health, which proved successful, though expensive, through ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Program)—to see what went wrong, what went right. And now we have to make new arrangements under globalization forces and we have new cooperation challenges in other areas, such as the environment and so on. These matters have been uppermost in my mind, plus the new thinking in the international community, particularly the centrality of poverty issue in development. Africa still remains the poorest continent. How can we attack poverty? Through industrialization? These are issues preoccupying my mind at the moment.

TGW: Prebisch, besides being charming enough to talk you into moving to Geneva, what were his other characteristics in terms of his intellectual prowess and the way he handled meetings? What was he like as a person?

BTGC: Well, I am rather limited on that because when I joined UNCTAD in 1968, after meeting him in Beirut, a change was taking place. Raúl Prebisch was in poor health and his position was being taken over by Perez-Guerrero, the predecessor of Gamani Corea. So, I knew Perez-Guerrero, and people like Iglesias more than I got to know Raúl Prebisch in person. I got to understand Prebisch more through his successors or his proteges and through his writings when he was at ECLA.

TGW: Would you characterize him as an intellectual giant?

BTGC: Well, if the analysis which was done in ECLA, when he was at the top, is taken into account and he had direct input in it himself, yes. He had, of course, very able people around him, like Iglesias, and the chap from Uruguay—I think it was Diego Cordovez. There were intellectuals around him, including people like Perez-Guerrero. It was a team. He managed to galvanize a team, and to see different sides and to challenge developed countries to adopt fair regulations in trade, in transfer of resources, and prices of commodities. They worked out all of this. He managed to give body and soul to the child of the Group of 77 (G-77), namely, UNCTAD, as head of UNCTAD, in opposition to GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) for instance. Because Raúl Prebisch believed in what John Maynard Keynes had believed—to have free and effective international institutions, you see: a monetary world institution, and a world or International Trade Organization (ITO), which would have decision-making powers at high level. Today's World Trade Organization (WTO), successor of GATT, is not quite what Prebisch had thought. You may recall that when the Group of 77 met after NAM

(Non-Aligned Movement) they were expecting, as second best, a UN Conference on Trade and Development, which could be a decision-making body wherein members meet every three years at high level. In fact, Prebisch and Perez-Guerrero and the Latins, and increasingly the Asians and others, wanted to go back to ITO. But, things being what they are, the fight through G77 or through UNCTAD is within the existing organizations, like the GATT and now the WTO. But the basic ideas of South-South cooperation in an operational economic trade sense were the product of people like Raúl Prebisch, like Enrique Iglesias. They were giants in that respect.

Asia was more for Non-Aligned Movement, more political and to prevent or avoid taking sides in a bi-polarized world to neutralize their jealousies, their in-fightings, et cetera. In any case, they were moving forward. India, Malaysia, and Korea were moving forward. They were more or less rapidly industrializing; nonaligned, and now becoming more of a regional cooperation force in Asia itself.

Latin America is a very difficult problem in that there is a giant world power next to it, and maybe there is a strategy to be effective in international organizations by negotiating jointly, effectively, with the United States. It does seem to me that trading relations between Latin American countries and the U.S. were very important in contradistinction to the trade relations between the Europeans and their former colonies.

Now, the issue of South-South cooperation was very strong in the early days and continued to be important. I remember taking part in a working group, which was chaired by a Nigerian, Akaporode Clark, which was on North-South relations. How to make it work? You could only make it work if you had South-South solidarity. I remember also attending a conference in Buenos Aires, organized by UNDP, on technical cooperation among developing countries, where the idea was to get more technical inputs from the Latinos and from the Asians.

But, at the moment, if I may jump, although South-South cooperation is there, as also North-South, there are emerging signs of sectoral cooperation alongside regional cooperation. By sectoral cooperation, I mean that professional groups, whether South or North—labor, in particular, whether it is North American or whatever, and so on—are beginning to be searching for more effort. Transnationals, or multinationals, or globalization, are affecting different parts of the world differently. There is a search for cooperation, for something that works. I don't think that a solution will be found in UNCTAD. I don't think either that it will be found in the World Trade Organization, which is dominated by the major countries. I think we need a more functional relationship in which interests of particular groups across the board are catered for. I don't know how much to read into what happened in Seattle. It was not a question of governments; it was on specific items—cheap goods based on low-cost labor going into industrialized countries. Workers are affected. On the other hand, the big countries going into developing countries to establish factories to exploit cheap labor. It seems to me that there is need to re-think interests of groups operating in different countries. Whether you can harmonize them, I don't know.

But all I am trying to say is simply that in response to your earlier question, namely, was Raúl Prebisch a giant, I would say that on balance yes, he has left a legacy of thought and organization. And there are intellectual giants coming up. One of them is Asian: Amartya Sen, on the concept of human development. To my knowledge he has not published much, but he is a giant. Thank God the UNDP and people like the late Mahbub ul Haq and the Nobel laureate in economics, Amartya Sen have promoted the whole concept of human development. The whole concept of development is changing: human development and sustainability of human development. Do we continue to define the development problem simply in materialistic terms:

GDP (gross domestic product), 10 percent, 15 percent, even if it means there is poverty and people die early? Or do we not find new measurements of development? And this combination in the (*Human Development Report 2000*) of different measures, such as education and income levels, longevity, how long people live; their quality of life, how they live, and what they enjoy;—these areas of great importance. But I think there is the problem of how the whole world, and in particular, developing countries, reacts to globalization because I think the industrialized countries are already united in that respect.

TGW: You mentioned earlier that your knowledge of commodities was rather sparse. After you had become a back-of-the-envelope economist in ECA, you became a back-of-the-envelope commodities man in UNCTAD. How did you react to this new challenge?

BTGC: When I removed the mystification about commodities—Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC), stabilization of prices, stabilization of income, competition of synthetic products, competition of substitutes—I began to see that what is required is flexibility and ability to adjust to changing conditions. But also that, in the interim, you needed something that holds things together, sustaining the developments and livelihood of most developing countries. Therefore, Raúl Prebisch was correct that 70 percent to 75 percent of the income of developing countries was dependent on their earnings from commodities, so also export earnings. It was necessary to try to stabilize prices or to increase earnings, national income, and balance-of-payments and employment. But, the more you did that, the greater was the speed away from commodities to synthetics or substitutes. Rubber was a clear case; natural rubber was so important, but then synthetic rubber was invented and it was more useful for certain uses.

In other words, I got interested in the dialectics—if I may put it that way—of development. That you cannot depend entirely on a set of factors, but equally, in a changing

period, when you are adjusting you need to stabilize. You cannot be changing all the time, and you cannot stand still, as it were. Yet, you need a period of stabilization and to plan. Hence, the Integrated Programme for Commodities. We wanted to have commodities programs and measures treated in groups so that you did not stabilize prices of cocoa and not of tea; you stabilized, not diversified. You also needed to process or manufacture. And you had funds to buffer-stock tin, but you did not have funds to deal with the problems of those products which could not be stocked. So, I became interested in what I had been studying much earlier, in the PPE: that life is a dialectical process, a continuing process of change and adjustment—stability at one moment, and movement in another. You have to be searching. Hence, it was research and development and diversification that became very important in UNCTAD and this is now important even in this country. How do we adjust to changing situations?

So, I went to UNCTAD and we were talking about stabilizing the prices of commodities. You work out a program and within two years the problem had changed. And, in fact, you lost. You stabilized prices, but the market reacted differently. It moved to substitutes, or synthetic products, or research has improved that product so that you use less of it than you required previously. In other words, I got interested in UNCTAD as much on this dialectical point of development as on the real need for predictable earnings and development, for security from the changing situations. For me, the height of my thinking was when we reached consensus—it was at the Seventh Session of UNCTAD in Geneva that we reached a decision for the first time in UNCTAD by consensus—in 1987. We put issues together as of common interest to all of us, that we agree on concrete measures within two or three years. We agreed that stabilization of prices, unless you increase investment, does not really work. I think the Final Act of UNCTAD VII was very interesting because there was consensus.

TGW: Of course, we have now moved ahead after the Cold War. It seems to me that that had something to do with consensus in 1987 that was not present in 1968. So, if I could just go back into 1968. You mentioned that your conception of commodities was different from other folks. What was the working atmosphere in the secretariat? That is, how much tolerance for ideas, new ideas, ideas against conventional wisdom, was there? How did clashes and views get sorted out?

BTGC: Clashes and views within the secretariat were sorted out, of course, by papers which were exchanged in seminars and working papers, and by introducing into the secretariat people who had new ideas, say on research—that what was required is not just stabilization but research into alternative uses of commodities. I gave you the example of rubber that was being used for cars, but for aircraft synthetic was more resistant and durable. Could we make any new uses of it? And there were other ideas in relation to research, not running away from a product but by using less of it by improving its quality. In other words, we brought in people on sabbatical from universities or research centers to talk to the diehard staff that had been there from the beginning, who believed that "we have to stabilize prices; our balance of payments are affected by these shifts in prices." And we were saying that this is anti-development. We have to see what we can do with the products, which we produce. Can we improve their qualities? Can we improve the demand in terms of quantity; to do the same thing with two tons that we would normally do with twenty tons. It became a process of development and a need to marry the interests of producers and consumers. We all could benefit from better utilization of our resources. And we had to discuss. Hence, there was an *entente*; the old guard and the new guard at UNCTAD and the Group of 77 began to act as a catalyst in all the relevant organizations. They agreed amongst themselves; so they operated within the framework of agreement that they

formally, as well as openly, discussed issues possibly. And now in WTO, there is a new perception because the developing countries are no more as homogeneous as before. Some are highly industrialized. Take Brazil, an industrial giant. Malaysia is moving, yet it is still in the G-77. Then there are those still at the bottom. G-77 is an amalgam.

TGW: I was going to ask this question later but you said something that makes me think I should ask it now. You spent basically twenty years of your professional life in the United Nations. And you mentioned that UNCTAD generated certain ideas. Is it possible for you to generalize about the quality of the international civil service, in comparison with, let's say, first-rate government civil services or first rate universities? Would you have expected more from the international civil service or, in light of the linguistic, cultural, and other kinds of problems, are you surprised that as much has been accomplished as there has been in terms of ideas?

BTGC: My God, that's a very difficult question. There are first-class brains in some of the organizations. People will go to them by conviction that things can be better, that things can be changed, be it on moral grounds or economic grounds. There are also people who have joined these organizations as providing comfortable jobs, good paying, no one breathing down your neck as you have more time and leeway than in private industry or in government, et cetera. There are weaknesses that arise from the need for equitable representation in international organizations. So, if we have the best, say, coming from Malaysia or Ghana, UNCTAD will not necessarily accept them because they are coming from only one or two countries. So, you have to have others come in from elsewhere. In other words, this issue of equitable distribution could lead to choosing the best people from a different country, but you could easily—and I think it is the latter—lead to countries chucking the people that they don't really need in their own countries. And this could lead, unless the contract is time specific, for those who are in service

to stay put and be quite comfortable! Why make the United Nations secretariat thinner when the ax might fall on you?

TGW: But you did find useful, for example, the insertion of outside voices—the academy, the private sector, and elsewhere?

BTGC: Yes. At UNCTAD, when we were looking at the problem of the Common Fund, the Integrated Programme for Commodities, we had inputs from universities, from research centers, people who came on short-term contract or who re-joined; they had gone away for training and came back. In other words, we began to think not in a static sense but in a dynamic sense in a world that is frequently changing, where there is an interlocking of issues. Environmental issues came in; the need to care for the poor came in; the need for specialization. In other words, we became more flexible and therefore more efficient.

TGW: Well, shall we call it a day? This is the end of the second tape, 11 May 2000, in Harare.

TGW: This is 12 May 2000, just outside of Harare, in the Chidzero residence. Tom Weiss continuing the interview with Bernard Chidzero at 10:00 A.M. Good morning.

We were in the midst of UNCTAD yesterday. We had begun with commodities, but before pursuing the commodities issue, I wondered if you might comment on the quality of leadership and the two styles of Perez-Guerrero and Gamani Corea—perhaps the differences between them, and whether one was more or less effective. But, as a springboard, how important is leadership within international institutions, particularly within the world of ideas?

BTGC: I assume we leave Raúl Prebisch aside. We have already said something about him—a very impressive man.

TGW: But you did not work with him much at the time.

BTGC: No. He was already on his way out, more or less. I worked under Perez-Guerrero, who was Venezuelan, and subsequently under Gamani Corea. On the style of leadership, it is difficult to say. When you are a director, you are running your own shop, and you meet the head of the organization either on formal social occasions or at formal meetings, and seldom on social occasions where you can relax, or get to know each other more informally. But I had the impression that Perez-Guerrero was nowhere near a Raúl Prebisch in terms of intellectual grasp of the issues. He was a good diplomat. He was quick in terms of wit as well as walking!

Gamani Corea, on the other hand, had a sort of professorial, university-type personality—not professorial in the sense of being detached from people, but articulating issues more clearly. Certainly, he had no hangover about socialism and so on. He felt more toward a mixed economy. I remember one evening, we had some small celebration to launch a report which had been prepared on Zimbabwe, called *Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order—An Economic and Social Survey*. We asked him to join us and I briefly summarized what this report was about. He said, as I recall, "You know, Bernard, this Third World socialism is not going to get us very far. We should just face the facts of the world and let investors come and let development go ahead." I laughed and said, "No, no. This is not intended to be socialism. It is just intended to be a transition between a capitalist command economy, which operated under Ian Smith, and an economy under the rulers of tomorrow who came from two camps: ZANU, which is Robert Mugabe's group, has strong Chinese influence; ZAPU, which came from the line of thinking of the USSR, has a strong brand of Soviet influence. When they come to rule, they will face real facts and you need a bridge. Therefore, we have to talk socialism, but at the same time face the facts that we will have a capitalist economy to work with or within."

And in fact, the first policy statement I made when I was appointed minister of economic planning was "growth with equity." In other words, we were going to put emphasis on growth, on attracting investment. But equity was intended to imply that there would be quite a strong emphasis on distribution—not just distribution through the normal means of employment and salaries, and provision of social services, but deliberate actions to generate equality, and hence our emphasis on education, on health, housing, and those sort of things as foundations for restructuring the existing society.

I have not lost the thrust of your question, which was really to compare the two leaders of the organization of UNCTAD. Both were intellectual. Both were committed. Both could communicate. But there was something more intellectual, more professorial about Gamani. He had been at Cambridge. I had been at Oxford. We were more or less talking the same language.

TGW: When I was re-reading the history of UNCTAD—a document that was done at the twentieth anniversary—obviously the IPC is probably the major story. But you had already been there directing the commodities division when Gamani came in 1964. How did he change things? Did he come in with a new idea, or was it the politics of the moment that changed?

BTGC: Well, I think when Perez-Guerrero took over, he left things pretty much to the heads of divisions, and I worked more closely with Alf Maizels, who was the guru in commodities. In fact, he should have been, in my view, appointed director of commodities. He had been there before. He had written a book, a very scholarly book on commodities. He was a very quiet man, a retiring man. But he became my deputy. And we were left pretty much to ourselves. We had accepted the thesis, which had been pronounced already under the leadership of Raúl Prebisch, on the dependence of developing countries on export commodities and on the problems of fluctuation of commodity prices and, therefore, fluctuations of export earnings, and

therefore, unpredictability—you can't plan. We had accepted that thesis. But there was a ring of government control in that philosophy—government must have a chance to influence movement of products and, therefore, prices and development.

Gamani more or less was influenced by the role of market forces, to find equilibrium between supply and demand. Therefore, the emphasis on production and research. In other words, developing countries should not just depend on stabilizing prices, but they should also ensure production and supply. That was one of the problems. Importers were never assured of supply or the quality of the product. So, research or testing was emphasized very much at the time when Gamani was there, and the need to keep an eye on substitutes for commodities. This thinking led, then, to hastening the completion of an Integrated Programme for Commodities. In other words, you could not look at price stabilization alone without looking at the quality of products, without looking at research and substitutes or the need to improve qualities. You needed finance and you had to look at how you arrange finance. Who puts up the finance? Is it developing countries or the whole world?

So, we evolved gradually into this need: to relate price stabilization through agreement on levels of prices, but also on funding to buffer stocks to ensure supply and for diversification efforts and, of course, research in order to compete with the new products or substitutes. Obviously, this required effective cooperation among developing countries themselves and dialogue with the industrialized countries. In other words, to try to look at the whole, a holistic approach if you want.

TGW: As I re-read the publications and thought back over this period, everyone agreed to the IPC, supposedly, and it represented a kind of international consensus on commodity policy. But in retrospect, in light of the lack of progress and the fact that nothing has happened, I

am tempted to ask what kind of consensus was this? And with hindsight, do you think that the IPC and the Common Fund should have been made such high priorities during that period, or were there other issues that should have grabbed our attention?

BTGC: Yes, there were other issues. They were included even in our discussions on IPC. The question on diversification, for example. Moving away from dependence on one commodity or two commodities to depend on a larger range of products, and not only on natural products but also on manufactured exports. In other words, to reduce vulnerability by depending on a larger base of natural products or raw materials. Therefore, the issue of industrialization became very important. We were concerned that some countries—certainly the European countries within the EEC (European Economic Community), at that time—were producing surpluses. They were subsidizing agriculture and producing surpluses which competed on the market with the products of developing countries. Yet, we were being urged not to subsidize development generally, but to let market forces determine the process. But here was a group of countries which were concerned with supporting their farmers and ensuring food supplies and producing surpluses which had to be disposed on the market at prices which were non-competitive. It was hard labor for developing countries.

The issues began to link up with the developments in other organizations, such as in the GATT. In other words, there was no point in UNCTAD taking the stance that it would sort out problems within the framework of UNCTAD by consensus or by votes, at least since 1987 when we first reached consensus on the Integrated Programme on Commodities, and other matters, at the Seventh Session of UNCTAD. But the Group of 77 began to work more effectively, or there was a purposeful approach to make sure that the consensus reached in UNCTAD found itself in decisions which were binding. They were taken in an organization where there were

negotiations—that is the GATT. Then there was the question of insuring that commodity earnings or actions by developing countries themselves, to enhance their economies, would be supported by the inflow of real resources, financial resources. Hence the need for the World Bank to assure resources for development and for the IMF equally to ensure that the resources for balance of payments coming in were real. In other words, that they were not undermined by other factors.

TGW: Earlier you had said that commodity markets were fragile and stabilization schemes were fragile and industrialized countries were very important in agricultural as well as the industrial sectors. Was this whole enterprise doomed to fail, or was it worth trying?

BTGC: It was worth something, I think. In failure we succeed because it lets us know our weaknesses and therefore how to overcome those weaknesses by taking necessary remedial measures. I do not think that this thrust of effort on commodities, or generalized preferences, for instance, to allow products of developing countries, particularly processed products, into markets of industrialized countries—always debated in UNCTAD—was to no purpose, or achieved no results. No, on the contrary, it coordinated the different positions of developing countries so that when they went to negotiate, either bilaterally or within the multilateral institutions, such as the GATT, they would be singing the same tune if you want—or making sure that the consensus was not eroded by individual interests creeping in.

TGW: Did you happen to read the Christopher Brown book on *The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control*?

BTGC: No, I have not.

TGW: He wrote a very scathing critique of the top management, basically attacking the whole notion of even trying such a scheme. He thought that efforts should have been put elsewhere. I just wondered what you thought of him.

BTGC: I think there was a period when the effort on commodities was worth it. And changing the rules of the game. It was not only commodities we were looking at. We were also looking, of course, at the costs of shipping these products, the problems of insurance, and so on. The idea was to improve things or have a new ball game. It was not to negate market forces, but to try to moderate market forces so that they are not so strong and so that the weaker should be protected, when you had a situation, such as was described by Raúl Prebisch, where the incomes of developing countries were dependent very heavily on commodity export earnings. I do not recall the figure now, but I think it was to the extent of 70 or 75 percent of income. You could not ignore that fact. The question was, how do you improve the situation? How do you enhance the sources of income for developing countries? If you just leave it to market forces, if you just export bananas, if the prices go up, good; if the prices go down, too bad. I think you need to have some sort of planning, some form of international understanding.

TGW: From what you said yesterday, and what you are saying this morning, UNCTAD and, indeed, the entire UN system, is almost entirely Keynesian in its approach to life in that we are not trying to ignore the market; it is just that we are trying to manage certain aspects.

BTGC: To avoid the excesses or distortions.

TGW: How precisely did the ideas within UNCTAD change intellectual and political opinion internationally? What was the impact on governments and nongovernment actors?

BTGC: That is difficult to say. But I think that one can generalize in a number of respects. The concept of the necessity of cooperation among producers became very real in

terms of the need to apply it. A number of examples demonstrated that. Take the oil producers—OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). They demonstrate that they could influence market forces, and more. You had the same thing with the tin producers. It was more difficult when you came to more perishable products, like tea, coffee, and so on. But, that sense of cooperation was there. That we cannot just deal individually. We have to try to work together.

How to work together was, of course, a problem. You have to negotiate price levels, floor and ceilings, with the consumers and they have their own considerations. And within that framework it was alright if we agree on prices, but can you assure a steady supply? And it was always difficult because certain products were dependent on the weather. There could be dry spells; there could be disasters. But it leaves you with a framework within which to operate, to enable developing countries to assess that they will have so much income, and the consumers will be supplied with so much or such quantity, roughly at such prices—cooperation.

TGW: You mentioned the one—temporary, anyway—success story of commodity producers, namely OPEC, in 1973-1974. How did this change the dynamics within the secretariat or within the negotiations at that time?

BTGC: I'm not sure I understand the question.

TGW: Well, the 1973-1974 oil prices led in very short order to the NIEO (New International Economic Order) and a certain, some would say, euphoria amongst the Group of 77 in pushing forward this agenda, which was the international agenda for a couple of years before switching back to business as usual. So, I was just curious as to how you viewed the impact of the oil price increases of 1973-1974 and again in 1979 on the dynamics of the group system and the dynamics of the secretariat.

BTGC: Well, I think different groups of countries reacted differently. The successful OPEC experiment brought the international community some semblance of stability and assurance. It brought to others difficulty because they could have gotten this product at lower prices than the agreed-upon prices. And to others, they got the product at a lower price than they could have gotten it otherwise. So, the impact was differential, depending on requirements or level of development of each country, in particular the consumers. But, on the secretariat, what it meant was that the secretariat had less of a role to play where there were successful agreements. The matter was now in the hands of the countries that had won new strength. This meant that you could not easily influence the impact OPEC prices were going to have on other countries who were importers of the product, who might have required cheaper oil than otherwise.

Take the question of cooperation among producers further, and take an example other than oil. It is interesting what happened among the rubber producers. They succeeded, too, in influencing the rubber market. But the consequence of it was to push research among consumers which accelerated development in the production of synthetic rubber. Synthetic rubber seemed to be suited to the purposes of aircraft tires and things like that, more durable. The lesson we learned from that was that you could not carry the task or objective of cooperation, or controlling, or influencing prices too far without actually negotiating with the consumers. If you push the consumer too much, they look for alternatives or synthetic substitutes. So, it can and should be a dynamic process. And I don't think it would be correct to say that the work on commodities was not worth it because I think that if the whole thing had been left entirely to market forces, there perhaps would not have been any early or concerted need for research and synthetic rubber. People would have gone on using the cheap product, unless it was for purposes

of producing a substance or a product which was more resilient or more durable, and not because of price. By which I mean, even if prices of rubber did not rise, the need would have become evident that the natural substance itself did not meet certain requirements. So it was not just the question of price; it was also the question of the nature of the product itself. The reliance on natural products did not enhance the development of science and technology, as such. So the two things became interrelated.

TGW: You mentioned something just a moment ago about the secretariats taking a back seat, for the moment, to the Group of 77. Obviously the 1973-1974 period influenced the ideas that became acceptable, more mainstream, in North-South negotiations, at least for a moment. But as one looks back over this period, what exactly is the relationship, concerning ideas, between the secretariat and the G-77? Did ideas mainly emanate from the secretariat, mainly from the G-77, or was it a two-way street?

BTGC: That is very difficult. There were cases in which the G-77 relied very heavily on the secretariat. They had an idea, and the secretariat developed the ideas or the techniques to be applied. There was a phase in which the industrialized countries began to consider the UNCTAD secretariat as the secretariat of the G-77. In other words, unlike the secretariat of, say, GATT, the UNCTAD secretariat was "left-wing," supporters of the poor, and people were giving them the means or the opportunity to negotiate. At the same time, the G-77 were beginning to recruit their own staff, particularly the rich organizations like OPEC and rubber exporters. They accessed information or advice not always from the secretariat of UNCTAD but often from institutions outside. So, I think it was an ambiguous relationship, the secretariat and the Group of 77. But generally, the secretariat of UNCTAD, regardless of their economic background, whether they were Asians or Americans or British or African, tended to provide information and

assistance to the G-77 to negotiate more effectively with the other side, which had sufficient staff from their own national institutions.

TGW: You mentioned the GATT, but you have been remarkably silent about the Fund. I guess I am curious to understand better the role of tensions among these organizations, or between UNCTAD which, as you poetically put it, were a bunch of left-wingers, I suppose. And I suppose the other three—the GATT, the Fund, the Bank—were obviously perceived (whether any of these perceptions were totally correct is another question) as representing the opposite camp. This kind of tension, is it useful in terms of producing new ideas?

BTGC: Yes. I myself believe in a system where tensions stimulate discourse or progress, basically because I believe that opposites constitute a dynamic system.

TGW: The dialectics.

BTGC: Yes, exactly. Without a dialectical situation, you tend to stagnate. Or, to be ideological, inflexible. If you take UNCTAD, which became really the spearhead of thinking of the G-77, a means of negotiating effectively, not only in GATT but now also even within the General Assembly itself, then I daresay that within the Bretton Woods institutions you could often recognize the thinking of the G-77. This demonstrates progress even in these organizations which had different objectives and different composition in membership. Numbers mattered to some extent in UNCTAD—the developing countries were in the majority. In any case, they developed a strong stance there. The GATT was very much a club of the rich, negotiating their problems amongst themselves. They were not primarily concerned with the problems of developing countries. They were primarily concerned with promoting specific trade relationships, protecting their own products, promoting regulations through tariffs. Trade

protected by tariff or non-tariff barriers was the central thing among people producing similar or competing products or wanting to have access into markets of other industrialized countries.

If you take the World Bank, on the other hand, it was a development arm. I don't think the money was intended, really, to go to other developed countries. It was or is an instrument of financing development in the less industrialized countries: the mobilization of resources, not for trade purposes as such, but for productive purposes, for development. And the IMF (International Monetary Fund), this is for monetary matters, balance of payment and exchange rates, movement of financial resources among countries generally which only subsequently becomes directly related to development in developing countries through, for instance, the Development Committees of the Bank and the Fund, which mobilized real resources for developing countries.

I well recall, as chairman of the Development Committee, where I served two terms from 1986 to 1990, how we argued bitterly on how to mobilize resources for development, in real terms. That meant that we ought to look at the interest rates; we ought to look at the charges for finances and inflation. Were we really transferring resources to developing countries if the finished products sold to those developing countries were very expensive and if the developing countries were not earning money sufficient enough or stable enough from their commodity exports? It became interrelated. What was missing, in my view, was a meeting of decision-makers within the Fund itself and in the Bank, also perhaps at heads of state levels to really understand; to underpin objectives and policies and examine in depth all issues that necessitated the establishment of these institutions and the real needs of national governments. These institutions were not sovereign, yet dealt with issues that affected sovereign states.

I am moving into a very difficult area now. In this jungle of institutions and ideas where groupings of countries—whether the G-77, or in the case of developed countries, the Group of 7

or the Group of 15—the interests of those groups and how those interests could be protected and advanced within the larger forums became of permanent importance.

TGW: Would it be fair to say that the *Trade and Development Report* was created as part of the dialectic, as sort of the antipode of the *World Development Report*? Was this the idea, to put different issues from the *World Development Report* front and center?

BTGC: Well, I am not very clear or qualified on that. If you are referring to the time I was at UNCTAD, I was preoccupied at the time with commodities matters. And when I left UNCTAD, I became preoccupied with specific problems of planning a country economy. But there is no doubt that the *World Development Report* was, indeed is, a major move in the right direction to deal with the problems of the world in their totality, in their interrelationships. The *Trade and Development Report* covered a narrower area, but a vital area, namely, that countries need to trade amongst themselves, to exchange goods; for countries to enhance their different productive capacities, and avoid each country trying to produce the same thing inefficiently and selling it to the world. Now, by linking trade and development, you are telling the countries: produce as well as you can produce; produce efficiently; but look at this in the context of the requirements of the world and the products in other countries, at the effect on other countries and their people.

The *Trade and Development Report* did not necessarily take into account issues of poor countries, the least developed countries, the lives of ordinary people. But once you are talking about the *World Development Report* you are talking about the whole spectrum and levels of development of different countries and the problems their people face. In UNCTAD, we promoted very strong preferential treatment for the least developed countries. I think this aspect of development came only later into the Bank and the IMF.

TGW: I think that is correct. One of the notions we have in this project is that ideas—whether at UNCTAD or other forums—frequently seem controversial but eventually work their ways into policy—the Bank, the Fund, and governments. Does that seem plausible?

BTGC: Yes.

TGW: You became deputy-secretary-general of UNCTAD in 1977. Prior to that there had been one deputy, Stein Rossen. How did the idea for a second deputy come up, and what were the politics around that?

BTGC: You know, I never really bothered myself about going into the politics of this. I guess I took it rather naively or simply that the volume of work of UNCTAD had increased. The need for specialization had become apparent. And I think there was also the consideration that the secretary-general of UNCTAD, Gamani Corea at that time, was preoccupied with high policy issues, coordination of policies, the Fund, the GATT, etc., and their constituencies. Stein Rossen had administrative issues to be looked after—running the organization. And he came from an industrialized country and some people may have felt that we needed a Third World person to come in from an UNCTAD constituency where the burning issues were, of course, commodities and the least developed countries. Further, there was the need to make our position felt in the other organizations through what many people called "the authentic voice from developing countries," i.e., UNCTAD. But, I think, it was generally because the work had increased in volume and complexity and there was a need for specialization and diversification. We needed to reflect this at the top.

TGW: Was there much dispute about this fact among delegates in Geneva, or back in the capitals?

BTGC: Quite frankly, I am not aware that there was any dispute about this. And if there was, perhaps, it was because I was one of the people affected and it was not mentioned to me. But they trusted Stein Rossen, an experienced UN international civil servant who had served, I think I told you before, in one of the regional commissions, in ECA, and who came from a country with progressive views. I don't think that there was doubt about his ability or his personality as such. But I think it became necessary to strengthen the Third World hand in the running of UNCTAD, and to strengthen it by injecting at the top a sense of urgency in relation to the problem of commodities, even finance. And I would have thought this cross-fertilization of ideas at the top level—Gamani Corea tending to be more intellectual and dealing with greater responsibilities and Stein Rossen being an efficient administrator and thinker, and Chidzero being a young rebel of some kind—was not a bad idea!

TGW: Did the balance then become somewhat skewed when Jan Pronk took over from Stein Rossen, because, indeed, Stein had quite a different profile than Jan Pronk? He was from a sympathetic country, but someone who, at least in the most conservative quarters of the world, was viewed with confidence. And I think that was not the case with Jan.

BTGC: No, in a sense I think the appointment of Jan Pronk strengthened the—I wanted to use the words "left wing" because that's what it was—more progressive socialist thinking and action. It also did reassure those countries in UNCTAD which were industrialized and were more sympathetic to UNCTAD—certainly the Netherlands was sympathetic to UNCTAD, as were the Nordic countries—reassure them of progress. I do not see that a deputy-secretary-general would have been appointed, say, from the U.S. or the UK. I don't think so, regardless of the qualifications of individuals, as in the case of Alf Maizels in commodities who was a first

rate brain in commodities. Yes, they did not appoint him director of the Commodities Division. Instead, they looked for someone from outside.

TGW: What is your view about the pluses and minuses of turning UNCTAD into a southern secretariat, as opposed to a universal institution or member of the United Nations? This was certainly discussed as an option. How did you react to that suggestion?

BTGC: I think we have to bear in mind here the history of UNCTAD and the rationale for its existence, even at the time when the discussion was taking place. UNCTAD was a byproduct, or a direct product of the Group of 77 although it was created by the UN in 1964, with a conference of members or ministerial representatives, which met every three or four years, and also a Trade and Development Board which met between conferences, and a permanent secretariat. I believe this is true, if we go back to the meeting of developing countries which took place, I think, in 1964 in Havana. The Group of 77 had meaningful input into international organizations. The original idea was to form a conference, which would have decision-making powers, say like the GATT where ministers met regularly and it was not a question of meeting periodically. Indeed, a secretariat was established, which made studies of the issues of interest to developing countries and reported to the Board and the Conference itself.

Now, I do not think at that time that you could have turned UNCTAD into a world forum to take over fully trade issues, or to be an ITO. It was difficult to do so. In fact, the industrialized countries would not have accepted that because GATT was there anyhow. So, historically, UNCTAD was established as an organization of UN members with a secretariat which specialized on the problems which interested the Group of 77 or, more correctly, developing countries generally. Now, my history may fail me here; but that is as I recall. Meaning, therefore, that you could not jump to the ITO; you needed an organization where

consensus could be reached among developing countries. Or where their views could be articulated more efficiently and then brought into a wider or treaty-making forum.

TGW: I was actually inquiring as to whether it would have been better on balance to have turned, straightforwardly, the secretariat of UNCTAD into a South secretariat, as opposed to remaining part of the United Nations system, in which universalism—membership by all countries, trying to balance and harmonize interests—is the operating assumption.

BTGC: Yes. I don't know whether it would have been better or not, but I don't think it would have been feasible. First, there were differences among the Group of 77 itself. I don't think they would have accepted such a secretariat as their own secretariat with so many differences amongst themselves, as in the UN organizations. Second, I think financing the secretariat would have posed a wide range of subjects. It seems more logical anyhow that the consensus-building process should be shared with the consumers. And in negotiating, I doubt that developing countries wished to have a confrontational approach by having their own very well-organized and well-greased secretariat which would confront, say, the secretariat of the GATT or the Bretton Woods institutions. It would have been a negation of the process of international cooperation involving different groups of people.

I did not see or hear the issue discussed, during my UN years, of the need for a full secretariat entirely controlled, recruited, financed, and directed by the Group of 77. It would have sharpened the gap between the North and the South. And it might have made it very difficult to promote the process of consensus-building and to narrow the gap between the North and the South in the manner in which you would discuss on the basis of information prepared by a common secretariat.

TGW: Well, you mentioned yesterday that you had made this gentle voyage from Ottawa toward East Africa and then you came to Geneva. But during this period in Geneva, ZAPU, ZANU, all sorts of folks wandered through and contacted you. Was it here that the idea for the development mission for Zimbabwe came up that resulted in this report you mentioned earlier, *Towards an Independent Zimbabwe*?

BTGC: No. That started as a result of, first, the General Assembly resolution on decolonization. I can't remember the exact wording or the title, but I think it is referred to in the study or review that we called *Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order, An Economic and Social Survey*. The General Assembly resolution called for the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the specialized agencies to assist in the process of decolonization. And, in this case, the study was in response to a request by the co-leaders of the Patriotic Front—ZANU and ZAPU, in accordance with the position that a study be prepared that would assist the nationalists to take over the country and run the economy. The task was handed over to UNCTAD to conduct this study with financing from UNDP. That having been done, it was left to UNCTAD to decide how to carry out this study. What happened was we consulted with the nationalists and with ECA, and with UNDP, which was going to finance it. It was agreed we should structure the team in such a manner that the head of the intellectual work to be done—the secretariat work—should not be Zimbabwean; it should be an outsider from a developing country. So a Nigerian was chosen—the head of the Nigerian Institute for Economic Research, Dr. Onitiri. It was then decided that the decision-making or study-controlling group should consist of various elements—representatives of the national organizations themselves, and representatives from ECA secretariat, and from other UN organizations. But significantly, the actual research work itself was to be done by sources or personnel from outside—so we had different nationalities or

personalities like Professor C. Stoneman, and Zimbabwean scholars as well. They did papers on specific subjects, agriculture and land manpower and education, et cetera. Over twenty papers were done. These were then pulled together by the Nigerian-led secretariat and put before the policy advisory committee, which I chaired because UNCTAD was the executing agency. I was appointed to head this on behalf of UNCTAD, not necessarily because I was a Zimbabwean but because UNCTAD was the UN agency concerned. So a deputy-secretary-general was appointed—I was deputy then—and thank God Stein was there to do other things—to direct the secretariat.

And we would meet to discuss these reports by the experts, digesting papers prepared by the secretariat. The secretariat, as I told you, consisted of Nigerians, some staff of ECA, and OAU (Organization of African Unity), as well. That's how we produced this study. It's a very important study, which influenced the thinking in this country decisively. And in a way, although I had been known in the nationalist movement since 1963, this study brought me into greater limelight so that, on the morrow of independence, I was called back to head the Ministry for Planning.

Interestingly enough, a number of people who worked on this project came back at the same time, like Dr. Moyana, who came back and was appointed deputy-governor of the Reserve Bank and later became Governor of the Bank. One became first Minister of Industry and Commerce and so on. I came back of course. I can name a host of people. Some are still here, others have left or have died. That was the team which formed the hub, and it was on the basis of that study that the first development conference in Zimbabwe, which we called ZIMCORD (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development) was prepared in order to rally

resources from the international community to promote development in Zimbabwe. We held this conference in 1981.

The first policy document prepared in this regard was called "growth with equity." In other words, when people say the Marxists succeeded the Ian Smith government, they don't understand what they are talking about. It was a mixed bag of people—some socialists, some capitalists, others just thinkers and so on, and virtually all of them without a full or fixed appreciation of the wider dimensions of Marxism, such as materialism, determinism, authoritarianism, and all the rest. But the point was to set various options open for the government as it moved forward to choose its own policies, or thrust for change and development.

TGW: In your view, the document prepared beforehand, *Towards a New Order*, as well as your own first document as minister*, Growth with Equity*—to what extent did these draw upon ideas that had been floating around within UNCTAD, within the UN system more generally? Or was this an original concoction?

BTGC: No, no. It was a mixed bag of things. We drew heavily on the work that was going on in UNCTAD. We also were influenced by the ideas which were suggested in the various papers by the individual experts, such as on mining, and the field of agriculture. But UNCTAD influenced the paper decisively in the sense that here was an organization which was interested in reforming the rules and regulations which governed international conduct, whether it was in trade, shipping, money, et cetera, or whether in relation to development generally and cooperation. So, there was a philosophical atmosphere pervading the team—that we had to change the rules of the game in Zimbabwe. Change was central. In other words, institutions have to be adapted, the rules had to be changed and, in doing so, we were looking at a more

equitable world. We were looking at the question of the least developed countries; hence, the question of preferential treatment and special measures to deal with injustices or unfair treatment.

I think we were influenced by UNCTAD, yes. The need to pay attention to manufacturing and diversification of the economy is very apparent in the report. The need to moderate market forces is here—not to negate market forces. The need for regional cooperation—you'll find it there. Yes, there was quite an impact on the report of the type of ideas that were discussed in UNCTAD or which had emanated from the work of UNCTAD.

TGW: Was there any link between what was going on in Lancaster House and the papers being developed in relationship to the economy? Was there any coordination between these or was the political dimension just going on its own?

BTGC: I think the political dimension predominated at Lancaster. But some of the participants in the preparation of the reports, those coming from political parties, i.e., from the Patriotic Front, were involved in the Lancaster House constitution and previous meetings. They also participated in the work of the team which prepared this report.

TGW: Just an interesting aside here. In 1979, I actually look leave from UNCTAD to work on the national program for Namibia. At that time, I think we all thought that Namibia was going to become independent immediately and that Rhodesia was problematic. It obviously turned out to be quite the opposite because Namibia came ten years later and Zimbabwe in 1980. To go back to your earlier research, did you think that Namibia would take ten years and Rhodesia would be Zimbabwe almost instantly, in 1980?

BTGC: I think we were much more prepared here to get independence in Zimbabwe. The war was on here, real war for independence. But, also, there was great activity on the

intellectual front in terms of preparation. And we were reporting regularly, through UNCTAD, to the parties. And, of course, representatives of ZANU and ZAPU participated in the UNCTAD study. The dialogue was on between the fighters and the political builders of tomorrow, so to speak. What we avoided, what we tried in the group which worked on the report, which had been requested by the nationalists, was to avoid being presented with independence without knowing how the Zimbabwe economy functioned. We even looked at such questions like, upon independence, would the new rulers know how the electricity system worked in Zimbabwe, in Rhodesia. Where are the main switches and generating controls? Would we know beforehand how the water system works operated? How many ministries are there? Who is running the ministries? This may seem simplistic and even naïve, but we left nothing to chance. We were advancing in a logistic manner and, bang, tomorrow you have it. And we were advising that you need to have outsiders and insiders working in liaison. People were coming here, coming to Geneva, in the context of planned contacts, meeting even with the white community, persuading some of them to stay on in free Zimbabwe, to rebuild together.

TGW: I guess what I was trying to figure out was whether the white community, or the black community, or the negotiators at Lancaster House, were reassured by the seriousness of the economic effort. In some ways, it demonstrated a seriousness of purpose. And it also suggested that things were not going to go to hell in a hand basket instantly.

BTGC: I'm sure behind the scenes they were assured because, first of all, the work was on the basis of a UN resolution and the British voted for it. And the study was carried out by an international organization, UNCTAD, financed by a UN organization, carried out by a team drawn from various parts of the world, and prepared with full knowledge of the leadership of the parties. I am quite sure that the British Commonwealth office, or the British government

generally, knew that serious work was on and were reassured. And I would suppose that the Zimbabwean or the Rhodesian intelligence service knew what was going on. I'm quite sure that a chap like Ken Flower of the Secret Service in Rhodesia (c.f., *Serving Secretly* by Ken Flower) would have been in the know. After all, some of us had even been asked earlier to participate in one capacity or another preceding meetings or conferences. I remember that for the Geneva conference I was asked to be advisor by both ZANU and ZAPU. I politely turned that down because I thought I should be neutral as an international civil servant and this was made public. In other words, people could see the emergence on the black side of a division of labor and respected the roles of a nationalist and an internationalist. It was a sophisticated approach and it was appreciated very much. And you can tell from the attendance of ZIMCORD—it was very well attended, and resources were promised and subsequently disbursed. And all this was facilitated by this report—the UNCTAD report and related preparatory work at home and abroad.

TGW: Would it be fair to say, in summary, that the Brits were the midwife of the political settlement, and perhaps the UN was the midwife of the economic settlement?

BTGC: Well, I would hesitate to put it so bluntly. I think it was a combination of both and the role of the fighters and nationalists was critical and decisive. The economic preparation forced the parties, the nationalists, to work very closely together in the team as well as when they reported back. And the Brits knew about it. The political settlement was a different matter.

TGW: On a personal note here, you mentioned that you were committed to coming back to Zimbabwe and that you would have come even had you not been offered a ministerial position. Was there any uncertainty in your mind or in the family's mind about leaving the relative tranquility of Geneva within the secretariat, with a salary paid in foreign exchange, and

with a retirement plan, et cetera, to come back to what certainly was an exciting but perhaps not a totally guaranteed situation?

BTGC: Well, take it this way—my wife knew and I told her from the very beginning, "I want to go back home." And as I told you, when we got married, I had already a post designated for me at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. She knew about it. So, she was prepared to come to Rhodesia. We were only two of us, then. The children did not yet exist, so they had no share in the decision. Friends, like Marjorie Perham, who was my mentor and tutor at the postgraduate level, had worried, not about Rhodesia only but about mixed marriages generally. She was single herself. Also, because I had been away so long from home, she thought that I did not realize what problems existed here, in Rhodesia. But there were no real misgivings about it because everything I had been doing pointed to my going back. The work on Tanzania and East Africa, the work on the labor movement in the Federation, and the study I did on *The Economic Consequences of Racial Discrimination*, which made me travel to different parts of East and Southern Africa, pointed in that direction. And my first appointment, after I failed to get the job in Zimbabwe, was to Ethiopia. If anything would have gone wrong, it would have been in Ethiopia, where life was entirely new and not easy for my young family. But sooner or later, we were home as we were in Ethiopia and we got friends like the Norwegian I referred to, Stein Rossen, Surendra Patel, the Indian, and an Ethiopian friend, who is living here in Zimbabwe right now, Eshetu, and others, and assurances from people like Robert Gardiner, and so on.

So that from that point on, there was preparation to go back. Going back to Kenya from Ethiopia, it was like, "Ah, we are going home now." When Raúl Prebisch succeeded in having me moved back to Europe from Kenya, I thought, "What's happening here? I thought I was

going home. Now I am going away." Others said, "No, you are being prepared for an interesting job, and UNCTAD will let you see where the problems are." As a matter of fact, I am pleased I went because I had been doing research work in ECA, and in Kenya I was doing development work in a country which had just become independent and there was then no current political struggle in Kenya in which I was involved. I was really working on specific projects with individual countries or individual specialized agencies. I did not tackle the problems of trade barriers, trade discrimination, commodity prices, freight and shipping, and problems of least developed countries. So, I went to Geneva I was prepared to return home.

When I brought my wife here (Rhodesia) for the first time, our son was about one year old and our daughter was a baby. This would have been in 1961. The Federation was still on. She once asked, "Do you think this will succeed? Do you see that there are real problems here?" I wondered and mused, and she said, "Together we can do it." I was assured. When in Geneva, I was asked to come here. At first I received a telephone call from the wife of the prime minister, Mrs. Sally Mugabe, his Ghanaian wife, who knew me. She said on the phone, "Bernard, can you take a call within one hour from Harare, from Bob?" I said, "Okay." I waited. The phone rang, and after exchanging greetings, he said, as I remember so well, "I am calling you on my own behalf, and on behalf of the party, asking if you can come and join us in the task of running the government." For a while I stammered, then I said, "What as?" And I waited.

Well, this was after national elections, and I had not participated in these elections. Bob said, "Well, we will find a formula." And, indeed, a way was found and I was made a senator when I came. But, on the occasion of the telephone, I said, "Maybe we should arrange for me to come home and we can discuss." And, indeed, arrangements were made after I spoke to

Gamani, secretary-general of UNCTAD. It was agreed that I should come to Zimbabwe. I came here first in March 1980 and later, was present on Independence Day, 18 April 1980. On the first occasion in March, there were discussions with the Prime Minister and a private dinner with his family. And I agreed. I telephoned my wife, and she said, "Yes."

So I went back to Geneva and that was it. I decided to leave the family behind because the children were going to school and we had to find a place to live in Harare. I came here, assumed my job. The task of building a ministry was not easy, but we did it. Subsequently, my family came.

TGW: This is the end of tape number three.

TGW: This is the continuation of the morning interview. This is tape number four, at the Chidzero residence. We just got you back home to Zimbabwe. From the description that you just gave, the study done under UNCTAD's auspices with UNDP finances was quite instrumental in reintroducing you back to the party and in your own return as minister. What, indeed, would you say was the UN's role in the report and in insuring the follow-up to the report?

BTGC: I would say the UN's role here could be described in three parts. First, whether deliberate or otherwise, it was as a contribution to the independence of Zimbabwe by, as it were, training someone who had wandered between research work in ECA, technical assistance work in UNDP, and reform work in UNCTAD, and was suddenly catapulted into the practical politics of Zimbabwe, but somebody who had already been preparing. Secondly, it was the study itself which underlined the issue of the complexity of this economy and which was done objectively and without any pre-judgement of what the nationalists might, in fact, do. Thirdly, whether deliberate or otherwise, a most constructive role which the international organizations in general,

and in particular the UN, played was in promoting the independence or decolonization process rather than simply talk, preach, take resolution and leave the process to take its own course. To remain with the results and make sure that the process bears fruit. And here was a study which brought me back home and which was followed by a conference supported by the UN and its specialized agencies and which led to a fruitful relationship which still continues, even now.

TGW: You mentioned that you had joined the party in 1963. Obviously, you were not in the bush with the fighters. You were in your UN assignments. When you came back as minister, you were not elected. Is the Zimbabwe system such that all ministers of parliament are elected or can you be appointed? I know that subsequently you ran for office. So I was just curious about this transition.

BTGC: The Lancaster House Constitution, which brought Zimbabwe into independence and is still obtaining now—because we failed to bring a new constitution last year, which had been drafted as a home-grown instrument. The Lancaster House Constitution provides for elected members as well as for appointed members. I believe the president can appoint up to twelve or more members of Parliament. It also, at that time, in 1960, provided for a senate, although this was a house which has subsequently been abolished, I think in 1985 or 1986. So, when I came, I was appointed a member of parliament in the senate. I was a minister of planning, as Senator Chidzero. But subsequently, I ran for elections and became an elected member.

TGW: Was it fun running for office?

BTGC: I tell you it was great fun. I enjoyed it. But I had a relatively easy constituency, which was Harare central and the township called Tafara. And I won the elections gloriously. I even got a cup or a souvenir to celebrate the occasion, from one of the areas, from Tafara, in fact.

But, I don't think I want to go through the process again because you tend to oversimplify issues to appeal to the people, even when you know you will not be able to do all you promise.

TGW: I'm sure it's hard to tell the constituency about dialectics. It would make their eyes glaze over. How many times did you stand for office, then?

BTGC: I ran for office twice—1985 and 1990.

TGW: So, through various ministerial posts, from 1980 to 1995, you focused on a host of ideas. How would you see your legacy, if that is an appropriate word here, in Zimbabwe, in terms of the ideas that guide the economy?

BTGC: Difficult—I suppose it is always awkward to talk about oneself. But, what I tried to do as a cabinet minister, and in particular first as a minister of planning, then finance, and then as a senior minister of finance, which means I was not only minister of finance but also a leading member of a number of cabinet committees. Some of which I chaired, such as the Ministerial Economic Coordination Committee, or MECC, where we brought all development issues. First at the level of senior officials or heads of ministries and then these together with their ministers before we went to cabinet, and the Finance and Economic Affairs Committee (FEA). This was a very important committee, which was chaired by the prime minister; it dealt with budget matters, with loan questions, and other importance financial matters. I look at my role as having been that of coordinator and a facilitator of the decision-making process, not just as a minister of finance, but overall coordinator of the ministries concerned.

My study on *Economic Consequences of Racial Discrimination* prepared me to face squarely the problem of race relations in Zimbabwe. And I approached my work in that spirit of avoiding duplication of expenditures by supporting segregated facilities or institutions, although these were already being abolished here. At the same time, because of the importance we

attached in UNCTAD to differential, preferential treatment for the least developed countries, I brought with me this attitude that we have to have differential or preferential treatment for the poor and those on the periphery of the economy or hitherto discriminated against. Hence, the policy of *Growth With Equity*, which meant we had to face these two together: to promote sustainable growth and to redistribute as equitably as possible. But we had also clearly realized, as in UNCTAD, that we could not solve all the problems of poverty or of the least developed countries unless the whole economy of the world is growing and governments adopt the right policies. So, unless the economy of Zimbabwe was growing, investment was taking place, we could not talk about equity, unless we are sharing a diminishing cake.

I think I made another contribution in the sense that, being relatively independent myself—because I came from the UN, someone who had done twenty years of United Nations work—I was not financially committed to my work in the sense that I did not look at my work as a job to earn money. I was supported from my UN pension, although I had not completed the minimum number of years required for early retirement; I retired two years earlier than the qualifying year for early retirement. Early retirement is at fifty-five, and I came here when I was only fifty-three years old. So, I still needed two years to qualify for early pension benefits, but we managed to make arrangements with UNCTAD that I borrowed money from Swiss banks to enable the UN to pay their 7 percent and my 7 percent monthly contributions, on the clear understanding that when I reached fifty-five and my pension was due, the down payment or cash payment would go to liquidate my loan to the extent necessary. It was a very expensive affair, including high interest rate, but we did it. It was also intended to enable me to meet a premium for my insurance, the education of my children, medical services. In that respect, I often joke with fellow Zimbabweans that, although I am not a freedom fighter or a war veteran, I fought a

different war and I did not come here for a job to earn money; I came here to contribute to the development of my country. Some of my friends chide me and say I should have remained at the UN until full retirement at 60 and cashed in good! Well?

When it came to changing from the socialist thrust or path, which we tried to follow during the first ten years after independence, roughly 1980 to 1989, and to respond more fully to market forces through economic and social adjustment policies and programs, we did so not so much because we were forced by the Bank or the IMF, but because we were responding to the changes in the world system, to new conditions and demands, and to our own monetary problems and budget deficits. The Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989 and market forces were beginning to operate more openly be approached or to be accepted in Eastern European countries and elsewhere. We had built institutions and services in Zimbabwe which needed to be sustained but, given that the national budget itself was limited, we could not hardly meet both service and development expenses on public accounts. We needed to attract investment and bilateral funding to come in. In this we were advised to work with the Fund and the Bank. Therefore, we embraced market forces more openly in the hope that investment would come and there would be efficient use of resources. Unfortunately, very little new investment came. We also abolished the paraphernalia of controls and regulations, such as import controls and foreign currency allocation procedures, which we had inherited from the Smith regime and which we had further strengthened. We released blocked funds which, during the years of the Smith regime, had accumulated, for dividends were not remitted in full during UDI. They were blocked here. These were the blocked funds. We took the decision to release the blocked funds, hoping to encourage investors to come. On second thought, my friends and I think we made a mistake. We should have moved more slowly and kept this money to grow and beef up our foreign

exchange reserves. But that's neither here nor there, now. All I am trying to say is that my UN background prepared me to serve here as a minister but still very much as a functionary, as a civil servant and not as a politician.

TGW: This independence, I'm sure, was invaluable to making you a serious voice internally, but, I presume, also with external bilateral and multilateral donors.

BTGC: Well, that's what killed me, you might say!

TGW: In what sense?

BTGC: Well, intensive work at the meetings with bilateral donors and participation in international organization's conferences. During that period, I had to attend many meetings. At one point, I became the deputy secretary of the conference at Buenos Aires, organized by UNDP on technical assistance cooperation among developing countries. Bradford Morse was the UNDP administrator, and I became deputy secretary for that particular purpose. I was released from my normal functions for a while, just as I was also released at another point to serve as a member on the Brundtland Commission on the environment, which took me to a number of countries, Brazil, in particular. And, as I mentioned earlier, as minister of finance, I became chairman of the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Governors of the Bank and the Fund, the Development Committee on Mobilization and Real Resources for Development. So, I was traveling a lot; twice a year, to the spring meeting and the autumn meeting of the Bank and the Fund, which I found extremely interesting and I always argued with my colleagues there that we ought to pay more attention to social aspects of development. "Yes," they would say, "but let's have the money first so we can tackle poverty realistically." I see that they have changed somewhat, that instead of ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility), they now have PRGS (Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy), the IMF replacing ESAF with Poverty

Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). In other words, the emphasis is now on poverty reduction, but it is understood that poverty reduction has to take place in a growing economy. So with that element of conditionality, we will still remain within a macro-economic framework, in terms of inflation, fiscal deficits and, of course, appropriate monetary policies, and so on. So, the object of growth still remains central, indeed primary, and determines the degree or the speed with which you can solve poverty problems meaningfully.

But what is new here now is that there must be what they call a "country strategy paper." In other words, the institutions like the Fund, the Bank, the bilaterals, and the NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) should now operate within a framework of a document which is prepared by the government itself, articulating the problems, objectives, and principles of policy, et cetera—central to poverty reduction and growth. But in preparing that document—and here is the rub—everybody must be involved, i.e., the private sector must be involved, and lead international donors must have a hand in it, and the civic groups. But the strategy paper must be owned by the government.

TGW: Wouldn't you say, indeed, that is an interesting development? That institutions like the Fund and the Bank have come to adopt such notions that fifteen years ago would have seemed fairly radical to them: enhanced structural adjustment, which includes poverty reduction, with growth; the idea that a country paper belongs more to the government than to the Bank or the Fund? These notions were central in the United Nations far earlier, but they seem to have migrated slowly to Washington.

BTGC: Yes, that is correct. In UNCTAD we talked about the need for governments to determine their own development strategies in this regard. But it is interesting that the Bretton Woods institutions have not only embraced this but are championing the cause and even going

beyond. Now, this may be welcome for some countries, but maybe not for others. The country's strategy paper must be the product of the various stakeholders in that country. The private sector must also be involved. In other words, poverty becomes a common element of attack. The strategy paper must be prepared and owned by the government, the country concerned, but the private sector and the donors, in particular, the international finance organizations, must be involved in the process. It is a work-frame and a reference point with objects clearly stated. Each preparation is going to be difficult, to say the least. But there might as a result emerge agreed and concerted action and investment for frontal attack on poverty.

We have started thinking about this here. I hope that when we reach an agreement, or when any country reaches an agreement, the issue will not arise that this is an IMF-imposed project, or that, for instance, we are cutting the budget deficit because the IMF or the World Bank requires that poverty approach. Rather, it should be that this is what we, as a country, have decided, in our strategy—that the budget deficit will be reduced as our own decision. But what is important is the recognition that poverty cannot just disappear through the trickle-down effect or as a byproduct of growth. It has to be purposely targeted and integrated in the process of growth. It should be an open investment area for even direct investment.

TGW: Before I forget, I am going to open a parenthesis here because it is a theme that has come up elsewhere in our interviews. You mentioned that you participated in the Brundtland Commission, and later in the Stockholm Initiative. In your view, both as a minister as well as a UN official earlier, how would you evaluate the impact of the ideas that come out of such a commission, whether it was sustainability in the case of Brundtland, or earlier, with the Pearson Commission, the Brandt Commission, the Aga Khan report on humanitarian issues, the Nyerere report on South-South issues, most recently the Ramphal-Carlson Commission on Global

Governance? What role do these special eminent persons commissions play in either generating or publicizing ideas?

BTGC: I think these commissions were not just academic exercises. They were intended to produce results which would be applicable to real situations and which would necessitate governments' policies and institutional arrangements. Certainly, this is the case with the one on the environment. The environment issue was never, and certainly is not now, just a question of preserving trees, preserving natural species, or balance of natural phenomena—it has become a matter of life and death. And countries became involved directly in preparing their own national environmental programs and participated in international conferences actively. So these conferences have generated an awareness of the real problems which we face, not just of academic ideas. They have underpinned the necessity for governments to take action.

And I myself, having participated in this work, realize even more now than when we were participating in the conferences, how crucial these issues were in enhancing our resources, not only just protecting but enhancing them. There are real costs to bear, by having to reforest when we should not have in the first place deforested; by preserving our species because they enhance our nature. And, as in the case of endangered animal species (cf. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species - CITES), here is an environmental and economic issue, as well as it is one of preserving species for scientific purposes or balance of nature. I believe that these conferences have served very useful purposes.

I also participated in the Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries. The follow-up has been more at regional levels, various countries working together. But also at the national and international levels—take here in Zimbabwe—we have a center which we call SIRDC (Scientific and Industrial Research Development Centre), which is

tackling all sorts of issues: food research and production, industrialization, and so on. I visited the center two weeks ago, and I was impressed by the interest which specialized agencies of the United Nations and bilateral bodies are showing and the role they are playing in that center. It is actually the second in the whole of Africa; there is one in South Africa. International organizations are already beginning to look at the results of what is being done at this center. All this is related to a number of conferences which have taken place, such as the Brundtland Commission and also international agreements like CITES.

The world has become one, in the sense of global governance, and the many issues of effective neighborhood as raised by the Commission on Global Governance. It is no longer just a theoretical, nice, moral issue about neighborhoods; it is a question of survival for countries to work together.

TGW: There is one other thought that struck me earlier, and I did not want to lose it here. You mentioned the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and, indeed, the collapse, virtually everywhere, of the socialist state-centric model of development. Were you surprised, as I think everyone else was, by the rapidity of the decline of the Soviet Union? What has the end of this model meant for development thinking here in Zimbabwe and for alternatives within the SADC region?

BTGC: Well, this is a whole subject in itself. You can, I suppose, begin somewhere with the movements in the USSR itself before it collapsed. When Gorbachev accepted or promoted *perestroika*, which, as I understand it, is restructuring, and *glasnost*, which is open discussion, it was acceptance of democracy and the operation of market forces. It became quite clear that you could not keep people behind the walls—the Berlin Wall collapsed just like a pack of cards when the time came. It also became clear, as a result of the build-up of armaments, we were moving as

it were in the direction of self-destruction. Hence, *perestroika* was absolutely essential, as was *glasnost*.

I think it was clear to us that, in the Third World, we could not just be watchers of this development and stand by. The world was rapidly become one, if you want. You can say that the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the forces that followed propelled a sense of globalization or were themselves the result of globalization. The concept of the sovereign state was at stake or in question. People wanted to reach one another. Countries needed one another in the process of development and to avoid the common disasters, which were looming, such as the possibility of nuclear warfare. And the new forces which were cutting across frontiers—fundamentalism, for instance, or even financial or capital movements knew no borders, whether it was religious fundamentalism or otherwise. In other words, no country was an island.

There is another dimension to this, which meant that the bipolarity of the world had gone. In other words, gone was the polarization of powers between East and West, led by the USSR on the one hand, and the U.S., on the other. Operation of market forces in general—not state control or organized or controlled markets—opened up a whole range of activities. Where did the Third World stand? At first we were afraid of being absorbed by one group or another and, hence, we crafted such institutions as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to be able to find our way or protect ourselves. Now, it is multi-polarization, or some say uni-polarization in the sense of a huge global force in which possibly one power has a leading role. That power, of course, may be the United States, but more likely the power of the big companies or the globalized market forces which have moved beyond national borders with hardly any effective control. I mean globalization in the form of transfer of resources, capital movement in particular, operation of stock exchanges, information technology and electronic transfer of funds—what is

at stake? We are beginning to think, in developing countries, that at a time when we are trying to strengthen our own economies, to evolve national economies, to cement our sovereignty, new forces are at work which require that the role of the state be changed to accommodate itself to the operation of forces which know no state boundaries. This means that the state must try to play at least a facilitative, understanding role, in which we come to know what the forces are which are operating, and how we accommodate ourselves to these forces of globalization. The impact on national laws or national institutions will be greater in developing countries because they are new, young institutions. But, as I said at the beginning, this is a very wide area and I have been interested in my own participation in meetings of the Commission on Global Governance, in search of rules or mores, customs or ways of behavior which would make nations work together, not by force or on the basis of national sovereignty, but because we are in a village.

What impact will this have on the United Nations? We could think that because of these forces which have been unleashed we need a world government. But is that realistic? Is it a possibility? Not in my view. It cannot be. Even if it were desirable, it would not be easy or practicable. The forces at work will defy even a world government. Or should it be just world governance—or evolution of mores, or rules of conduct—that we do certain things because they are good? The concept of national sovereignty remains very real, and yet it is being challenged left and right. And this, in my view, further emphasizes the need to strengthen the UN as a point of reference where we can all meet to exchange views and see whether we can moderate the negative forces or effects of such phenomena as globalization. And, I am interested—albeit in my superficial readings of the first of the planned Millenium Summit of the UN—I'm reading a contribution here by the Commission on Global Governance, which has a summary of the points that it is hoped will be discussed at the Millennium Summit—that globalization is going to be a

central issue, as will the question of technology; speed of information dissemination and action and the need for technology. I will study this very carefully.

TGW: Actually, just before coming here, I read the Secretary-General's basic document, the millennium report, *We the Peoples*. And it seems to me that you probably should take a close look at it. Many of the things that you have been describing within UNCTAD and within Zimbabwe—your own effort to find the appropriate mix of healthy state and orchestrated market forces and also civil society—all come together within the report. And the bottom line is trying to make sense of this and pulling those forces is, at least for me, what I would see as global governance.

BTGC: It also looks as if it will be the initiation of periodic global conferences. I think the session is in September, isn't it?

TGW: Yes, 6-8 September.

BTGC: I don't know how many heads of state will come. Thousands of people will come. I suppose New York will be able to accommodate all of them. I wonder whether this is the beginning of such sessions every five years, where the whole world can meet and say, "We are on this globe. The Martians are coming, what do we do to defeat them or to live together peacefully!"

TGW: It does seem to me that the notion of getting together at a summit at the heads of state level is indeed one of the likely outcomes of this with some periodicity. You mentioned, just a few moments ago, the notion of sovereignty and the fact that it is not as sacrosanct as it once was. I was interested, in reading your paper, "The Imperative of International Cooperation," from 1966, that there was one double exclamation point in the text. "International

cooperation is imperative because of the inherent economic and political limitations of nation-states, however sovereign!!" Do you still believe this?

BTGC: I still, in a way, believe in it. What is implied is that we have to redefine the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty we cannot do away with. We have not reached the stage of free movement of people without regulations, for reasons which may not do with security or protection of jobs. There are other challenges—disease control, for instance. Even security still is necessary. But I think that the concept of sovereignty of a state as an autonomous unit, self-sufficient, interacting with other autonomous, self-sufficient units, is becoming an obstacle. We have got to find some other ways of doing things. Already we are making attempts at greater regional cooperation, in which we surrender certain aspects of sovereignty and retain others, and evolve a new regional sovereignty, so to speak, in a dynamic process. I do not imagine God was sitting on high, saying, "You are sovereign. You have inherited that territory. I have determined that you shall stay there." Human beings are endowed with two very important capacities: 1. cognitive, thinking capacity to recognize problems, to recognize good and bad; and 2. the will to use that capacity; one is free to do or not do. But we may now be facing a situation where we may not be free; where we are fenced in by monsters which we have created—I use the word "monsters" guardedly. I have read somewhere that it is possible to imagine that one day there will be a man-made, sophisticated computer which will not only think faster than men but can fight men!

TGW: I was struck yesterday, at lunch, by your young friend, Mazhou, from the Foreign Ministry—the one moment when he sat up and really paid attention was when Professor Kahari mentioned that, in his view, sovereignty was irrelevant. It seems to me that foreign ministries are very protective of this notion. Indeed, Brian Urquhart, in his interview, mentioned that the

United Nations was the last bastion of sovereignty, somewhat ironically. But it does seem to me that your earlier writing on this, that the doctrine of sovereignty is antiquated and, in any case, wholly anachronistic in the demands of the African situation. It strikes me as if we are moving in fits and starts toward something like that.

Those who are familiar with nation-states and see them as the main organizing principle are going to hold on for as long as possible, but, as you mentioned earlier, substantial inroads have been made in this area. I think one should distinguish between that and what you said earlier: the role for a healthy state. It seems to me that one of the excesses of the 1980s and 1990s was this notion that anything the state could do, someone else—the market or NGOs—could do better. I believe that we are moving back toward some more central ground. Is that correct? For example, the subtitle of the 1997 World Bank report actually suggests that the state is back in the center, and one should not forget it.

BTGC: I think we have to be selective. There are certain functions, or certain activities, which cannot be performed globally, uniformly, to the benefit of most people or mankind. I think they need to be organized in functional units where you can reach the people. And that functional unit may be the state, today, which organizes itself. It can run schools. It can make laws for security. I do not think you can throw away this; it would be reckless. We have not yet evolved that idyllic world where we can, as it were, move willy-nilly without devouring each other, as it were, or destroying what we have created. So I think there are functions which the state has to perform and continue to perform. The real need is to define the state. What is the state? Is it just a legal and geographic entity or just a group of elected or self-appointed people, buttressed by a law, which they themselves have made? Or can we continue to espouse universal laws within which states will operate and observe rules and regulations. Just as the role of the

state is evolving from that of a policeman or a regulator of market forces or a collector of taxes or controller of expenditures and—in some cases—engine of growth or controller of production units, the role of the state is becoming more and more that of a facilitator of market forces and activities guarantor or regulator of rights.

But what are market forces? That is the question. Are market forces the power to command productive resources and the power to command the distribution of goods and services, determine price margins and profits? There are a host of things which are partly economic, partly political, partly moral or legal. I think for a long time to come, in spite of what I have suggested to the contrary, we will have the state, and we will have some need of sovereignty. But this has to be coordinated, harmonized. We have to evolve rules or mores which we observe. Just as we talked about business ethics, we already have or should embrace ethics among sovereign states—that there are some things that we just do not do because they harm you or the others. Or they are just not good. But how to define good? An ideal thing you want to do? What people want done? What is expected of you, regardless? I was more revolutionary when I did that piece of work than I am now. I am now more on *terra firma*.

What we have to do is to involve the ordinary people more and more in the decision-making process, in decisions that affect their daily lives. We cannot go back to the Greek city-state where you called everybody to gather and you had a type of democracy where you discussed directly and you agreed. That was possible when you had a small village. It is not possible when you have a country like Zimbabwe. But with effective means of communications, precise knowledge, effective contact and speedy information, we should be able to understand each other more, or the world should be able to understand and act harmoniously, the world defined as the totality of the people. Professor Kahari was saying yesterday, "Let's perfect

native languages, local, regional languages." Will this make for greater cooperation or greater differentiation? We would have to make sure that words in some dialects mean the same in the other dialects.

TGW: For those of us who have watched states argue about interpretations of documents and international gatherings, I am not sure that Professor Kahari is not getting us into a real bind. Actually, I was struck in going through some of your writings by the importance of a subject you have touched upon this morning, mainly science and technology. In fact, in the 1966 piece, you wrote: "The age of science and technology is also, or should be, an age of boundless opportunity and limitless possibility of progress through dynamic cooperation, cutting across the artificial frontiers of ideologies and, often, the equally artificial geographical boundaries of nation-states." Have today's technologies benefited Africa in the way that you imagined them, or could they have contributed more? I am thinking here, in particular, of the communications revolution and what this means for the SADC region.

BTGC: Science and technology—I think they do benefit us. And we need more of that. I referred earlier to this country's scientific institute—it's not very far from here, actually, and very impressive—SIRDC, which underpins the importance Zimbabwe attaches to science and technology. Yes, we have suffered from diseases which science and technology can eliminate. We suffer from hunger, and science and technology can produce new types of food or help us distribute food more efficiently and by more efficient transport means or by dissemination of knowledge, generally. We can know our environment better through dissemination of information and exchange of ideas, of new inventions and so on.

In the process, however, we are also creating other problems. And this is, perhaps in my own frame of mind. But every positive step of progress creates almost an equal or relative

amount of opposition which is contrary to the forward movement which tends to negate it, or, better still, to spur us to greater efforts or deeds. So, we control population, right? And we produce pills, condoms, or whatever it is. In a society which is knowledgeable, which is educated, that seems to work. But in a society where religion, or ignorance, prevails, the device is not used or it is misused.

I follow the developments in medical science. Malaria we have controlled. But new types of harmful animals or pests breed as a result of the inventions or of environmental change. Nature seems to defy permanent solution. It is not just because I am dialectical in my thinking—not Marxian nor even Hegelian, but just natural—I do not see permanent perfection as attainable. Each stage of perfection creates new challenges. It is in the nature of man. If we have perfection, in a situation where there are no challenges, that is the end of life. We would be in heaven. But that does not mean we should not attempt to perfect things, but by the very process of perfection we bring other factors that are not real or challenging. You almost arrive, like Aristotle, at a concept of God by the process of rationalization, by the process of thinking. Like the young girl in Canada, Suzette, who used to ask me when I was in Mattawa, "Why are you black?" And I said, "I don't know." She then said, "Why don't you know?" Then I responded, "God made me black." So, she asked, "Who is God?" Why, why, why, until you simply said, "That's why"—nodded your head and acknowledge defeat.

TGW: Yesterday we touched upon sanctions against Rhodesia and you mentioned, quite quickly, that they were ineffective or leaky. Sanctions have, of course, in the 1990s become a popular tool in the United Nations. Did these sanctions play any role in Rhodesia becoming Zimbabwe or, if we move next door, were sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, in your view, an important contributing factor to the eventual liberation of South Africa?

BTGC: Put it this way. Sanctions are a blunt instrument which hurts even those who are not responsible. They work, but they hurt the innocent as well. If you take the case of Rhodesia, sanctions in some respect propelled Rhodesia to go forward with industrialization. You could not easily import things; you had to produce them because you had no foreign currency or had to conserve it. You could not export much, if at all, because you had no markets to send to. So, you tended to become self-reliant or autonomous. In fact, and ironically, industrialization grew significantly in Rhodesia because of protective walls against imports and targeted allocation of foreign currency and managed value of the Rhodesian dollar. You could only import things which were essential. And you could export only through breaking sanctions, and it was not easy to do so either.

Sanctions stimulated the imagination of people to produce for themselves, to break sanctions, to survive. But I fear sanctions also produced a class of industrialists who were afraid of competition. When we opened up the country they were afraid of foreigners. They were not only afraid of them, but they could not compete with them because competition was not the culture under which they had grown. They competed only amongst themselves. I fear that when an American investor came and had a product to produce, they were a little askance about it. So, sanctions are a very expensive process of disciplining a nation in the sense that it retards growth in some areas, but it also sharpens growth where you had a competitive edge, as was the case in Rhodesia. You had minerals and there was agriculture, and you had some skills and skilled personnel. So you could grow behind sanction walls.

Sanctions denied people essentials which were not available locally, such as medicines, or distorted the expansion of skills otherwise required for the benefit of the world. You train people and you keep them behind the same walls. You are denying the world a great deal of

benefit which these people can give. Hence, when sanctions were broken up, many people left, not just because they were afraid of nationalism. They were looking for better chances. And they are contributing a lot to the outside world.

Sanctions did wrong things in catering more for the ruling minority than for the majority, those outside the pale of the economy. Better education for the ruling community, better medical services for the ruling group, jobs were plentiful for the ruling group. And those outside the pale of the formal economy suffered unnecessarily. But when you removed sanctions and tried to spread quickly the benefits to everybody, and people took jobs for which they were not fully qualified, inefficiency sets in and, with it, the risk of decline and corruption, calling for more rapid education and training as well as adjustment.

TGW: The argument is a very complicated one. But, at a macro-political level, was the statement that Zimbabwean independence, or black majority rule in South Africa, whatever the economic discontinuities, was this an important message to get to the globe? And, in your view, did it actually contribute to accelerating the appearance of Zimbabwe and a black South Africa on the international scene?

BTGC: In a real sense, yes. Because it accentuated the opposition. If there had been no sanctions and the process was more of a normal one, it might have taken longer to attain freedom. Accommodation would have taken longer. In South Africa, it was not sanctions but the oppressive regime which begot opposition from inside. So, both systems hastened the process of independence, of majority rule. Why did it take 300 years, from Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 to 1948—that is to the elections which threw out Jan Smuts—in South Africa? There were opposing organizations, but people were more accommodating. There was discrimination, but interracial accommodation was growing more or less naturally. But then came the 1948

elections and apartheid. Jan Smuts, who was a liberal Afrikaner and had led South Africa, was out. White opposition leaders took over and people were herded together like cattle. That leads to the national liberation struggle and so on, as an internal force. Of course, there were sanctions of a kind on South Africa, but I don't think that was the major force for liberation. It was the system, the oppressive system, which made for the liberation movement and, of course, the example of national liberation generally.

In Rhodesia it was the combination of the two forces. A rebellious, oppressive internal regime, which triggered opposition and liberation war, and sanctions from outside.

TGW: Yesterday, we touched upon regional cooperation and your own views on it, which grew from your experience in Kenya. How do you look at the last twenty years of the experiment with regional cooperation, South-South cooperation with the Southern African region, the SADC region?

BTGC: It has been a complicated process because of various factors, such as the different political status of the participants. Originally, cooperation in Southern Africa, such as Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was a political tool to force liberation on South Africa and Rhodesia and so on. It was cooperative on the margins, teaching people how to use international technical assistance and other forms of aid in order to be united. You were not addressing the fundamental issues of investment, of coordinating productive activities, of joining to face the outside world together as an economic unit. It has grown, gradually, into what is now SADC, with one C, that is Southern African Development Community. But, at the beginning, to repeat, it was more an instrument of technical cooperation and for bringing in assistance from outside. Although the natives—and I don't mean black or white, I mean the people of the region themselves—although involved in this—this was more an

outside initiative to influence events and promote EEC interests and yet at the same time to bring the people together.

Now, however, the countries of Southern Africa have become more conscious. They face the same problems squarely as independent countries. They face the problems of blocked or land-locked small economies. They can't sell their products as freely as they want. They face the problems of foreign investment, which is not readily or equitably coming into the member countries. They face the common problems of security—whether from lack of adequate growth, or unemployment, or political threat from abroad.

In addition, in order to stimulate growth and exchange of products among the countries, to facilitate movement of capital resources as well as human, the necessary policy and legal instruments are being in place. So also administrative institutions. Thus, SADC has become a different animal altogether, which is not an outside arrangement but an internal arrangement in which the governments and the private sector are actively involved. So it is the governments, businesses and labor donors of course—the stakeholders who are involved, more and more.

The size of markets, for instance, is important. The larger the market, the better and therefore, the fewer geographical or legal limitations, the greater the movement of productive resources, whether financial or human, and the exchange of products thereof.

There are new challenges coming from outside, like globalization. Can a single country like Zimbabwe alone face globalization? I will give you a typical example where we are trying to cooperate now in a number of countries in SADC—on the operation on the stock exchange. We have a stock exchange in Zimbabwe; Botswana has, and South Africa has the largest and oldest. If we have rules which regulate the movement of resources, facilitate the movement of financial resources or capital within the region, this would be to the benefit of the region, and

limit or stem the flight of capital. One member country may be favored more by investors, but if the doors are more or less the same in the region and the resources move, say from Zimbabwe to Botswana, they will come back to Zimbabwe one way or another. I am talking somewhat in theory, but fact should support this, having to do with the operations of the stock exchange or movement of other resources in a viable economic community.

Earlier, somewhere in this interview, I said that we unblocked investment dividends which were blocked by Ian Smith here. They went away. If we had SADC, perhaps we could have let a little bit go there, a little bit in the community. We could have "managed" liberalization within a large community. I think South Africa is somewhat restrictive in the remittance of dividends. They remit dividends but they don't drain the source. Because those dividends, if they are productive, they grow or increase and the original investors get more, while cooperating countries benefit. It is a question of confidence in the future of a country and the community of countries in which that country is a member. Not only confidence, but also of where one's resources, one's funds, get higher returns. That is normal. So regional cooperation has become, now in Southern Africa, a deliberate response to recognized problems, not just something which was dreamed of in ECA, or in Brussels.

TGW: So you remain sanguine about the future of SADC over the next ten to twenty years?

BTGC: Yes, I am. We have to change; we have to improve it. And South Africa is becoming more active, but we don't want SADC to be simply a market for goods produced in South Africa. We have to see now that South African investment comes here or moves in the region. But for South African investment to come here, there must be an environment which is attractive. This becomes a disciplining instrument for the countries concerned. I also believe

that the new, more numerous, COMESA will be an important free trade area and effective instrument for growth and development.

TGW: Well, perhaps this is a good moment to pause for our lunch. Thank you.

TGW: This is the beginning of the fifth tape, the afternoon at the Chidzero residence. Hopefully, after our copious lunch, we will be able to make sense this afternoon. I actually thought I might start with a contemporary event, coming from South Africa: the debate about land reform here. I was going back to your doctoral dissertation and, toward the end, on page 253, you argue, "the question of land is of particular importance in any multiracial territory in Africa." This certainly could have been written today or yesterday. What is your own assessment about what has gone right and what has gone wrong about land reform in Zimbabwe, and what remains to be done?

BTGC: In relation to land?

TGW: Yes, in relation to land and in general, since this was an idea that you obviously felt strongly about forty years ago.

BTGC: Yes. I think, basically, it is the inequitable distribution of land preceded by compulsory acquisition of that land. In other words, had that land been taken over by government with the agreement of the people who were moved from that land, and they were compensated for or paid for it, the result might be inequitable in terms of the amount of land possessed by the minority and that possessed by the majority, but the process would have been done with agreement. Therefore, there would be some justification. You could say, "We negotiated."

But this was not so. The land was taken away compulsorily in terms of Land Apportionment Act 1931 and ancillary measures; later even more drastically implemented by the

1951 Native Land Husbandry Act. All these legal provisions, the cornerstone of minority power in Southern Rhodesia left more than 70 percent of the arable, fertile lands in the hands of the minority. The rest was in the semi-arable, even arid rocky areas. People were forcibly moved away from their areas. I think that is the initial and basic injustice.

All goes, of course, back to 1890, when Rhodes acquired the land through the British South African Chartered Company, which was the instrument Cecil Rhodes used to colonize. Zimbabwe was not colonized by the British government, as such. It was by a company. And it was only in 1923 that the Rhodesians, or the white community, decided whether they wanted to be a colony like all other colonies, ruled from the Colonial Office in London, or to be on their own, ruled in other ways. And they chose responsible government, normally not answerable or subject to British Colonial Office approval or control, except in certain areas as African customary law and, of course, external relations. But even in this regard, they immediately fell under the Commonwealth Office, which was different from the Colonial Office.

Now, having had inequitable distribution of land, there followed inequitable provision of services, by which I mean access to financial resources and marketing arrangements, for instance. There was no land ownership by the majority of the blacks. They could not raise loans with banks. They had no collateral and therefore no way the banks could be assured of repayment. And the services were also discriminatory, such as access to fertilizers, insecticides, marketing arrangements. These were separately, racially, provided. In consequence, you had not only geographical separation of land, inequitably distributed, unjustly acquired or unilaterally acquired, but you had also the discriminatory provision of production and marketing services. It is true that the then-government, before the Federation, and even after, there were some services provided to African agriculture, such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and, earlier, there

were what we called demonstrators—people who went into the country to tell farmers what to grow, how to grow it, and when to begin cropping it. But there was still the unjust fact of two agricultural systems, two land systems.

It is this which forced many black people to eke out a precarious existence on inadequate land and poor land, and on whom taxation was imposed—the so-called poll tax or head tax—or to force the natives to go to work on the farms owned by the white community. Even that labor was, of course, not adequate. Additional labor had to be imported from Malawi and from Zambia, as well as Mozambique, the more so as the local people preferred to till their poor lands in the native or communal areas rather than work on white-owned land and mines and live in compounds.

They built these compounds which you still see on farms. It's like medieval days. There is a manor, a house of the master, and an area for workers, for squatters who live very poor lives. There were no sanitation or health facilities, and hardly any schools whatsoever. I went through this myself, so I speak from experience.

When, therefore, the bug for independence or emancipation from colonial rule began to bite deep, land was foremost, to get back the land. It was not only a question of being our own masters politically, to run the country; but it was also land reform. And the war was fought bitterly on the basis of land. Before independence, this issue was so strongly debated that it nearly broke the negotiations; the Lancaster House negotiations nearly collapsed on the question of land. It was then that the Americans and the British came with promise to provide funds to assist in land redistribution and development. I don't recall offhand the exact formula they used or whether it was a legal document. But it was on that understanding that the nationalists agreed to the Lancaster House Constitution.

The new government did some resettlement of people on land acquired from the government itself and from the white community. But the land was used to resettle refugees, people who had been forced out of Rhodesia and gone to the neighboring territories. They had run away from conscription or the war itself. Those were given priority for resettlement. And money was found partly from the British as well as from others. But the measures that were introduced did not go to the fundamental question of changing the laws, or reacquiring the land, and adopting the principles which would guide that process. There was a ten-year moratorium provision in the Lancaster House Constitution. Generally speaking, there was the overriding principle of "willing seller, willing buyer." Therefore, pay market price for the land. That for a developing and poor would-be landowner. Later, a different principle was driven by the new independent government: pay for development made on the land and not for land as such, and certainly not for undeveloped land.

But, when the war ended, and during the first years of independence, the issues were not adequately addressed either. There were other immediate priorities. Security was one of them. Uniting the three armies—the two national liberation armies and the Rhodesian army—was another one of them. The need for security from the destabilization measures of South Africa was immense. In consequence, a very high percentage of the budget, to begin with, went to defense. This was followed by education, i.e., priority in the development of human resources, and health, of course, these latter two services taking about 40 percent of the national budget.

Indeed, it was in the light of this that we organized the historical conference that we called "Zimcord" (the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development). You will recall that I have already referred to the findings and recommendations of the study in which I participated as chairman of the Policy Committee, the report which you have seen, *Economic*

and Social Survey of Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order. Although in the survey there was not a strictly-defined new order, envisaged was a radically changed system in which the majority would be involved. There would be a new approach to economic development in which there would be considerable restructuring and reorganization to bring into the pail of the economy those so far kept at the periphery of it.

So the land issue has remained central—before independence, after independence, and now even more central. Everybody is in it—the ruling party and the opposition. Arguments vary as do motivations of different stakeholders. Such is the dialectic of development, I might add!

TGW: This is, perhaps, an interesting counterfactual. Given your work on Tanganyika and the favorable impression you had of trusteeship, would it have been possible, let's say, to have a short trusteeship in Zimbabwe in 1980? Could the land reform have occurred more quickly? The reason I ask this is, of course, that trusteeship now—although it is no longer called that—is back front and center, with the UN activities in both Kosovo and East Timor for a transition period, turning over various administrative functions to the United Nations as a way of moving ahead more quickly. This is very much in retrospect, but do you think this might have been an option in Rhodesia?

BTGC: Yes, in general. But in truth I would say no. Because the land had been acquired in about 1890 by the British South Africa Company, it was company property. When the question was put in 1923 whether Rhodesia should become a colony, if the white settlers had opted to become a colony the normal British colonial policies would have applied. This suggests to me that Southern Rhodesia would have become a colony and the settlers, I suppose, would not have been able to pass the Land Acquisition Acts and the Land Husbandry Act, which really

enforced the alienation and inequitable distribution of land because the Colonial Office would have come in and might have exercised some moderating influence. But the decision was made in 1923 to be a self-governing country, and this question became very difficult.

Then I would like to suggest that the land question could have been settled within the framework of Rhodesia and Nyasaland where, again, British rule was reintroduced at the federation level. Now, whether the governor-general would have influenced the units in the Federation—Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland—is a moot point. But, I suggest, when UDI took place in 1965, if the Labour Government in the UK had intervened and re-imposed British authority, we might have seen a different evolution in what remained as Rhodesia. But, as it is, the British did not intervene. So UDI was declared, sanctions were imposed, the country grew on its own as it were, and we have a different history altogether.

TGW: So, trusteeship was not an option. Let's say UN administration from 1980 to 1981—was this just politically impossible at that point? Because now, in 1999 or 2000, in countries admitted substantially more destroyed than this one was by war, but nonetheless in war torn societies, the United Nations, in conjunction with donors, has sort of taken over for a short period of time in order to create breathing space. And I presume it could have undertaken land reform.

BTGC: In what I have been saying in the last few moments, I have abstracted the subject from the framework within which these discussions should have taken place, which is an intellectual history of the United Nations. Now, the question you pose is interesting. Could the United Nations have intervened and interposed between the settlers and the blacks, and could British support have carried out a trusteeship regime to enable the two sides to come together peacefully? I suppose that would have been possible if the British had taken a strong stand and

quashed UDI or nipped it in the bud or if the UN had said, "We do not support what has happened in Rhodesia. It is illegal and it violates human rights. And we are sending UN troops to regulate the situation." But British prime minister Wilson, as I recall, refused to intervene. So the British, who had the primary responsibility, considering the history of the country, refused to intervene. The size and composition of the white opposition combined with British interests, and the British refused to intervene. How could the UN have intervened? I am quite sure the U.S. would not have supported such an intervention. You might have had a truncated UN force come in. Even if one thought that this was an opportunity to intervene militarily and with an international force, the boys, the nationalists, were not playing here. They were prepared to fight to the end. In other words, I don't know what the reaction of the nationalists would have been, whether they would have accepted trusteeship or whether they were so sure that they would win anyhow and would have regarded trusteeship as being only a delaying tactic or even a betrayal.

TGW: I am going to shift gears here a little bit. I would like to ask you when you first became aware of issues concerning women in development. I ask this because some of my female researchers have asked me to ask participants this. Clearly today it is impossible to conceive of development without the notion of gender. And the Stockholm Initiative memorandum that you helped author in 1990 called for strengthening the role and rights of women as essential to any people-oriented strategy. And there was a conference in 1975 on women. I am just wondering when it became obvious to you that the role of women would have to be more centrally conceptualized as part of the development perspective.

BTGC: Centrally conceptualized? I think it is difficult for me to say when. But, a little bit of background. From early childhood I would have been aware of the economic role of women in African society. They are the people who plowed the fields. They are the people who

maintained the homes while men were hunting or discussing issues at the *dare*, which is the forum where the men meet and discuss family, tribal, as well as state matters. Women have always been a power, certainly in the Shona society. They have also been a power in the sense that in a normal Shona society, no man took a decision without consulting or telling a *mai* or *amai*, which means mother, "This is what I want to do. What do you think?" Her views were always sought, even if they were perhaps not always followed. They mattered in traditional society and behavior.

So I have been aware of this. In my own background it was there, although ours was a mixed family in the sense that my father originally came from Malawi and my mother was Shona from a fairly chiefly family in Manyikaland. My father would also say, "*Mai*, what shall we do?" Perhaps this was too general and the practice was not taken to the position where the women would sit at *dare* or council, where the decisions were formally taken. In other words, the women were consulted, but the decisions were taken by men. Now, those learned in African anthropology and sociology might differ. I am only stating what I saw and what I experienced.

Well, when did it first become obvious to me that the role of women would need to be recognized centrally as part of the development perspective? I think partly at the university, because—not in Ottawa but in Montreal where I was doing post-graduate study—boys and girls were equals; we argued like anything in debates (we used to have interuniversity debates between McGill University and St. Lawrence University NY). Perhaps I can go back earlier, to South Africa, when in the National Union of South Africa Students boys and girls mixed freely to speak. As I think I told you earlier, the president of NUSAS was a man, Philip Tobias, and his deputy was a woman, Patricia Arnette. She eventually succeeded him as president. We accepted

her fully. She ran matters as president. In other words, I was exposed to accepting the concept of leadership by women and to see them as equal in decision-making.

Then, when I was at Nuffield College, Oxford, the same thing. Take the leadership of Lady Perham. But I think the turning point for me was when I was in UNCTAD. When did the Brundtland Commission take place?

TGW: The report was published in 1987.

BTGC: It was then, when I participated in the Brundtland Commission. Harlem Brundtland really ran that commission most competently. She was prime minister of Norway already, of course. It was clear that women were as competent, if not more competent.

As to the recognition of women by law, or of the central important of the gender issue, I think these were matters not uppermost in my mind when I was minister of government—namely, that we needed to enact laws or establish special employment quotas for women. Although even in my time we had women in high positions, such as the woman I was talking to you about, Diana Gut, who became our executive director in Washington at the World Bank and IMF. She was in my ministry as a deputy-secretary and, at one point, she was acting secretary. We treated her equally. There were other highly placed women in government and elsewhere, even as ministers. Mrs. Chitepo and Fly Chung for instance

TGW: I guess I am also trying to figure out the dynamics. How this issue, which was clearly embedded in your own background and your own experience, then emerges as an important norm for the international community, and why that resulted. Was it one of conviction? Was it one of lobbying strength of women? Was it because it made good economic sense? Why did this occur?

BTGC: I think it was a combination of factors. The recognition of the struggle which the women themselves had put up from the suffragette movement on. The actual role they were playing in government in my own country also reflected the role they played in the war. The women fought side by side with the men in the liberation movement. And we have a couple of ministers in the government now who were in the war. In other words, recognizing that women had actually promoted the liberation and therefore contributed and were contributing to progress.

The role of women was also central in the study of human rights. Can we distinguish between human rights for men and human rights for women? Or are human rights just human rights? To me, that is a very forceful argument—that human rights have to be for everybody.

But equality for men and women does not mean that one does or should do exactly what the other does in practice because there are certain obvious differences. So, I think it was more a process of convergence of different experiences and, of course, a matter of legal equality. Again, background and experiences predisposed me to accept women as equals. I accepted my sisters. I accepted the role which my mother played in raising money for me and sending me to school. My first bicycle was bought by my mother! All these factors built together. I always treated women as equal.

TGW: This has been very interesting indeed. I would like now just to migrate a little bit forward to the discussion we began this morning. When I was in your study earlier, we saw your gavel and plaque from UNCTAD VII in 1987 in Geneva, and you mentioned that this was a meeting conducted by consensus.

BTGC: Well, not quite. It was controversial in the first place. There was confrontation; there has been confrontation. But the futility of adversarial relationships became very apparent in Geneva. That we needed to compromise, to reach agreement and to avoid voting. Voting

after that meant those who had won often had to live with their vote unimplemented if they did not have the effective means, which the defeated minority had. Those who voted against would not be compelled to provide resources to implement the decision. Whereas, if we could reach consensus, we would have a sense of obligation as a group to move forward. And, I think, it was also the realization at UNCTAD in discussing the Integrated Programme for Commodities and the issue of the Common Fund, that we were talking about issues that were beneficial to both the exporters and the importers. The exporters were interested in real and regular remuneration; the importers were interested in reliable supplies and good quality and not fluctuation in supplies and so on. So, stabilization became a matter of common interest.

I think in Geneva in 1987, we had experienced political awareness which contributed to the issue of compromise and, where possible, unanimous decisions. Take the example of my own country. On the morrow of independence, the prime minister announced the policy of national reconciliation and working together. It was a political decision. The message was that people with opposed interests or history can gain more by working together. And, at the back of my mind, as president of the UNCTAD VII in Geneva, I had this in mind—working together. We lose nothing from working together. We need to reconcile our differences. But, to be more correct, it was also due to the shrewd and able negotiating skills of the Group of 77. They were not just demanding. They were not only preaching. They had skillful negotiators, and the negotiators on the side of the developed countries responded realistically.

TGW: But they learned some lessons from the past. A couple of persons interviewed for this project—Johan Kaufmann, who has just died recently—argued that the confrontation, or the adversarial, to use your terms, methods of the mid-1970s had, in fact, alienated many friends and

that it was better to look for common ground rather than a confrontational method. Did this seem to be a general lesson, do you think?

BTGC: I think so. And in my view, it is contained even in political terms in the policy of reconciliation. It means we have so many things in common, whatever our differences. Let's maximize the common grounds, benefit from the commonalities. The differences will be resolved in time. We would not go anywhere; we would only continue the struggle if we were confrontational. Someone must win in the end or must it be a "win-win" situation. But, when you are looking for progress, why don't you maximize the benefits deriving from common ground? Well, I suppose it is not a good parallel I am going to cite—if we move two steps forward, but we are thrown one step backward, at least we would have gained one step forward!

In other words, the concept and process of negotiation became more mature in the Group of 77. After all, for some of us we had been students of Latin, where the word *negotiare* means, in the real sense, to overcome difficulties or go through tortuous terrain. At one point you go down, the next time you go up, the next time you go sideways. But you are moving forward each time; you are trying to avoid permanent obstacles. And if you can agree on five things out of ten, why not? Negotiation was no longer adversarial; we had not gained much from adversarial stances. So, in a sense, what you have cited is correct. But I think it was a much more pragmatic development. Constant failure or stalemate in UNCTAD was beginning to worry the Group of 77 that this organization would not go anywhere. And, if UNCTAD were to disappear, what would replace it? Would the Group of 77 carry the same adversarial arguments and stances in GATT? They were already growing individually in GATT or as small groups, but they were not as well organized as in UNCTAD.

I think the consensus was also due to skillful discussion with different groups. I would meet with the Group of 77, and we would discuss where we are going, what we want to achieve. There would be arguments and the president of the conference would make suggestions. I would meet with the others and they would say, "What are we getting? A big conference like that, all that taxpayers money! Are we not more credible to the world by reaching agreement and justifying expenditures in government?" Common sense, you know.

TGW: Did you use this same approach personally when you were minister of finance in dealing with the IMF and the World Bank? You knew them up close as a participant in discussions in and out of the UN system. But when you became minister of finance, presumably you had a different profile. The IMF structural adjustment programs were then much more controversial, certainly in this country. How did you balance political pressures at home and legitimate demands from the Bretton Woods institutions?

BTGC: That was more difficult. But we were not pushed, as some people think, by the IMF to change direction and accept market forces. We began slowly to accept market forces. We realized ourselves that the institutions that we had built and the very credible achievements we had made in education and in health were no longer sustainable financially, unless the economy grew and we derived more public revenue to reduce the fiscal deficits and limit crippling borrowing to finance deficits. And how would the economy grow? The state itself had limited resources to invest directly to produce wealth or to sustain the existing institutions. The national budget deficit was high as we spent more and borrowed by financing the deficit. We needed to involve the private sector more actively. How would we involve the private sector? By inducing them to invest. How do you induce them to invest? By building some sense of confidence and future security by the presence of someone they can believe in. They were

capitalist in orientation, after all. Some would say, if the IMF is here, the world would have faith and confidence in the country and there would be investment inflows and concessional resources. Well, it is a fact even now that the IMF is a key to investors, or is it their handmaid? But this is not to say that the Bretton Woods institutions themselves played a passive role in our case!

The question was put to me only six weeks ago: "You are asking us to come and invest. Why don't you want to work with the IMF?" Even NGOs are beginning to keep their money away or to avoid passing through government hands or channels. "You people have something up your sleeves. That's why you don't want to work with the IMF," the timid or untrusting would say.

Yet, we knew very well, on the other hand, that it is not easy dealing with the IMF. The IMF program will involve major pains, not only in the reduction of budget allocations for social services like education, but also in not crowding the private sector by increased borrowing from it or overtaxing it. We debated these issues. We knew that with IMF programs, prices would go up because we would have stopped subsidizing or controlling the prices. The market forces would have to operate more efficiently by reducing costs or by increasing prices or by reducing the number of workers. Therefore, there would be redundancies and retrenchments of works. Fixed wages or minimum wages would go. All of these were very difficult issues, so we asked for some compensatory arrangements, which we called the Social Adjustment Fund—I can't remember the exact name right now. We put up a fund which was to help those who got retrenched, who could not meet increased costs—school fees, transport fares, et cetera. The Fund would support their families or pay school fees, also by setting machinery to find jobs for those who became entrenched. In other words, we did not want market forces to have a free

reign without having some measure of counteracting the effects or compensating, especially in an economy of such wide disparities as ours.

Put differently, we tried to get to the bottom of the problem. We tried to reach consensus and convince people; we had to show the bad sides and the good sides and try to see, on balance, what was better. We arrived at an agreement, which was the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme or ESAP. We believed investment would be forthcoming, but then drought descended upon us, our export commodity earnings fell, our costs continued to increase and there were disturbances in other parts of the country which did not encourage investment to come. The IMF program did not work as had been anticipated.

Again, I must emphasize that development is a process of constant adjustment and of recognizing the obstacles that must be removed, the clear areas which must be held and sustained. In a sense, the experience I had at UNCTAD stood me in good stead here because we had already been very critical in UNCTAD about the IMF, as you know. They appeared anti-development in the basic sense of that word. Change the structures and institutions of colonial yesterday. They wanted only to stabilize and promote the interests of the strong countries, and we had managed to have the IMF and World Bank introduce the concept of transfer of real resources to developing countries. This job was given to the development committee. But things were difficult. We had to bite the bullet; how to reform and at the same time make things bearable by the ordinary people. We cut down on subsidies or removed subsidies. We knew that this would be very difficult for the consumers. There, we failed to introduce real measures which would have helped. Such measures as stimulating production, so that by supplying the market as fully as possible there would be no shortages; there would even be over-supply and the

prices would find their level. We failed to achieve that. Reform benefited the few; the many suffered even more in the circumstances prevailing.

In other words, the debate that took place in UNCTAD, which was among countries, to change the international system in order to facilitate freer, more equitable growth of the smaller, poorer countries, obtained help as well in our case here. We had to change the laws and the regulations to bring in other forces which would expand production and increase employment. But, as in international organizations, good intentions and plans are difficult to implement because the issues easily become political and old stakeholders have deep, rooted interests. Or exogenous forces come in, such as drought. And there was an economic recession in the world anyhow. There were other areas which attracted investment because changes welcome to the capitalist world were taking place—in Eastern Europe, for instance—and investors were looking in that direction already. Certainly, by 1990, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there were new areas of investment opening up and there was keen competition for resources.

TGW: This next question may seem as if I am coming from a position that Americans who play baseball would call "left field." It is not exactly linked to the previous one. I would like to explore a little how serious your candidacy for Secretary-General was in 1991. I was reading Boutros-Ghali's autobiography, and he writes that he teased you and said: "If you want the approval of France, you must not only speak French but also speak English with a French accent." What exactly were the politics of that moment—in 1990 and 1991—in running for secretary-general?

BTGC: Well, it was a difficult period. I had done more than ten years in government. I had succeeded in bringing forth good results at UNCTAD VII. I had been very active in international forums, conferences on environment, technical cooperation, et cetera. People knew

me. There was a desire among many African countries that the next Secretary-General should be African, and I seemed to be a good candidate. I had reached a very high level of international and, some said, of diplomatic services in UNCTAD as deputy-secretary-general though at assistant-secretary-general level. It was only a jump for me professionally to under-secretary-general level at the UN itself. The next thing would have been a political appointment—secretary-general. I had done work which promoted multiracialism in my country, which accepted tolerance and accommodation. Earlier, I had worked on the subject of economic and social consequences of racial discrimination and had worked on socioeconomic development and regional cooperation, as well as chaired the Joint Committee of Governors of the Bretton Woods institutions. Not really a nationalist in the narrow sense, I was a recognized international functionary. It was felt that I would make a good secretary-general. I spoke French, though I have since forgotten most of it for lack of practice.

On the other hand, I was Anglo-Saxon in a sense, and France was head of the francophone world at a time when some feared and must have said, "The world is going English, even the UN. It is time we have someone who is from the francophone world." At the same time, the Arab world, with their own prevailing problems, felt that it would be constructive if they had the head of the UN with an Arab background. Here, I suspect there was a convergence of interests between the francophone and the Arab world. But the politics of it also were that, as I understood, although the British were favorable at the beginning they soon developed cold feet about supporting someone with a background of nationalist involvement from a country rearing a fearless head in the rough-and-tumble of the world. And I think the French probably set on them as well. I never really knew what the position of the Americans was, although it must have been decisive, given their leadership role.

But, internally here, although there was a great push and sustained support by some, realism and other interests prevailed. Some people did not want me to go because they wanted me to stay in the country. There was an immediate job to be done here. Others would have said, "You are going away to the UN system? You are running away from the very pressing problems here?" So, whether by default or by machinations—and I myself, in process, did not warm up very strongly to the job, especially as by the time the votes were taking place my health was deteriorating somewhat and the rigors of the job imperceptibly became awesome. I hesitated, considering the unrelenting strain which would arise from playing the role of secretary-general in a sharply divided world. I knew the UN system well, considering, in particular, my work in UNCTAD and the UNDP. I also knew the specialized agencies and got along very well in Kenya, when I was representative of the UNDP there, with the ambassadors from different countries. But Boutros Boutros-Ghali was probably correct to say that I would have to speak English with a French accent!

TGW: So, after you were minister, you became senior minister, in what year?

BTGC: First I was minister for economic planning from 1980 to 1982. In 1982, I became minister of both finance and economic planning. Then I became senior minister of finance, with all the preparatory work and meetings. When I went to Geneva to act as president of UNCTAD VII, I was already senior minister.

TGW: How many senior ministers are there and do they form a sort of inner cabinet?

BTGC: Not so much an inner cabinet. You just had to keep a keen, even coordinating eye on the ministers who were related to development. So I kept a very close eye on the ministers of industry, commerce, transport, and agriculture. But not the ministers of education and health, those were more or less outside of my field. Then I chaired, of course, a number of

ministerial committees as senior minister, as I have already indicated in the course of this interview.

TGW: When did you leave government, and what was the immediate cause of that?

BTGC: I left government in 1995—April I think. Inevitable effects of long service, of hard work, and poor health, in the first place. I fell ill in October 1993 after attending so many meetings—World Bank, IMF, the Paris meetings, donor meetings, and so on. I was constantly on the move and dealing with endless problems when I came back home. One day I just collapsed in my office. That was the beginning of deterioration in 1993. In 1994, I had to go for specialist treatment overseas, but I never really fully recovered. By 1995 it was decided that I should have lighter duties, indeed I should rest. It also coincided with the period when we thought we needed to bring the private sector and stakeholders more into the development process. So, my successor, who had himself been a successful businessman, took over as finance minister.

But also by 1995 I was 68, and we felt that perhaps we needed change anyhow. But, I might add, it was also felt that I could do some re-thinking and some advisory work in government that might ease the shock of retirement! I was again becoming more like a civil servant, a consultant and advisor. I became an older nationalist and attending regularly meetings of the ruling party. But, basically, it was poor health and telling age and my own will. Some people say my spirit also went down anyhow after failing to get the job of Secretary-General, which would have been my apex, having done more than ten years at university, twenty in the UN, and fifteen in government.

TGW: But you remain active now. As you mention, you are spending half a day each day at the office doing economic research and writing.

BTGC: Yes, I remain active now because I am committed. This is a continuation of those early feelings that I had when I was in South Africa that I must go back home. I went to Canada. I said I must go back home to help my people. I went to Oxford. I felt I must join the struggle. Finally, I abandoned virtually everything in the house in Geneva to come home to join the struggle. And I think you can detect two trends here. One is what one might call inertia. You are used to doing certain things and your body must continue to do those same things. It is in a state of inertia. It's in the system. The other is a consciousness, an awareness at a given time that, for instance, if it was very difficult to carry out economic structural adjustment, it is very difficult to carry out retirement adjustment! You must do something. I think some companies prepare their senior people for a period of time to retire, so that they get used to retirement. I have no doubt in this regard that the government of Zimbabwe, the president of Zimbabwe, realized that this chap had been working twenty years in the UN non-stop, and then fifteen years in Zimbabwe. To just drop him would have been death for him. And I think that some of my colleagues were also interested that they should have some way of tapping on my experience. I don't interfere in ministerial duties, but there are often questions which arise where I can pick up the phone and call my colleagues and talk, or talk to the president. In other words, the arrangement that has been made is a very flexible one.

TGW: I'm sure they appreciate your wisdom after all this time.

BTGC: Well, I don't know whether it's wisdom or perhaps the mere fact of looking back without heat, stopping to ask questions, to reflect, and to project forward together.

TGW: One of the topics that we talked about at lunch was the topic of next year's *Human Development Report*: human rights. And actually, when I looked at your publication of 1960, *Partnership and Practice*, you emphasized way back then the notion of rights and

individual rights. Some people argue that this is indeed the most subversive idea that we have seen in the twentieth century. What is your own thought about human rights?

BTGC: This is something of a double-edged sword. You cannot have democracy which is not underpinned by human rights, the right of individuals to speak, to move and to associate freely, to be protected, to be active in society without fear. Yet, at the same time, you need to organize yourself in, say, political parties which require discipline. And you need to impose certain restrictions in order to buttress your independence. You have to recognize that in society there will always be individuals who want to work for the opposition or to destroy the structures. So, imposing limitations or instilling responsibility becomes necessary. Those limitations may impact negatively on human rights. The question uppermost in my mind is "who is for whom, or for what?" Man for human rights or human rights for man? I don't mean men in the sense of women and men; I am talking of human beings. Rights, like institutions, are to serve society and to serve human beings; and not the reverse.

I am generalizing, but to come back to what I think you wanted to raise, to assert for instance that freedom of speech is a human right. But freedom must also recognize certain obligations, limitations, duties. A right implies duty. If you become destructive, then I think society has a right to moderate your rights, to clip your wings for the purpose of maintaining unity of purpose, or to avoid self-destruction. A special example, the NGOs promote human rights. This is fine. But I think the rights of the individual should be seen or promoted jointly with the rights of the state. The state has rights and duties as well within which those of the individual are promoted and protected.

TGW: You mentioned that almost scandalous word, "NGO." Civil society clearly since the end of the Cold War has become the most important growth sector as much as corporations.

How do you see the evolution of civil society in Zimbabwe, and more generally, in the next ten or fifteen years? This has become a very dynamic element in the recent past. Where are we headed? And where is civil society headed in terms of a balance with the state?

BTGC: I cannot give an argument on Zimbabwe, as such, because we have certain peculiar developments, such as the urge on the part of some civic groups to change government for the sake of change. That role is not the main permanent role of NGOs. They have a development role to play. There may be a tendency for nongovernment organizations to become instruments of their countries, to promote the interests of their home countries, or to become agents of political parties. There may be a tendency on the part of some NGOs to operate as agents of multinationals or transnationals. I have seen an article, which I think was written by a Canadian, where the main complaint is about NGOs becoming the engines, or arms, of big companies because they get money which they can then use, curiously enough, for charitable purposes! So, nongovernmental organizations have proliferated. If they can remain in the areas of serving mankind without taking sides with political groups, they will serve a very useful purpose. But, if they become associated with eroding or opposing parties, they become part of a political system. They become political agents. And, I think, this would destroy or minimize their roles.

I hear that in some countries, including probably this country, NGOs speculate in foreign currency with the hard currency they get from overseas. They speculate with this money in the sense that, as at present in this country, people think that the Zimbabwe dollar is weak or may be devalued and that if an NGO has foreign currency, it would be more than tempted to wait to convert it into Zimbabwe dollars after devaluation so that it, the NGO or other civic group, gets

more Zimbabwe dollars to help more people! Just like speculators operate on the market. These things are being talked about. I hear morality and money can easily interact.

There has to be maintained a certain moral rectitude in NGOs and civic groups. They are an important instrument which can cut down on government bureaucracy—bureaucracy even in specialized agencies of the UN. It is argued, I fear correctly, that if you trace the various points where development money is spent until you come to the real target or project itself, a relatively small percentage will actually go to that project itself because there have been so many intervening stages—payments of intermediaries of experts; payment of this, payment of that, et cetera. Whereas NGOs, it is also argued, go straight to the project; they bypass certain market forces and civil government bureaucracy. That is a virtue but it is also a danger because the NGO's they may be promoting projects which are not those of government or which are even anti-government. Effective cooperation is essential.

Now, how will things evolve in Zimbabwe? We have launched a process of consultation. We have established a National Economic Consultative Forum, which meets fairly regularly. This includes representatives of the state, or government, as ministers or officials, the private sector, and elements of labor. But we are hoping that NGOs will have an input because they are agents of development. They live with the people. They know the people. But we have to bring them into the consultative forum so they are part and parcel of a national strategy, and they don't take short-cuts of their own and become divisive elements. I don't know whether we are going to achieve that.

TGW: It is exactly that same challenge, I believe, with the UN system as a whole, whether it is at the debate level in the General Assembly or at the operational level in development and humanitarian relief—that is, how to meld together nongovernment and

intergovernmental inputs. There are plusses and minuses of both, as you have clearly pointed out.

There was a question I thought of earlier. I wrote it down and just discovered it again. You spent much of your career working here on planning and, actually, also in the UN and in some of the commissions in which you participated. Many of the efforts resulted in setting up targets of one sort or another. I was looking at, for instance, the Secretary-General's millennium report, which sounds remarkably like the Stockholm Initiative memorandum, which set up targets such as primary education for all children, equal participation for boys and girls, reduction of child mortality. The only difference is, this was ten years ago and the Secretary-General comes along with more or less the same projections.

BTGC: I can think of the New International Economic Order, where it was agreed that one percent of GDP, or whatever it had, should go to aid. Yes.

TGW: My question is, what purpose do they serve? We are always aiming higher than we can achieve. But, in looking back at these various exercises in target-setting, is this a useful exercise?

BTGC: I think it is a useful exercise. It draws attention to the objective in measurable terms—time and quantity, the speed at which we must move. Otherwise, things are not oriented. You may achieve or you may not achieve the objectives, but you guide yourself. I drive, say, to Bulawayo, which is about 400 or 500 kilometers from here. I might set myself a target; let's say that I must reach Gweru, which is about halfway from here to Bulawayo, in two hours time. That helps me to see at what speed I must move and if I stop, how long I should stop in order to keep the target. I may not achieve the target of getting there in two hours, but at least there is something that urges me to remain within certain limits.

A plan is not a street map. Rather, it shows you the general points; it shows you that that is north and that is east, et cetera. You do not end up going in the opposite direction because you know where you are going if you follow the map. But it is not a street map where I can see what that building is and where to turn at what street corner and so on. I think Nyerere, in his book, puts this very well when he says it is a disciplining instrument. You may not attain the objectives, but at least you know how difficult the task is. If you take the New International Economic Order, it was an instrument to mobilize resources; a country must aim at, say, 0.7 percent of its GNP. And some countries have achieved those percentages; I think the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. Others have never come anywhere near that. But there was an orienting, disciplining exercise and also a measurement of our success or failure.

TGW: I am looking very much forward to reading your poetic autobiography, which you have told me is now called *The Migrant*. I just, as one final question, would like to ask you, what, in your view, are the main intellectual and main operational challenges before the UN system in the next decade?

BTGC: I think that some of the intellectual challenges would be to evolve a UN system in which voting as voting would be unnecessary except on matters of life and death, so to speak. We must attempt to reach decisions by consensus. This does mean reforming, in a sense, the Security Council, where power is in the hands of the few who make decisions. That is a challenge. It is a challenge which we need to think through. If we maintain the Security Council, can we democratize it? If we do, will it operate? We have to think through that. It becomes the cabinet, if you want, of a world government!

How can we deal with economic questions? Do we need an economic council? Because so far we have failed disastrously. We have the Economic and Social Council. It is a separate

organization from the Security Council, with separate membership. It debates issues, but it is not really the type of decision-making body at the world level, whose decisions, are binding on the countries and are implementable. I am thinking whether, in fact, we can emulate operations or the policy-making arrangements at the level of sovereign states by instituting organs of the UN where decisions are taken at high level and are legally binding. And I am thinking particularly of economic decisions.

There seems to be a real challenge. Do we want to think in terms of a sovereign international organization which will take binding decisions applicable to all, regardless—which will be a burden on the poor, on the small countries? Or do we want to pursue this idea which the Commission on Global Governance has been advocating, namely, that we have common norms and objectives, and view each other as neighbors, not members of a global government. We would live and work cooperatively, freely. But is that in the nature of man, or are we looking for angels? As countries, we are endowed with different resources and capacities in the world and are at different stages of development with different compositions of populations. You cannot avoid working in smaller groups, whether you call these groups single nations or groups of nations. Progressively, we have simply to surrender certain common functions to, say, the UN, to surrender them deliberately to the extent that we can. But not completely merging organizations to become an authoritarian regime or organ but maybe a facilitative instrument.

And, I think, if decision-making in such an organization can be facilitated by transmission of precise, correct objectives and information, speedier transmission of that information, and the availability of the technical instruments to communicate efficiently and without sectional interests—you may computerize the decisions in New York, or wherever it is—we may be nearing a global village with common objectives based on common mores and

good neighborly behaviors. Essential would be collection, analysis, and utilization of vital information at the level of the UN, which has relevance to the ordinary people or to which individuals, the civic groups, churches have access. These various groups are the instruments, but what material do they use? What access do they have to vital or really relevant information? How objective is the information which we get?

Another challenge—should the UN still remain an organ which is based on the voluntary participation of members? There is no obligation of membership. Should it become obligatory that everybody becomes a member, and under what circumstances? Or should the UN remain as it is, and how does this affect decisions? I don't know, really, but there is no doubt in my mind that we do need an organ like the United Nations. There is equally no doubt that it should not just become a forum of sovereign states. Other organs or organizations should have access, whether NGOs, universities, or other professional groups, not indirectly through other organizations which have their own problems, i.e., UNESCO (UN Educational, Social and Cultural Organization), UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), or FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization). More civic participation in the UN itself and the specialized agencies is what I am trying to underline.

TGW: Indeed, a big challenge. Is there a question that I should have asked, or that you wished that I had asked, that I did not, and that you would like to answer?

BTGC: Well, this exercise that you have undertaken, what exactly do you expect to come up with that is not already in other sources or found in other publications? What will be the distinct or critical result of this exercise?

TGW: We are hoping, as we have attached the label "future-oriented history of ideas," that, from this itinerary over the last fifty-five years, we will pick up some history of how ideas

emerged, how they were massaged, how they were lobbied for. The transmission belt between the idea, through the international institutions, a norm, and eventually a policy that is then implemented by governments, NGOs, corporations. There has been virtually no work on the relationship between ideas and international institutions. There has been a little work on ideas and foreign policy but almost none of ideas and international institutions. And, it is particularly difficult within the United Nations system because most people who work for the United Nations, or for long portions of their lives within the United Nations, write very little about their experiences. And the UN system itself has spent virtually no time or resources on building up an institutional memory. So we hope in some way to fill that lacuna.

BTGC: Yes. I can see this emerging more concretely and more systematically from the monographs you are doing because ideas would have been collected, analyzed, sifted and put together, discussed, accepted or rejected, and so on. Say, on money and finance, you would have come up with something more concrete. And it would have been done by authoritative individuals or institutions. And they would have consulted with others. But it is a little bit more difficult for me to see how, from interviews such as this one, ideas and the concepts were born or grew or were nurtured and what effects they have had on the UN, and how they might affect the future of the UN. My question relates to oral evidence. For example, I can summarize my own experience with regard to the UN. I began my work by studying policies, ideas, institutions, and history at the university. Studying to understand, not yet to perform. I then moved to the next stage where my understanding was tested by surveys of problems using the instruments that I had acquired, surveys in ECA such as *The Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discrimination*. I was using the instruments which I had learned—economic tools, social tools, psychological tools, budgetary tools—to see what emerges from this. Then this got translated

into practice in Kenya, at the level of an individual country. How do you translate these ideas, e.g., on duplication of social services in a discriminating society and the budgetary complications and use of resources which could have been more efficiently utilized elsewhere—how do you translate or relate this to the level of the UN, to its intellectual history?

I suppose there is some important link, working at the country level on projects, on government policies, with external organizations, bilateral or multilateral. I can see that. I can see how having moved from surveys at ECA to operational or concrete projects at the country level, the solid conclusion emerges that Kenya is not an island; it is operating in a world in which there are institutions, rules and regulations, which have been formulated in years past by bilateral or multilateral organizations or simply as colonial legacies. So, we want to reform the trade regime; we want to reform the monetary system; we want to reform the insurance regulations; we want to regularize commodity markets and so on. In other words, we were changing the rules and institutions to facilitate the actions of individual countries or groups, as in UNCTAD or WTO.

Seeing that all this will depend on the abilities of the individuals or countries to understand those institutions or practices, you say, well, the best thing to do is to develop and sharpen your human resources, the instrument by which the machinery of national governments and international bodies run. You need to have research and development. It is the only way you can operate efficiently in this existing system or modified systems. We are concerned about the world as a whole because new forces have come to the fore or they have grown out of certain activities, say globalization for instance. But how do you deal with that globalization? Now you have computer bugs and so on.

I know that I told you all this already, but I don't mind repeating it. I am not a pessimist or an optimist, as such. I wish to describe myself as a realist. And a realist is for me an amalgam of optimism and pessimism. And I believe that there are hardly any permanent parallel positions; they tend to merge. There are permutations. I fear one cannot have two opposites coexisting in parallel *ad infinitum*. It defies logic. I do not know how many millions of years the world has been in existence or man as a two-legged creature. But if we accept that man has a thinking capacity, and a loving capacity, and an emotional capacity, as well as a physical body, we reach the conclusion that there is no perfection.

TGW: Your alloy of optimism and pessimism is remarkable. You have had a remarkable life and career, and it has been my pleasure to spend these two days with you. I thank you very, very much.

BTGC: Well, I thank you for your patience with me and for the many words I have used. I hope we can sift the chaff from the grain at one point or another.

TGW: And make a good loaf of bread.

BTGC: Yes! Thank you so much.

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