

"Then and Now: Ralph Bunche and the Integrity of the International Civil Service"

Transcript of remarks made by James O.C. Jonah at the final Ralph Bunche Lecture Series at the Dag Hammarskjöld Auditorium on 5th February 2004

Moderator: (Sir Brian Urquhart). Thank you very much. I will try not to talk as much as I would like to say about this subject, but I just wanted to say before introducing James Jonah that I think Ralph Bunche got as near as anyone has to being a model international civil servant. And he was also a very outspoken champion of this ideal. U Thant, the third Secretary-General, wrote about him in his memoirs, "Bunche was an international civil servant in the true sense of the word." And I cannot think of anyone in the operational arm of the Secretariat dealing with political matters who was less nationalistic in his concept and in his approach to the problems. On the other side of the fence as it were Dean Rusk who actually said: "Now I know that you were a good international civil servant, I heard of Federenko's charge against you today—Federenko was a very vitriolic Soviet ambassador—and I also have many complaints about you, most recently, about some of the comments you made about United States policy in Santa Domingo."

Bunche was extremely resistant to pressure from outside, particularly from his own country the United States. He was also very insistent on the highest possible professional and ethical standards. And for those of us who were lucky enough to work with him this was an apprenticeship that was harder in the beginning. But later on we discovered that if one tries to live up to these standards life becomes easier rather than more difficult.

We are very lucky I think to have today James Jonah, a notable disciple of Ralph Bunche, who incidentally, has occupied I suppose a wider variety of senior post in the Secretariat than anybody I can think of. Everything from a very active party in the Middle East, to running the Personnel Office, to being the first head of the attempt to gather serious information in the Secretariat, and also as a under-secretary general for Political Affairs. But all of that did not distract James from the needs of his own country Sierra Leone, when that country really needed him. He was at one time the chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone and was virtually the chief Minister of the country through a very difficult period, and later on he was Finance Minister. Well, I have said enough and James please address the subject which you incidentally have always showed the greatest interest in—the International Civil Service.

James Jonah

Thank you Brian, I really felt a little inadequate to be here because I believe that you more than anybody else could have given this lecture on Ralph Bunche and the International Civil

Service. Furthermore, you have written, I think, the best biographies of the two colossi of the International Civil Service—Dag Hammarskjöld and Ralph Bunche. Nevertheless, I feel greatly honored that I have been asked to deliver this lecture.

I like the topic itself because it involves “Then and Now: Ralph Bunche and the Integrity of the International Civil Service.” I like the title because it will offer us some sense of perspective. I think in these days, even around the UN, you do need a lot of perspective. I have often been amused and bemused by so-called experts of the United Nations who make profound statements of the Organization when in fact their knowledge of the UN does not extend more than seven years in the Security Council; yet, they make statements about the UN which really cannot stand close scrutiny. It is also true that even today amongst the staff you find individuals who really have no idea of what the UN has gone through in the past. That’s why I like the topic, because when you look at Ralph Bunche’s life and time at the UN, you will see that he has experienced a great deal of the turmoil of the Organization. He witnessed the travail of the Korean War and the withdrawal of recognition of the Secretary-General by the Soviet bloc. Secretary-General Trygve Lie had antagonized the Soviet Union when he strongly supported United Nations action in Korea. Owing to the Soviet boycott of him, Trygve Lie gave instruction to all senior officials not to accept invitations extended by Soviet bloc countries. Needless to say, that made life for the senior Secretariat officials very difficult.

Ralph Bunche also witnessed a very tragic period in the history of the UN. I refer, of course, to the witch-hunters in the McCarthy period of 1952-1953. Make no mistake it was a difficult and painful period for the UN Secretariat. The McCarthy period was in my judgment the first serious challenge to the independence of the International Civil Service. Owing to the strong support of the staff and other member states the UN was able really to survive; but not until it had lost some of its best staff members. Ralph Bunche himself was distressed, following the death of a very brilliant Legal Counsel and international civil servant who was his friend. Mr. Abraham Feller was indeed a victim of that cruel attack on the International Civil Service.

The Congo crisis (1960-1964) represents yet another excruciating experience for the United Nations. I wrote a doctoral dissertation on the subject of peace keeping and peace making in the mid 1960’s. The Congo crisis formed a major part of my study. Without any hesitation I can say that I have not encountered a more difficult and complex operation in the annals of the Organization. Ralph Bunche from the outset of the crisis was the architect and principal driving force of the operation. More about this later. I cannot fail to mention Bunche’s decisive role in the Middle East crisis of 1967. A difficult time indeed when the Secretary-General had to respond to the request of the Egyptian government for the withdrawal of UNEF I from Sinai.

I used to have the privilege of being taught by both Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart, and in my over zealotness, there were times when I would rush to them about certain developments that have occurred. In my naiveté I would behave as if I had discovered something new. It was during such occasions that I learnt an expression from both of them. And the expression was "what else is new". And I think that as we survey current developments at the UN we have to say what else is new. The truth is there is not much that is new. The fundamentals of International politics remain the same. It is possible to argue that Ralph Bunche really came to the UN Secretariat almost by accident. He had been a distinguished scholar before the Second World War; he had proven himself in doing very good research on the mandate system of the French in Togoland and the French colonial rule in Dahomey. Accordingly, he was very well placed when the United States government was looking for an Africanist to assist them to know what was going on in the African Continent; particularly when allied troops were about to be deployed in North Africa. Ralph Bunche really came to the scene and proved that he was a true scholar and because of his performance and achievement he was later brought into the planning for the United Nations at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations in 1944. From domestic political reasons the trusteeship principles were never discussed at the Dumbarton Oaks talks. Nevertheless, Ralph Bunche made tremendous contribution in transforming the mandate system of the League system to the Trusteeship under the United Nations. At the San Francisco conference of 1945 Bunche almost single-handedly formulated the charter provisions of the Trusteeship system.

With his wealth of experience it was not surprising that the UN Secretariat needed his guidance. In the temporary absence of Victor Hoo, the Chinese UN assistance Secretary-General, Bunche came on temporary loan to the UN Secretariat on 22 April 1946 for six weeks as acting director of the Trusteeship department. The six weeks loan was prolonged and in the end, in December 1946, the Secretary-General, on the recommendation of Victor Hoo, requested the United States Government to release Ralph Bunche to become a permanent member of the Secretariat. So that's how he came to the UN. There had been earlier plans for Bunche to join the US delegation to the United Nations. Of course Bunche initially felt he was happy at the UN Secretariat because he did not want to go back to Washington due to Jim Crow; there was a very difficult racial problem in the City. But he did not stay in the UN only because of racism in Washington D.C. I will talk about that later on.

The first painful problem that faced Ralph Bunche and tested his commitment to the International civil service was the requirement by US law regarding the loyalty oath. In January 1953, in one of his last official acts President Truman issued Executive Order 10422, which required that every American citizen working for International Organizations must be subjected to a loyalty investigation. It was under that provision that Bunche on 25-26 May 1954 appeared before the loyalty board. Could you just imagine, in 1954, the man who had

been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize four years earlier because of his extraordinary achievement in the Rhodes armistice talks being brought before a loyalty board. But Ralph Bunche complied with US law and the full story is chronicled in Brian Urquhart's marvelous biography on Bunche. The irony of these developments was that just before the loyalty hearing Bunche was dining at the White House. So you can see the strange happening of that period. Happily, Bunche was vindicated. The charges against Bunche were based on false information by people who were either envious of him or did not like him. After Bunche was cleared, Hammarskjöld said, "Bunche has always had my unreserved confidence as a man of outstanding integrity. He is an honour to the organization he serves." Regrettably, Secretary-General Trygve Lie had not helped matters much. By allowing the FBI to conduct investigations on UN premises he thrust a dagger at the heart of the International Civil Service. It is of some interest that the compromises that were made in the UN Secretariat in New York were not tolerated in the Geneva office even among US nationals.

Fortunately, with the arrival of Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General he managed to get the FBI off the UN building. But the practice of sending the names of US candidates for employment to the US government for clearance continued. I am very happy to say that while I was head of the Office of Personnel Services in 1979-1982, with the assistance of my friend George Sadler who was then representing the United States in the 5th committee, we were able to end that practice.

During his tenure in the Secretariat, Ralph Bunche worked closely with three Secretaries-General—Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjöld, and U Thant. In each case, Bunche's early relations with them were reserved. Reading Brian Urquhart's biography on Bunche I reached the conclusion that Bunche did not think highly of Lie and that Lie, in turn was very jealous of the accomplishments of Bunche. Lie struck Bunche as lazy and vain. There were times when Lie was rude to Bunche but Bunche made no public complaint.

After a brief period, the relationship between Bunche and Hammarskjöld became exceedingly warm. They were intellectual soul-mates and Hammarskjöld trusted the judgment of Bunche. You have just heard what Brian Urquhart said about U Thant's deep respect for Bunche as an independent civil servant. It is clear that Bunche equally respected the integrity and steadfastness of U Thant although at times he could not fathom the mode of his spiritual thinking. In fact it is true to say that both men stayed longer in the UN Secretariat to support each other. One general last point on Bunche's relationship with the Secretaries-General. Bunche recognized that Trygve Lie could be self-serving and petty. A clear example was Lie's refusal to authorize the payment to Bunche the commensurate salary at the Mediator level. Of some significance is Bunche's preference for some pugnacity in a Secretary-General. When, on U Thant's return from his trip to the sub-continent in September 1965, Bunche

observed that he was somewhat rattled by Soviet Ambassador Federenko's criticism, Bunche had this to say "The Secretary-General is thin-skinned and takes attacks hard. So was and did Dag, but Dag Hammarskjöld was more of a fighter—he got angry and belligerent as well as hurt."

Bunche's concept of an independent civil service may appear to some as too rigid. To illustrate the point let me mention the initial reaction of Bunche when the announcement was made on 22nd September 1950 that he had won the Nobel Peace Prize. Believe it or not, his first reaction was to reject it. He knew the strict provisions of the staff regulations and rules. However, when he did consult the Secretary-General, he was urged to accept it. When Dag Hammarskjöld became the Secretary-General, Bunche recounted his dilemma and Lie's advice. Hammarskjöld made it clear to Bunche that he would not have advised him to accept the award. This is very interesting, because it was a kind of rigid concept of impartiality and integrity of the International Civil Service. Bunche himself came to be hesitant to nominate people for the Nobel Prize although he was under pressure many times to do so. Bunche made very few exceptions. One of them was his recommendation for Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld was given the Nobel Peace Prize posthumously.

Perhaps, Bunche realized the uniqueness of Dag Hammarskjöld. Bunche was in the hall of the General Assembly on 3 October 1960 when Dag Hammarskjöld refused to resign as Premier Khrushchev had demanded and went on to oppose Khrushchev's proposal of the Troika, which, in fact was the second serious challenge to the concept of an independent international civil service. In notes exchanged by both men at the Assembly, Bunche understood that had Hammarskjöld temporized, it would have been fatal for the UN.

It was not by happen-stance that Bunche remained totally committed to the United Nations Secretariat and the International Civil Service. Had he wanted to he could have left the UN and gone to greener pastures. Many will be surprised at the numerous offers made to Bunche while he was a staff member. On 21 April 1948 President Harry Truman sent Dean Rusk to New York to persuade Bunche to accept the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. Even with his strong academic credentials and his devotion to Harvard University, Bunche, because of pressure of events in the UN, was unable to take up the appointment as professor of Government that was announced on 27 1950 by Harvard University.

The demand for Bunche's talents and experience was bi-partisan within the United States. After Eisenhower was elected president, he offered Bunche the position of deputy to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at the US Mission to the United Nations. Noting that he loved his job in the Secretariat, Bunche politely declined. President Eisenhower returned to Bunche

in 1956 when the US Embassy in Vienna informed Bunche, who was in the city for the establishment of the IAEA, that the president wanted to appoint him as a member of the United States Commission on Civil rights. Bunche declined that appointment and stayed on in the Secretariat. Early June, 1960, Robert Kennedy went to see Bunche on behalf of his brother John Kennedy who was running for President. Bunche was asked to join the campaign as a foreign policy expert. Bunche declined with the observation that he had refused a similar offer from Adlai Stevenson when he was running for president in 1952. He preferred to stay at the United Nations. There were even attempts to coax Bunche to run for a US senate seat from New York.

Until I read Brian Urquhart's biography on Bunche I did not fully appreciate the advice given to me by Bunche on several occasions when I was tempted to leave the Secretariat to take up appointments outside the organization. When President Stevens assumed his duties he approached me to join his government on the basis of a prior understanding. When I sought Bunche's guidance on the matter, he urged me to stay on in the Secretariat. When President Stevens persisted I returned to Bunche with the proposition that I would go to Sierra Leone for a few years and then resume my service with the organization. Bunche explained to me that it would be better for me to remain as an international civil servant. I can say in retrospect that the advice given to me by Bunche was sound and I have never regretted staying on in the secretariat continuously for over 30 years.

Let me now draw your attention to an aspect of Bunche's life and time as an international civil servant that has caused some confusion. Bunche was a valued member of a small group of senior secretariat officers that Dag Hammarskjöld regularly consulted on policy towards the Congo and the exchange of cables and directions on political, military, and civil administration. Besides Bunche, there were two other senior American officials in the group that became known as the "Congo Club"—Andrew Cordier and Henry Labouisse. As Brian Urquhart observed the "Congo club" became a favorite target of Soviet abuse during a high point in the cold war. Brian Urquhart was also correct when he remarked that the Congo problem was a major test of the authority and independence of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat. Bunche, as the first senior secretariat official in the Congo at the outset of the crisis, passed the test with flying colours. His task was not easy. Bunche clashed with General von Horn, ONUC commander, over the use of force. Gen. von Horn did not readily grasp the political role of peace-keeping. He wanted to use force while Bunche believed in resolving problems by patient negotiations. But even a patient Ralph Bunche could find the going rough when dealing with the mercurial Prime Minister of the Congo, Premier Lumumba. Bunche could not agree to the request of Lumumba that his government should take charge of the Leopoldville airport. In his anger, Lumumba refused to meet with Bunche to discuss the matter further. Bunche, having realized his usefulness was in question, asked to return to headquarters in

New York. He was replaced as the SRSG by Rajeshivar Dayal. Prior to the arrival of Dayal in the Congo, Andrew Cordier, the executive assistant to the Secretary General, arrived in Leopoldville on 1 September 1960 to relieve Bunche.

Bunche had come under criticism for his membership in the "Congo Club" as well as his activities in the Congo when he served as the Special representative of the Secretary-General. At the initial stage of the Congo operation, Bunche was obliged to work closely with US Ambassador Timberlake. That, of course, made the Soviet Union suspicious. But Bunche was always conscious of his role as an independent Civil Servant of the United Nations. One writer has remarked that "on occasion Bunche made decisions as an international civil servant which Timberlake opposed."

It is true that Dag Hammarskjöld relied heavily on Bunche, Cordier, Labouisse and Wieschoff—all Americans. Perhaps, Hammarskjöld was overly confident that others would respect their status as International Civil Servants. Urquhart quoted one US official as observing during a difficult period in the Congo Crisis that these Americans "tended to show more resistance towards suggestions coming from the United States than from any other sources."

Despite his difficulties with Premier Lumumba, Bunche was saddened when he learnt of his murder in Katanga in February 1961. Yet, in a demonstration by African-Americans in the Security Council following the death of Lumumba, Bunche was criticized, along with Dag Hammarskjöld and Ambassador Stevenson, as a stooge of the white man. The record will clearly show that Bunche, during his involvement in the Congo, never deviated from his obligation as an International Civil Servant. He went to great length to preserve his impartiality and objectivity. For example, in his first visit to Katanga, he realized he would have to rely on the code facilities of the Belgian officials to communicate with Hammarskjöld who was remaining in Leopoldville. Bunche quickly arranged to communicate with Hammarskjöld by a pre-arranged code system. In the end, of course, the arrangement caused some confusion with the UN team in Leopoldville but the Belgians had no clue of what Bunche was reporting to Hammarskjöld.

Significantly, the constant attack on the "Congo Club" began to worry some of its members. In September 1960, Labouisse refused to remain as a fourth member of Hammarskjöld's directorate on Congo affairs on the grounds that Hammarskjöld had too many senior American Assistants already. Bunche himself tendered his 'formal resignation' to Hammarskjöld on 27 June 1961; it was not acted upon. Other changes followed. Cordier was moved out of Hammarskjöld's executive office. Three Africans—Robert Gardner of Ghana, Francis Nwokedi of Nigeria and Taeb Sahbani of Tunisia—came into the picture.

Hopefully, I have been able to debunk the mythology of the “Congo Club” as an instrument of the United States in its clash with the Soviet Union in the Congo crisis. The debate about the “Congo Club” has led me to re-examine my own contacts with the major powers during my service with the United Nations. I am aware that at times I was perceived by some colleagues as leaning too much to one major power or the other. The truth is rather simple. Apart from the requirement that International Civil Servants should not receive or act on advice from member states there is no constraint on close cooperation with member states when they are pursuing common policy as approved by the organs of the organization. Accordingly, while engaged in peace-making and peace-keeping efforts of the UN I cooperated closely with one or the other of the permanent members of the Security Council. But cooperation does not mean taken instructions even if some may perceive it as one and the same thing. Frankly, in all my years at the UN Secretariat I cannot recall either the United States government or any other member states insisting that I do as I am told. Arguably, I can affirm that until the mid-1980's the major western powers did respect the independence and international character of the Secretariat.

As a central figure in the first generation of international civil servants under the UN Charter, Bunche was conscious of his responsibility to help train or acculturate the second generation of international civil servants. This may explain why, despite his very busy daily schedule, Bunche found time to educate me. My regret is that I often did not grasp the message he was endeavoring to convey to me. One instance was when one day he asked his secretary to call me to come up to his office. I was then having my office on the 35th floor. Upon my arrival in Bunche's office on the 38th floor, he informed me that I should accompany him to the first floor. When we exited the elevator I noticed a crowd of spectators. Bunche introduced me to a baseball player who turned out to be Jackie Robinson. Bunche had arranged a ceremony on his behalf and I sat through that ceremony without grasping what it all meant. It was only after I had read Urquhart's biography on Bunche that I finally understood what Bunche wanted me to experience. Bunche and Jackie Robinson shared common views about race relations in America. At a time of black power and calls for revolution, they believed in moderation and integration.

With respect to the Secretariat as a whole, Bunche had strong commitment to staff welfare and advancement. Let me cite two cases mentioned in Urquhart's biography on Bunche. The case of Mr. Pove Bang-Jensen was a deputy secretary of the Special Committee on Hungary which was established to deal with the refugees arising out of the 1956 Hungarian revolt. He had kept a secret list of some of these refugees and refused to turn the list over to senior secretariat officials including the Secretary General himself. As a man full of idealism, Bang-Jensen kept the list secret on the grounds that he had assured the refugees that their names would be kept secret with him. Bang-Jensen unfortunately did violate his obligations to the

Secretary-General and something had to be done. Dag Hammarskjöld authorized a number of investigations and other procedures to make it easy for Bang-Jensen to change his mind. When all these efforts failed, Hammarskjöld turned to Bunche in August 1957 and requested him to look into the case. Even Bunche was not able to resolve the matter and the Secretary-General was obliged to dismiss Bag-Jensen from the UN Secretariat. Sadly Bang-Jensen disappeared from his home on 23 November 1959 and three days later was found dead in Alley Pond Park in Queens.

The second case has a comical side to it. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that such an event could have happened in the United Nations Secretariat. But it did happen. It came to Bunche's knowledge in July 1952, that a black staff member named Edith Jones was being dismissed from the Secretariat on orders from the Secretary-General himself. Her crime was that she was dating a young man from Norway; his parents had complained to the Secretary-General and he had then given the dismissal order. Incensed, Bunche confronted Trygve Lie and had the dismissal rescinded.

The third case, in which I was involved and is not mentioned in Bunche's biography, concerns an Egyptian lady who was working on the 38th floor. She had gone to see Bunche about problems she was having with a very "powerful" senior official also on the 38th floor. Bunche told me that he could not discuss the matter with his colleague and had therefore advised the staff member to go to the Appeals Board. What Bunche wanted me to do was to act as her counsel as I was a member of a panel of counsels. I was warned by members of the office of personnel that I would damage my career at the UN if I decided to represent the staff member. Given my full confidence in Bunche I took the case and happily we won the case and she got her promotion. Obviously, the incidence did not adversely affect my standing in the Secretariat.

Bunche's role in the Middle East Crisis of 1967 has been controversial. As the key advisor to U Thant he was blamed by some for wrongly advising U Thant to accede to the request of President Nasser to withdraw UNEF I from Sinai. Urquhart's biography has covered fully the circumstances that guided Bunche and U Thant. Because I initially thought that diplomatic means should have been used to convince the Egyptian government to change its mind, I discussed my views with Bunche. I did discover what Urquhart has related. Both U Thant and Bunche exhausted every possibility to avert the war which came in June 1967. The Egyptian government was so convinced that Bunche had made a blunder that U Thant was advised not to take Bunche with him on the Secretary-General's trip to Cairo to meet with Nasser. But Bunche was not discouraged. He continued as the trusted adviser of U Thant on the Middle East and other matters and to the end he shared the deep regret of U Thant that the Secretary-General's role in the crisis had been so misunderstood.

While Bunche was conscious of his rank in the Secretariat and the privileges that went with it, he was equally aware of its responsibilities. It was that balancing act that constrained Bunche's involvement in the civil Right's Movement as he would have wished to be. In a eulogy delivered at Bunche's funeral service by Roy Wilkins at the Riverside Church on 11 December 1971, Mr. Wilkins said this of Bunche:

"...He conceived it to be a matter of honor not to allow his title or his activities in the United Nations to intrude in any official way into the internal affairs of a member nation—the United States of America."

But make no mistake. Bunche was totally committed to the Civil Rights struggle in the U.S. Ralph Bunche was a member of the Board of Directors of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). He was in close touch with the leading Civil Rights leaders and he joined Martin Luther King in the march on Washington D.C.

I would hazard a guess, perhaps with some trepidation, that Bunche would be dumb-founded by the use of information technology in world affairs in general and in the Secretariat in particular. I say this because he often cautioned me against rushing to the press. Bunche was famous for his restraint in his public statements. Urquhart quoted the comments of a young US Marine Officer, F.P. Henderson, on how Bunche conducted the six-week Armistice Negotiations at Rhodes. Hendersen said, *inter alia*,

"throughout the negotiations Bunche held no press conference and made no public statements or announcements, and delegations also observed his wishes on this."

In a departure from the usual practice, Bunche effectively used a press conference in defense of U Thant's role in the Middle East Crisis of 1967.

That the Secretariat would employ officials who are better known as 'spin doctors' would have troubled Ralph Bunche. Obviously, the United Nations should utilize the new information technologies to win wider support for the Organization. But great caution should be observed. Anyone who has followed the saga of Mr. Alastair Campbell in his quarrel with the BBC in the case of Dr. Kelley's death will not fail to comprehend that 'spin doctors' cannot be the best or proper custodians of the soul or integrity of any organization.

From all that I have said, it is my judgment that were Bunche here with us today he would be disappointed with the current erosion of the concept of the International Civil Service. My judgment is reinforced by the discussions with regarding the nature of the International Civil

Service. Shortly after I became acquainted with him in mid-1960's I sought his views of Hammarskjöld's Oxford speech of 30 May 1961 on the topic "The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact." Bunche immediately affirmed his full agreement with Hammarskjöld. He added that the speech could not be improved upon because the Secretary-General had said it all. Bunche also expressed confidence that the views expressed in that speech would remain relevant for a very long time. It has been my constant practice to return to that Oxford speech as often as I can. I have the text here with me and I hope it will be read again and again by all.

Of course, there are those who are anxious to assert that while the concept of the International Civil Service may have been an excellent idea in the past, it now has no practical significance. I personally disagree with this latter cynical view and for the following reason. As you may be aware Hammarskjöld was prompted to make that speech because of what Walter Lippman reported as being the views of the Soviet premier Krushchev. Krushchev was reported to have said that "while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men." Let me quote in full a section of Hammarskjöld's speech that may ring true today. He observed,

"the attitude which the article reflects is one which we find nowadays in many political quarters, communist and non-communist alike, and it raises a problem which cannot be treated lightly. In fact, it challenges basic tenets in the philosophy of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, as one of the essential points on which these experiments in international cooperation represent an advance beyond traditional 'conference diplomacy' is the introduction on the international arena of joint permanent organs, employing a neutral civil service, and the use of such organs for executive purposes on behalf of all the members of the organizations. Were it to be considered that the experience shows that this radical innovation in international life rests on a false assumption, because 'no man can be neutral', then we would be thrown back to 1919, and a searching re-appraisal would become necessary."

Hammarskjöld went on to clarify that an International Civil Servant need not be neutral on moral and ethical principles but must always be impartial in his or her conduct. In his conclusion Hammarskjöld sounded a warning that should be heeded today. He warned that

"to abandon present efforts in the direction of internationalism symbolized by the international civil service—somewhat surprisingly regarded as a cause of tension—might, if accepted by the member nations, well prove to be the Munich of International Cooperation as conceived after the first World War and further developed under the impression of the tragedy of the Second World War."

Finally, there are those who maintain that Hammarskjöld's ruminations are no longer relevant or realistic in an international community of one super-power. I do not believe that Bunche would have accepted such as surrender. We have an inkling as to what might be Hammarskjöld's view on the matter. Urquhart recounted an incident in which Bunche was asked by Dean Rusk to convey to Hammarskjöld, then in the Congo, the unhappiness of President Kennedy with the action of the UN in Katanga. President Kennedy asserted the right of the United States to have been consulted before the United Nations took drastic action in Katanga. Bunche conveyed to Dean Rusk the anticipated response from Hammarskjöld, but passed on the message to the Secretary-General anyway. Hammarskjöld's re-action was swift and with his own words I will conclude this lecture. Hammarskjöld asserted,

"what a page in UN history...it is better for the UN to lose the support of the US because it is faithful to law and principles than to survive as an agent whose activities are geared to political purpose never avowed or laid down by the major organs of the UN."

Thank you very much.